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ABSTRACT 
Farmer access and financial performance are used as 
criteria to evaluate major farm credit schemes and lenders 
within the formal sector in Kenya. A non-mathematical model 
is constructed to demonstrate the interaction of political 
and financial factors in determining the performance of the 
farm credit system according to these criteria. The model 
identifies why and how major government initiatives in farm 
credit provision so frequently have been disappointing by 
either or both of these criteria. The questions of access 
to credit, the relevance of credit to on-farm innovation, 
and the ability of credit to stimulate agricultural pro- 
duction are also related through the model. 
The performance of the system is viewed from the per- 
spective of financial repression and its effect on the 
development of financial structure. The hypotheses explored 
in the study demonstrate the applicability of elementary 
capital market and financial theory to Kenya's agricultural 
credit system. The model derived from these hypotheses 
highlights the constraints to financial development, in terms 
of farmer access and the financial viability of agricultural 
loan portfolios, imposed by the peculiar set of assumptions 
upon which government intervention in credit provision, 
often with the support of external donors, is based. 
The model is derived largely from the malfunctioning of 
major elements in Kenya's farm credit system, which has been 
the most visible fact of theoretical and operational interest. 
However, its validity is confirmed by the explanatory power 
of the framework it offers for the analysis of the outstanding 
success of the cooperative structure in rural financial inter- 
mediation in the early 1970's. 
The Repayment Index, which makes its d¬but in this 
study, is applied in two concluding exercises as a social 
science research tool and as a credit management tool. 
Borrowers' repayment performance may be precisely quantified 
and ranked in terms of Repayment Index values. Rigorous 
statistical treatment of repayment performance, including 
correlation with borrower, farm and loan characteristics, 
is possible using Repayment Index values. These values also 
furnish a basis for loan administration decisions and for the 
comparison of the performance of loan portfolios, credit 
decisions and decision makers, and of other managerial 
variables within the lender's control. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A. Summary and Conclusion 
Kenya's agricultural credit system is characterised by 
lender's specialisation for the provision of financial services 
to various classes of farmers. Short and medium term cooperative 
credit is available to smallholder growers of certain cash crops. 
Long term credit is provided by the settlement authorities for 
settlement scheme farmers. The commercial banks lend on a short 
and medium term basis to viable large farms and to small farmers 
established in the cash economy through off-farm employment or as 
substantial producers of cash crops. The Agricultural Finance 
Corporation (AFC) provides medium and long term funds to virtually 
all of the large scale sector owned by Kenyans, and also issues 
medium term loans for specific enterprises on smallholdings in 
areas where the land is registered. The Cereals and Sugar Finance 
Corporation (C&SFC) raises funds in the local money market for short 
term finance for large scale wheat and hybrid maize producers, and 
various sources, such as the Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA), 
merchant banks and finance companies, and the Kenya Farmers' 
Association (KFA) provide either narrowly limited or small amounts 
of agricultural credit to their established clientele. 
How did this diversity arise? How may the various speciali- 
sations and, equally importantly, the gaps in availability of 
credit to Kenya's agriculture, be explained? What are the con- 
straints which limit the interaction of the agricultural sector 
and the financial sector, and is there any scope for their removal? 
This study approaches these questions within the framework 
of political economy, directing its attention to questions of 
financial market theory, elementary aspects of financial logic, 
and the nature and quality of government intervention. Agri- 
cultural technology, the risks of farming, rates of return in 
agriculture and other factors beyond the control of lenders and 
farm credit policymakers are accepted as given. This is not to 
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say that credit cannot alter any of these factors, nor does it 
imply that lenders are necessarily fully informed of the financial 
implications of the realities of agricultural production. Rather, 
it merely facilitates examination of financial aspects of the farm 
credit system and the measures taken by government to shape this 
system. 
While financial logic and capital market theory alone are 
insufficient to explain the state of farm credit in Kenya, 
consideration of the political constraints within which much of 
the farm credit system has been structured provides the basis 
for a political-financial model which offers an explanation for 
the problems encountered by lenders and the malfunctioning of 
the system. These problems include the necessity of rationing 
credit stringently and hence restricting rural access to credit 
and also to other financial services; the difficulty in achieving 
financially viable levels of agricultural loan portfolio per- 
formance; the isolation of specialised lenders from the broader 
financial market; poor loan discipline characterised by borrowers' 
delinquency, deceit and diversion of loan proceeds; and the 
necessity facing lenders of taking into account political 
considerations in their credit policy making and loan decision 
making. 
The farm credit system in Kenya conforms to the pattern 
associated with financial repression, manifested in low interest 
rates and intervention in financial markets to correct the effects 
of low interest rates and to channel to agriculture funds which 
would otherwise not be forthcoming. The particular type of inter- 
vention which has been undertaken has not been oriented towards 
providing incentives to enhance the spontaneous development of 
financial markets in socially acceptable directions. Intervention 
has been direct and therefore not possessing very much flexibility. 
Where intervention has been massive, as with respect to the 
financial arrangements of settlement agriculture, loan arrears 
have grown to be massive, too, and initial expectations embodied 
in farm plans have been made to appear ludicrous. Where inter- 
vention has been out of touch with rural financial markets or 
the potential for such markets, as in the case of the Agri- 
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cultural Finance Corporation, there has been little dynamic 
impact on rural development, institutional self-sufficiency 
and viability have yet to be demonstrated after more than a 
decade, external assistance and national subvention are relied 
upon as engines of growth, and benefits have been distributed 
narrowly rather than broadly and comprehensively. Both of 
these major manifestations of intervention have involved the 
intensive rationing of credit, providing a restricted number of 
borrowers with lots of credit, relative to their debt capacities. 
The results, in terms of portfolio performance, conform to 
financial logic. 
Kenya's pluralism has permitted it to experiment, however, 
and one result has been the very promising start of a reformed 
rural cooperative banking system based on substantial public 
sector support and supervision, and on the traditional cooperative 
functions of providing marketing channels for 
cash crops and supplying certain farm inputs. 
very good example of financial liberalisation 
to farmers growing cash crops, the experience 
banking system between 1972 and 1975 suggests 
for an alternative, market oriented approach 
aspects of rural development. 
B. Hypotheses to be Tested 
certain smallholder 
While not really a 
and while limited 
of the cooperative 
considerable scope 
to the financial 
The analytical focus of this paper is on the interaction 
between the financial sector and the agricultural sector. The 
general concern is rural development and the extent to which it 
may be hindered, enhanced or otherwise influenced by the relation- 
ships which exist between the two sectors. A set of related 
hypotheses are used to develop the position taken in this paper, 
and these are listed below organised according to topic. 
Individual hypotheses are listed again, primarily in Chapter V, 
in the sections in which they are confirmed or discarded. 
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1. a) Public policy designed ostensibly to stimulate rural 
development through the provision of credit to farmers on 
"reasonable" terms in Kenya has in fact led to distortions 
in credit allocation by the formal sector which are dys- 
functional to rural development. 
b) Public policy has contributed to imperfections and 
deficiencies in the organisation of formal financial 
markets in Kenya. 
c) Public policies relating to farm credit have worked 
against the interests of small farmers in the competition 
for scarce credit in Kenya. 
2. a) A concept of the "need" for farm credit permeates 
relevant public policy in Kenya. 
b) The concept of credit need is based upon political 
concern in Kenya. 
c) The concept of credit need diverges sufficiently from 
the financial concept of debt capacity that it results in 
a questionable use of credit in an attempt to stimulate 
rural development in Kenya. 
d) Public policy orientation in Kenya, as manifested by 
the "need creed, " supports the fragmentation of financial 
markets. 
3. Public policy in Kenya, as embodied in "low" interest 
rates and the resulting impediments to financial market 
integration, restricts the supply of funds available for 
lending to farmers. 
4. a) The restricted supply of private domestic resources for 
agricultural credit in Kenya reinforces the requirement 
that lenders ration credit. 
b) Farm credit in Kenya is rationed according to commercial 
and political criteria. 
c) Credit rationing by the public sector in Kenya is not 
based on careful considerations of optimal resource use. 
d) Farm credit rationing in Kenya works to the disadvantage 
of the small scale farm sector in the competition for loans. 
e) Interest rates in the market for formal farm credit in 
Kenya play virtually no role in allocating credit among 
borrowers or loan applicants. 
5. a) The nature of public sector involvement in the farm 
credit market in Kenya is conducive to poor loan repayment 
performance. 
b) Poor repayment performance hinders the development of 
agricultural credit institutions in Kenya. 
c) Repayment performance on agricultural loans in Kenya 
varies directly with the borrower's commitment to farming. 
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5. d) Repayment performance on agricultural loans in Kenya 
varies inversely with loan size within any given credit 
scheme. 
e) Repayment performance on agricultural loans in Kenya 
varies. inversely with the borrowers' net worth. 
f) Poor payers include practically all borrowers who 
obtained funds under politically based credit rationing 
criteria in Kenya. 
6. A partial departure from the mainstream public sector 
farm credit policy in Kenya, embodied in cooperative savings 
and credit experience involving smallholder growers of cash 
crops, has yielded relatively satisfactory operating results 
consistent with the theory of financial liberalisation and 
has increased access to financial services in rural areas. 
C. Def init ions 
Certain specialised terms are used in this paper, and certain 
lay terms are used in a specialised sense. To identify more pre- 
cisely the paper's subject matter and the concepts it develops, 
key words are defined below, in alphabetical order. Definitions 
specific to Kenyan agriculture, such as what constitutes large 
scale and small scale farms, are given in Chapter I. 
Agricultural credit refers to loans in cash or kind issued 
directly to farmers. The term is used synomously in this paper 
with farm credit. It does not include credit to those who 
facilitate the flow of goods and services to and from the agri- 
cultural sector, such as crop finance for the purchase of 
harvested produce. Agricultural credit is usually provided 
for three ostensible purposes: 
l 
1) To accord access to or control over basic factors of 
production, primarily land. 
2) To increase production through the development of 
resources. This process involves mainly the application 
of capital and labour to land. 
3) To facilitate commercial transactions, including the 
purchase of seasonal inputs. 
1. Donaldson, G. F., and J. D. Von Pischke, "A Survey of Small 
Farm Credit in Kenya, " Small Farmer Credit in Kenya. Vol. VII. 
AID Spring Review of Small Farmer Credit. Washington, DC, Agency 
for International Development, February 1973. pp. 9- 10. 
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The distinction between 2) and 3) frequently depends upon the 
source of credit. The purchase of machinery or water tanks, for 
example, could occur under either heading. If the supplier issued 
the credit, heading 3) could apply. If a bank made the loan, 
heading 2) would be appropriate. Whatever the purpose for which 
credit is provided, it may be difficult or impossible to identify 
its impact because credit is fungible, part of an undifferentiated 
cash flow. In addition, agricultural production by smallholder 
households is typically only partially commercialised, implying 
that decisions relating to production and consumption are in- 
extricably mixed. 
I 
Financial innovation is used here as defined by Cameron and 
Patrick, to refer to "the introduction and utilisation of new 
financial techniques and institutions. "2 On a historical basis 
all of the means of payment and financial instruments currently 
in use were innovations in technique at an earlier stage of 
financial development, as were present day financial institutions. 
In Kenya's recent financial history the Cooperative Savings Scheme 
and the Cooperative Production Credit Scheme are examples of 
innovation on both the institutional and technical sides. Other 
examples include the national currency and Central Bank and the 
appearance of finance companies and of specialised institutions to 
channel funds to various sectors of special development priority 
as perceived by Government. 
Financial markets refer to markets dealing in financial 
assets, primarily debt instruments. Van Horne provides a useful 
definition of financial assets: 
3 
Unlike real, or tangible assets, a financial asset is 
a claim on some other financial unit. It does not pro- 
vide its owner with the physical services that a real 
asset does. Instead, financial assets are held as a 
store of value for the return that they are expected 
to provide. 
1. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 
Agricultural Credit through Cooperatives and Other Institutions. 
Rome, FAO, 1965. pp. 1-2. 
2. Cameron, Rondo, and Hugh T. Patrick, "Introduction, " in 
Cameron, Rondo, et al.. Banking in the Early Stages of Indus- 
trialization. New York, Oxford University Press, 1967. p. S. 
3. Van Horne, James C., Function and Analysis of Capital Market 
Rates. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1970. p. 1. 
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A market is commonly defined as relationships between buyers and 
sellers, and also as a mechanism for bringing potential buyers 
and potential sellers together. This mechanism and set of re- 
lationships include institutions and individuals acting as inter- 
mediaries and specialising in certain types of financial trans- 
actions. Myint characterises well developed financial markets as 
consisting of a financial centre which attracts resources from 
domestic and external sources and of a financial network which 
links the centre with lenders and borrowers throughout the economy. 
l 
Rural financial markets are those in which rural people are 
active. Their participation may be as buyers or as sellers or 
as both buyers and sellers. Rural financial markets are not 
necessarily wholly rural institutions, and will frequently 
function as a link between rural cash flows and those of the 
larger economy. Such interdependence is natural. The seasonal 
nature of much rural economic activity implies marked variations 
in the liquidity absorbed by or available within the rural sector 
at different times of the year, and this periodic variation is in 
fact a primary raison d'dtre for financial markets linking rural 
and non-rural economic units. 
Financial markets are frequently referred to as capital 
markets, but the latter term is avoided in this paper in the 
interest of precision. Capital is a broad and somewhat esoteric 
concept which encompasses a variety of specialised meanings. 
For example, in the financial context capital markets are markets 
dealing in financial assets having a maturity in excess of one 
year, while money markets specialise in short term financial 
assets. 
2 
The subtle relationships between various types of 
capital need not be explored if the term capital market is 
discarded, and no loss of clarity need occur. 
1. Myint, H., "Dualism and the Internal Integration of the 
Underdeveloped Economies, " Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly 
Review. XCIII, 93, June 1970. p. 138. 
2. Van Horne, James C., opcit., P. 12. This distinction and 
the possibility of confusion is noted in Perera, Philips, Develop- 
ment Finance: Institutions, Problems and Prospects. New York, 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. p. 83; and in Williams, David, "The 
Growth of Capital and Securities Markets, " Finance and Development. 
III, 3, September 1966. p. 213. 
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Financial repression is defined as the imposition of 
policies which restrain the rate of growth of financial assets 
in real terms. The phrase has two connotations. The first is 
that the degree of restraint is substantial, exceeding, for 
example, the level of retardation which would ordinarily be 
associated with anti-inflationary measures used by monetary 
authorities in a highly developed economy. The second is that 
the source of financial repression is government, as manager of 
the money supply, as a major borrower, spender and investor, and 
as the regulatory authority over financial institutions. 
No precise definition of financial repression is given by 
Shaw or McKinnon, the writers who have popularised the term. 
The definition given above is based on their observations, 
including an example given by McKinnon: 
1 
Organised banking has a sorry record in penetrating the 
economic hinterland of less developed countries, in 
serving rural areas in general, and in serving small 
borrowers in particular. Bank credit remains a financial 
appendage of certain enclaves: exclusively licensed 
import activities, specialised large scale mineral ex- 
porters, highly protected manufacturing, large inter- 
national corporations, and various government agencies, 
such as coffee marketing boards or publicly controlled 
utilities. Even ordinary government deficits on current 
account frequently pre-empt the limited lending resources 
of the deposit banks. Financing of the rest of the 
economy must be met from the meagre resources of money- 
lenders, pawnbrokers, and cooperatives. It is this 
phenomenon that I call "financial repression. " 
In other words, financial repression is manifested by a financial 
mechanism in which modern, large scale financial in 
follow rationing criteria which deny access to non-modern, non- 
large scale economic units. Shaw provides a thumbnail economic 
explanation of the mechanism of financial repression: 
2 
... the techniques of financial repression... are simple 
but numerous, widely known, and widely practiced. The 
1. McKinnon, Ronald I., Money and Capital in Economic Development. 
Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1973. p. 68. 
2. Shaw, Edward S., Financial Deepening in Economic Development. 
New York, Oxford University Press, 1973. p. 80. 
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principle that guides them is to establish unattractive 
yields on domestic financial assets and so to repel 
demand. 
The operation or dynamics of financial repression are 
explored in detail within the Kenyan context in this paper, and 
in this context it is held that financial repression is based on 
an unrealistically low level of interest rates which works to 
the disadvantage of most of the rural population in two ways: 
by failing to stimulate investment in non-cash financial assets 
and hence failing to mobilise rural savings; and by failing to 
provide a level of remuneration to financial institutions 
commensurate with the costs of small transactions and the risks 
of lending to small scale agriculture, hence discouraging these 
institutions' entry into the small scale economy of rural areas, 
completing the circle of non-interaction. Shaw asserts that 
"the subsidised loan rate represents repression at its worst, "1 
and it is easily demonstrated that most formal lending to the 
agricultural sector in Kenya involves some element of subsidy. 
Formal credit is used in this paper to refer to finance 
provided by organisations having a formal charter registered 
with the appropriate government agency, and dealing in a more 
or less impersonal and commercial way with written evidences of 
indebtedness, frequently on a large scale. The providers of 
formal credit include the "modern financial sector" in developing 
countries. Formal credit is usually subject to a relatively sub- 
stantial amount of government control. Financial repression is 
the result of restrictive policies functioning through the 
operations of intermediaries issuing formal credit. 
Widely used terms which are more or less synonomous with 
formal credit include institutional credit, organised credit and 
modern credit. These alternatives are avoided in this paper on 
grounds ranging from convenience to accuracy. Institutional 
credit is probably in general not a bad compromise derived from 
the term financial institution, but is at variance with the 
1. Ibid., p. 87. 
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meaning of institution in its broad sociological sense of 
being an organised way of doing things. Informal credit 
(see below) arrangements such as rotating credit associations 
are indeed institutions in many societies, and the highly 
institutionalised nature of many rural societies provides the 
basis for misinterpretation if the term institutional credit 
is used synonomously with formal credit in discussions dealing 
with rural development. 
Organised credit is a gross misrepresentation, implying 
that informal credit arrangements are not organised or perhaps 
even in disarray. In fact, traditional (in the folk or socio- 
logical sense) financial delivery systems are frequently as 
intricate as the societies which developed them. 
1 
To regard 
these as lacking in organisational structure or cohesion is 
erroneous both on a comparative basis -- between different types 
of societies today -- and on an historical basis, as apparent 
from the evolution of finance. 
2 
Use of the term organised in 
this inappropriate and misleading sense may be just another 
manifestation of what may be lightly termed the "pre-development 
blank slate assumption. " Under this assumption nothing of 
economic interest or financial consequence occurred before the 
advent of some "organised" reference date, such as the arrival 
of modernity in the form of colonial or post-revolutionary 
institutions, the start-up of some development project or the 
establishment of a certain regulatory authority, etc. 
Modern credit is a harmless phrase, a contrast with 
traditional credit. However, it is not terribly revealing 
of the nature of the transactions or parties involved, and 
because of its bland ambiguity is avoided in this discussion. 
1. Several examples are provided in Firth, Raymond, and B. S. 
Yamey, Capital, Saving and Credit in Peasant Societies. London, 
George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1964. See also the articles in 
Small Farmer Credit: Informal Credit. Vol. XV, AID Spring 
Review of Small Farmer Credit. Washington, DC, Agency for 
International Development, June 1973. 
2. See, for example, Postan, M. M., Medieval Trade and Finance. 
Cambridge, at the University Press, 1973; and Polanyi, Karl, 
et al., eds., Trade and Market in the Early Empires. Glencoe, 
the Free Press, 1957. 
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Informal credit is characterised by small scale activities, 
frequently limited by the lenders' and borrowers' preference for 
face-to-face transactions. Informal credit often involves no 
written evidence of indebtedness, and is largely outside the 
control of government except in the very broadest sense relating 
to government's role as an issuer of currency. The scope of 
informal financial transactions is widely varied. Informal 
transactions include kinship credit, those involving professional 
rural moneylenders, and those which occur in the active kerb or 
bazaar markets in certain countries. Informal transactions also 
include the arrangements for circumvention of exchange or other 
controls over finance which frequently abound in developing 
countries. 
.,, Intensive credit rationing. Credit rationing has two 
dimensions: it is possible to limit the amount of credit 
issued to each borrower so that recipients receive less than 
they would in the absence of such rationing, and it is possible 
to limit the number of recipients so that more credit is available 
for each that would be the case were a larger number of borrowers 
accommodated from the lender's resources. Intensive credit 
rationing refers to the latter case, that of much for the few, 
while the opposite situation, a little for the many, may be 
called extensive credit rationing. 
These terms are not in common use. Their invention for 
the purposes of this paper reflects necessities imposed by 
the theoretical grey areas which are found in the literature 
on credit rationing. A discussion of some of the problems 
arising from the ambiguities of the concept is contained in 
Chapter II of this paper. 
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D. The Relevance and Contribution of the Research 
The main emphasis of this paper is the interaction between 
the financial sector and the agricultural sector, primarily the 
small scale portion of the agricultural sector because it is in 
this portion that questions of access have their greatest social 
and developmental importance. The hypotheses to be tested were 
formulated as the basis for examining the question of whether 
financial markets have a role to play in rural development, and 
if they do, how that role could be enhanced. 
This approach is both old and new. It is new in that 
agricultural credit in developing countries has usually been 
viewed within the context of agriculture rather than finance, 
as manifested by the design of many rural development projects 
and by the nonviable nature of so many of the farm credit 
institutions which inhabit the Third World. However, since the 
publication of the Spring Review of Small Farmer Credit published 
in 20 volumes by the United States Agency for International 
Development (US AID) in 1973 and the appearance in 1974 of the 
World Bank's internal document entitled Bank Policy on Agri- 
cultural CreditI the conclusion that lack of credit is generally 
not a constraint to small scale agricultural development has 
been widely aired, rendering less attractive the narrow conceptual 
base inherent in viewing farm credit solely-in relation to 
agriculture. 
Suggesting that the interaction of the financial sector and 
the rural sector may be shaped to promote rural welfare is, of 
course, not new. Concern with rural indebtedness in India found 
expression in measures such as the Bengal Regulation XV of 1793, 
the Deccan Agricultural Relief Act of 1879, and the Usurious Loans 
Act of 1918. The Deccan Act, "a direct result of severe agrarian 
riots, " enabled courts to reduce "unreasonable charges on account 
1. Published in a slightly revised form by the World Bank in 
May 1975 as Agricultural Credit in the Sector Policy Paper 
Series. 85 pp. 
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of interest and to spread the amount actually due over instal- 
ments. " Going back further in history, Sidney Homer's A History 
of Interest Rates cites interest rate controls in the Code of 
Hammurabi (c. 1800 BC) and includes references to earlier sources. 
2 
The writings of the Schoolmen and of Koranic scholars on the 
subject of interest rates may be taken as evidence of a similar 
concern. 
3 
Benjamin Nelson relates the historical course of the 
controversy over usury in Western history to the philosophical 
basis of human society, beginning his enquiry with an exploration 
of the Judaic prohibition of interest on loans to insiders in the 
tribal brotherhood specified in Deuteronomy xxiii: 19-20, and the 
parallel approval of the practice of charging interest on loans to 
foreigners. His thesis is neatly summarised in the title of his 
work, The Idea of Usury: From Tribal Brotherhood to Universal 
Otherhood. 4 Nelson perceives that the preferred status reserved 
traditionally for members of tribal brotherhoods by their peers 
has been extended and generalised with the development of Western 
society. While human concern has expanded to encompass larger and 
larger groups, the reality of brotherhood in the tribal sense has 
been replaced by a certain sense of individuality and alienation, 
i. e., by universal otherhood. 
1. An excellent summary in this vein of the problems and practices 
of rural borrowing and lending in India in the century before 
independence is contained in Reserve Bank of India, Report of the 
Agricultural Finance Sub-Committee, 1945. Bombay, 1945, reprinted 
in 1965. The material quoted here is found on pp. 23-24 of the 
1965 edition. 
2. New Brunswick, New Jersey, Rutgers University Press, 1963. 
pp. 25-27. 
3. Shakespeare also provides evidence that debt has been a 
problem of mankind for some time. Polonius' advice to Hamlet, 
Neither a borrower, nor a lender be; 
For loan oft loses both itself and friend, 
And borrowing dulls the edge of husbandry, 
is, followed directly by, "This above all: to thine own self be 
true.... " ("Borrowing dulls the edge of husbandry" is of course 
in conflict with the optimistic thesis on which many rural credit 
schemes are based. ) The importance of debt to the denouement of 
The Merchant of Venice may also reflect popular fascination with 
the financial function. 
4.2nd ed., enlarged. Chicago, The, University of Chicago Press, 
1969. First published in 1949. 
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To return to the narrower concern, Keynes noted: 
1 
... for centuries, indeed for several milleniums, 
enlightened opinion held for certain and obvious 
a doctrine... that the rate of interest is not self- 
adjusting at a level best suited to the social 
advantage but constantly tends to rise too high, so 
that a wise government is concerned to curb it by 
statute and custom and even by invoking the sanctions 
of the moral law.... Provisions against usury are 
among the most ancient economic practices of which 
we have record. 
However, this older, narrower approach, characterised by concern 
about exploitation of borrowers by lenders, and by efforts to 
intervene on behalf of the debtor in the determination of 
interest charges, is quite different from the current ground- 
swell in the literature, which treats the scope for creation and 
distribution of benefits from the interaction of the two sectors 
rather than how the rural sector can best be protected from the 
financial sector. The element of paternalism apparent in the 
older approach becomes less attractive to developers as evidence 
of the rationality of smallholders, in the broad context of 
2 
political economy, becomes more firmly established empirically. 
The most damaging set of field studies, from the point of 
view of the old school of low interest rates and subsidised credit, 
are those of Professor Dale W. Adams and his colleagues in the 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology at the 
Ohio State University. Their primary data was collected in 
several Latin American countries in the 1960's, as well as more 
recent data from Asia. Some of their most interesting results 
from the point of view of this dissertation are that the policies 
promoted by the old school tended to result in severely restricted 
access to credit by small farmers, and that large farmers who 
I. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. 
London, Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1960. p. 351. 
2. The economic rationality of African farmers in several 
countries was reasonably well documented by the mid-1960's, 
as indicated by the literature summary in Dean, Edwin, The 
Supply Responses of African Farmers: Theory and Measurement 
in Malawi. Amsterdam, North Holland Publishing Company, 1966. 
pp. 75-81. See also, Wolgin, Jerome Morris, Farmer Response to 
Price in Smallholder Agriculture in Kenya: An Expected Utility 
Function. Unpublished PhD dissertation, Yale University, 1973. 
15 
received subsidised credit -- at negative real rates of interest 
in certain inflation-prone Latin American countries -- frequently 
diversified their activities out of agriculture with the proceeds 
of subsidised agricultural loans. These findings suggest that 
resource allocation distortions harmful to "equitable" and broadly 
based rural development arise from applying the old approach. 
I 
This paper is intended to constitute an addition to the stream 
of the literature to which Adams and his colleagues at Ohio State 
have contributed so much. 
The writer's work attempts to make two original contributions. 
The first attempt at originality is directed at explaining the 
operation of Kenya's farm credit mechanism within the approach 
provided by that body of financial market theory, associated with 
the work of Edward S. Shaw and Ronald I. McKinnon. among others. 
which holds that the interest rate is _a- 
key determinant and per- 
haps the key determinant of the quality and quantity of financial 
development in less developed countries. The attractiveness of 
the theoretical base provided by this school of thought appears 
1. Among the publications of Ohio State researchers which are of 
particular interest from the point of view of this dissertation 
are: Adams, Dale W., "Agricultural Credit in Latin America: A 
Critical Review of External Funding Policy, " American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics. 53,2, May 1971. pp. 163-172; Adams, 
Dale W., Harlan Davis and Lee Bettis, "Is Inexpensive Credit a 
Bargain for Small Farmers? The Recent Brazilian Experience, " 
Inter-American Economic Affairs. 26,1, Summer 1972. pp. 47-58; 
Adams, Dale W., and Joseph L. Tommy, "Changes in Small Farmer. 
Credit Use in Southern Brazil, 1965-69. " Studies in Agricultural 
Credit and Technology, Economics and Sociology Occasional Paper 
No. 61, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, 
The Ohio State University, Columbus, February 1972; Adams, Dale, 
William Simpson and Joseph Tommy, "Capital Formation on Small-to- 
Medium Sized Farms in Southern Brazil, 1965 to 1969. " Research 
Notes on Agricultural Capital Formation and Technological Change, 
No. 8, The Ohio State University and ESALQ/University of Sah 
Paulo, Columbus, June 28,1971; Adams, Dale W., et al., "Rural 
Capital Markets and Small Farmers in Taiwan 1952-1972, " Small 
Farmer Credit in East Asia. Vol. XI. AID Spring Review of Small 
Farmer Credit. Washington, DC, Agency for International Develop- 
ment, 1973; Erven, Bernard, and Norman Rask, "Credit Infusion as 
a Small Farmer Development Strategy -- The Ibirubä Pilot Project 
in Southern Brazil. " Studies in Agricultural Capital and Tech- 
nology, Economics and Sociology Occasional Paper No. 48, Depart- 
ment of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, The Ohio State 
University, Columbus, December 1971; and Rask, Norman, "The Impact 
of Selective Credit and Price policies on the Use of New Inputs, " 
Development Digest. IX, 2, April 1971. pp. 49-54. 
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sufficient to permit the formulation of a model of farm credit 
in Kenya. To the extent the model approximates reality it may 
also be applicable to the financing of local small scale enter- 
prise and other areas in which formal lenders find it difficult 
to operate. 
The second contribution consists of the specification of 
an index of repayment performance (in Appendix B) which provides 
a quantitative tool for comparing the repayment performance of 
different borrowers (in Appendices C and D). The index may also 
be used as a measure of portfolio performance, complementing those 
commonly in use. These include 1) the collection ratio, which is 
basically loan collections expressed as a percentage of amounts 
overdue and falling due, 2) amounts overdue as a percentage of 
total amounts outstanding, and 3) ageing of arrears to indicate 
the length of time for which amounts in arrears have been over- 
due. The collection ratio is the only dynamic or flow type of 
measure among these three, and is in fact a comparison of a 
cumulative flow of receipts with a cumulative flow of amounts 
falling due. The repayment index proposed in this study is in 
fact superior in certain respects to the three measures commonly 
in use because it is capable of comparing an entire flow with an 
entire stock on a continuous basis. 
The index of repayment performance is so elementary that it 
is inconceivable that it has not been previously developed else- 
where. However, the writer's survey of the farm credit literature 
and experience with financial institutions have failed to uncover 
any other efforts to develop such a measure, useful to the social 
scientist and rural developer because it provides a basis for 
comparing borrowers' performers as payers, and useful to the 
financier because it provides a finer and more timely measure 
1. This exposition is limited to the Kenyan case, and hence no 
general theory of formal farm credit in developing mixed economies 
is proposed here. However, the Spring Review country papers and 
other descriptive literature appear to offer scope for the 
generalisation of the model and the formulation and testing of 
a theory of farm credit over a broad range of agricultural, social 
and institutional conditions. 
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of portfolio performance than those commonly in use, and which 
can easily be added to the types of analytical data generated 
almost effortlessly by computerised accounting systems. If the 
writer's claim to originality in this respect is unfounded, at 
least a claim of independent development can be based on reference 
to analyses of farm credit programmes listed in rural development 
and farm credit bibliographies and to standard texts on financial 
analysis and loan portfolio management. 
An additional feature of this study is that it attempts to 
build a framework to support the conclusion that credit rationing 
by politically established criteria increases the probability that 
some borrowers will receive too much credit relative to their 
ability to service debt. While this observations is by no means 
original, it is one that is frequently overlooked -- rationing is 
usually associated with scarcity and intervention to secure a 
wider distribution of the rationed good or service, not with 
inundation and concentration. As noted above on page 11, the 
overloading of individual borrowers with credit is referred to 
as intensive credit rationing. 
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CHAPTER I 
A REVIEW OF KENYAN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT 
The purpose of this chapter is to sketch the general 
outline of Kenyan agriculture in the recent past and as of 
the early 1970's. The utility of a review of this type is 
based on two observations. The first is that the configuration 
of credit delivery systems reflects the character of Kenyan 
agriculture. This pattern is a natural result of the pro- 
pensity to view agricultural credit within the context of or 
primarily in relation to agriculture. Hence, a useful approach 
to analysis consists of following the same track, at least at 
the outset. A second justification is that rural financial 
flows are closely related to the character of the country's 
agriculture, the major source of rural incomes. 
A. Geographical and Historical Factors Contributing 
to the Structure of Kenyan Agriculture 
1. Rainfall, Altitude and Soil Types as Determinants of Land Use 
Kenya is located on the edge of the old and stable southern 
African land mass, being interrupted by the Rift Valley, the 
country's most prominent geological feature. 
' The Rift manifests 
geological activity characteristic of areas on the margin of 
large land masses, which is also reflected in the varied land- 
scape found in Kenya. 
Almost every variation of physical feature is to be 
found, from the permanent snows... of Mt Kenya to the 
hot humid coastal belt, and from the arid eserts... 
to the lush parklands of the high plateau. 
1. Government of Kenya, The Economic Development of Kenya: 
Report of an Economic Survey Mission. Nairobi, Government 
Printer, 1962. P. 3. 
2. East Africa Royal commission 1953-1955 Report. Cmd 9475. 
1961 reprint. London, HMSO, 1961. pp. 6-7. 
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While providing majestic and awesome scenery, this variation 
also renders much of Kenya unsuitable for arable cropping, as 
about two-thirds of the country's surface is desert or semi- 
desert. 
1 
The remaining one-third is found in the southwestern 
portion of the country and in a narrow belt along the Indian 
Ocean Coast. The southwestern quadrant has been described as 
Upland Kenya, "the backbone of the Republic. "2 An East-to-West 
profile of land types and uses is described in an early World 
Bank report on Kenya: 
3 
As the land rises inland, the vegetation and the prospects 
for cultivation improve, and the climate moderates to 
subtropical and temperate. In the middle altitudes, the 
rising grasslands provide a home for game and herds of 
domestic cattle. The plateau and upland areas lying 
between 5,000 and 9,000 feet which cover roughly the 
southwestern quarter of Kenya, comprise some of the best 
land for settlement and agriculture in Africa. Eventually, 
the land drops away to the basin of Lake Victoria, housing 
the rich lands of Nyanza on the lake's northeastern shore. 
The report adds that areas suitable for unirrigated intensive 
cropping or grazing are limited to the Coast and higher elevations 
enjoying a good probability of at least 35 inches of rainfall 
annually. 
4 
However, 89% of the country lies below the 30 inch 
isohyet, suggesting the pervasiveness of inadequate rainfall as a 
constraint to agriculture. 
5 
In general, rainfall and altitude have a high correlation 
away from the Coast. 
6 
So consistent is the relation between these 
variables that cropping patterns follow contours in many parts of 
1. Ojany, Francis F., and Reuben B. Ogendo, Kenya: A Study in 
Physical and Human Geography. Nairobi, Longman Kenya, Ltd., 1973. 
p. 1. Maps vividly illustrating rainfall zones are included in 
the East Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955 Report. 
2. Ojany, Francis F., and Reuben B. Ogendo, op. cit., p. 38. 
3. Government of Kenya, The Economic Development of Kenya. p. 3. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ojany, Francis F., and Reuben B. Ogendo, op. cit., p. 61. 
6. Republic of Kenya, Atlas of Kenya. 3rd ed. Nairobi, 
Government Printer, 1971. pp. 4-5,14-19,23. See an elaboration 
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the country: e. g., sorghum grows between 3,000 and 5,000 feet, 
coffee between 4,500 and 7,000 feet, tea between 5,000 and 7,400 
feet, pyrethrum above 6,500 but optimally at 8,000 feet, etc. 
1 
Reflecting interaction between Indian Ocean monsoons and 
continental air masses, the rainfall pattern is dramatically 
bi-modal in the central portion of the country but somewhat 
more evenly distributed towards the west. 
2 
This pattern permits 
double cropping in many densely populated smallholder areas. 
Finally, it should be noted that there is little substitute 
for rainfall. Irrigation is not a major factor in Kenyan agri- 
culture. 
3 
Official schemes covered fewer than 8,000 ha in 1973 
and involved only 4,100 plotholders. 
4 
The Kano Plains and the 
Tana Basin offer potential for irrigated agriculture, but funds 
will probably not be available for any significant development 
of water resources in these areas before 1980.5 
Within the country's arable areas the derivation of soil 
types is an important determinant of agricultural development 
potential. Heyer et al. note that, 
6 
The areas with volcanically derived soils generally 
(offer) much greater potential for development than 
the granite derived soils. In the latter areas, with 
(continued) of this point in Hickman, G. M., and W. H. G. Dickins, 
The Lands and Peoples of East Africa. 3rd impression. London, 
Longmans, Green & Co., Ltd., 1964. pp. 11-12. 
1. AclAnd,, J. D., East African Crops. London, Longman Group 
Ltd., 1971. pp. 63,153-154,188,210. 
2. Ojany, Francis F., and Reuben B. Ogendo, op. cit., p. 58. 
3. O'Connor, A. M., An Economic Geography of East Africa. 
London, G. Bell & Sons, 1966. pp. 59,218,252; International 
Labour Office, Employment, Incomes and Equality: a Strategy 
for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya. Geneva, 1972. 
pp. 411-420. 
4. Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey 1974. Nairobi, 
Government Printer, 1974. p. 73. 
5. Ojany, Francis F., and Reuben B. Ogendo, op. cit., pp. 144, 
146-147; ILO, op. cit., pp. 411-420. 
6. Heyer, Judith, et al., Rural Development Planning in Kenya. 
Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1971. p. 14. 
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very old and sandy soils and uncertain rainfall, 
the problems of agricultural development reach 
grim proportions.... 
However, Kenya has never had a soil survey and hence only 
partial data is available. 
1 
A general typology of soil types in the National Atlas of 
Kenya indicates that well drained soils predominate in the main 
arable zones. 
2 On the lower western slopes of the Aberdares, on 
the northern slopes of Mt Kenya, and in certain other lower areas 
on the fringes of the arable highlands, black clays or black 
cotton (grumosolic) soils as well as dark brown clays with 
light textured top soils (planosolic soils) are found. 
2. European Settlement and Its Effect on Land Use 
European involvement on a significant scale in what is now 
Kenya began in the 1890's when the British government assumed the 
task of administering the territory. In 1896 railway construction 
began in Mombasa and in 1901 the line reached Lake Victoria, 580 
miles inland. 
3 
The opportunities opened by the railway and the 
need to. generate traffic to pay for the enterprise provided a 
basis for European settlement, and by the outbreak of World War I, 
approximately 1,000 farms and a few plantations had been estab- 
listed. 
4 
At that time the European population numbered about 
6,000.5 After the War the Soldier Settler Scheme gave an impetus 
1. Republic of Kenya, Report of the Working Party on Agricultural 
Inputs (The Havelock Report). Nairobi, Government Printer, 1971. 
p. 6. 
2. Republic of Kenya. 3rd ed., pp. 26-27. 
3. Wrigley, C. C., "Kenya: The Patterns of Economic Life, " in 
Harlow, Vincent, and E. M. Chilver, eds., History of East Africa. 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1965. pp. 209-211; Huxley, Elspeth, 
White Man's Country. London, Chatto and Windus, 1935. (1956 
reprint). pp. 77-79. 
4. Odingo, R. S., The Kenya Highlands: Land Use and Agricultural 
Development. Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1971. p. 30. 
5. Cone, L. Winston, "European Settlement and Early Agriculture, " 
in Cone, L. Winston, and J. F. Lipscomb, eds., The History of 
Kenya Agriculture. Nairobi, University Press of Africa, 1972. 
p. 36. 
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to colonisation and resulted eventually in the establishment 
of 1,246 new holdings. 
1 
In 1934, when there were about 2,000 
European landholders or occupiers in Kenya, recommendations of 
the Kenya Land Commission (Carter Commission) provided the basis 
for fixing the boundaries of the Scheduled Areas, reserved pri- 
marily for European agriculture (and the production of "squatter" 
labourers and their families, comprising as many as 150,000 
persons in the 1930's). 
2 
These boundaries remained virtually 
unaltered until the 1959 decision to remove race as a basis for 
land ownership within these areas. 
3 
a. Statutory and administrative protection 
The impact of European settlement on Kenyan agricultural 
development remains a topic of controversy. 
4 
A major fact was 
the existence of almost 3,000,000 ha of large scale, commercially 
I. Lipscomb, J. F., "Soldier Settlers, " in Cone, L. Winston, and 
J. F. Lipscomb, eds., op. cit., pp. 55-57. For a fuller description, 
with details varying slightly from Lipscomb's account, see Ghai, 
Y. P., and J. P. W. B. McAuslan, Public Law and Political Change in 
Kenya: A Study of the Legal Framework of Government from Colonial 
Times to the Present. Nairobi, Oxford University Press, 1970. 
p. 81. R. S. Odingo notes some of the problems encountered by 
this project, o . cit., pp. 30-31. 
2. East Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955. pp. 53-57; Cone, 
L. Winston, and J. F. Lipscomb, "Phase II - 1923-1939, " in Cone, 
L. Winston, and J. F. Lipscomb, eds., op. cit., pp. 59-60; Wrigley, 
C. C., OP-cit., p. 257; Ghai, Y. P., and J. P. W. B. McAuslan, OP_ 
cit., pp. 94-97. The Non-scheduled Areas were reserved for 
African use. 
3. Wrigley, C. C., op. cit., p. 259; Lipscomb, J. F., "Land 
Transfer and African Settlement, " in Cone, L. Winston, and J. F., 
Lipscomb, eds., op cit., pp. 121-122. The removal of tribal and 
racial impediments to land tenure was recommended several years 
earlier by the East Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955, op-cit., 
pp. 60-61. 
4. Cone, L. Winston, and J. F. Lipscomb, op. cit., appear fre- 
quently to present views which may have been popular among many 
of the European settlers. A Marxist interpretation (marred by 
the inaccurate reporting of certain facts relating to the be- 
haviour of the financial sector) is found in van Zwanenberg, 
Roger, The Agricultural History of Kenya. Paper No. 1. Histori- 
cal Association of Kenya. Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 
1972. A more conventional examination is provided by Wrigley, 
C. C., op. cit. A moderately radical view is found in an 
Z3 
oriented units operated by Europeans. Another was the relation- 
ship between these units and the African rural sector, which 
involved dependence on African agricultural labour by European 
farmers plus the institution of a number of policies which 
affected African agricultural development. The impact of 
colonial agricultural policies cannot be explored in detail 
here, and for the purposes of this paper the land question does 
not require recapitulation. 
1 
Suffice it to note that a number 
of measures were taken which gave economic and statutory en- 
couragement to the large scale European sector while simul- 
taneously closing the door to African development along certain 
lines. "Legislation to benefit one community inevitably affected 
the other adversely"2 may be too broad for precision, but the 
tendency towards discrimination in colonial policy needs little 
elaboration. As late as the 1950's dual pricing policies, 
restrictions on marketing and on production of certain major 
crops, and discriminatory borrowing regulations were in effect 
which hindered African initiative in cash cropping. 
3 
The discriminatory aspects of ordinances and arrangements 
affecting cash cropping are noteworthy. 
4 
Principal cash 
(continued) extensively documented paper by Smith, L. D., "An 
Overview of Agricultural Development Policy in Kenya, " in 
Heyer, J., J. K. Maitha and W. M. Senga, eds., Agricultural 
Development in Kenya: An Economic Assessment. Nairobi, Oxford 
University Press, 1976. 
1. It may be useful, in view of frequent confusion on the point, 
to note that "approximately four-fifths of the total acreage of 
high-potential land (was) in the Non-scheduled Areas. " (Govern- 
ment of Kenya, The Economic Development of Kenya. p. 51. ) 
2. Ghai, Y. P., and J. P. W. B. McAuslan, op. cit., p. 96. 
3. Forrester, Marion Wallace, Kenya To-Day: Social Prerequisites 
for Economic Development. 's-Gravenhage, Mouton & Co., 1962. 
pp. 78 ff. 
4. The importance of administrative arrangements and their 
extra-legal aspects in Kenyan administration are discussed in 
McAuslan, J. P. W. B., "Control of Land and Agricultural Development 
in Kenya and Tanzania, " in Sawyerr, G. F. A., ed., East African Law 
and Social Change. No. 6, Contemporary African Monograph Series, 
East African Institute of Social and Cultural Affairs. Nairobi, 
East African Publishing House, 1967. pp. 172-257. 
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enterprises on smallholdings today -- tea, coffee, pyrethrum 
and dairying based on improved stock -- were restricted to 
varying degrees but on a significant scale during the colonial 
era through a series of administrative arrangements. These per- 
mitted adoption or gave official support in the form of technical 
advice, marketing arrangements, etc., only to operators who could 
meet certain standards which were at times stated explicitly in 
racial terms. It has been noted by several observers that labour 
intensive enterprises, such as coffee, were the most subject to 
controls, given the dependence of the European farm sector on 
African labour. 
At the same time, however, efforts were made to introduce 
new food crops in African areas and veterinary services were 
supplied which had the effect of strengthening African herds as 
well as protecting European herds from diseases harboured in or 
spread by the grazing or movement of livestock owned by Africans. 
Another aspect of European settlement was its effect on the 
expansion of African cultivation. Again, the precise impact is 
open to question. The African population appears to have expanded 
at a considerable rate during much of the colonial period, first 
as a recovery from a series of epidemics and insect plagues shortly 
prior to European penetration, later as a recovery from famine 
and pestilence in 1898-1899 and in 1918-1920, and after about 1930 
in response to those aspects of European penetration which 
increased African life expectancy. 
2 Thus, with and as a result 
of European penetration African populations faced certain 
limitations on land availability -- offset only slightly by the 
opening of previously unexploited land to squatter-labourers on 
1. Heyer, J., "A Survey of Agricultural Development in the 
Small Farm Areas of Kenya since the 1920's. " Working Paper 
No. 194, Institute for Development Studies, University of 
Nairobi, October 1974; Wrigley, C. C., op. cit., pp. 255-256. 
2. Low, D. A., "British East Africa: The Establishment of 
British Rule 1885-1912, " in Harlow, Vincent, and E. M. Chilver, 
eds., op. cit., pp. 3-4; Wrigley, C. C., op. cit., pp. 254-255. 
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European farms l-- as well as a probably unprecedented increase 
in p. opulation. Shifting cultivation was the norm until the 
1920's, when settled agriculture became common in some of the 
better endowed African areas. While from this point of view 
European settlement hastened the development of African agri- 
culture, it appears that the food crop bias in colonial policy 
for African areas, exacerbated by land pressure, skewed develop- 
ment away from those enterprises or enterprise mixes which might 
have contributed most to smallholder welfare had there been no 
European farm sector. 
b. Transport facilities 
The importance of the railway to the development of Kenya's 
large scale farm sector has already been noted. The trunk line 
linking Mombasa, Nairobi and Kisumu was supplemented by a spur 
to Thika, a coffee and sisal area, in 1913, and the period 
between 1925 and 1930 saw a massive increase in the system 
when lines were laid to serve the main cereal producing portions 
of the European areas. 
2 
The road network expanded at a slower rate. As of 1959 
Kenya had only 531 miles of bitumen roads, but by 1973 the 
system had expanded to more than 2,300 miles. 
3 
The growth of 
the 45,000 mile gravel and earth road system has not been so 
dramatic in relative terms, but some of its development has had 
a substantial impact on agricultural progress.. A primary example 
consists of the more than 800 miles of "tea roads" in smallholder 
tea areas which had been constructed by 1969 to facilitate the 
daily leaf collection so essential for efficient tea production. 
4 
1. Squatter-labourers were reported to number 150,000 in the 
early 1930's, and a proportion of these were considered unlikely 
to return to their native reserves. See Ghai, Y. P., and J. P. W. B. 
McAuslan, op. cit., p. 95. 
2. Odingo, R. S., o . cit., pp. 32,35. 
3. Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1968. p. 122; 
Statistical Abstract 1973. p. 172. 
4. Kenya Tea Development Authority, Annual Report and Accounts, 
1 July 1968 to 30 June 1969. Nairobi. P. 18. 
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Kenya lacks navigable rivers and inland water transport 
plays no commercial role except on Lake Victoria. 
c. Institutional infrastructure 
The institutional infrastructure in the agricultural sector, 
widely defined to include the channels handling the flow of goods 
and services to and from the sector, has two primary character- 
istics, which are to some degree interrelated. 
The first is an abundance of controls. 
I 
The statutory board 
syndrome of administered prices and monopolistic marketing is well 
advanced in Kenya, and is discussed in a later section. The 
development and roots of controls over land use from early in the 
colonial era is well documented, 
2 
and as of the early 1970's 
included controls of an administrative nature which can be, and 
in apparently 5-10% of cases submitted for approval are, invoked 
to prevent land transactions. 
3 
Controls may also be used to force 
farmers to plant certain crops. 
4 
Likewise, "orders" can be 
applied to land if the Government does not approve of its use or 
the manner in which it is used. 
5 
The fact that the more drastic 
of these powers have been invoked only infrequently in the past 
in no way diminishes their existence on the statute books. 
The second major characteristic of the institutional structure 
is the overwhelming influence of European penetration in Kenya. 
1. In spite of the pervasiveness of controls and preference for 
public sector monopoly in key markets, some observers still por- 
tray the Kenyan approach to development as being fundamentally 
"capitalistic". See, for example, Lele, Uma, The Design of Rural 
Development: Lessons from Africa. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1976. P. 41; and Wolgin, Jerome Morris, op. cit., p. 1. 
2. Ghai, Y. P., and J. P. W. B. McAuslan, op. cit. Chapter III, "The 
Development of Agrarian Administration. " pp. 79-124. 
3. McAuslan, J. P. W. B., "Control of Land. " p. 194 ff; Fleming, 
J. T., "An Analysis and Review of the Kenya Land Reform Programme 
1966-1968. " Nairobi, Ministry of Lands and Settlement, June 
1968. pp. 47-52. 
4. The Agriculture Act. Chapter 318, Laws of Kenya. Nairobi, 
Government Printer. 
5. Ibid. 
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The institutional infrastructure was developed around the product- 
ion and export of produce from European farms. Marketing and 
input supply organisations, the most interesting example being 
the Kenya Farmers' Association, are frequently vertically 
integrated from depots in rural centres to import-export 
facilities in Mombasa. The orientation of these organisations 
has been towards large scale production, although since indepen- 
dence most institutions related to agriculture have been modified 
and a few others newly formed or reorganised -- towards the needs 
and potential of a larger number of farm operators. 
Although agricultural research was begun in African areas 
in 1947,1 the utility of the Government's research activities 
has accrued largely to the large scale sector. 
2 
This reflects 
both the orientation of research activities and also the channels 
of communication or media used to inform farmers of research 
results. 
3 
Likewise, studies of small farm management problems 
only got underway on a significant scale in the early 1960's. 
4 
It is generally accepted today that the lack of agronomic 
research and the related absence of innovations suitable for 
smallholders in the lower, drier arable areas in, Kenya is an 
important constraint to development in these zones, 
5 
which 
have an increasingly important role as population pressure extends 
the margin of cultivation. Even at the present time extension 
advice is to a significant extent not heeded by farmers because 
it fails to be harmonious with small farm systems -- the 
1. Swynnerton, R. J. M., A Plan to Intensify the Development of 
African Agriculture (The Swynnerton Plan). Nairobi, Government 
Printer, 1955. p. 50. 
2. de Wilde, John C., Experiences with Agricultural Development 
om Tropical Africa. Vol. II, The Case Studies. Baltimore, Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1967. p. 133. 
3. ILO, op. cit. , pp. 145-148,153-156. 
4. de Wilde, John C., op. cit., Vol. II, p. 103. 
5. See, for example, Hunt, Diana M., "Agricultural Innovation in 
Mbere. " Working Paper No 166, Institute for Development Studies, 
University of Nairobi. June 1974. pp. 59-62; "Resource Use in 
a Medium Potential Area: The Mbere Rural Economy. " Working Paper 
No. 180, Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi. 
August 1974. pp. 28,39-44. 
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constraints on experimental farm or trial plot yields may, 
and generally do, differ from those facing the small farmer. 
Consequently, technical recommendations per se may overlook 
the opportunity cost to the farmer of adoption. 
I 
The provision of financial services has also tended to 
follow patterns outlined above with regard to other aspects 
of institutional infrastructure. Virtually every large farm 
which is not in organisational chaos or which does not have 
grossly ineffective management has access to a range of credit 
facilities, while smallholder access to formal credit is more 
restricted. Likewise, savings facilities and other financial 
services provided by the largest and also by several of the 
smaller financial institutions tend to be offered on terms which 
limit the access of many ordinary people. These issues will be 
dealt with in detail later in this paper. 
The cooperative structure has been used by the Government 
in an attempt to obtain reorientation of certain functions re- 
lated to agriculture without frontally attacking older arrange- 
ments. Cooperatives have certain monopsonistic roles conferred 
by law, and are frequently linked to statutory boards through 
produce marketing channels. 
2 
This base with respect to major 
smallholder cash crops such as coffee, milk and pyrethrum has 
been used to provide an integrated credit and savings system, 
input supplies and other services which are increasingly charac- 
terised by horizontal and vertical integration within the co- 
operative structure. 
1. Belshaw, D. G. R., "Agricultural Extension, Education and 
Research, " in Helleiner, G. D., ed., Agricultural Planning in 
East Africa. Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1968. 
pp. 68-69; Heyer, Judith, at al., op-cit., p. 112; ILO, 
op. cit., p. 146. 
2. Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Cooperatives and Social 
Services, Cooperative Development Policy for Kenya. Sessional 
Paper No. 8 of 1970. Nairobi, Government Printer 1970, provides 
an outline of policy and structure. Details of cooperatives' 
monopsony powers are found in McAuslan, J. P. W. B., "Cooperatives 
and the Law in East Africa, " in Widstrand, Carl Gosta, ed., 
Cooperatives and Rural Development in East Africa. Uppsala, 
The Scandinavian Institute of African studies, 1970. pp. 106-107. 
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B. The Structure of Kenyan Agriculture: 
The Number and Size of Farm Firms 
1. Large Scale Agriculture 
The large scale agricultural sector is located primarily in 
the former Scheduled Areas and in the Coastal Strip. This sector 
is a result of European settlement in Kenya, as the Scheduled 
Areas were "reserved" for European farming1 during most of the 
colonial era. The Scheduled Areas consisted of about 2.8 million 
ha (7.0 million acres) of land of variable quality, 
2 
as suggested 
by the diverse types of large scale farming which developed. A 
brief description of the large scale sector shortly before 
independence is found in Kenya's Economic Survey 1961: 
3 
The Scheduled Areas, with the addition of European and 
Asian farms in the Coastal Protectorate, consisted in 
1960 of 3,609 agricultural holdings of 20 acres (8 ha) 
or more and in total covered 12,100 square miles (31,400 
km2) of land. The average size of holding was 2,142 
acres (868 ha), although half of the farms were smaller 
than 890 acres (360 ha). 
Of this area, 15% was cultivated for the production of 
temporary and permanent crops. Permanent crops occupied about 
42% of cultivated land on large farms and the major permanent 
crop in terms of land area was sisal, accounting for roughly 
half of permanent crop cultivation. Wattle, coffee, sugar, tea 
and pyrethrum (in descending order of importance) accounted for 
most of the balance of permanent cropping. An additional 40% of 
cultivated land on large farms was devoted to cereal production 
in the years immediately prior to independence, and about one half 
1. The presence of "squatters" and labourers has already been 
noted. In addition, certain Africans living in the Scheduled 
Areas at the time European farms were established continued to 
reside in these areas until the late 1930's. (Ghai, Y. P., and 
J. P. W. B. McAuslan, op. cit., p. 96. ) Finally there were more 
than 100 Asian farms in the Scheduled Areas. (Colony and Pro- 
tectorate of Kenya, Agricultural Census 1960, quoted by Cone, 
L. Winston, and J. F. Lipscomb, op cit., P. 81. ) 
2. Odingo, R. S., op. cit., pp. 12-26. Metric conversion added. 
3. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya. Nairobi, Government 
Printer, May 1961. p. 15. Metric conversion added. 
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Table I-1. Land Utilisation on Large Farms in Kenya, 
1960 and 1972. 
1960 
Land Use Ha (000) % 
Temporary crops 277 8.9 
Temporary meadows 89 2.8 
Temporary fallow 54 1.7 
Permanent crops 184 5.9 
Uncultivated meadows 
and pastures 2,230 71.3 
Forest 114 3.6 
Other 182 5.8 
Total 3,130 100.0 
1972 
Ha (000) % 
302 11.2 
95 3.5 
70 2.6 
146 5.5 
1,756 65.3 
150 5.6 
169 6.3 
2,688 100.0 
Source: Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1973. p. 111; 
Statistical Abstract 1968, p. 78. 
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of the cereals land was under wheat, one third under maize, and 
the remainder planted to barley and oats. The balance of culti- 
vated land, about 13%, was devoted to other temporary crops, 
including labourers' cultivation. 
1 A large portion of the 85% 
of the uncultivated large farm area was used for grazing. 
The overall pattern of large scale exploitation did not 
change markedly following independence, and whereas the number of 
large scale holdings was 3,624 in 1960,3,166 were enumerated in 
1972.2 Total large farm area declined by 16% from 3,130,000 ha in 
1960 to 2,688,400 ha in 1972.3 The composition of the sector in 
terms of farm size and ownership changed substantially, however. 
While in 1960 there were 528 large farms of fewer than 50 ha, or 
15% of the total, 770 were reported in 1972, or 24% of the total. 
4 
Enumeration errors aside, this change represents the subdivision 
of certain large farms which accompanied their transfer to African 
ownership. There were approximately 300 European large scale 
farmers operating in Kenya in 1972 according to the ILO Report. 
5 
The rate of transfer has been highest, in terms of land area, in 
the mixed farming areas and lowest in the predominantly range areas. 
6 
The transfer of large farms has occurred in six ways: 
7- 
1. Ibid., p. 15. 
2. Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1973. p. 111; 
Statistical Abstract 1968. p. 78. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1973. p. 111. 
5. ILO, op. cit., p. 35. 
6. Compare land use and land ownership maps in Odingo, R. S., 
. cit., pp. 179,190.0- 
7. The first four types of transfer noted here are mentioned 
in Republic of Kenya, Report of the Mission on Land Settlement 
in Kenya (Van Arkadie Report). Nairobi, Government Printer, 
1966. p. 10. The fifth type, involving groups of settlers, 
was initiated in 1971. The sixth type includes the Haraka or 
squatter schemes and the Nandi Salient-. See references in 
sections devoted to settlement and land transfer in Republic 
of Kenya, Economic Survey (annual) and Department of Settlement 
Annual Report (annual). A description of the various types of 
schemes developed under the Land Transfer Programme is also found 
in Republic of Kenya, Development Plan 1974-1978. Part I. Nairobi, 
Government Printer, 1974. pp. 225-230. Details of the background 
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1. Open market transactions arranged privately between buyer 
and seller. 
2. Transfer under the Compassionate Farms programme, involving 
special conditions of valuation and finance based on concern for 
the status of the European seller. 
3. Acquisition of farms to be run as State farms, either on an 
interim basis for eventual sale or for retention "in the national 
interest" as seed farms, stud farms, etc. 
4. Acquisition of farms by the settlement authorities1 and the 
subsequent subdivision and sale of these lands to individual 
members of settlement schemes. 
5. Acquisition of farms by the settlement authorities and the 
subsequent operation of these farms as going concerns by groups 
of settlers. 
6. Miscellaneous transfers ranging from the occupation of 
abandoned farms by former farm labourers, to the turning over 
to local authorities of European farmland purchased by the Kenya 
Government. 
For the purposes of this discussion only the major channels 
of transfer are dealt with, and these can be grouped under two 
headings. One heading includes all of those methods of transfer 
which involved an attempt or initial commitment to maintain the 
farms (or portions of them which would be classified as large farms 
in their own right) as going concerns. The other heading includes 
those in which no such attempt was made, where subdivision was 
undertaken at the outset. For purposes of convenience the 
relatively small number of State farms and miscellaneous forms 
of transfer can be excluded on the grounds that the acreage, 
production and number of settlers involved is relatively small. 
Farms taken over as going concerns frequently underwent an 
(continued) to land transfer are presented in the Van Arkadie 
Report citied above, and are also summarised in Von Pischke, J. D., 
Small Farmer Credit in Kenya: A Review of Major Credit Schemes. 
Vol. I. A Review of Major Agricultural Credit Programs and 
Institutions Operating in Kenya. Studies in Employment and Rural 
Development No. 5. Washington, DC, International Bank for Re- 
construction and Development, September 1974. (mimeo) pp. 2-25. 
1. Settlement authorities as used in this paper refers to all 
Kenyan agencies involved in the settlement of Africans on settle- 
ment schemes. These include the Settlement Fund Trustees, Depart- 
ment of Settlement, Central Land Board, etc. 
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organisational change. Whereas the majority of Europeans in 
mixed farming areas farmed as proprietors or worked essentially 
as proprietors under corporate forms established for convenience, 
the majority of buyers have been groups of Africans organised as 
partnerships, corporations and cooperatives. Unfortunately, no 
comprehensive published documentation of the extent of this shift 
in organisational form and ownership pattern is available. How- 
ever, several sources nutE the existence of this change. Link 
states that larger farms, in terms of land area, in Trans Nzoia 
were generally acquired by "loose partnerships". 
l 
More detailed 
concern for the effects of grouping on the capital structures of 
large farms is contained in a report prepared by a committee 
considering the pros and cons of subdivision of large farms under 
some form of collective ownership: 
2 
At the time of take-over, most people could not raise 
the initial deposit (required by mortgage lenders) by 
themselves and consequently they grouped themselves 
together to form companies, partnerships and cooperatives. 
Further evidence is found in the Ministry of Agriculture's large 
farm supervised credit project proposal prepared for World Bank 
consideration: 
3 
There is a fairly typical pattern of events leading to a 
problem farm situation. The farm is bought from a Euro- 
pean farmer by thirty or so members who form themselves 
into a partnership, cooperative or company. 
This proposal also mentions that there were an estimated 600 
problem farms among the 3,200 composing the large scale sector 
in 1974,4 implying that a substantial number of former European 
1. Link, H., "A Study of the Financial and Loan Repayment Position 
of African Large-scale Farms in Trans Nzoia District, 1969/70. " 
Kitale,, German Agricultural Team, District Agricultural Office, 
September 1970. (mimeo) p. 7. 
2. Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Agriculture, "Draft Report 
and Recommendations of the Committee on Sub-Division of Large 
Scale Farms. " Nairobi, July-August 1971. (mimeo) p. 2. 
Brackets added. 
3. Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Agriculture, "Group Farm 
Supervised Credit Project. " Nairobi, March 1974. (mimeo) p. 6. 
4. Ibid. 
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holdings now operated by Africans face serious difficulties. 
Similar findings are reported by MogakaI and Onyonka. 
2 
The 
financial implications and problems of the method used to 
transfer large scale farms more or less intact will be dis- 
cussed later in this paper. 
2. Settlement Agriculture 
About 550,000 ha (1.3 million acres) of former European 
farming land -- largely in mixed farming areas -- had been 
acquired by the Settlement Fund Trustees by the end of 1971.3 
The mechanics of land transfer through the settlement author- 
ities has generally involved the following steps: 
4 
1) Negotiations on a willing-buyer-willing-seller basis between 
the European farmer and the settlement authorities. 
2) Subdivision of the farm into units judged sufficient to 
enable an African farmer to obtain a specified return 
under a standard farm budget devised by the settlement 
authorities. 
3) Selection of settlers and their establishment on the land. 
Settlers' establishment involves substantial amounts of credit, 
as settlers undertake to pay for their land over 30 years and 
are also issued 10 year development loans for grade cattle, etc. 
The implications of the role of credit to settlers will also be 
1. Mogaka, Thomas N., "Focus on Land Transfer in Trans-Nzoia 
District, 1962-1973: An Outline of Successes and Failures of 
Large Scale African Farming Since the Dawn of the Great Land 
Transfer. " Kitale, District Agricultural Office, May 1973. MS 
2. Onyonka, Zachery T., "Report on the Loan Schedules for Large 
Scale Farmers. " Nairobi, Department of Economics, University 
College, 10 July 1969. (mimeo); Agricultural Development 
Banking: A Case Study of Kenya. Unpublished PhD dissertation, 
Syracuse University, 1968. 
3. Republic of Kenya, Department of Settlement Annual Report 
1971. Nairobi, Government Printer, 1972. P. 50. 
4. The complete process is of course more complicated than 
described in the summary given here. Details are found in the 
annual reports of the Department of Settlement and the old 
Central Land Board, and in Storrar, A., "A Guide to the Prin- 
ciples and Practices of Land Settlement in Kenya, " Journal of 
Local Administration Overseas. 3,2, January 1964, pp. 14-19. 
A summary is also given in Donaldson, G. F., and J. D. Von Pischke, 
op. cit., pp. 6-11. 
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explored later in this paper. 
The latest comprehensive official accounting available in 
1974 concerning the number of European farms purchased by the 
settlement authorities for subdivision appeared to date from 
1965, when 780 had been obtained for High and Low Density schemes 
and 314 additional farms had been purchased under alternative 
transfer arrangements involving the settlement authorities. 
1 
Later acquisitions reported by the Department of Settlement 
include: 46 farms in 1965-1966 (an unspecified number of which 
are included in the 780 reported above, due to a change in 
reporting periods), 24 in 1966-1967,13 in 1967-1968, five in 
1968-1969, three in 1970 and 11 in 1971.2 The total number of 
former European farms on which settlers were receiving Depart- 
ment of Settlement services at the end of 1971 appears to have 
approximated 950.3 About 420,000 ha (1.1 million acres) of this 
land had been subdivided and awarded to individual settlers, and 
an additional 120,000 ha (300,000 acres) transferred to various 
sorts of cooperative farming organisations. 
4 
Settlement agriculture includes a broad variety of Kenyan 
upland enterprises: dairying, beef, sheep, pyrethrum, sugar 
cane, potatoes, maize, wheat, barley, coffee, tea and other, 
minor crops. Production statistics are usually reported together 
with those for the rest of the "small scale" sector, although 
Department of Settlement annual reports contain turnover data 
for cooperative marketing societies on settlement schemes. 
1. Government of Kenya, Central Land Board, Final Report 1964- 
1965. Nairobi, 1965. p. 13. 
2. See pages 48,47,18,15 and 13 of the Department's Annual 
Reports for the respective periods to 1970 and Republic of Kenya, 
Lands Department, Annual Report 1971. p. 7. 
3. Derived from Government of Kenya, Central Land Board, Final 
Report, and subsequent annual reports of the Department of Settle- 
ment. The Department's Five Year Review and Annual Report 1967/ 
68 mentions a total of 1,005 farms purchased. (See p. 4) 
4. Republic of Kenya, Department of Settlement, Annual Report 1971. 
p. 50.48,000 ha of cooperative farms in the 01'Kalou Salient are 
in effect managed by the Department of Settlement. 
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3. Small Scale Agriculture 
From the statistical point of view the small scale sector 
is the residual portion of Kenya's agriculture, comprising every- 
thing that is not large scale, as defined above. This land was 
classified in the 1960/61 sample census as consisting of: 
1 
1. some one million peasant holdings on land in the 
main, of high potential, covering some 18 million 
acres (7.2 million ha)... referred to as the agricultural 
sector of the Non-scheduled Areas. 
2. some 110 million acres (44.5 million ha) or 173,000 
square miles which are outside the areas of European 
and Asian farming and which due to a low rainfall expecta- 
tion are inhabited almost entirely by nomadic pastoral 
tribes... referred to as the pastoral sector of the 
Non-scheduled Areas. 2 
The size of holding in the small scale agricultural sector 
averages less than 5 ha. The 1960/61 sample census reported a 
mean holding size of 1.95 ha in Central Province and 3.80 ha in 
Nyanza Province, both figures applying to areas in which land was 
consolidated. 
3 
Small farm size distributions are no longer pro- 
vided in the annual Statistical Abstract, although data from the 
1970 Abstract presented in the ILO Report suggest that half of 
the country's smallholdings consist of less than 2 ha, as shown 
in Table 1-2, and that the median size of smallholding is less 
than 1 ha. This data raises some interesting questions because 
the figure for the total area registered does not reconcile with 
those found in certain Kenyan documents, including the Economic 
Survey 1970.4 In fact, according to the annual Economic Surveys 
the number of registered holdings and the area registered did not 
until 1973 equal the quantities noted in the ILO Report. 
5 
1. Colony and Protectorate'of Kenya, Economics and Statistics 
Division, Office of the Minister of State for Constitutional Af- 
fairs and Economic Planning, Kenya African Agricultural Sample 
Census, 1960/61. Part I. Nairobi, Government Printer, 1962. p. 1. 
2. The pastoral sector is excluded from further consideration in 
this paper for reasons discussed later. 
3. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Sample Census, p. 18. 
4. See Republic of Kenya, p. 75. 
5. See Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey 1973. p. 79; 
Economic Survey 1974. p. 78. 
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Table 1-2. Size Distribution of Registered Smallholdings 
in Kenya, 1969. 
Size of registered Number Area 
holding in hectares (000) % (000 ha) % 
Less than 0.49 91 11.7 28 1.1 
0.5 - 0.99 121 15.5 89 3.4 
1.1 - 1.99 192 24.6 274 10.3 
2.0 - 2.99 128 16.4 303 11.4 
3.0 - 4.99 104 13.3 404 15.1 
5.0 - 9.99 88 11.3 629 23.8 
10.0 or more 54 7.0 923 34.9 
All sizes 777 100.0 2,646 100.0 
Source: International Labour Office, Employment, Incomes 
and Equality: A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employ- 
ment in Kenya. Geneva, ILO, 1972. p. 36. 
Note: Columns may not sum to totals because of rounding 
errors. 
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This disparity is so great that it appears that settlement 
land may be included in the data used in the ILO tally, although 
it is generally conceded that such land could not at that time 
have been considered registered 
holdings on Trust Land had been 
Land Registers. 
1 
There are alsi 
data may understate the size of 
agriculture by including in the 
in the same sense that small- 
registered by formal entries in 
3 grounds for suspicion that this 
the average registered holding in 
total small town parcels as well 
as small rural parcels kept as public domain which consist of 
watering points and rights of way. In addition, fragmentation in 
certain registered areas would render the average agricultural 
holding larger than the mean plot size. 
Whatever the mean size of registered plots, the possibility 
that the unselective use of official data understates the mean 
size of agricultural holding is swamped by the increasingly wide- 
spread existence of unregistered subdivisions of registered plots. 
The mean size of holding is smaller than the mean plot size, re- 
flecting, in part, the conflict between legal and administrative 
provisions on one hand and social priorities and customary inheri- 
tance provisions on the other. 
2 
Because of these conflicts and 
also because of the costs of recording successions in Land 
Registers, many heirs prefer informal subdivision as a working 
arrangement. Wilson estimated in the early 1970's that fewer 
than 1% of the probable number of successions in Kisii District 
were reflected on the Land Registry. 
3 
A survey conducted by Fleming between 1966 and 1968 noted 
217 deaths of land owners in sample areas, of which 192 were not 
reported to land registration authorities. 
4 
Land Control Boards, 
01 
1. Republic of Kenya, Development Plan 1974-1978. Part I. p. 
227. By mid-1975 over 5,000 settlement holdings were recorded 
in Land Registers as a result of registration efforts underway 
for several years. (Private communication from J. C. D. Lawrance, 
Land Tenure Advisor, Ministry of Overseas Development, London. 
21 May 1975. ) 
2. Wilson, Rodney J. A., "Land Control and Kenya's Smallholder 
Farming Areas, " East African Journal of Rural Development. 5, 
1-2,1972. P. 139. 
3. Ibid., p. 132. 
4. Fleming, J. T., "Analysis and Review, " p. 105. 
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which have absolute discretion to render a transaction invalid 
and which cannot be challenged through the courts, are supposed 
to ensure that holdings do not fall below recommended minimum 
sizes through subdivision, a measure based on economic consider- 
ations as perceived by the Government. 
' 
Wilson indicates that in 
the two areas in which he conducted fieldwork the minimum recom- 
mended holding size in fact exceeded the mean plot size, 
2 
which of 
course must be viewed against the fact that the land reform measures 
which culminate in registration involve substantial efforts at con- 
solidation, reducing the probability that individual landholders 
might in fact own several small plots of a total acreage in ex- 
cess of the recommended minimum. The result of all of these 
problems and conflicts in attempts at development administration 
is that the registries become increasingly out of touch with the 
realities of land usufruct. In addition to these factors and the 
ambiguities surrounding the function of the Land Control Boards, 
problems of education, the inconvenience of the location of Land 
Registries, avoidance of transfer fees, the occasional necessity 
of bribing civil servants and other transaction costs lead to un- 
registered transactions. Fleming found that of 847 transfers 
monitored, 61% were unregistered. 
These observations reinforce the interpretation of other 
farm size data which suggests that the majority of farms in the 
smallholder areas are in fact "small" in terms of absolute size 
and in comparison to averages in the large scale sector. 
1. The Land Control Act of 1967 established the Boards and pro- 
vides the framework for their operations. Fleming, J. T., 
"Analysis and Review, " describes these arrangements and problems 
of implementation, pp. 47 ff. Wilson, Rodney J. A., "Land Control, " 
also notes the divergence between Boards' performance and their 
terms of reference and presents data which suggests that Govern- 
ment policy is based on a false premise concerning the effects of 
subdivision on agricultural production, as small farms are more 
productive in terms of land, i. e., more intensively farmed, than 
larger holdings. This point is also discussed in a section of the 
ILO Report dealing with the large farm and settlement sectors. 
ILO, op. cit., pp. 125-126. 
2. "Land Control, " pp. 125-126. 
3. "Analysis and Review, " p. 40. 
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The mathematics of smallholder agriculture in the 1960/61 
sample census quoted above were that one million peasant 
holdings occupied 7.3 million ha of land. Given an estimated 
3% growth rate in the rural population and discounting popu- 
lation drift down into the lower, less agriculturally attractive 
areas, the situation in 1975 would approximate 1.5 million 
peasant family farms on 7.3 million ha, or a mean small farm 
size of less than 5 ha. The ILO Report, drawing on 1969 pop- 
ulation data, mentions 1.7 million rural households and 1.2 
million settled agricultural holdings. Of 31 Districts having 
medium or high potential land, the median amount of land, 
measured in hectares of high potential equivalent, was 0.8 ha 
per person resident in these Districts. 
1 
The degree of commercialisation in the smallholder sector 
covers a broad range. While smallholder agriculture reportedly 
produces about half of the marketed agricultural output in terms 
of value, the sector is predominantly subsistence oriented and 
supports perhaps 80% of Kenya's settled population. Cash 
cropping is highly developed in certain areas, and subsistence 
orientation does not exclude a substantial degree of commerGiAii- 
sation. Rather, subsistence orientation is seen in the preference 
for household self-sufficiency in basic foods. This orientation 
is reflected in land use patterns. The small scale sector dif- 
fered from the large scale sector in land use around the time of 
independence primarily in the higher proportion of land devoted 
to temporary crops (31% as opposed to 9%) and also exhibited 
proportionately less permanent cropping (3% of land area as 
opposed to 6%). In both sectors, the bulk of the land con- 
sisted of uncultivated meadows and pastures (71% of the large 
scale areas, 57% of the small scale areas). 
2 
1. ILO, op. cit., p. 35. The weightings used in this calculation, 
admittedly crude, were that five ha of medium potential land and 
100 ha of low potential land are equivalent to one hectare of 
high potential land. 
2. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Sample Census 1960/61. 
Part I. p. 25. 
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Data for small scale areas in 1960/61 and for small scale 
and settlement areas in 1969170 is contained in Table 1-3. The 
most striking aspect of the ten-year comparison is the increase 
in the land area included. While the addition of settlement 
schemes would have increased the area by more than 500,000 ha, 
the major portion of the increase is simply the result of a 
change in the basis for enumeration, which makes comparison of 
the two periods difficult. Suffice it to note that the majority 
of land in the areas covered is not cultivated, and that perma- 
nent crops (coffee, tea, tree fruits, etc. ) account for a relatively 
small portion of smallholder land. However, permanent crops 
occupied about one-fifth as much area as temporary crops in 
1969/70 -- double the proportion reported in 1960/61 -- signify- 
ing their considerable importance among arable enterprises and 
their increasing role in smallholder agriculture as discussed 
later in this paper. 
The 1,546,000 ha of cultivated land shown in the Table for 
1969/70 is expanded to 2,303,000 ha if the anomalies of reporting 
mixed cropping and land cropped twice a year are allowed for. On 
this basis, the soundest in view of reporting practices, 43% of 
smallholder and settlement cultivated land was devoted to maize 
in 1969/70; 10% to millets and sorghum; 21% to pulses, primarily 
beans; 11% to permanent crops; and the remaining 15% to temporary 
crops not included elsewhere. 
I 
The total area devoted to coffee, 
tea and pyrethrum -- crops which are entirely cash enterprises -- 
was about 100,000 ha, or about 7% of the total cultivated area on 
smallholdings and settlement schemes. 
4. Statistical and Classificatory Problems 
The classification of agriculture used in this paper is tri- 
chotomous: large scale, settlement and small scale. This cate- 
gorisation poses certain problems, as a two sector model is used 
1. Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1973. p. 105. 
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Table 1-3. Land Utilisation Reported on Small Farms in 1960/61 
and on Small Farms and Settlement Schemes in 1969/70 
in Kenya. 
_ 
Land Use 
Temporary crops 
Temporary fallow 
Permanent crops 
Uncultivated meadows 
and pastures 
Forest 
Other 
Total 
1960/61 
Ha (000) % 
932 31.2 
47 1.6 
87 2.9 
1,715 57.4 
23 .8 
187 6.1 
2,991 100.0 
1969/70 
Ha (000) % 
1,286 15.9 
i 
260 3.2 
(6,606 80.9 
8,152 100.0 
Source: colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Kenya African Agri- 
cultural Sample Census, 1960/61. Part I. p. 25; Republic of 
Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1973. pp. 105-108. 
Note: A change in series accounts for most of the increase in 
hectares enumerated in 1969/70 as compared with 1960/61. 
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for the presentation of official statistics. These problems 
arise because some system of classification is required to deal 
with credit schemes, which are usually specialised by purpose or 
enterprise and also limited by ranges of loan sizes. Access to 
agricultural credit is very much a function of the agricultural 
environment of the borrower or potential borrower. 
The large scale sector as referred to in this paper is as 
given by the official statistics: units of more than 20 acres 
(8 ha) in the former Scheduled Areas and Coastal Strip which 
have not been included in settlement programmes. 
I 
This sector 
is varied. It includes plantations, mixed farms and ranches. 
Forms of organisation include control by multi-national corpora- 
tions, cooperatives, state farms, proprietorships, etc. In many 
cases large mixed farms operated by African purchasers formed 
into companies, cooperatives and partnerships are simply-a de 
facto collection of small family farms, reflecting organisational 
problems of joint ownership on one hand and official and lender 
reluctance to permit formal subdivision on the other. 
The smalf farm sector is taken here to exclude settlement 
schemes and pastoral agriculture. Settlement schemes are a 
special case as far as credit is concerned because they are a 
child of credit provided to settlers by the Agricultural Settle- 
ment Fund and also because settlement farmers have been generally 
excluded from the considerations of other institutional lenders. 
Pastoral agriculture is excluded from this study, although it may 
be argued that the principles to be developed in the following 
pages apply with equal force to this second special case. 
Pastoralism is excluded because of its uniqueness. Monetary 
finance plays a relatively minor role, reflecting a low level of 
pastoral cotmmerciiälisation. The debate over the effects of develop- 
ment interventions, the range of practicable development alternatives 
1. In many of the presentations which follow, the large scale 
sector is listed and discussed first, followed by material 
pertaining to the settlement and small scale sectors. This 
sequence is used merely for convenience and is not intended to 
convey any judgement concerning priorities of any other nature. 
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and appropriate development policies and goals for the pastoral 
sector appears to be even less advanced than that concerning 
small scale permanent agriculture in Kenya. 
C. Production Performance in Kenyan Agriculture 
1. Volume of Production 
The proportion of gross domestic product contributed by the 
agricultural sector amounted to roughly 30% in 1973 according to 
official statistics. 
1 
About 53% of agriculture's share is thought 
to originate outside the monetary economy. Agriculture's share of 
GDP stood at about 45% in the early 1950's and the estimated pro- 
portion outside the monetary economy amounted to about 65%. 
2 
The 
agricultural product grew from Sh 2,531 million in 1964 to Sh 3,816 
million (at 1964 prices) in 1973,3 a compounded increase of more 
than 4% per annum. These statistics indicate that while agricul- 
tural production has expanded and has become more highly commer- 
cialised, other portions of the economy have expanded more rapidly. 
Agticulture is also the dominant source of Kenya's exports. 
4 
Non-agricultural exports accounted for less than 15% of total 
exports beyond East Africa in 1960, and not more than 30% in 
1972. Coffee, the largest single export commodity, has provided 
between 20% and 30% of Kenya's earnings from exports in recent 
years to countries beyond East Africa. Tea has contributed an 
additional 10% to 20%. 
2. Composition of Output 
An interesting feature of the statistical series showing 
the proportion of gross marketed agricultural output originating 
1. Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey 1974. p. 2. 
2. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Economic Survey 1961. p. 2. 
3. Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey 1974. p. 2. 
4. Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1968. p. 45; 
Statistical Abstract 1973. p. 59. 
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from the small farm and the large farm sectors is its relative 
constancy since the share of each reached approximately 50% in 
1967.1 In 1960 the contribution of the small scale sector 
amounted to only about 32% of the whole. 
2 
Part of this shift 
reflects the subdivision of large farms under the Land Transfer 
Programme, part the increase in smallholder output with the rise 
in cash cropping, and part the organisational and managerial dis- 
array of some of the large farms transferred as large farms. 
Permanent crops (primarily tea, coffee and sisal) account 
for about half the value of Kenya's total marketed production. 
Livestock provides about a quarter of the total, and cereals 
approximately 10-15%. A breakdown of marketed agricultural 
output by major categories of enterprise as of 1960 and 1973 
is given in Table 1-4. An interesting aspect of the data, 
which must be regarded as not more than approximate, is the 
relatively small shifts which have occurred in overall pro- 
portions, against an almost tripling of gross farm cash income. 
Within the smaller categories, the shifts between 1960 and 1973 
have been significant in terms of proportional magnitudes, with 
the entire agricultural sector moving towards the composition 
characteristic of the small scale sector in 1960. Unfortunately, 
recent published statistics have not contained breakdowns by crop 
for both the large scale and small scale sectors. 
Of particular interest to the points to be developed later 
in this paper are the increases in smallholder production of 
certain cash crops and of improved maize varieties. The case of V 
coffee has been dramatic, for smallholder tonnage constitutes 
half the national crop. This proportion was reached in the 
1. Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey 1968. p. 50; Economic 
Survey 1974. p. 55. J. Heyer suggests this balance is spurious, 
that unrecorded. marketed output would be greater for small than 
for large farms. See Heyer, J., "Survey, " p. 29. 
2. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Economic Survey 1962. 
pp, 16,20, adjusted for the change in series as given in 
Heyer, J., "Survey, " p. 30. 
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Table 1-4. The Value Composition of Gross Marketed Agricultural 
Output in Kenya, 1960 and 1973. 
(in millions of shillings and in %) 
1960 
Scheduled Non- 
Commodity Areas & Scheduled 1973 
Group Coast Areas Total Total 
Sh m% Sh m% Sh m% Sh m% 
Cereals 113.9 15 26.9 14 140.8 15 290.5 12 
Temporary 
Industrial 
Crops ( 26.0 4 16.5 9 42.5 5 182.8 7 
Other 
Temporary 
Crops ( 19.3 10 19.3 2 157.7 6 
Permanent 
Crops 421.4 56 80.8 42 502.2 53 1,180.6 48 
Total Crops 561.3 74 143.5 75 704.8 74 1,811.6 73 
Livestock 196.1 26 49.0 25 245.0 26 656.8 27 
Gross Farm 
Revenue 757.4 100 192.5. 100 949.8 100 2,468.4 100 
Sources: Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Economic Survey 1962. 
pp. 16,20; Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey 1974. p. 54. 
The basis used for the 1973 calculations is slightly different from 
that used in 1960, reflecting the standardisation of reporting 
years for the various commodities and the elimination of inter- 
sectoral transfers, as explained in Republic of Kenya, Economic 
Survey 1967, pp. 32 ff. 
Definitions : 
Cereals: Wheat, maize, barley, rice, etc. 
Temporary Industrial Crops: Oil seeds, pineapples, pyrethrum, 
sugar cane, tobacco, cotton. 
Other Temporary Crops: Pulses, potatoes, etc. 
Permanent Crops: Coffee, sisal, tea, coconut products, wattle, 
cashew nuts, fruit, etc. 
Livestock: Cattle and calves, sheep, goats, lambs, pigs, 
poultry and eggs, wool, hides and skins, dairy products. 
Note: Columns may not sum to totals because of rounding errors. 
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mid-1960's, 
1 
having risen from a level of 19% in 1960.2 This 
growth followed the relaxation of restrictions which limited 
African production. Smallholder tea has also shown extraordinary 
expansion, which was still underway in the mid-1970's. While in 
1960 there were fewer than 1,000 ha planted to tea in smallholder 
areas, 
3 
almost 31,000 ha had been planted by about 80,000 growers 
by June 1973.4 Pyrethrum has also changed from being predominantly 
a large scale crop to being overwhelmingly a small scale one. While 
in 1960 smallholder tonnage accounted for 21% of total production, 
5 
in the early 1970's smallholders produced 90% of the crop. 
6 
The rate of smallholder adoption of improved varieties of 
food crops is more difficult to document, and it is regrettable 
that there is no published statistical series showing estimated 
improved seed turnover, broken down on a geographical basis and 
by crop. However, data obtained by Mundt for the smallholder 
District of Kericho shows an immense increase in the volume of 
hybrid maize seed sold between 1967/68 and 1971/72: 
7 
1967/68 121 tons 
1968/69 136 tons 
1969/70 243 tons 
1970/71 346 tons 
1971/72 582 tons 
The rate of growth monitored by Mundt amounts to 48% compounded 
annually. Moock indicates that while in 1962 only 2% of the 
farmers in the densely populated Vihiga Division of Kakamega 
District grew hybrid maize, by 1970 the adoption rate stood 
1. Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey 1967. pp. 35,38,39,44. 
2. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Economic Survey 1962. p. 18. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey 1974. p. 65. 
5. Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1968. p. 73. 
6. The Pyrethrum Board of Kenya and the Pyrethrum Marketing Board, 
Annual Report and Accounts for the Period Ist October 1969 to 30th 
September 1970. p. 3. 
7. Mundt, Christoph, "Betriebsberatung und Kreditvergabe auf Af- 
rikanischen Kleinbaurenbetrieben in Tropischen Hbhenlagen Ost- 
afrikas (Kericho District, Kenia), " (Extension Services and Credit 
on African Smallholdings in Tropical Highlands in East Africa 
(Kericho District, Kenya)}. Kitale, German Agricultural Team, 
1973. (mimeo) p. 24. 
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at 59%. 
1 
This type of growth was also found by Garst in areas 
studied in Kisii, in which the estimated cumulative adoption 
for improved maize stood at about 2% in 1960 and exceeded 75% 
by 1970, defined as farms on which adoption had taken place as 
a percent of the total number of farms in the area. 
2 
A review of the vigour of hybrid maize adoption in Kenya 
sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation suggests an increase in 
the area planted to hybrid maize on smallholdings from 700 ha in 
1964 to 137,500 ha in 1971, indteating an annual growth rate of 
more than 50% on a compound basis. 
3 
This estimate appears to be 
based on Kenya Seed Company data and on the recommended application 
rate of 10 kg of seed per acre (25kg per ha). While work by 
Moock4 and Allan5 indicates that planting at the recommended 
density is perhaps only infrequently observed on smallholdings, 
the evidence nevertheless suggests a very rapid growth of hybrid 
maize adoption. 
However, the 1969/70 small farm census indicates that the 
total area on small farms and settlement schemes planted to un- 
improved maize was 849,700 ha, while improved varieties occupied 
155,800 ha. 6 Although an estimated 15% of maize land devoted to 
improved varieties may not appear impressive, there probably has 
been significant expansion in smallholder cultivation of improved 
varieties since 1969/70. 
1. Moock, Peter Russell, Managerial Ability in Small Farm 
Production: An Analysis of Maize Yields in the Vihiga Division 
of Kenya. Unpublished PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 
1973. pp. 110-111. 
2. Garst, Ronald D., The Spatial Diffusion of Agricultural 
Innovations in Kisii District, Kenya. Unpublished PhD dis- 
sertation, Michigan State University, 1972. p. 122. 
3. Streeter, Carroll P., "Reaching the Developing World's 
Small Farmers. " New York, Rockefeller Foundation, 1973?. p. 48. 
4. Moock, Peter Russell, op. cit., pp. 258-259. 
5. Allan, A. Y., "Maize Diamonds, " The Kenya Farmer. January 
1968. p. 18. 
6. Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey 1974. p. 56. 
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Another indicator of improved practices is the growth in 
fertiliser use. Kenya imports its entire chemical fertiliser 
requirements, and the trend in the use of this class of input 
is suggested by the following import data, which is net of 
re-exports, expressed in thousands of metric tons: 
l 
Type of 
Fertiliser 
Imported 1960 1965 1970 1972 
Nitrogenous 14.7 47.9 50.2 54.7 
Phosphatic 13.0 11.9 19.3 15.4 
Other 10.8 10.8 48.9 59.7 
There is a general concensus that fertiliser usage has not 
increased by a very significant factor on large farms during 
the last ten or 15 years, suggesting that the upsurge in 
imports reflects mainly small farmer demand. 
2 
Data from one 
of the main distributors also suggests that the volume of 
fertiliser purchases has increased greatly in small farm areas. 
3 
Also of note is the growth of dairy enterprises based on 
grade cattle in smallholder and settlement areas. Lacking 
reliable livestock census data, the major dimension of adoption 
cannot be monitored. However, the rise in estimated real gross 
farm revenue from dairying on small farms by more than 60% 
between 1963 and 1966 gives an indication of the scope of the 
change. 
4 
In money terms the rise in gross farm revenue was 
from Sh 10.4 million to Sh 16.2 million, perhaps 75% of which 
reflects the transfer of grade cattle from large farms to 
settlement schemes. 
5 
The Department of Settlement reported 
1. Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1968. p. 56; 
Statistical Abstract 1973. p. 72. 
2. Republic of Kenya, Report of the Working Party on 
Agricultural Inputs. p. 11. 
3. Donaldson, G. F., and J. D. Von Pischke, op. cit., pp. 150-151. 
4. The publication of small farm dairy revenue data has been 
discontinued and indications for years following 1966 are 
lacking. Revenue data is from Republic of Kenya, Economic 
Survey 1967, p. 47, and a price deflator was calculated from 
Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1968, p. 75. 
5. Estimated from Republic of Kenya, Economic Surve 1967, 
p. 47 and Economic Survey 1970, p. 74. 
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over 95,000 dairy cows on settlement schemes as of the end of 
1971,1 and while some of this herd consisted of animals brought 
to the schemes by farmers from small farm areas, the bulk would 
represent an addition to the non-large farm herd since the start 
of the settlement programme in the early 1960's. Between 1967 
and the end of 1974 the Agricultural Finance Corporation pro- 
vided loans to smallholders for the acquisition of over 20,000 
animals2 and the commercial banks also provided a substantial 
amount of funds to owners of smallholdings -- an amount which 
probably exceeded AFC's lending in these areas. 
3 
Given the 
transfer of animals within the smallholder sector, not all of 
these loan-financed animals would constitute additions to the 
smallholder herd. Grade cattle, nevertheless, have been a 
popular innovation by smallholders in recent years. 
1. Annual Report 1971. P. 36. 
2. Agricultural Finance Corporation, "The IDA 105-KE Small- 
holder Agricultural Credit Project: Report of the Period 
June 30th 1967 to 31st March 1973, " contains an estimate of 
15,000 grade heifers financed under this scheme. This figure 
was subsequently raised to 17,000. The estimate of 20,000 
used above seems a reasonable extrapolation from the lower 
base, given a second IDA project and lending under the KFW and 
AFC small scale programmes. 
3. Data gathered by the writer in Murang'a District indicates 
that in the first quarter of 1973 AFC registered 30 charges 
against registered land with respect to loans amounting to 
Sh 140,000 while the commercial banks registered 236 charges 
with respect to Sh 1,942,200 of loans. Most of these com- 
mercial bank loans were ostensibly for agricultural purposes. 
See Von Pischke, J. D., Small Farmer Credit in Kenya: A Review 
of Major Credit Schemes. Vol. III, Credit Use and Development 
on Nineteen Murang'a Farms 1969-1973. Studies in Employment 
and Rural Development, No. 5. Washington, DC, International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, September 1974. 
(mimeo) p. 39. This finding suggests that the trend noted 
almost a decade earlier in the Lawrance Report may still con- 
tinue, i. e., "that in the last seven years farmers have received 
as much credit from the banks as from the Government's general 
credit programme.... " Republic of Kenya, Report of the Mission 
on Land Consolidation and Registration in Renya 1965-1966 (The 
Lawrance Report). Nairobi, 1966. p. 126. In fact the ex- 
istence of this trend in 1970 was affirmed by data provided 
to the World Bank's agricultural sector review mission. 
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D. Markets for Productive Factors in Kenya 
1. The Market for Landl 
Two legal regimes apply to land in Kenya: customary and 
non-customary. 
2 
The non-customary originated with European 
penetration and has been extended to customary landholders as 
a result of the process of change which has altered the economic 
basis for customary land arrangements. The non-customary regime 
applies to the majority of land devoted to the types of agri- 
culture of interest from the point of view of this paper, and 
its application is widening with Government initiatives to 
expand land registration. Registration may be viewed as a 
primary thrust of the move from customary to non-customary 
land tenure arrangements. 
a. The market for land in the former Scheduled Areas 
European agricultural settlement in Kenya has involved some 
formalised procedure for registration of claims over land virtually 
from the time it began. Organised and controlled access to land 
was essential to Britain's concern for encouraging European 
settlement on one hand and for its responsibilities, as perceived 
at the time, as colonial overlord of the indigenous population on 
the other. 
Towards the close of the colonial era in 1961, the distri- 
bution of Scheduled Area alienated holdings by type of tenure 
was reported as follows: 
3 
freehold tenure 226,700 ha 
99 year leasehold 239,300 ha 
999 year leasehold 2,571,300 ha 
1. This section has benefitted greatly from comments, on an 
early draft, provided by Mr J. C. D. Lawrance of the Ministry of 
Overseas Development, London. 
2. McAuslan, J. P. W. B., "Control of Land. " p. 177. 
3. Government of Kenya, The Economic Development of Kenya. 
p. 47. The Scheduled Areas also contained a small amount of 
unalienated land. 
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Most of the freeholdings reflect grants made prior to the 
enactment of the Crown Land Ordinance of 1915, although in 
the early 1960's legal provisions were enacted enabling the 
conversion of leaseholds into freeholds. 
1 
Leaseholds were 
provided largely under the 1915 Ordinance, although that form 
of tenure was also the most common for European farmers prior 
to 1915.2 The lessor was formerly the British Crown and is now 
the Republic of Kenya. The land transferred for African settle- 
ment schemes since 1960 is held initially by the Settlement 
Fund Trustees as the creditors of the settlers. Registration 
of settlement land was underway by the early 1970's. Settlers' 
title is confirmed by original letters of allotment issued as a 
basis for taking up plots, but certificates are not being issued 
to settlers until their loans from the Agricultural Settlement 
Fund are repaid in full. 
3 
In the 1950's the "normal" market for land in the Scheduled 
Areas was characterised by a turnover in the market of about 5% 
of the total number of holdings. 
4 
Transfers of agricultural land 
in the Scheduled Areas were supported to some extent by the Land 
Bank, founded in 1931.5 
Data pertaining to recent activity in the large farm land 
market are not readily available, given the Lands Department 
practice of making no distinction in its Annual Reports between 
1. McAuslan, J. P. W. B., "Control of Land. " p. 175. Evidently 
little use has been made of these facilities, provided in the 
Conversion of Leases Regulations. 
2. Sorrenson, M. P. K., "Land Policy in Kenya, " in Harlow, Vincent, 
and E. M. Chilver, eds., History of East Africa. Oxford, Claren- 
don Press, 1965. pp. 673-680; Lipscomb, "J. F., "The Crown Land 
Ordinances, 1902 and 1915, " in Cone, L. Winston, and J. F. Lipscomb, 
eds., op, cit., p. 54. 
3. Private communication from Mr J. C. D. Lawrance, Land Tenure 
Advisor, Ministry of Overseas Development, London. 21 May 1975. 
4. Private interview with Mr Dermott Kydd, Chief Valuer, Lands 
Department, Ministry of Lands and Settlement, Nairobi, 1973. 
5. Cone, L. Winston, and J. F. Lipscomb, "Phase III -- 1939- 
1959, " in Cone, L. Winston, and J. F. Lipscomb, eds., op. cit., 
p. 81. 
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settlement land and the remaining large farm properties. 
Information concerning the extent to which African-owned large 
farms have changed hands in the market and the extent to which 
shares in such farms have been traded is not readily available. 
Data from the Nyandarua Registry for 1974, where virtually 
all registered titles are in respect of settlement plots, shows 
an ownership turnover through sales of about 0.2% of the total 
of 5,663 registered plots. 
' 
b. The market for registered land in smallholder areas2 
One of the main rationale advanced for the allocation of 
considerable budgetary resources to land registration in areas 
not subjected to European settlement is the favourable impact 
on agricultural development envisaged from registration. In the 
quaint prose of the Swynnerton Plan, the objective of registration 
was stated as follows: 
3 
Sound agricultural development is dependent upon a system 
of land tenure which will make available to the African 
farmer a unit of land and a system of farming whose pro- 
duction will support his family at a level, taking into 
account perquisites derived_from the farm, comparable with 
other occupations. He must be provided with such security 
of tenure through an indefeasible title as will encourage 
him to invest his labour and profits into the development 
of his farm and as will enable him to offer it as security 
against such financial credits as he may wish to secure 
from such sources as may be open to him. 
At another point the Plan uses more direct language: 
4 
We must go all out for the primary objective, to give 
security of tenure and an occupational license. 
The Lawrance Report notes that security of tenure and 
possession of registered title are not necessarily the same, 
summarising one set of observations as follows: 
5 
1. Lands Department preliminary material. 
2. Smallholder areas as used here include the former Trust Lands. 
3. Swynnerton, R. J. M., op. cit., p. 9. 
4. Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
5. Republic of Kenya, Report of the Mission on Land Con- 
solidation and Registration. p. 9. 
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We do not wish to decry registration of title as a 
useful, indeed necessary process, but we must get it 
into the right perspective. It is not a panacea for 
all tenurial ills, nor indeed is it, as so many seem 
to think, an end in itself. We feel we must make this 
clear because, in making it an aim of policy to apply 
registration of title unselectively to all areas capable 
of development throughout the whole country, the Kenya 
Government is not only attempting a task of unparalleled 
magnitude but could in many places be merely handing a 
stone to the man who is asking for bread. 
By the end of 1973, about 3.1 million ha or 20% of the 15 
million ha deemed fit for registration in smallholder areas by 
the Kenya Government had been registered and the process leading 
to the issue of titles had begun for another 20%. 
1 
The process 
of registration has tended to follow a pattern of priorities 
which has resulted in the early registration of the areas which 
are well endowed agriculturally. 
Registration has in fact provided a cornerstone for small- 
holder credit by public sector lenders and commercial banks by 
creating in land a mortgagable asset. However, credit is not 
generally available for the purchase of smallholder land per se, 
2 
although of course the fungible nature of credit makes it im- 
possible to prevent borrowers' using credit for the purpose most 
important to them, not necessarily for the purpose judged most 
important by the lender. 
3 
1. Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey 1974. p. 78. 
2. The Agricultural Finance Corporation provides loans to 
smallholders who have less than ten acres and who can enlarge 
their farms with the purchase of contiguous land. However, this 
situation appears to be infrequent and few loans of this nature 
have been made. Commercial banks generally prefer to lend for 
"productive purposes" only and in any event are unwilling to 
provide credit at the maturities appropriate for investments in 
land. 
3. Field surveys confirm the diversion of commercial bank credit, 
issued for production purposes or for the acquisition of grade 
cattle, for the purchase of land. See Wilson, Rodney J. A., "The 
Economic Implications of Land Registration in Kenya's Smallholder 
Areas. " Staff Paper No. 91, Institute for Development Studies, 
University of Nairobi. February 1971. p. 17; Von Pischke, J. 
D., Credit Use and Development. p. 121. 
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The extent to which registration is responsible for the 
development of an active land market is not assessable because 
of the impossibility of isolating the effects of registration 
from the other factors which result in purchases, sales, leases, 
and similar transactions. Wilson suggests that registration per 
se has little effect on the market for land. 
1 
The trends in land 
transactions monitored by Wilson appear to be the result of 
rational responses to the economics of land -- independent of 
registration -- within the social patterns of Kisii, where he 
conducted a survey of landholders who appeared to have an interest 
in registration because of their dealings in land and their 
mortgaging of land. The volume of transfers (i. e., purchases, 
sales, and gifts) reported before and after registration by these 
respondents was not greatly different, leading Wilson to conclude 
that registration was not a material factor affecting transaction 
volume. 
However, Wilson notes that some of the pre-registration 
transactions reported may have been initiated by buyers in an- 
ticipation of registration, as timely purchase would not involve 
the expenses and formalities of transfer which would obtain 
following registration, while also providing the prospect of a 
dispute-free registered claim. In any event, logic suggests that 
registration would contribute to the development of a land market 
primarily by rendering transactions easier and safer. 
It may also be asked whether the period monitored by Wilson 
was sufficient to support his conclusion. Registration occurred 
in 1967 in Wilson's sample area, while results of his study 
appeared in 1971. Even if the period were sufficient, however, 
and the question of the accuracy of reports of pre-registration 
transactions is ignored, the problem remains of isolating the 
effects of registration from the changing economics of land use. 
1. Wilson, Rodney J. A., "Economic Implications of Land 
Registration. " p. 24. 
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Statistics showing land registry entries do indicate an 
increasing volume of transactions, but without additional in- 
formation on the events behind citizens' approaches to the 
registries interpretation is again difficult. There is also 
evidence, cited previously, that the volume of unregistered 
transactions is large, amounting to a substantial number in 
relation to those which are registered. This anomaly also 
complicates` attempts to assess the level of activity in the 
land market. Table 1-5 gives the number of transfers recorded 
on selected registries for several years between 1964 and 1974. 
The 1964-1966 statistics are not consistent in all cases, as 
land was still being added to several of the registries during 
that period. During 1971 the number of registered transactions 
was no doubt inflated to some extent by the formalisation of 
earlier unregistered transactions in response to an educational 
programme mounted in 1969 and 1970 by the Government in an 
effort to inform the citizenry more fully of the role of 
registries and protection registration affords. However, 
the 1974 figures clearly suggest an increase in the number 
of transfers. 
This trend is largely confirmed by a longer series of 
data on transfers available for Kiambu and Nyeri, where 
registration has been complete for some time, as given in 
Table 1-6. These series, however, suggest a wide degree of 
variation in the number of recorded transactions. While 
great increases in transfers occurred in Kiambu in 1963 and 
in Nyeri in 1965, the volume of transfers recorded annually 
in the mid-1960's does not appear to have been maintained in 
all later periods, for reasons which are not fully discussed 
in published information. 
Table I-7 indicates that transfers tend to be more 
frequent in better endowed Districts, such as Kiambu and 
Nyeri, than in poorly endowed Districts such as Kakamega 
and Kisii, although this pattern is not entirely consistent. 
Once again, this observation suggests that the increasing 
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Table I-5. Simple Transfers Recorded in Selected Land Registries, 
1964-66,1971 and 1974. 
Year 
Registry 1964 1965 1966 1971 1974 
Bungoma 59 73 85 273 707 
Eldoret 42 89 70 28 83 
a/ Embu 330 573 644 1,042 1,288 
Kakamega 7 66 107 598 880 
b/ 
Kiambu 2,248 2,283 3,060 2,014 3,901 
Kisii - 1 22 178 580 
" 
Kisumu - - - 35 90 
Meru 36 84 211 467 945 
Murang'a 376 548 601 1,608 2,026 
Nyeri 597 1,205 1,766 612 853 
Source: Republic of Kenya, Lands Department, Annual Report 1965, 
1966,1971, and preliminary data for 1974. 
a/ including Kirinyaga, created from the Embu Registry in 1971. 
b/ including Ngong. 
c/ including Siaya, created from the Kisumu Registry in 1971. 
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Table 1-6. Land Transfers Registered Annually in Kiambu and 
Nyeri Districts, Selected Years, 1959-1974. 
Year Kiambu Registry Leri Registry 
1959 a/ 
1960 782 a/ 
1961 852 68 
1962 872 764 
1963 1,557 339 
1964 2,248 597 
1965 2,283 1,205 
1966 b/ 1,766 
1971 2,014 612 
1974 3,901 853 
Source: Data through 1963 are from Republic of Kenya, Report 
of the Mission on Land Consolidation and Registration, pp. 165, 
170; data for 1964-1966 and 1971 are from annual reports of the 
Department of Lands; while 1974 statistics are from unpublished 
Department of Lands records. 
a/ denotes the year in which the process of initial regis- 
tration of smallholdings-was completed in a District. 
b/ indicates an absence of data available on a consistent basis. 
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Table 1-7. Rates of Registered Turnover in Land Ownership 
through Transfers in Selected Districts, 
1965,1966,1971 and 1974. 
Transfers as a 
Proportion of Registered Registered, Register 
District Holdings or Titles Holdings- Titles- 
Registry 1965 1966 1971 1974 1966 1971 1974 
(Registration completed prior to 1965) 
Embu/ 
Kirinyaga 1.3% 1.5% 2.1% 2.2% 43,302 49,882 57,764 
Kiambu 6.1% 8.2% 2.8% 5.3% 37,408 72,675 74,062 
Nyeri 2.8% 4.0% 1.3% 1.7% 43,593 48,221 49,546 
(Registration underway in 1965) 
Bungoma . 7% . 7% 1.1% . 2% 11,978 24,672 38,424 
Kakamega . 1% . 2% . 7% . 8% 63,372 89,645 117,177 
Kisii . 1% . 4% . 3% . 8% 5,503 54,796 71,320 
Meru . 7% 1.0% 1.1% 1.8% 22,426 43,819 53,424 
Murang'a . 9% . 8% 1.4% 1.7% 74,987 117,143 117,899 
Source: The percentages of holdings transferred in 1965 and 1966 
are based on the number of holdings registered as given in Repub- 
lic of Kenya, Economic Survey 1967, p. 54; and on the number of 
transfers reported annually in Republic of Kenya, Lands Depart- 
ment, Annual Report 1965, p. 15, and Annual Report 1966, p. 15. 
Data for 1971 is from Republic of Kenya, Lands Department, Annual 
Report 1971 and from Fleming, J. T., unpublished manuscript quoted 
by permission. 1974 statistics are from unpublished Lands Depart- 
ment material. 
a/ Registered holdings as used in this Table refers to the cum- 
ulative total of original registrations. Increments from sub- 
division are excluded from this measure, resulting in an over- 
statement of the proportions shown in this Table for 1965 and 
1966. 
b/ Registered titles refers to the total number of parcels 
carried on Registers at annual reporting dates. 
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trend in the proportion of transfers is a function of economic 
growth, not necessarily of other factors set in train by the 
existence of registration. Fleming notes that factors associated 
with a relatively high level of purchases and sales in any given 
area include: 
1 
1. population pressure on the land, 
2. relatively advanced farming standards, and 
3. access to alternative land, as on settlement schemes or 
where several plots are owned by an individual. 
These observations are consistent with economic logic. All 
suggest a relatively large or rising number of alternatives 
available to land owners, conducive to an augmented volume of 
transactions. On the other hand, highly developed land, such 
as that carrying mature coffee trees, tends not to be transferred 
on a commercial basis, according to Fleming, 
2 
suggesting that 
those committed to and earning regular cash incomes from farming 
have little incentive to sell their most highly developed land 
which would tend to be specialised and hence, other things re- 
maining equal, offer relatively fewer attractive alternative uses. 
Of particular interest is the impact of subdivision on the 
number of titles registered. Table 1-7 shows the number of 
original registrations recorded by 1966 and the number of plots 
on the registries as of the end of 1971. In three Districts -- 
Kiambu, Nyeri, and Embu/Kirinyaga -- registration was completed 
prior to the end of 1965. While in Nyeri the rate of growth in 
the number of titles was less than 2% annually between 1966 and 
1974, and in Embu/Kirinyaga less than 4% annually, an explosion 
of the number of plots appears to have occurred in Kiambu, 
yielding an annual growth rate of 9%. Much of this increase no 
doubt relates to the urbanisation of this District, which is 
contiguous with Nairobi. In the other Districts in the Table 
the increase in the number of registered plots reflects 
primarily the progress of initial registrations. 
1. Fleming, J. T., "Analysis and Review. " pp. 6-13. 
2. Ibid. 
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In addition to transfers, the land market as evidence of 
an increasingly commercial outlook by smallholders is also 
represented by leases and other charges made by lenders. These 
have also experienced considerable growth according to published 
Lands Department statistics and data from other sources. 
1 
Land in smallholder areas has indeed become a commodity. 
This property of land in many parts of Kenya is a fairly recent 
development which is related to economic forces which increase 
the value of land through contributing to its scarcity. 
2 
The 
effect of scarcity is seen in the intensification of its use 
through the replacement of shifting cultivation with sedentary 
agriculture which occurred in the 1920's in many smallholder 
areas. 
3 The role of increasing scarcity is also indicated by 
Wilson's observation that in Kisii land was freely available 
for occupation through the 193U's. 
4 
In economic terms the increasing scarcity of land is a 
function of an increasing demand relative to a more or less 
inelastic supply. Supply is not entirely inelastic, as shown 
by the recent expansion of agriculture into forests beyond the 
former upper altitude limits of-cultivation and into bush beyond 
the former lower altitude limits of sedentary cultivation, as 
for example, in Central and Eastern Provinces near Mr Kenya. 
However, extension of cultivation at the margin involves in- 
creasingly unattractive returns. Upland areas yield only one 
1. Republic of Kenya, Department of Lands, loc. cit.; Wilson, 
Rodney J. A., "Economic Implications of Land Registration. " 
p. 4; Von Pischke, J. D., "Credit Use and Development. " p. 39; 
Fleming, J. T., unpublished manuscript quoted by permission. 
Details of these transactions are not discussed here, as the 
increasingly commercial attitude towards land is amply re- 
flected in the data relating to transfers. 
2. S. H. Fazan reported being told by Kikuyu elders in 1929 
that, "No man might dispose of his land by barter for profit. " 
Quoted in Fleming, J. T., "Analysis and Review, " p. 16, who later 
notes (p. 23) that as of the late 1960's restrictions on the 
disposal of land under customary law have been replaced: "The 
only effective rule that is observed is that land will go to.. 
the highest bidder or whoever has ready cash to hand. " 
3. Heyer, Judith, "Survey. " p. 10. 
4. "Economic Implications of Land Registration. " p. 5. 
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crop a year and are generally far from markets for cash crops 
(excluding tea), while lowland areas are subject to low and 
relatively uncertain rainfall which greatly adds to the risks 
of production as well as restricting opportunities for cash 
cropping. 
As land becomes less freely available there may be an 
incentive to increase land productivity through the more 
intensive application of other factors of production. Land 
scarcity alters the economic underpinnings of traditional 
tenure arrangements, and the development of land in Kenya has 
been accompanied by individualisation of tenure. The Lawrance 
Report indicates that the momentum for individualisation had 
assumed irreversable proportions by 1945.1 This institutional 
development epitomises the change from customary to non-customary 
tenure arrangements in Kenya's recent history. 
c. The market for unregistered land 
Unregistered land falls almost entirely under the customary 
legal regime, and virtually no monitoring of the extent and 
nature of transactions involving unregistered farmland is under- 
taken by official sources. These transactions would no doubt 
be complex and diverse in relation to those noted. on Land 
Registers, reflecting the economic and social bases of the 
societies involved. 
Some indications of the nature of land as a commodity in 
Murang'a prior to registration were recorded in the writer's 
case studies. 
2 In one instance an elderly farmer with a large 
plot had planted trees on his land in the 1930's to provide 
evidence of his claim to the land, to which he now has title. 
More than one respondent indicated that prior to land registration 
in Murang'a unimproved land could be reclaimed by a seller or 
his heirs simply by refunding the purchase price, a systel known 
1. Republic of Kenya, Report of the Mission on Land Consoli- 
dation and Registration. pp. 5-6. 
2. Credit Use and Development. pp. 73-74. 
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as "customary mortgage" or "pledging". Improved land could not 
be reclaimed in this manner, although transfers were not ir- 
reversable under practices and considerations enforced by elders 
to whom matters of this sort were referred. 
The arrangements for transfer of unregistered land need 
not be considered further here. However, it should be noted 
that farmers without land to pledge as security have very little 
chance of obtaining medium or long term credit from the Agricultural 
Finance Corporation or from the commercial banks, the main sources 
of such credit. The commercial banks of course lend against other 
security, but few farmers would have sufficient suitable assets 
other than land to offer the banks as security. The Lawrance 
Report suggests that the fact that land registration provides 
theoretical access to credit was an important reason why there 
appeared to be considerable public sentiment for registration 
at the time that mission was in the field, 
I 
and public enthusiasm 
on these grounds for land registration was also noted a decade 
earlier by the East African Royal Commission. 
2 
2. The Market for Agricultural Labour 
Official estimates of the amount of wage employment 
generated by the agricultural sector are subject to a degree 
of inconsistency and are useful primarily as indicators of 
relative magnitudes. 
3 
Wage employment estimates by sector and 
industry suggest that as of the early 1970's agriculture and 
forestry employed about 200,000 wage earners who constituted 
about 45% of the total private sector wage labour force. 
4 
1. Republic of Kenya, Report of the Mission on Land Consoli- 
dation and Registration. p. 24. 
2. Op. cit., p. 97. 
3. Brief discussions of the problems involved in interpretation 
of recorded data are found in Republic of Kenya, Statistical 
Abstract 1973, p. 221, and in Ray, Robert S., "The Structure of 
Employment in Kenya, " in Sheffield, James R., ed., Education, 
Employment and Rural Development. Report of the Kericho (Kenya) 
Conference, 25 September to 1 October 1966. Nairobi, East African 
Publishing House, 1967. p. 194,196. 
4. Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1973. P. 222. 
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a. Labour in the large scale farm sector 
A contrasting official estimate places the large farm wage 
labour force at about 187,000 or approximately one quarter of 
the total wage labour. force in 1972.1 The ILO Report indicates 
that employment in large scale agriculture declined (from 1960)2 
through 1967 as a result of the transformation of large scale 
farms into settlement schemes, which in effect substituted family 
labour for wage labour, and as a result of the reduction of labour 
inputs per hectare on remaining large farms. 
3 
Kenya does not have a history of landless labourers. Indeed, 
the thrust of much of the political activity of the European 
settlers was to secure labour from the African population, as 
noted earlier. However, land pressure in the last decade has 
provided the basis for the creation of a class of landless 
labourers, and this development of landed and landless classes 
was presaged by the Swynnerton Plan as a "normal step in the 
evolution of a country. "4 
Labour tends to be organised on plantations, but generally 
not on mixed farms and ranches. Outside the plantation sector 
employers of agricultural labour are usually not organised, al- 
though membership in the Kenya National Farmers Union provides a 
forum for discussion and consultation for a number of large scale 
operators. The 1974-1978 Development Plan contains scant reference 
to labour organisation or its projected development. 
b. Labour in the settlement and small scale farm sectors 
Official sources indicate that more than 300,000 persons 
are employed for wages in settlement and small scale agriculture. 
5 
Approximately one-seventh of these are estimated to be children 
(euphemistically termed "juveniles"). Slightly fewer than half 
1. Ibid., pp. 223,225. 
2. Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1968. p. 164. 
3. ILO, op. cit., p. 92. 
4. Swynnerton, R. J. M., op. cit., p. 10. 
5. Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1973. pp. 248-249. 
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are casual labourers. Almost two-thirds are adult males. 
Casual labourers are frequently obtained from the immediate 
vicinity of the employer's farm. Permanent labourers may come 
from further afield, although the range of mobility may be re- 
stricted somewhat by preferences to engage and to work for 
members of one's own tribal group or clan, which would minimise 
communication problems. 
There is no system of formal labour organisation relating 
to smallholder agriculture. The existence of a going rate in 
each area and widespread knowledge of this rate therefore suggests 
an integrated farm labour market. Moock reported a prevailing 
stated wage of Sh 2 per day in Vihiga during his period of 
residence there, although he doubted that the rate was in fact 
constant throughout the year. 
1 The writer found indications of 
a pervasive wage in Murang'a, and a substantial reported increase 
in this wage, from Sh 2 per day in 1969 to Sh 5 per day in 1973. 
Gwyer found that wages paid in small scale areas tended to 
vary directly with the level of cash crop development as mani- 
fested by the diversity of cash enterprises, and that diversi- 
fication tended-to create flatter labour requirement profiles 
throughout the year. 
2 
Undiversified areas had greater seasonal 
variation in 'Labour demand, dominated by maize labour cycles. 
Gwyer notes that in most Districts casual wage rates ex- 
ceeded the regular or full time wage rate. 
3 He suggests this 
reflects a) the different opportunity costs of full time workers, 
who are assumed to be landless, and casuals, who are assumed to 
prefer part time employment; plus b) the difficulties of keeping 
a full time labourer fully employed on a smallholding. It would 
appear that the differential return to the tasks or of the 
1. Moock, Peter Russell, op. cit., p. 220. 
2. Gwyer, G. D., "Labour in Small Scale Agriculture: An Analysis 
of the 1970/71 Farm Enterprise Cost Survey Labour and Wage Data. " 
Working Paper No 62, Institute for Development Studies, Univer- 
sity of Nairobi, 1972. p. 13. 
3. Ibid. 
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urgency of the tasks for which casuals are frequently recruited 
would also influence the demand for their services. The question 
of risk attached to the two forms for farmer and labourer is not 
explicitly cited by Gwyer and could no doubt usefully be 
incorporated into the analysis. 
Gwyer's analysis also points out that food supplies are 
major determinants of labour supply in many smallholder areas. 
A poor harvest in one District increases the number of people 
who go to neighbouring Districts in search of work. 
1 
3. The Market for Physical Capital: Inputs and Supplies 
a. The market for agricultural machinery 
Agricultural machinery is sold by various private dealers 
situated in Nairobi, Nakuru and other centres. Dealers include 
local subsidiaries of manufacturers abroad, local agents en- 
franchised by such local subsidiaries, and distributors en- 
franchised directly by foreign manufacturers. 
2 
A number of 
standard makes are available, although two brands accounted 
for 70% of the tractor market in the late 1960's. 
3 
Credit facilities are provided for eligible buyers of 
certain brands by tied financing companies affiliated with 
major manufacturers, and one finance company in Nairobi reported 
offering hire purchase facilities for farm machinery in 1973. 
Commercial banks and the Agricultural Finance Corporation also 
provide funds for the purchase of tractors and other machinery. 
The volume of tractor imports during the ten years ending 
in 1972 varied erratically around an average of more than 900 
units annually. 
4 
In terms of value at the farm gate, tractor 
imports amounted to between 50% and 67% of total expenditures 
1. Ibid., p. 14. 
2. Republic of Kenya, Report of the Working Party on Agricultural 
Inputs. p. 29. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1973. p. 73. 
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on imported farm machinery between 1964 and 1969 when the total 
market turnover was about Sh 40 million annually. 
' 
The Ministry of Agriculture has a Tractor Hire Service with 
a fleet of 50 machines. 
2 
This service has been concerned with 
expanding land under cultivation, especia 
for wheat and cotton, and in filling gaps 
mechanical draught in small scale areas. 
small in relation to the national tractor 
farms alone there were an estimated 5,500 
b. The market for seasonal inputs 
fly under special schemes 
in the availability of 
However, its impact is 
fleet. On large scale 
tractors in 1972.3 
Fertilisers, seeds and chemicals are handled by three major 
systems of suppliers, and in addition several plantations import 
their supplies directly. 
One of these systems consists primarily of the Kenya Farmers' 
Association (Cooperative) Ltd. (KFA), which was founded early in 
the colonial era by British settlers. KFA handles a variety of 
farm inputs and certain household items at 32 branches and depots 
in major rural centres. 
4 
In addition, KFA has relationships with 
a number of stockists or traders in small centres. Two hundred 
such channels were reported in 1969.5 
The second major input supply network centres around Mac- 
kenzie Dalgety Ltd., which is part of the Inchcape Group and has 
traded in East Africa since the last Century. 
6 
This organisation 
has a number of branches and depots in rural areas, and with the 
exceptions of Nakuru, Nairobi and Mombasa these are not found in 
1. Republic of Kenya, Report of the Working Party on Agricultural 
Inputs. p. 25. 
2. Republic of Kenya, Development Plan 1974-1978. Part I. p. 220. 
3. Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1973. p. 118. 
4. A list of branches and depots is found on the inside cover 
of KFA annual reports. 
5. The Kenya Farmers' Association (Cooperative) Ltd., Directors' 
Report and Statement of Accounts, 1968-1969. p. 5. 
6. National Christian Council of Kenya, Who Controls Industr 
in Kenya? Report of a Working Party. Nairobi, East African 
Publishing House, 1968. pp. 54-55. 
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towns also served by KFA branches and depots. In addition, 
a number of stockists in smaller centres carry brands imported 
by Mackenzie Dalgety. 
The third major input supply system is the cooperative 
structure, which is most well represented in smallholder coffee 
and pyrethrum areas. Cooperative stores provide supplies to their 
members for the cash crops handled by cooperatives and have also 
expanded their lines to include a broad range of farm inputs and 
tools. As of 1974 and 1975 efforts were underway to obtain a 
fertiliser import license for the apex body, the Kenya National 
Federation of Cooperatives, and to expand its activities as a 
channel for farm inputs to primary marketing societies. 
1 The 
cooperatives are increasingly in a position to offer supplies 
on credit to loyal members, which should greatly enhance their 
competitive attractiveness. 
2 
A recent development has been the introduction of small 
packages for inputs on a scale more suitable to the requirements 
of smallholders than the 50 kg or 100 kg bags commonly used on 
large scale operations. The Havelock Report recommended this 
development, 
3 
and in KFA's 1970-1971 annual report the intro- 
duction of a 33.3 kg bag of fertiliser to accompany the 10 kg 
or "one acre pack" of hybrid maize seed was announced. 
4 
Fertilisers are increasingly available in 25 kg bags, too, and 
small stockists frequently break standard lots to sell inputs 
5 
by the kilogram. 
1. Turtiainen, Turto, "Cooperatives in Kenya and the Role of 
the Nordic Project. " Nairobi, Kenafec Press (Cooperative Press), 
May 1974. p. 11. 
2. Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Cooperatives and Social 
Services, Department of Cooperative Development. "Policy for 
Credit Sales and Loans to Members. " Commissioner's Circular 
No. 9 of 1972.27 November 1972. 
3. Republic of Kenya, Report of the Working Party on Agri 
cultural Inputs. p. 18. 
4. p. 5. 
5. Moock noted this practice in Vihiga, an area of very small 
farms, in 1971. See Moock, Peter Russell, op. it p. 227. 
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c. The market for other supplies and inputs 
Fencing, hand tools, sprayers and similar items are handled 
by the concerns and channels involved in seed, fertiliser and 
chemical distribution, and also by local stockists including 
ironmongers. Outlets are found in District headquarters towns 
and smaller centres. There are also local fabricators of gal- 
vanised steel sheet water tanks and local purveyors of fence 
posts in many areas. 
E. Marketing Arrangements for Agricultural Produce 
1. Statutory Boards and Marketiag Organisations 
Public sector authorities exercise control over the country's 
major export crops and also have considerable influence over the 
pricing or major food crops such as maize, wheat and beans. There 
were more than ten such entities in operat-, onal existence at the 
national level in the early 1970's, many tracing their roots to 
wartime measures introduced in the early 194Q's. 
1 
The framework 
of controls established in the colonial era has. been largely 
maintained. Indeed, it is interesting to note that no major 
1. East Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955. pp. 65-70; ILO, 
op. cit., pp. 159-163; Ghai, Y. P., and J. P. W. B. McAuslan, op. 
cit., pp. 97-109. The latter source goes into the greatest 
detail, discussing the Defense (Agricultural Production) Regu- 
lations 1940 and the Increased Production of Crops Ordinance 
1942, as well as documenting the dates at which statutory boards 
were organised for various crops. These include wheat, 1930 
(reorganised 1952); cashew nuts, 1933; pyrethrum, 1935 (1956); 
passion fruit, 1937; sisal, 1939 (1945); pigs, 1945; coffee, 
1946; t'a, 1950; cotton lint and seed, 1954; cereals ('heat, 
oats, barley, sunflower), 1956; canning crops (pineapples), 
1957; dairy products, 1958; maize, 1959. (In many cases, 
notably that of maize, the establishment of a statutory board 
followed long after the imposition of some form of statutory 
control. ) Most statutory boards are listed in a directory, 
"Statutory Boards Coming Within the Purview of the Inspector 
of Statutory Boards, " published periodically by the Inspector- 
ate of Statutory Boards in the Office of the President, 
Republic of Kenya. 
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changes have been made with respect to the system of controls 
since independence. Boards and legislative Acts exist for all 
major cash crops, and prices are administered by these authori- 
ties. In some cases the crop authorities are monopsonistic 
buyers of smallholder produce, as for tea, while in other cases 
their purchasing authority in theory extends only to the marketing 
of surpluses across District boundaries and import-export 
monopolies, as for maize. The statutes pertaining to most of 
the statutory boards typically allot them responsibility for a 
broad range of functions such as collection, storage, marketing 
and distribution. 
2 Statutory boards have played an important 
role in the development of smallholder crops, as suggested by 
Swynnerton: 3 
The development of large African cash crops should on 
no account take place in a haphazard manner. 
Right from the beginning of the development of a cash 
crop industry, therefore, even though in the beginning 
they have to rely on Government for funds and staff, 
cash crop boards should be set up... for each major 
developing cash crop.... 
The structure of statutory control and the strength of 
board monopoly varies considerably. At least two tiers of 
intervention can be identified: one involves policy-making and 
control, and the other involves operational responsibility for 
processing, storage, marketing and related functions. In the 
case of the Maize and Produce Board these two tiers are combined 
in one body. In the case of tea, the Tea Board of Kenya is the 
controlling organisation for the entire industry while the Kenya 
Tea Development Authority has responsibility for processing and 
marketing the produce of the smallholder segment of the industry. 
4 
1. See The Laws of Kenya for chapters regarding specific crops. 
2. For a brief statement by a Minister of Agriculture concerning 
the official rationale for and scope of intervention, see Nyagah, 
J. J. M., "Policy Issues, " in Amann, V. F., ed., Agricultural Policy 
Issues in East Africa. Proceedings of the East African Agri- 
cultural Economics Society Conference, Nairobi, June 1971. 
Kampala, Makerere University, 1973. p. 2. 
3. Op. cit., pp. 24-25. 
4. National Christian Council of Kenya, Industry in Kenya. 
pp. 22-24. 
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Pyrethrum and coffee have an even greater structural diversity. 
The pyrethrum industry has a controlling board, a marketing 
board, and a processing company owned by the marketing board 
and other investors. 
I 
Coffee production and marketing policy 
is the responsibility of one board, an apex cooperative does 
most of the processing of clean cherry and grading, a separate 
company affiliated with the board mentioned above provides 
storage facilities, and yet another entity is responsible for 
organising and conducting auctions for the buyers who export 
the crop. 
2 
The cooperative structure is also accorded statutory 
monopsony by Section 48(1) of the Cooperative Societies Act, 
which gives the Minister concerned the power to require that 
all producers of an agricultural commodity in a given area sell 
the marketed share of their production of the commodity to the 
society handling the commodity in the area if the society first 
obtains a market share of 60% in the area and commodity concerned. 
3 
This provision has found expression largely in marketing arrange- 
ments for smallholder coffee, smallholder pyrethrum and dairy 
produce. With respect to coffee and pyrethrum the cooperative 
structure is a client organisation of the statutory boards which 
control these industries. 
The extent of intervention depends on the nature of the 
crop. Export crops for which there is little home market, such 
as coffee, tea and pyrethrum, provide a situation in which inter- 
vention and controls are most easily applied. Crops which are 
grown primarily on a large scale, such as wheat, are also 
relatively easily controlled, especially as the control mechanism 
can be made to serve the economic interests of already important 
interest groups, such as large landowners. Smallholder food 
1. Ibid., pp. 35-36. 
2. Ibid., pp. 16-19. 
3. Crow, W. M., and K. Ram, A Guide to the Cooperative Societies 
Act. Lower Kabete, Kenya Institute of Administration, 1969. 
pp. 45-46. 
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crops such as maize and beans are the most difficult to control, 
and for these crops Maize and Produce Marketing Board prices 
provide something of a floor price. However, only a small pro- 
portion of total maize output is marketed through this Board, 
as most of the crop is consumed by growers, and as growers are 
free to sell maize privately within their own Districts. 
Boards do not appear to have accumulated hugh reserves 
along the pre-independence West African pattern or the Malawian 
pattern of the first half of the 1970's, and the operations 
(as opposed to their price policies) of the various statutory 
bodies appears not to have been subjected to very much economic 
analysis. 
Managerial performance of the various statutory marketing 
organisations appears to vary greatly. The Kenya Tea Develop- 
ment Authority, with support and supervision from the Common- 
wealth Development Corporation and the World Bank, appears to 
be a model of a cash crop development institution. 
1 
The Maize 
and Produce Board, on the other hand, has provided material for 
press comment and commissions of enquiry. 
2 
The 1974-1978 Development Plan indicates that "marketing and 
pricing policies will be completely overhauled" during the Plan 
period, 
3 
although there is little indication of the direction of 
the expected changes. 
2. Non-statutory Marketing Facilities for Farm Produce 
Beneath the statutory marketing structure local markets in 
food crops operate on a traditional and also on a conventional 
commercial basis. Local markets in rural areas are characterised 
by numerous sellers, frequently women, of home-grown produce. The 
larger towns are served by market gardening entrepreneurs. 
1. An early assessment is contained in Ruthenberg, Hans, 
African Agricultural Production Development Policy in Kenya, 
1952-1965. Berlin, Springer Verlag, 1966. pp. 39-47. 
2. See, for example, Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select 
Committee on the Maize Industry. Nairobi, Government Printer, 
1973. 
3. Republic of Kenya, Development Plan 1974-1978. Part I. 
p. 200. 
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Outside the statutory marketing structure certain commodities 
are traded in relatively unsupervised markets. Macadamia nuts, 
wattle bark and charcoal are a few examples. 
The statutory system of controls is of course impossible 
to enforce tightly with respect to certain crops. Dairy pro- 
duce is traded on the black market in Nairobi, perhaps tolerated 
by the authorities bei 
problems which appear 
Creameries to provide 
and on a daily basis. 
were also frequent in 
cooperatives have not 
p 
cause of the marketing and processing 
to plague the efforts of the Kenya Cooperative 
fresh and clean milk in sufficient quantities 
The writer found that "illegal" milk sales 
Murang'a District, an area in which dairy 
proved very successful. 
I 
1. Credit Use and Development. pp. 183-189. 
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CHAPTER II 
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND BROADLY-BASED DEVELOPMENT 
A. Introduction 
This chapter attempts to provide a theoretical framework 
for examination of the effectiveness of agricultural credit in 
Kenya as a rural development policy instrument. The approach 
taken is to consider the role of financial markets in the 
development process, with special attention to the extent to 
which they may contribute to broadly-based development. 
Broadly-based development may be defined as being self- 
sustaining and having a positive impact on the productivity of 
large segments of the population. 
1 
Given the importance of 
agriculture in the Kenyan economy, broadly-based development 
perforce includes rural development involving large pro- 
portions of the rural population -- more production by most 
people. The definition used here is not directly concerned 
with relative aspects: that some may contribute more than 
others or that it may not be practicable to remove constraints 
to productivity or to enhance the productivity of all producers 
to the same degree. However, it will be apparent from the 
emphasis of this chapter that the distributive implications 
of the approach taken are egalitarian in the sense of providing 
more opportunities to a larger and expanding portion of the 
population. 
The structure of this chapter includes an initial state- 
ment of the nature of financial deepening, followed by obser- 
vations on the efficiency-enhancing function of intermediation 
in financial markets, and the relation between real and financial 
development. The second portion of the chapter is devoted to 
a critique of the use of financial technique as a development 
1. Lele, Uma, The Design of Rural Development. p. 20. 
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stimulant, and the third examines the implications of financial 
deepening for rural development. The closing portion of this 
chapter is devoted to other aspects of "practical" importance 
which may diminish the effectiveness of financial markets in a 
developing mixed economy such as Kenya's. 
B. The Theory of Financial Deepening 
1. Definition 
Financial deepening refers to the growth of an economy's 
financial assets at a more rapid rate than the growth of its 
real assets. 
1 
The term appears to have been coined by Shaw 
in his book on the subject, as it is not found in his earlier 
publications or in major works by others writing before the 
appearance of Shaw's book who were concerned with the same 
phenomenon. 
2 
Financial deepening is a function of the operation of 
financial intermediaries. The relationship between growth in 
real assets and the growth of financial assets may be illustra- 
ted by simple balance sheet presentations. The following example 
traces the transfer of savings of 100 to investment in real assets 
through three alternative channels, each representing an alter- 
native financial technology. Several simplifying assumptions and 
simple balance sheet presentations are used as required. 
Self-finance is the most fundamental case, as shown in 
Table II-1. The saving unit is also the investing unit. The 
accumulated saving represented by a cash balance of 100 is an 
asset, which in turn is represented by a financial claim, net 
1. Shaw, Edward S., Financial Deepening. p. vii. 
2. Shaw's use of "deepening" in this context is consistent with 
the more general usage found in the term "capital deepening. " 
Capital deepening denotes an increase in the amount of capital 
per unit of labour, which permits the realisation of greater 
labour productivity. See, for example, Stonier, Alfred W., and 
Douglas C. Hague, A Textbook of Economic Theory. 4th ed. London, 
Longmar Group Ltd., 1972. pp. 602-603. 
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Table II-1. Alternative Financial Technologies: 
The Self-Finance Model 
A. Saving-Investing Unit's Balance Sheet 
Before self-finance 
Assets Liabilities & net worth 
Cash 100 Net worth 100 
After self-finance 
Assets Liabilities & net worth 
Real assets 100 Net worth 100 
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worth, of the same amount. With self-finance, the transfer of 
100 from monetary saving to real investment is simply the exchange 
of one asset for another on the same balance sheet, i. e., by an 
internal shift in the unit's asset portfolio. The salient account- 
ing feature of the alternative financial technologies discussed 
here is suggested most conveniently in the liabilities and net 
worth side of the balance sheets under consideration. It is 
apparent in the self-finance model that no new financial claims 
are created -- the level of financial claims in the example 
remains unchanged at 100, representing the net worth of the 
saving-investing unit. 
Direct finance is the second alternative channel for trans- 
ferring savings to investment, as illustrated in Table 11-2. 
Direct finance occurs when the saving unit transfers liquidity 
directly to the investing unit in the form of a loan, as assumed 
in the Table, or in the form of equity participation. In the two 
unit economy of direct finance financial claims expand at the same 
rate as investment in real assets. No financial deepening occurs. 
The addition of the investment of 100 in real assets on the 
closing "after investment" balance sheet of the investing unit 
is reflected in the addition to financial claims represented by 
the loan of 100 recorded as a liability of the investing unit. 
The element of specialisation introduced by direct finance 
is apparent in the transfer of liquidity from one unit to 
another, which enables the investing unit to employ the savings 
accumulated by the saving unit. It is apparent that direct 
finance involves allocative flexibility which is absent in the 
self-finance model, which is the limiting case. The allocative 
advantages of direct finance and of purely financial transactions 
is illustrated more forcefully in the fact that the investing 
unit in Table 11-2 had nil assets before direct finance. The 
investing unit became an entity only by virtue of the performanace 
of the financial function embodied in the creation of a financial 
claim, in the form of a loan, on the investing unit by the saving 
unit. 
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Table 11-2. Alternative Financial Technologies: 
The Direct Finance Model 
A. Saving Unit's Balance Sheet 
Before direct finance 
Assets Liabilities & net worth 
Cash 100 Net worth 100 
Loan to investing 
unit 
After direct finance 
100 Net worth 100 
B. Investing Unit's Balance Sheet 
Before direct finance 
Assets Liabilities & net worth 
Total assets -0- Liabilities & net worth -0- 
After direct finance 
Cash 100 Loan from saving unit 100 
After investment 
Real assets 100 Loan from saving unit 100 
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A higher order of specialisation is provided by financial 
intermediation. When intermediation is introduced the saving 
unit places its funds at the disposal of the intermediary, who 
in turn provides them to the investing unit, as shown in Table 
11-3. With intermediation, the investment of 100 in real assets 
used in the example is accompanied by a growth of 200 in financial 
claims. Hence, financial assets expand at a more rapid rate than 
real assets, indicating that financial deepening occurs. The 
new financial claims in the example consist of 100 in the form 
of a deposit liability to the saving unit by the intermediary, 
and a liability of 100 on the investing unit's balance sheet 
representing a loan received from the intermediary. The 
insertion of additional intermediaries in the chain between 
the saver and investor would result in an even greater growth 
of financial assets relative to real assets. 
These models of alternative financial technique -- self- 
finance, direct finance and financial intermediation -- suggest 
that financial deepening requires a financial sector inter- 
mediating between savers and investors in the economy. However, 
the simple presentation in Tables II-1,2 and 3 leads to a 
fundamental question: of what benefit, in terms of the growth 
of real asset holdings, is the proliferation of financial claims? 
What are the benefits of financial intermediation? 
2. The Utility of Financial Intermediation 
Economic units having funds in excess of their own direct1 
investment opportunities are linked, through financial markets, 
with units having direct investment opportunities exceeding 
their capacities of self-finance. The importance of providing 
a link between these two types of units rests on the system- 
atic difference between the incidence of "excess" saving and 
useful outlets for investment funds. Writing after the 
1. Direct investment is used here to denote the acquisition 
of real assets by an investing unit. The term does not refer 
to the purely financial transaction between a saving unit and 
an investment unit as in the direct finance model presented 
above. 
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Table 11-3. Alternative Financial Technologies: 
The Intermediation Model 
A. Saving Unit's Balance Sheet 
Before intermediation 
Assets Liabilities & net worth 
Cash 100 Net worth 100 
After intermediation 
Deposit with 
intermediary 100 Net worth 100 
B. Intermediary's Balance Sheet 
Before intermediation 
Assets Liabilities & net worth 
Total assets -0- Liabilities & net worth -0- 
Intermediation - step one 
Cash 100 Deposit from saving unit 100 
Intermediation - step two 
Loan to investing 
unit 100 Deposit from saving unit 100 
C. Investing Unit's Balance Sheet 
Before intermediation 
Assets Liabilities & net worth 
Total assets -0- Liabilities & net worth -0- 
After intermediation 
Cash 100 Loan from intermediary 100 
After investment 
Real assets 100 Loan from intermediary 100 
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tradition of Schumpeter, Cameron and Patrick note that: 
1 
In an exchange economy individual savers are not neces- 
sarily the most efficient investors, since savings 
depends primarily upon income whereas efficient invest- 
ment depends primarily upon entrepreneurial talents, 
knowledge and willingness to take risks. 
Through exchange, financial resources are made available to those 
units which are judged capable of using them to best advantage, 
obtaining higher returns on the use of these resources than 
would be available from their alternative uses 
Financial intermediaries enhance the efficiency and con- 
venience of the allocative process in the operation of financial 
markets by enabling financial resources to flow indirectly 
between surplus (saving) and deficit (investing) units. The 
process and vocabulary of intermediation are described aptly 
by Van Horne, who states that intermediaries "transform direct 
claims -- primary securities -- into indirect claims -- called 
indirect securities -- which differ in form from direct claims., 
2 
Intermediation increases the utility of financial resources by 
enabling the-market to allocate these resources without requiring 
buyers and sellers of securities to negotiate directly with each 
other for each transaction. Direct negotiation and hence direct 
finance involves the inconveniences of barter, to which they are 
analogous. Intermediation increases the attractiveness of 
financial assets and liabilities by providing 1) economies of 
size, 
3 
2) divisibility and flexibility, 3) diversification of 
risk, 4) a variety of maturities through pooling, and 5) expertise 
and convenience. 
4 
Economies of size originate from the continuous nature of an 
1. Cameron, Rondo, et al., Banking in the Early Stages of 
Industrialization. New York, oxford University Press, 1967. p. 8. 
2. Van Horne, James C., Capital Market Rates. p. 6. 
3. "Economies of size" is used here rather than "economies of 
scale" to avoid ambiguities which may arise from the definition 
of economies of scale which suggests that that term refers to the 
scaling up of all inputs by proportional amounts. 
4. Van Horne, James C., Capital Market Rates. pp. 6-7. 
Van Horne speaks of economies of scale rather than economies of 
size. 
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intermediary's transactions according to Van Horne, but con- 
tinuity appears a trifle vague. It may well be that the 
characteristic of continuity and economies of size are simply 
a result or derivative of the repetitiveness and multiplicity 
of such transactions. Continuity is an important dimension of 
financial markets because of the rapidity of change in prices 
in such markets. Changing market conditions create a premium 
on access to information. Such access, inherent in continuous 
operations in a market, provides a basis for economies of size 
in intermediation. Procedures and contacts suitable to the 
intermediation function are other bases for these economies. 
Van Horne indicates that frequent transactions also underlie 
the expertise and convenience which develop through inter- 
mediation. Expertise is another aspect of the access to 
information provided by market participation, and convenience 
is a function of intermediation er se as well as of the 
necessity of frequent transactions to ensure liquidity of 
financial assets, which is discussed later in this section. 
The other advantages of intermediation listed by Van Horne 
have a somewhat more "physical" nature than those discussed 
above, stemming from the input homogenising (blending) and the 
output specialising (segmenting) nature of intermediaries' 
market operations. Divisibility and flexibility refer simply 
to the sizes of transactions -- small inputs can be aggregated, 
large inputs can be disaggregated. The creation of a variety of 
maturities reflects the operation of the same process, but in 
another dimension, that of time. Long term commitments of 
resources can be used for a series of short term transactions, 
and short term commitments of resources can be "rolled over" 
or refunded to provide a stable stock of resources in the 
longer term for any particular user, or may be pooled for the 
creation of a more stable core of resources for diverse uses. 
Intermediaries transform maturities. Diversification of risk 
is also a function of the aggregation and disaggregation in- 
herent in intermediation, and diversification is a means of 
increasing portfolio liquidity. 
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Liquidity is simply "nearness to cash, " with cash defined, 
according to the narrow definition of the money supply, as the 
basic or fundamental financial asset which best satisfies all 
requirements of money. Liquidity has two dimensions: "1) the 
length of time and transaction cost required to convert (an) 
asset into money, and 2) the certainty of the 
1 
y price realised. " 
Liquidity is somewhat paradoxical. Without liquidity there 
would be little in the way of financial markets,, because the 
absence of liquidity implies that financial assets could not 
be converted into cash. However, the ability of financial 
markets to offer an opportunity for conversion, without great 
losses of time and of value, is a major determinant of the 
attractiveness of financial assets (defined to exclude cash) 
to surplus units in the economy. On the other hand, a state 
of complete liquidity would imply the absence of any financial 
assets other than cash (or money supply narrowly defined), 
and hence also an absence of financial markets. 
Intermediaries are essential to the development and 
functioning of financial markets, as without them these markets 
could deal only in direct finance with all of the disadvantages 
of barter exchanges between savers and investors. The market- 
creating function of intermediation is of great economic interest 
because of the role of markets in resource allocation, and ad- 
vocacy of financial deepening is economically justified only if 
it can be demonstrated that more efficient financial markets 
contribute to the more efficient allocation of real resources 
in the economy. 
The general conclusion from the argument developed here is 
that financial intermediation increases the efficiency of finan- 
cial markets. Efficient financial markets enhance the efficiency 
of markets for real capital by lowering the costs of the provision 
of savers' funds to investors, as suggested by the increased 
number of alternative channels between segments of financial 
1. Van Home, James C., Capital Market Rates. p. 12. 
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markets created through the activities of specialists engaged 
in intermediation. Financial deepening reflects specialisation 
to the extent that specialists take a position by issuing claims 
on themselves rather than acting merely as agents between 
principals functioning as savers and as investors. 
3. The Problem of Efficiency and Perfection in Financial Markets 
Efficient markets are indicated by a uniformity of prices 
for a given product traded by a large number of buyers and sellers 
at any given point in time. This definition, specified in terms 
of static equilibrium under conditions of perfect competition, 
assumes that sellers (and buyers, for that matter) do not engage 
in collusion, that government price controls are absent and that 
trading costs and other differentials related to location are not 
material. 
1 
Perfectly competitive financial markets would yield 
a single rate of return, a uniform price for financial capital. 
2 
However, financial markets are characterised by two "distortions" 
or imperfections which diminish the utility and hence the applic- 
ability of the concept of perfect competition as an analytical 
tool. The first is that the price of finance is difficult to 
specify because of the time dimension of credit. Costs and 
returns are not apparent with respect to any given type of 
credit transaction at the time a bargain is struck because 
default can occur only in the future and is perforce unknown. 
A second characteristic of financial markets is product dif- 
ferentiation, and this trait logically follows from the un- 
1. Stigler, George J., The Organization of Industry. Homewood, 
Illinois, Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 1968. pp. 118-119. 
2. Shaw, Edward S., op. cit., pp. 48,62; McKinnon, Ronald I., 
op. cit., pp. 5-6. Support for the assertion that financial 
markets in less developed countries are more fragmented than 
those of developed countries is found in the division between 
formal and informal financial markets and the large role played 
by informal markets in developing countries. Differences in 
degrees of fragmentation and efficiency are also implied by U 
Tun Wai's observation that the organised money markets in 
developing countries are characterised by a wider range of rates 
at any given time than those in developed countries, although 
violations of ceteris paribus assumptions render this observation 
inconclusive. See "Interest Rates in the Organized Money Markets 
of Underdeveloped Countries, " IMF Staff Papers. 5,1956-57. p. 
256. 
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certainty attached to the future, suggesting that the "imperfection" 
of product differentiation actually renders financial markets more 
workable by differentiating risk. Some types of financial assets 
entail higher risks than others, as for example common shares 
compared with savings accounts, even under assumptions of no 
uncertainty regarding the future rate of inflation. The price 
of such differentiated assets, as expressed in their market rates 
of interest or yields, would vary with the degree of uncertainty 
attached to their returns, other things remaining equal. Yet, 
other types of market imprefections would also be reflected in 
differential returns, making conclusive analysis difficult if 
not impossible, at least over any other than the very long run. 
Approaching financial markets from the specifications of the 
perfectly competitive equilibrium model requires the use of 
simplifying assumptions. These assumptions tend to deny or mask 
the existence of the very sorts of problems -- differential risk, 
market structure, regulation, articulation with the rest of the 
economy -- which are of greatest theoretical interest 
from the 
point of view of the contribution of the financial sector to 
economic development. Because of these problems there is con- 
siderable precedent for rejecting the analytical framework of 
perfect competition in the study of financial markets. Stigler 
argues that: 
1 
There is no 'imperfection' in a market possessing 
incomplete knowledge if it would not be remunerative 
to acquire (produce) complete knowledge: information 
costs are the costs of transportation from ignorance 
to omniscience, and seldom can the trader afford to 
take the entire trip. 
This line of reasoning leads Stigler to conclude that, "We 
cannot possibly afford perfect markets.... "2 Gunnar Myrdal 
summarily dispenses with the concept of equilibrium in his 
notes on controls on the financial sectors of South Asian 
countries: 
3 
1. Stigler, George J., op. cit., p. 119- 
2. Ibid., p. 120. 
3. Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations. Vol. 
III. New York, Pantheon, 1968. p. 2091. 
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Indeed, the concept of "equilibrium" in the money, 
credit, or, more widely, capital market is meaning- 
less, except when all controls other than the level 
of interest rates (sic) are taken as given. As this 
is not the assumption used in our analysis, the terms 
will not be used. 
In other cases writers using the term imperfection in the context 
of financial markets have used definitions of imperfection which 
differ from those commonly found in the market organisation 
literature. For example, Masson and Hirshleifer apply the term 
to a situation defined in terms of an interest rate which is a 
function of loan size. 
1 
While students of financial markets have developed models, 
using data over long time series in highly developed financial 
markets, which employ or in certain ways approximate the concept 
of equilibrium, 
2 
the methodological problems of ensuring a high 
degree of consistency over time are considerable and in any case 
the data base and limited variety of securities in financial 
markets in developing countries, possibly excluding Mexico, is 
such as to render this approach generally unrewarding. 
3 
To avoid the analytical blind alleys leading from the 
concept of perfect competition, Shaw and McKinnon employ variants 
of an alternative approach, consistent with the view that 
realistic assessment of market performance should be in terms 
of "workable" competition4 rather than in terms of competition 
1. Masson, Robert Tempest, "The Creation of Risk Aversion by 
Imperfect Capital Markets, " American Economic Review. LXII, 1, 
March 1972. p. 78n; Hirshleifer, J., "On the Theory of Optimal 
Investment Decisions, " Journal of Political Economy. 66, August 
1958. p. 329. 
2. Examples are found in the studies äiscussed in chapters 
dealing with interest rate structures in Van Horne, James C., 
op. cit. 
- 
3. McKinnon, Ronald I., op. cit., p. 3. For analysis of the 
Mexican case see Bennett, Robert Lee, The Financial Sector and 
Economic Development: The Mexican Case. Baltimore, The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1965. 
4. Neither of these writers uses the term "workable competition, " 
however. This term was proposed by John Maurice Clark in his 
early article, "Towards a Concept of Workable Competition, " 
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which is "perfect" in some abstract sense. This distinction is 
of such theoretical interest, and of such importance to the 
interpretation of the prescriptions of Shaw, McKinnon and others 
of similar persuasion to warrant a digression on financial market 
imperfections and the peculiar problems they entail from the point 
of view of this analysis. The term imperfection is retained here 
only because of its currency, and in a strictly technical sense. 
Financial markets in developing countries, especially formal 
financial markets, do not operate in a free market environment and 
often are as far from economic perfection as they are from purely 
monopoly situations. 
' 
Two major influences constrain the operation 
of financial markets in many developing countries from performing 
the allocative role which they would play under the assumptions 
of perfection within the usual neo-classical analytical framework. 
Both of these influences diminish the extent to which financial 
markets are workable, and both arise from extra-market considera- 
tions. One is the incomplete monetisation of the typical developing 
mixed economy, while the other is government intervention. 
a. Incomplete monetisation and the economic performance, 
of financial markets 
Incomplete monetisation in the context of developing 
economies has two common manifestations. One is simply that 
the production process in certain sectors and geographical areas 
is not characterised by monetised exchange. An aspect of this 
phenomenon is that production-for-own-use predominates, i. e., 
economic activity is largely of a subsistence nature. The family 
unit consumes most or all of its own production, and participation 
in monetised commercial activities is sporadic and infrequent. 
Another aspect of the non-monetised character of economic activity 
in such sectors and areas is the role of bartering in the exchange 
process. Barter markets do not have a standard medium of exchange 
(continued) American Economic Journal. XXX, 2, June 1940. pp. 
241-256, and elaborated many years later in his Competition as 
a Dynamic Process. Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 
1961. 
1. McKinnon, Ronald I., op. cit., p. 3. 
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or numeraire. In barter and production-for-own-use the level of 
specialisation in production is low, the range of exchanged goods 
and services restricted, and the trading mechanism cumbersome. 
Exchange, and hence specialisation, are not greatly facilitated 
by barter because of the requirement that barter transactions can 
be effected only when there is a mutual coincidence of wants with 
respect to the limited range of specific goods and services each 
party is willing to trade. 
The utility of financial markets as development media is a 
function of the utility of money, the basic financial asset. The 
market for money arises because money trades against all other 
economic goods, to the extent the trade in all other economic goods 
is monetised. Expressed in another way, money clears the payments 
network between net buyers and net sellers with the limitations of 
a currency area. A currency area may not be congruent with the 
national economy, however, because of incomplete monetisation. 
I 
To the extent that the economy is monetised, intermediation 
facilitates the flow of money between net buyers and sellers and 
hence increases the efficiency of monetisation. 
In the non-monetised parts of an economy, however, monetary 
prices do not perform a direct allocative role and hence the 
allocative function of financial markets does not directly apply. 
In a non-monetised economic sector the opportunity for monetary 
accumulation is constrained and financial intermediaries also 
cannot play their role as operators of the payments system. 
Thus, the existence of a significant sphere of economic activity 
beyond the frontiers of monetised transactions tends to be 
reflected in narrow and shallow financial markets. With a higher 
volume of transactions reflecting increased monetisation, such 
markets could have an opportunity to become increasingly workable. 
While this aspect of incomplete monetisation concerns 
primarily the quantitative importance of money in relation to 
1. Shaw, Edward S., OP-cit., p. 60. 
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economic activity, the second perspective is fundamentally 
qualitative in nature. In the economies of many developing 
countries the money issued by the State, and other components 
of the money supply (however defined over the range from Ml 
through M3) which are denominated in the same units as specie 
issued by the State, fall far short of fulfilling the abstract 
functions of money: e. g., a medium of exchange, a unit of 
account or numeraire, and a store of value. 
Imperfections in the role of the money issued by many 
governments are reflected in exchange controls and in substantial 
rates of inflation. Exchange controls are an attempt to protect 
the domestic statutory and administrative monopoly which govern- 
ments accord the money they issue and the money supply they control. 
However, exchange controls in fact limit the ability of the national 
currency to serve as a medium of exchange by restricting its use 
in external transactions, which must frequently be conducted via 
some other medium of exchange. When national currencies are 
extremely weak the State may even attempt to ensure that certain 
domestic transactions are conducted via another medium of exchange. 
For example, foreign travellers have been required to pay for 
hotel accommodation in India in foreign exchange, and Ghana Airways 
has refused to accept Ghanaian currency in payment for drinks 
purchased aboard it flights. In certain situations several 
currencies have circulated domestically when the State's currency 
is weak, openly as in the cases of South Korea in the 1950's and 
South Vietnam during the period of American military involvement, 
clandestinely wherever currency black markets operate. The use 
of cigarettes as a medium of exchange in Germany in the immediate 
post-War era is a variant on the theme of incomplete monetisation. 
l 
The difficulty certain national currencies have experienced 
in serving as a store of value is well known and illustrated most 
1. For a discussion of the problems inherent in imperfect per- 
formance of legal tender see Hayek, F. A., "Choice in Currency: 
A Way to Stop Inflation. " Occasional Paper 48, Institute of 
Economic Affairs, London, 1976. 
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forcefully by countries which have suffered rates of inflation 
exceeding 100% per annum. Airline tickets were purchased as a 
store of value at one time in Brazil, tractors have been hoarded 
by large farmers in Chile, and land and buildings have attracted 
the funds of savers in many countries because of the prospects 
of a return on investment superior to that offered by financial 
assets denominated in the State's currency unit or by direct 
investment in "productive" enterprises. The traditional preference 
of French and Indian peasants for gold is also to some extent 
attributable to the superiority of gold as a store of value in 
comparison with the national currencies of these countries. 
1 
National currencies generally encounter less public resistence 
to their function as a unit of value than to their roles as media 
of exchange and stores of value. Subdivision of major units which 
are large accommodates small transactions, as suggested by the 
farthing. Where the major unit itself is inconveniently small, 
the public seems prepared to deal in large numbers, as in con- 
temporary Italy and pre-New Franc France and pre-New Dinar Yugo- 
slavia, or to deal in multiples of the unit, as in Iran where 
convention, permits the informal specification of prices in units 
consisting of ten rials. These are matters of form, not of 
substance. 
However, recent experience with inflation in industrialised 
countries with broadly-based financial markets has engendered 
attempts to improve upon the national monetary unit as a. numeraire. 
Inflation accounting has blossomed into a popular field of enquiry 
and debate in industrialised countries, and in Britain the Sandi- 
lands Report and the lively correspondence in the business section 
of The Times following the Report's appearance in 1975 exhibited 
a general professional consensus that the assumption of parity 
between different vintages of the national currency unit employed 
in standard accounting practice easily entails suboptimal financial 
1. A dissenting view is presented in Chandavarkar, Anand G., 
"The Nature and Effect of Gold Hoarding in Under-Developed 
Economies, " Oxford Economic Papers. NS, XIII, 2., 1961. pp. 137- 
148. 
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decision-making and misleading appraisal of investment results. 
Thus, the deterioration of the ability of the national money to 
serve as a store of value also diminishes its utility as a standard 
of value when more than one time period is under consideration. 
Both aspects of incomplete monetisation increase the costs 
of securing real growth. In contrast, the expanded use of money, 
from increased monetisation of the economy, occurs with and con- 
tributes to real growth. McKinnon emphasises this interrelation- 
ship in a model which indicates that accumulations of money are 
required for real growth because of the lumpiness of investment. 
Larger volumes of savings are required before investment can be 
expanded (except by units having access to the proceeds of the 
inflation tax), given the insufficient alternatives to self- 
finance within the constraints of highly imperfect financial 
markets in many developing countries. 
l If the accumulation of 
real balances is retarded'by inflation, the cost of investment 
is obviously increased. 
b. Public sector intervention and the analytical treatment 
of financial markets 
Public sector intervention is the second major phenomenon 
which renders unrealistic any attempt to use the perfect competition 
model to explain the performance of financial markets in developing 
countries. This intervention takes three main forms, ranging from 
the pervasive to the highly specific. 
The first and most extensive example of intervention is the 
usual government monopoly of specie issue and, government control 
over the money supply. In other words, governments control the 
supply of a major portion of the firms in the financial sector, 
and through manipulation of the money supply affect the operations 
of all financial firms as well as the allocation of real resources. 
However, government monopoly is not complete because of the existence 
of substitutes for the national currency which are used by the 
public to fill monetary functions which they consider are only 
insufficiently performed by the currency issued by the State. 
1. McKinnon, Ronald I., op. cit., pp. 57-67. 
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Foreign exchange and gold are two such substitutes, as indicated 
above, and the spectrum of imperfect substitutes is indeed broad. 
The second variety of government intervention in the operation 
of financial markets consists of regulations and measures which 
apply to large numbers of firms in the formal financial sector. 
A primary example is found in interest rate regulations which 
control the price which intermediaries may obtain for certain of 
their services. While intermediaries generally are capable, 
through market imperfections, of selectively raising and lowering 
charges levied on borrowers through the use of fees and control 
over the terms of customers' access to other services, the fact 
remains that interest rate regulations limit the range over which 
any given type of intermediary can specify the price for one of 
its major products or services, i. e., loans. 
Governments frequently erect barriers to entry into inter- 
mediation in formal financial markets, and intermediaries already 
active in financial markets are frequently restricted in their 
ability to diversify their activities. The most common barrier 
to entry facing prospective financial intermediaries is the legal 
requirement that a certain-minimum capital base, in the form of 
balance sheet net worth, be subscribed by the sponsors of the 
proposed venture. Diversification of commercial banks, for 
example, is also restricted on a functional and geographical 
basis, as specified by acts defining banks and the business they 
may conduct, and by regulations concerning the establishment of 
branch offices. 
Another form of this variety of intervention is government 
designation of priority sectors in the allocation of credit by 
banks and other institutions. An example of this type of control 
in Kenya is found in Central Bank circulars which request the 
commercial banks to exempt African farmers and businessmen from 
credit squeezes, as noted elsewhere in this paper. 
Deposit insurance by public sector agencies is also an example 
of intervention. While the benefits of deposit insurance from the 
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depositors' point of view are apparent, the manner in which the 
premium is frequently charged -- levied on all institutions 
at the same rate and paid by the institution rather than directly 
by the depositor -- may relieve individual intermediaries from 
the influence of certain market forces which would encourage them 
to behave in a more responsible manner than they may be forced to 
under the usual system of deposit insurance. This is not to say 
that insured intermediaries behave or tend to behave irrespon- 
sibly, but rather that considerations of degree may be involved. 
This example would not apply to most of the banks operating in 
Kenya. The Government has interests in two of the banks, making 
a deposit insurance system under Government auspices of rather 
low priority with respect to these two banks-1 Two other banks 
are British overseas banks, which probably have a stronger 
financial standing than the Kenya Government, making deposit 
insurance superfluous in these two cases. 
Other forms of this variety of intervention, aimed at broad 
classes of intermediaries, include the legal aspects of loan 
security arrangements and the repudiation of debtors' obligations 
to their creditors. Indian experience-provides examples of both 
of these phenomena, as indicated elsewhere in this discussion. 
To summarise, legislation for many years in several Indian states 
permitted certain types of lenders, such as cooperatives and other 
agencies deemed to be more socially desirable or politically 
pliable than commercial banks and other lenders, to obtain a 
first charge over a borrower's assets even if a commercial bank 
held a prior charge over such assets. 
2 
The repudiation of rural 
indebtedness through government action on behalf of large classes 
of debtors has been a repetitious aspect of Indian financial 
history, 
3 
the most recent example consisting of actions taken 
1. In addition to the two solely commercial banks in which the 
Government has an interest, the Cooperative Bank is also closely 
identified with the Government, which appoints four members of 
that Bank's nine-man Board. 
2. Report of the Expert Group on State Enactments Having a 
Bearing on Commercial Banks Lending to Agriculture. Bombay, 
Reserve Bank of India, 1971. p. 4. 
3. Ibid., p. 19; Report of the Agricultural Finance Subcommittee. 
94 
following the assumption of emergency powers in 1975. 
A third form of intervention is that which affects specific 
intermediaries. The most obvious illustration is government own- 
ership of certain financial institutions. The control of govern- 
ment balances and their employment in a manner favouring specific 
institutions is a second example of this type, while the design 
of specific credit projects or programmes aimed a certain types 
of borrowers or firms is a third. In addition, financial 
institutions in developing countries may frequently experience 
political intervention with respect to issuing and collecting 
specific loans. Public sector financial institutions may like- 
wise be restricted in their range of managerial control over key 
operating variables. Wages of staff of public sector banks, for 
example, may be regulated with reference to general civil service 
scales, which may not be appropriate to the accomplishment of 
certain institutional objectives. Staff travelling expenses in 
one Mediterranean country.; are so well controlled on a per diem 
basis that officials of that country's state-owned agricultural 
bank and Ministry of Agriculture leave their offices as in- 
frequently as possible for official journeys requiring overnight 
lodging away from home, as per diem allowances are so meagre as 
to require officials to meet a substantial share of their travel 
expenses from their own pockets. The requirement that the agri- 
cultural bank in that country obtain its vehicles through the 
government purchasing agency under a non-price rationing mechanism 
ensures that loan officers and agriculturalists are limited in 
their mobility. In Kenya the Treasury must be consulted with 
respect to the employment of Agricultural Finance Corporation 
balances, and AFC management has not always been free to invest 
these funds in money market instruments providing the combination 
of yield and liquidity which probably would have been selected by 
prudent managers not under Treasury control and public sector 
bureaucratic restriction. Control over the branching policies 
of specific institutions and with respect to specific branches 
(continued) pp. 22-37. 
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is another form taken by this type of intervention. 
In summary, firms in the formal financial sector experience 
an amount of government control which is large relative to the 
amounts of government control commonly imposed upon many other 
economic sectors in a mixed economy. In many developing mixed 
economies controls apply to the level of resources available 
within the financial sector, to the price of much of the "product" 
of the sector, to the number of firms in the sector, to the price 
of labour and capital employed, to the deployment of resources by 
purpose, and to the locations at which business may be conducted. 
These restrictions obviously create quite a different market context 
from that assumed by analytical models of competition and monopoly 
as they are commonly employed, and hence open to serious question 
the applicability of such models. 
4. Analysis of Financial Markets in Terms of Workability 
Given incomplete monetisation and the market imperfections 
inherent in government intervention, discussion of the performance 
of financial markets in developing countries in terms of the 
perfectly competitive model is forced and unrealistic. An 
alternative approach, however, permits considerations of relative 
rather than absolute aspects of market performance, with a view 
towards making markets more workable rather than. more nearly 
perfect. The concern for workability does not deny the concept 
of perfection, as demonstrated by the attention accorded interest 
rate differentials by Shaw and McKinnon. In fact, their use of 
interest rate structures as indices of market performance is much 
more consistent with the traditions of neo-classical economics 
than are, for example, measures used by the Wallichs in their 
evaluation of the performance of financial markets in Japan. 
1 
The problems surrounding the application of their criteria are 
indicative of the difficulties encountered with measures which 
1. The discussion that follows is based on Wallich, Henry C. 
and Mable I., "Banking and Finance, " in Patrick, Hugh, and 
Henry Rosovsky, eds., Asia's New Giant: How the Japanese 
Economy Works. -Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1976. 
p. 251. 
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are not defined in terms of workability. 
Three alternative bases for evaluation of financial markets 
are proposed by the Wallichs, and a brief critique of each serves 
to indicate the nature of the problem. 
The Wallichs' first proposal is that financial markets may 
be evaluated in terms of their degree of perfection. In a perfect 
financial market "every participant can both lend and borrow any 
amount he wants to at the same rate. " The most striking feature 
of this approach is its assumption that market participants face 
no financial constraints, that they can borrow without any ex- 
ternally imposed limit and that they may also lend without any 
externally imposed limit. The equation of what market positions 
participants would "want" to take and the maximisation inherent 
in assumptions of market perfection is of course linked through 
the assumptions of perfection, but when these assumptions are 
relaxed or discarded as inapplicable the concept of the desire 
to lend or borrow contrasts sharply with the realities of credit 
rationing. The assumption that participants could lend or 
borrow at the. same rate suggests that there are no transactions 
costs, which is tantamount to saying that there is in fact no 
market. 
The Wallichs' second suggestion is that the performance of 
financial markets may be evaluated in terms of the extent to which 
non-financial firms use financial markets to raise funds, rather 
than relying solely on internally generated resources. While this 
measure is perhaps instructive as a descriptive device concerning 
broad magnitudes (e. g., less than 25% in typical developing mixed 
economies as opposed to more than 75% in highly developed mixed 
economies), it tells us_, little of the rationality of the market 
in its allocation of resources or of the factors which determine 
the allocation and levels of access achieved. 
The third measure of financial system performance proposed 
by the Wallichs is the value added to GNP by the financial sector. 
They note, however, that this measure may understate the strategic 
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role played by the financial system. Their critical statement 
contains a peculiar assumption of markets for finance which can 
be disembodied of financial decision makers: "To the extent that 
this allocation is determined not by the supply and demand 
originating from the real sectors, but through allocative 
decisions made by or through the financial system.... " Un- 
fortunately, there is no precise analytical tool at the present 
time which can discriminate on this basis, even if the nature of 
each of these aspects of the allocative process -- supply and 
demand as allocators versus decision makers as allocators -- 
could be precisely identified. To return to the value added 
by the financial sector, it is worth noting that this measure 
implies the existence of transactions costs. However, it gives 
no indication of the efficiency or competitiveness of the 
financial system in its creation of added value. 
The vocabulary of financial market performance has been 
enriched by Shaw and McKinnon's use of the terms financial 
repression and financial liberalisation. These terms assist 
analysis of the workability of financial markets, representing 
movements along a continuum of greater to less inhibiting inter- 
ference. Financial repression narrows the range of savers' 
choices and restricts the flow of funds to investors through. - 
financial markets. It also retards financial development, the 
augmentation of the size and form of the financial system which 
permits increased specialisation in the use of both real and 
financial assets. Financial liberalisation provides a richer 
array of financial assets to savers, enhances the alternatives 
open to investors through financial markets, promotes the growth 
of intermediaries subject to some degree of competition, and 
pushes outward the frontiers of monetisation. 
Shaw and McKinnon both refrain from any summary statement 
of their positions -- there is no concise definition of the 
theory of financial deepening as applied to economic development. 
Shaw does, however, indicate in capsule form, in the Preface to 
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his book, the general area of concern: 
1 
The emphasis. . . on financial deepening... implies a bias 
towards decentralisation of economic choice in a context 
of either capitalism or socialism. Its focus is on 
markets and on the seamless web that binds them together 
in an economic system. 
The target of this book is the "lagging economy. " The 
lagging economy confines itself to poverty partly by 
imposing upon its markets patterns of financial, fiscal, 
and international economic policy that, in effect, in- 
struct market participants to keep aggregate levels of 
income and wealth where they are. It depends upon the 
plan, mandate, ration, license, and privilege to optimise 
resource allocation and use. It resists liberalisation 
of markets, where decentralised decisions could advance 
economic welfare, even though its government sector is 
inept. The lagging economy is stubbornly poor. 
The development of increasingly specialised intermediary 
functions and a proliferation of differentiated financial assets 
-- an "imperfectiotl` in terms of the perfectly competitive model -- 
are integral parts of the process of financial innovation, as new 
markets of savers are tapped and developed by new types of finan- 
cial instruments. Successful financial innovation permits a more 
efficient allocation of resources in both real and financial 
markets, which stimulates real investment. 
2 
However, the appearance of new intermediaries and instruments 
are not in themselves necessarily manifestations of liberalisation 
or of successful innovation, nor are they necessarily contributors 
to development. Governments can contrive intermediaries and 
instruments through the use of "the plan, mandate, ration, license 
and privilege, " but in so doing they often do not enhance the 
workability of financial markets from the point of view of the 
community as a whole. The ability of such contrivances to survive 
on their own by providing the community with the services it 
desires, in a liberalised financial market, is the test of their 
1. . cit., p. vii. 
2. Ibid., p. 70; Gurley, John G., and Edward S. Shaw, Money 
in a Theory of Finance. Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 
1960. p. 49. 
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contribution to the workability of the market. 
The financial sector is a logical focal point for measures 
of repression or of liberalisation because of its interaction 
with all other sectors, based on the role of money as a commodity 
which trades against all other economic goods, and also because 
of the key role of financial markets in the allocation of resources. 
Market workability may be enhanced by giving more head to enter- 
prise by the removal of restrictions, and by the use or withholding 
of state power in order to encourage, stimulate and enforce 
workable competition. 
C. A Critique of the Financial Approach to Development 
1. The Immature Status of Finance in Development Theory 
Capital is a concept which has always occupied the attention 
of economists. Its quantity and its quality are fundamental con- 
cerns of those studying the process of production and mechanisms 
of distribution. The forms assumed by capital include, at the 
least, "either funds waiting to be invested or specific capital 
goods (the result of past investment), 
" 1 and its quantity is 
regarded as a stock within the time perspectives usually found 
most useful for economic analysis. This stock, insofar as it 
consists of specific capital goods -- real assets -- is depleted 
through its contribution to production, and the value of specific 
capital goods may also be depressed by events in the economic 
environment which render it relatively less productive, such as 
obsolescence caused the appearance of more productive and hence 
superior competing capital. 
Capital goods are created in response to investment. Invest- 
ment can take place only as a result of saving, commonly viewed as 
acts of abstention from consumption. When the act of saving 
1. Harcourt, G. C., Some Cambridge Controversies in the Theory of 
Capital. Cambridge, at the University Press, 1972. p. 6. The 
implicit assumption in this statement that financial capital is 
limited to funds waiting to be invested is in fact too limiting. 
Funds waiting to be used for consumption expenditure are also 
financial capital, as discussed below. 
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occurred in the past, the avialability for current investment of 
its contribution to capital depends upon its being available in 
liquid form for the purchase of capital goods. Claims on 
financial intermediaries provide a high degree of liquidity 
and hence play an important role in the savings-investment 
process. In addition, financial intermediation permits borrowers 
to obtain funds for current investment against the promise of 
repayment out of future savings rather than from the borrower's 
own past savings. Of course, the ultimate sources of the inter- 
mediary's funds are acts of saving in the past and up to the 
present, and the benefits of intermediation enjoyed by the 
borrower cannot be provided for the closed economy as a whole 
in real terms. 
For the closed economy as a whole, there can be no net 
financial savings. Sources of funds equal uses of funds. The 
claims which constitute the financial assets of savers are 
identical to and comprise the financial liabilities of borrowers 
and sellers of equities. Therefore, over any given period ex post 
savings must equal ex post net investment in real assets for that 
period, reflecting the netting out of financial savings. 
1 
Real 
saving equals real net investment. That real saving is not 
necessarily identical to financial saving is a result of the 
utility of financial assets to those units not using all their 
financial income all the time for consumption, the role of non- 
monetised capital formation, and the fact that those units per- 
ceiving real investment opportunities are not identical to those 
units undertaking financial saving. The difference between 
financial saving and real net investment is one reason why study 
of the financial sector and its operations may yield insights 
into development. 
In view of the link between savings and investment, and its 
importance to the development of economic thought, the reasons 
why savings are translated into investment have received con- 
1. See Van Horne, James c., op. cit., pp. 10-11 for a mathematical 
expression of these points based on some of Raymond W. Goldsmith's 
work. 
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siderable attention. However, it is perhaps surprising that 
there has not been more attention in recent economic literature 
to the process through which savings is, translated into investment. 
In a monetary economy much of the savings which is devoted to 
investment is processed by the financial sector in its role as 
intermediary. Goldsmith has attempted to quantify the extent to 
which non-financial sectors rely on the sale of debt and equity to 
finance investment, calling this relationship the external financing 
ratio. Specifically, it is the ratio between new issues of finan- 
cial instruments, on a net basis, by enterprises other than finan- 
cial institutions, and gross domestic capital formation. 
1 
His 
attempts, admittedly yielding only rough orders of magnitude 
because of data problems, suggest that during the period 1949- 
1963 the ratio stood between . 30 and . 
60 for seven Western European 
countries studied, at . 
13 for the USSR, . 34 for the USA, . 
52 for 
Canada and . 99 for Japan. 
2 
Goldsmith's data problems throughout his lengthy attempts to 
quantify the relationships between financial structure and develop- 
ment are perhaps indicative of the general lack of attention 
economists have until recently given to financial structure. The 
relative vacuum which existed is in retrospect somewhat surprising. 
As one reviewer noted: 
3 
Finance has been a neglected area in the development 
literature. -The long neglect of 
finance is somewhat 
surprising considering the importance ascribed to it 
by Schumpeter in his Theory of Economic Development 
and the key role of savings and investment in most 
development models. Because so many of these models 
were formulated in real terms, they had no "room" for 
money or finance either as an influence on the rate of 
saving or as a mechanism for translating savings into 
investment. 
1. Goldsmith, Raymond W., Financial Structi 
New Haven, Yale University Press, 1969. p. 
2. Ibid., p. 140. Gross capital formation 
durables in this reckoning. 
3. Cole, David C., review of Financial Dee 
Development, by Edward S. Shaw, The Journal 
4. September 1974. p. 1345. 
ire and Development. 
136. 
includes consumer 
pening in Economic 
of Finance. XXIX, 
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However, since the publication in 1960 of Money in a Theory of 
Finance by Gurley and Shaw, several works have appeared which 
have attempted to integrate the observed operation of financial 
markets with the corpus of modern macro-economic theory. 
I 
The omission of attention to financial processes, which is 
curious in view of the interests of major classical economists in 
the theory of money and in the operation of banking and credit 
systems, may perhaps simply be a casualty of classical economics 
reflecting the post-Ricardian rejection of mercantilism and the 
centre-stage position mercantilism accorded full-bodied money as 
wealth and a factor of production. The inattention of Keynes, 
and others in his debt, to the financial function is also sur- 
prising. Keynes noted at several points in The General Theory 
that the financial process involves the "costs of bringing 
borrowers and lenders together,, 
2 
although this cost was apparently 
not included specifically in his major contribution, which 
focussed on the gap between savings and investment and its 
consequences for production and employment. That savings does 
not necessarily equal investment had been noted prior to the 
appearance of The General Theory in 1936, and has been generally 
accepted since. This gap implies that the role of the financial 
system may be more complex than assumed in classical economic 
theory. However, the assumptions that 1) money can be produced 
at no cost in terms of real resources, and 2) that input and output 
are homogenous, have been largely retained by Keynes and many other 
post-classical theorists. 
In addition to the possibility that the financial process 
was largely ignored because of the momentum achieved by concern 
for other economic variables and because of the manner in which 
economists became accustomed to examining problems of interest 
to them, there is also the possibility that the exclusion of the 
1. Works by Goldsmith, Gurley, McKinnon, Patrick and Shaw, 
among others, are cited in the bibliography of this study. 
2. See, for example, London, Macmillan & Co., 1960, pp. 144f, 
219. (emphasis added). 
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financial mechanism and its structure from formulation of theories 
of production, growth, distribution, etc., is the result of analyti- 
cal economy. Either the heuristic utility of simplification was 
judged to outweigh the marginal explanatory advantages of com- 
plexity, or the financial sector and its operations evidently did 
not appear material to the majority of economists until perhaps 
recently, or its structure was not thought to exert any significant, 
independent causality on major economic variables. 
The orthodox assumptions of the costlessness of producing 
money and the frictionless allocation of resources imply a 
costlessness of financial transactions and precludes con- 
siderations of the efficiency of financial intermediation and 
of financial innovation. 
1 
Intermediation is not allowed for at 
all if it is assumed that savers are inseparable from investors. 
Intermediation is treated implicitly as a given or constant 
under the condition of input and output homogeneity, which 
further implies that any or all savings may be available for 
any or all investment. Orthodox macro-economic theory suggests 
that the most attractive investments may be undertaken without 
financial constraints and only at the margin does an insufficiency 
of funds force adjustment or abandonment of investment plans. 
Economic theory often advances on assumptions of perfect 
foresight and perfect information, i. e., of risklessness and 
certainty, which also imply a greatly diminished role for 
financial intermediaries. As noted previously, intermediaries 
differentiate risk and in so doing provide a greater range of 
choice to investors not graced with perfect information and 
foresight, enhancing the total volume of investment. 
If the financial process has received only scant attention 
from economists concerned with major issues in developed economies, 
1. "The 'producer' of a debt is a debtor simply because he has 
acquired resources through no effort of his own; they were simply 
transferred to him by the creditor.... " (emphasis added). For a 
detailed and sympathetic statement of this approach to money and 
finance, termed the Wealth View by Shaw, see Pesek, Boris P., 
and Thomas R. Saving, Money, Wealth and Economic Theory. New York, 
The Macmillan Co., 1967. This quotation is from p. 78. 
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its neglect in the context of developing economies is perhaps 
more easily understood but no more easily justified. As noted 
by Ya4er, 
l 
By and large there seems a widespread presumption in 
the development literature that financial variables 
have little or no effect upon economic growth. The 
arguments fall generally into two categories: 1) the 
financial system is inherently unimportant in a poor 
or backward economy, and 2) the financial institutions 
in poor or backward economies are inadequate and un- 
suited for contributing to economic development. 
Yarler indicates that the presumption of inherent unimportance is 
based on five observations: 
2 
1) Only small portions of developing economies deal with and 
through financial institutions. 
2) Savings and savings capacities are thought to be negligible 
for the bulk of the household sector. 
3) Savers prefer tangible rather than financial assets. 
4) The interest rate has little meaning as an allocative device 
in economies characterised by the three qualities mentioned 
immediately above. 
5) In any case interest rate structures tend to be badly distorted 
because of market fragmentation and market thinness. 
The position that the financial system is so inadequate as 
not to merit serious consideration as a development tool has 
been based on six observations, again as classified by Yager. 
3 
1) Financial systems in many developing economies are patterned 
on imported institutional arrangements which are not designed to 
meet local opportunities in a comprehensive or dynamic manner, 
and are in fact incapable of doing so. 
2) Financial markets are often very narrow. 
3) Financial markets are characterised by underutilised and 
inefficient intermediaries. 
4) Disillusionment with attempts to control and/or stimulate 
finance through the establishment of central banks has also 
contributed to the lack of interest in the potential of the 
financial system as a development tool. 
1. Ya*er, Betty Slade, An Analysis of the Financial System in 
Turkey, 1949-1963. Unpublished PhD dissertation, Vanderbilt 
University, 1967. (University Microfilms 68-12,804). p. 3. 
2. Ibid., pp. 3ff. 
3. Ibid., pp. 7ff. 
105 
5) To the extent that the interest rate -- often low or negative 
in real terms -- pays an allocative role it frequently promotes 
investment of low social priority, as in real estate and into 
short term and often speculative investments by upper income 
groups. 
6) Finally, fiscal priorities in the form of governments' thirst 
for funds and related suspicions that price stability conflicts 
with development by restraining governments from creating allo- 
cative power for themselves through the inflation tax overwhelm 
possibilities for meaningful monetary management. The central 
bank printing press appears to be a superior alternative to 
financial markets as a means of stimulating investment. 
From this typology it appears that shallow finance has its 
own vicious circle of inattention. Imperfections in the market 
create justification for ignoring the potential role of a more 
effective and workable financial system. The points listed by 
Yager indicate that the assumptions used to justify ignoring the 
potential for real growth found in financial intermediation 
involve a lack of appreciation for the direction of causality. 
2. Capital Shortage or Capital Surplus? A Paradox Explored 
a. The high returns hypothesis 
The lack of agreement on the fundamentals of the debate 
around what Shaw terms financial deepening is reflected in 
alternative views about the supply of and demand for capital 
resources in less developed economies. A key example of the 
gaps presently existing with respect to the role of finance in 
development may be illustrated with reference to statements by 
Shaw and opposing observations by others. 
The typical lagging economy, short of physical and human 
wealth, is long of investment opportunities at high rates 
of return. The evidence can be found in aggregative data, 
not too precisely perhaps but adequately, if changes in 
national income are divided by concurrent or lagged in- 
vestment and the result multiplied by capital's share in 
income.... There is no shortage of investment opportunities: 
there is a shortage of savings for their finance, especially 
for the best ones among them. 
1 
1. Op. cit., p. 81. 
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Shaw devotes only a single paragraph to this important point and 
provides only scattered and fragmentary data in substantiation. 
His indifference between simultaneous and lagged functions is a 
curious contrast with contemporary quests for econometric refine- 
ment. The statement is also remarkable in that it says that the 
situation exists at any point in time. The arguments put by Shaw 
and McKinnon suggest that liberalisation would lead to growth 
which in turn would create new rounds of investment opportunities. 
But Shaw's assertion is not conditional upon liberalisation. 
Rather, the existence of such opportunities in the typical lagging 
economy, presumably at virtually any time, provide the very basis 
for liberalisation. 
The concept of the "high return" is almost as vague as it is 
ubiquitous, but Shaw appears clearly to have in mind a norm based 
on prevailing rates in economies with well developed, competitive 
financial systems. He indicates that marginal returns in develop- 
ing economies may be extremely high in relation to average returns 
in developed economies, 
I 
but hopefully marginal returns in developed 
economies also frequently significantly exceed the average. At 
another point Shaw refines his positon: 
2 
Savings are scarce in lagging economies in the sense that 
excess demand for them can be found, at loan rates pre- 
vailing in more developed economies, in investments with 
acceptable degrees of risk. The capital market can be 
cleared of excess demand*at some structure of loan rates 
which is high. 
Shaw is referring to real rates of return in a world of risk and 
uncertainty. 
But is it valid to assume that numerous attractive investment 
opportunities are not taken up in developing economies because of 
a shortage of appropriate finance? While consistent with economic 
logic, the thesis of capital shortage -- defined as insufficient 
savings reflected in low levels of investment -- in the face of 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., pp. 121-122. 
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attractive investment opportunities is frequently disputed on 
institutional and other grounds. In fact, the question of the 
relative scarcity or abundance of attractive investment oppor- 
tunities lies at the very heart of the controversy over financial 
repression and liberalisation, and is especially marked in the 
debate regarding interest rates and financial policies appropriate 
for broadly based rural development. 
For purposes of discussion it is useful to enquire what basis 
Shaw may have had for his assertions and then to examine state- 
ments to the contrary by others. 
The evidence supporting Shaw's position that developing 
economies, probably as a whole, contain a surplus of investment 
opportunities relative to their sources of funds is of course 
found in the examples of the developing countries which have 
taken the path to liberalisation in recent years. The country 
of this type with which Shaw was probably most intimately 
acquainted and personally involved, the Republic of Korea, 
in fact registered greatly increased levels of savings, invest- 
ment and growth following reforms which began in 1963. Gross 
investment as a proportion of GNP increased from 13% in 1962 to 
20% in 1967, from mid-1964 through 1967 the wholesale price index 
increased at 7% per annum in contrast with 21% per annum on 
average for the decade ending in 1963, industrial production 
rose by 16% a year and imports by 39% a year between 1964 and 
1967, while foreign exchange earnings and balances increased 
greatly. 
I 
These changes followed relatively drastic but temporary 
cuts in government capital expenditure (down 18% in 1963, a 
further 20% in 1964) and a decrease in the rate of expansion 
of the administrative budget including a civil service wage 
freeze in 1963 and 1964 in the face of a 60% rise in the con- 
sumer price index. Restrictions on administrative expenditure 
1. Kanesa-Thasan, S., "Stabilizing an Economy -- A Study of the 
Republic of Korea, " IMF Staff Papers. XVI, 1969. pp. 1-26. 
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evidently did not greatly impair civil service efficiency if the 
245% increase in internal tax receipts between 1964 and 1967 as a 
result of improved administration is indicative of the opportunities 
for economies then available in public administration. Government 
expenditure as a proportion of GNP declined from 23.5% in 1962 to 
13.9% in 1967. Government's share of capital formation declined 
from 60% to 30% over the same period. 
1 
These changes occurred with the public sector's opting for 
liberalisation. 
The primary policy emphasis during the years immediately 
after 1963 was on curbing the pace of monetary expansion 
and on expanding the role of the pricing system in order 
to achieve a more efficient allocation of resources. 
2 
The monetary authority obtained increased flexibility in control 
and stimulation by moving from a system of direct controls towards 
the use of indirect measures. 
3 
The complex system of credit 
rationing in use up to 1964 included loan ceilings on formal 
sector lenders, preferential interest rates for priority borrowers, 
advance deposit requirements for imports and quotas on central bank 
rediscounts. However, these proved politically fragile and 
administratively vulnerable: preferential terms were broadened 
in practice so that their presumed effectiveness was diluted, 
banks provided credit in excess of their ceiling restrictions, 
there was no control over the use of credit rationed according 
to the complex system then in force, and the informal market 
flourished outside these encumbrances and was twice as large as 
the banking system. 
4 
In 1965 credit ceilings were discontinued 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., p. 3. 
3. Ibid., pp. 7 ff. 
4. Ibid., pp. 7 ff. The operation of informal markets in the 
face of controls was amusingly noted by John Exter, former 
Governor of Ceylon's central bank at a Society for International 
Development meeting in New York in May 1969. On the subject of 
exchange controls Exter drew an analogy with a boyhood experience. 
To paraphrase to the best of the writer's recollection: "We used 
rocks to try to dam small streams, and sure enough, wherever we 
placed a rock no water flowed through the rock. " 
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and at the same time the central bank was experimenting with 
more vigorous use of conventional reserve requirements, marginal 
reserve requirements, interest bearing blocked accounts, and with 
treasury notes and its own bonds as instruments of monetary control. 
This success story, one of the most widely documented, is 
paralleled by Indonesian experience in 1967-1969, and by Taiwan's 
less dramatic but quite impressive performance which is summarised 
by McKinnon. 
1 
b. The low return hypothesis 
Two dimensions of dissent from Shaw's thesis of capital 
shortage relative to attractive investment opportunities at 
high returns are found in the literature. One is that financial 
capital seeking remunerative real investment opportunities is 
abundant but rates of return low; the other is simply that rates 
of return are low. 
The first argument, abundant financial capital and low 
returns, has been advanced by observers of development finance 
institutions who have been impressed with the lack of attractive 
projects, implying low prospective returns on new investments 
which might be considered. 
Perera noted from his study of development finance companies 
and institutions that a lack of sound projects is one factor 
which limits foreign investment in developing countries, 
2 
while 
White reported that a lack of projects suitable to the exacting 
and apparently to some extent conflicting rationing requirements 
of the African Development Bank was largely responsible for the 
slow beginning made by that Bank. 
3 Schatz also concluded, from 
1. Op. cit., pp. 105-116. McKinnon also provides data on developed 
economies which have recently prospered from liberalisation and 
less developed economies which have stagnated or declined with 
financial repression. 
2. Perera, Phillips, Development Finance. p. 54. 
3. White, John, Regional Development Banks. London, Overseas 
Development Institute, 1970. pp. 124 ff. 
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his experiences with the Federal Loans Board and the regional 
Loans Boards in Nigeria that a shortage of viable projects -- 
"i. e., projects that, all things considered, promise to be 
sufficiently profitable to attract indigenous private invest- 
ment" -- exists relative to available financial resources, 
but 
that this shortage is obscured by a "false demand for capital" 
in the form of a plethora of proposals for projects of highly 
questionable worth. 
1 
Looking elsewhere in Africa, Schatz was 
able to find an impressive array of reports and articles in- 
dicating the widespread existence of the "capital shortage 
illusion" he identified in Nigeria. 
2 
The shortage of viable projects has been observed at widely 
differing levels of development initiative: foreign investment, 
regional development bank investment, and relatively small scale 
investment by local entrepreneurs. However, the range of inclu- 
siveness'should not be considered definitive in that each case 
involves only one type or class of intermediary or one or a 
restricted range of sources of finance. Development finance 
institutions, frequently somewhat politically contrived rather 
than formed in response to market opportunities, may of course 
experience difficulties in finding the special sorts of invest- 
ment situations they are expected to support, and their approach 
and sources of information may be quite distinct from the entre- 
preneurial essence they are supposed to capture. Foreign 
investors may be deterred for a number of reasons which differ 
from those which would enter into the calculus of a local 
investor, too. 
1. Schatz, Sayre P., Economics, Politics and Administration 
in Government Lending: The Regional Loans Boards of Nigeria. 
Ibadan, Oxford University Press, 1970. pp. 112,119; "The 
Capital Shortage Illusion: Government Lending in Nigeria, " 
Oxford Economic Papers. NS, 17,2, July 1965. p. 309. For 
an opposing view see Diaku, Ikwuakam, "A Capital Surplus Il- 
lusion: The Nigerian Case Revisited, " The Nigerian Journal 
of Economic and Social Studies. 14,1, March 1972. pp. 135- 
146. 
2. Schatz, Sayre P., "Government Lending to African Business- 
men: Inept Incentives, " Journal of Modern African Studies. 
6,4, December 1968. pp. 521-522. 
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At the level of the national economy, however, some 
observers have pointed to the same types of problems Perera, 
White and Schatz identified with respect to specific specialised 
financial institutions. For example, arguments of insufficient 
infrastructure have been used by Bauer and Yamey to explain the 
alleged lack of profitable investment opportunities in developing 
1 
economies: 
The productivity of resources depends upon the avail- 
ability of complementary resources and of a market for 
the output. This is as true of capital as it is of 
natural resources. There are at present a number of 
underdeveloped countries which cannot use all the 
capital to which they have access on easy terms; there 
is an insufficiency of suitable opportunities for the 
profitable employment of the available funds and of 
personnel with the required experience and skill.... 
Indeed, it is not unlikely that inexperience, lack of 
training and acquired skills in the population and 
inappropriate social and economic institutions curb 
the economic development of backward countries more 
effectively than the lack of physical capital assets. 
Schatz develops the same theme by stressing the crucial role 
of capital formation -- in the broadest social sense -- in the 
provision of externalities which create growth. 
2 
He hypothesises 
that accumulation of capital is the most effective way to induce 
changes which remove constraints to growth. Sociological, techni- 
cal, attitudinal and economic barriers to growth crumble under a 
high rate of investment. Many investments which could be most 
effective may not be financially attractive, and governments 
generally, according to Schatz in 1968, lacked the power and 
inclination to undertake many useful social investments with 
substantial positive externalities. 
Other writers have stated merely that rates of return in 
developing countries tend to be low, regardless of the availability 
1. Bauer, P. T., and B. S. Yamey, The Economics of Underdeveloped 
Countries. Cambridge, at the University Press, 1957. p. 129. 
2. Schatz, Sayre P., "The Role of Capital Accumulation in 
Economic Development, " Journal of Development Studies. V, 1, 
October 1968. p. 40. 
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of financial capital. Nurkse, as an early articulator of the 
low returns hypothesis, noted that "the inducement to invest 
is limited by the size of the market, " and that the small size 
of markets in low income countries with attendant high in- 
elasticities of demand constitutes a formidible barrier to 
economic progress. 
1 
Technical discontinuities or lumpiness 
in investment requirements further serve to depress the rate of 
investment in such economies, according to Nurkse. 
2 
Nurkse's examples may reflect contemporary thinking of the 
time at which he wrote in the early 1950's, 
3 
and suggest that 
his concern appears to be with the injection of relatively large 
increments of capital in capital intensive production processes 
rather than with the gradual accretion of investment or with the 
development of local solutions to questions of capital intensity. 
This concern appears to have been overtaken by events since 
Nurkse wrote, however. Large increments of capital tend, in 
the real world of development, to be association with extractive 
industries, foreign investment, development monuments and in 
general with the fat rather than the lean side of the dual economy. 
c. Dualism as an explanation 
Myint has argued that the most significant aspect of dualism 
is the provision of scarce inputs on excessively favourable terms 
to the modern sector, including the public sector, and on excessively 
1. Nurkse, Ragnar, "Problems of Capital Formation in Under- 
developed Countries, " in Problems of Capital Formation in Under- 
developed Countries and Patterns of Trade and Development. New 
York, Oxford University Press, 1957. pp. 6-8. 
2. Ibid., p. 10. 
3. Lewis, also writing in the 1950's, took a less simplistic 
approach, noting that very little hard data was in fact avail- 
able for judgements concerning the productivity of capital in 
developing countries. His discussion of why marginal capital- 
income ratios should vary between developed and developing 
countries closes with the observation that the arguments are 
inconclusive and that any comparisons can be no more than 
guesses. See Lewis, W. Arthur, Theory of Economic Growth. 
London, George Allen and Unwin, 1955. pp. 201 ff. 
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unfavourable terms to the traditional sector. 
1 
Scarce inputs 
identified by Myint as being of special relevance to his argument 
include capital funds, foreign exchange and public economic 
facilities such as transport, communications and power. To the 
extent Myint's observations are correct with respect to capital 
funds, they provide an explanation of the phenomenon which Schatz 
called the "capital shortage illusion. " The types of financial 
institutions studied by Schatz in Nigeria, as part of the public 
sector and having the accoutrements of formal finance, would 
obviously, as a priority function in planning preferences, have 
preferential access to funds for on-lending. Their access would 
no doubt be on "excessively favourable terms, " as noted by Myint. 
Thus, one blade of the scissors of the capital shortage illusion 
could be formed by the preferential access to funds enjoyed by 
certain lending institutions in developing countries. 
On the other hand, the intended borrowers from the sources 
which occupied Schatz's attention, African businessmen engaged 
in small and medium scale enterprises outside agriculture and 
trade, would in general come from and be seeking materials and 
markets in the traditional sector in which product markets are 
depressed by the "excessively unfavourable" terms of access to 
scarce resources noted by Myint. The depressed level of access 
would constrict demand by rendering abundant factors, such as 
labour, less productive than would otherwise be the case, and 
tend to restrict the investment opportunities available in the 
traditional sector, providing the other blade of the scissors 
of the capital shortage illusion. 
Thus, the arguments that rates of return available in 
situations of low levels of material development are generally 
unattractive, and that low rates of return often coexist with 
an abundance of financial capital may be seriously questioned 
to the extent that they are held to portray an inherent 
characteristic rather than simply the result of public policy. 
1. Myint, H., "Dualism and Internal Integration. " p. 128. 
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3. Liberalisation, Interest Rates and Levels of Investment 
The question of available rates of return and related 
investment opportunities is central to the consideration of 
alternative financial strategies for promoting growth. Shaw 
and McKinnon prefer market rates of interest rather than ad- 
ministered rates because the former are held to be superior on 
allocative and equity grounds. As one of the prime raisons 
d'dtre of administered rates is to ensure cheap credit for 
borrowers in general or for specific borrowers in particular, 
the abandonment of administered rates with financial liberal- 
isation strongly implies a rise in borrowing rates. Rises 
could be especially notable with respect to credit for small 
farmers, given the costs of its provision as suggested by the 
financial statements -- frequently indicating losses, either 
directly or through an accumulation of bad loans -- of agencies 
attempting to use credit as a means of promoting rural development. 
Another indication that market rates would be substantially 
above administered rates is seen in the negative real rates of 
interest which result from "low" nominal rates in economies 
with "high" rates of inflation. Negative real rates suggest 
financial repression and would be likely to disappear with 
liberalisation in financial markets and related fiscal and 
foreign trade and investment arrangements. 
The increase in interest rates which could be expected 
to accompany liberalisation would in most cases not be of the 
order to which financial institutions are accustomed, which are 
frequently expressed in fractions of a percent. 
1 Rather., the 
rate rises would in most cases be substantial. The interest 
rate reforms in Korea in 1965 involved a jump in the standard 
bank loan rate from 14% to 26%, with roughly commensurate rises 
in deposit rates. 
2 McKinnon notes that real rates of between 
1. U Tun Wai documents changes in central bank rates in a 
number of developing countries, indicating a range of changes 
of between 11% and 2% in any given step. See "Interest Rates 
in the Organized Money Markets, " Table 6, p. 261. 
2. Kanesa-Thasan, S., op. cit., pp. 9 ff. 
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15% and 25% on agricultural and other small scale lending would 
probably be required to make this type of business attractive to 
formal sector intermediaries. 
1 
His justification of such rates, 
that they "would be high enough to divert funds from low-yield 
investments in urban enclaves but still dramatically undercut 
some extremely high rates of interest charged in traditional 
credit markets, "2 returns the reader to the crux of the debate: 
would "high" real lending rates in fact narrow the gap between 
the cost of capital and its marginal efficiency to the extent 
that total investment or investment in sectors such as agri- 
culture would be depressed? 
Shaw notes that higher interest rates are frequently held 
to be beyond the financial capabilities of borrowers and that 
it is averred that loan demand at higher rates would fail to 
materialise, i. e., that higher rates of interest would depress 
the rate of investment. 
3 Shaw's assertion that such fears are 
unfounded is based on the observation that investment oppor- 
tunities emerge with liberalisation on a broad financial and 
economic front which reduce investment costs. 
These costs include those transactions expenses which 
face petitioners for rationed resources such as credit from 
banks, licenses from the government bureaucracy, foreign 
exchange, etc. Repression also deprives the clients of financial 
institutions of benefits of competition within the financial 
sector. Banking concentration based on a restrictive charter 
policy, bankers' agreements which restrict competition, lenders' 
risk aversion at low interest rates and appropriation of banks' 
resources by public sactor debt issues which cannot be refused 
by banks are listed by Shaw as typical examples. 
4 
1. Op. cit., p. 77. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Op. cit., pp. 122-123. 
4. Ibid., p. 123. The social opportunity costs of central 
bank imposition of subscription quota requirements on commercial 
banks to ensure that government securities issues are fully taken 
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An additional cost of transactions which Shaw contends 
is reduced by liberalisation is the cost of the learning process 
to lenders and to borrowers. Freed from restrictions which 
limit their possibilities, a refinement and specialisation of 
skills is encouraged. Lenders find themselves in a better 
position to undertake risks, and borrowers find themselves in 
a position to expand their operations. Shaw indicates that 
the learning process is one cost of capital accumulation. 
1 
This area of cost reduction is less readily apparent than 
others itemised by Shaw. From the point of view of the individual 
intermediary it is perhaps unlikely that liberalisation will 
lower his costs of decision-making. While certain constraints 
imposed by regulations will be removed with liberalisation. 
eliminating their contribution to the complexities of risk 
taking, liberalisation also assails those comfortable little 
devices which characterise quiescent as opposed to competitive 
markets. With liberalisation, old friends may wither before 
new and stauncher competitors, and upstarts may usurp positions 
of importance and infringe on time-honoured boundaries estab- 
lished in more relaxed times. The things that liberalisation 
tends to sweep away are of course the things which debilitate 
markets as efficient allocative devices. More workable markets, 
which must be evaluated from the point of view of the borrower 
and the community as well as that of the lender, will not be 
welcomed by intermediaries who have shielded themselves from 
the effects of competition. 
Shaw's point might more easily be couched widely in, terms 
of the costs of allocative decision making rather than narrowly 
in terms of markets. Under regimes of financial repression 
markets play a restricted role in resource allocation. Allocative 
(continued) up at par are explored by Porter, who indicates that 
such requirements immobilise tools of monetary control. See 
Porter, Richard C., "Narrow Security Markets and Monetary Policy: 
Lessons from Pakistan, " Economic Development and Cultural Change. 
XIV, 2, October 1965. pp. 48-60. 
1. Op. cit., p. 124. 
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decisions are taken to a large extent by government, which 
intervenes in a financially repressive manner. With liberali- 
sation the allocative role of government is either diminished 
outright or else changed in form from one of direct controls to 
one of indirect controls. Liberalisation shifts back to the 
market some of the costs of allocative decision making. That 
these costs could be lower when directed towards market decision 
making rather than towards intervention is suggested by the 
economies of the function of financial intermediation as outlined 
by Van Horne. And, as liberalisation provokes expansion of 
market activity it may allow economies to be realised. 
4. Alternative Techniques for Mobilising the Economic Surplus 
Each economy begins its development by intensive ex- 
ploitation of a savings-investment technology that is 
chosen for historical, political, social and perhaps 
economic reasons, and then... experiments with alter- 
native technologies that are marginally superior in 
terms of their capitalised returns and costs. 
1 
This abstract and somewhat forced observation by Gurley and 
Shaw suggests that economies face a number of options in "savings- 
investment technology" -- i. e., the methods by which savings are 
stimulated and transformed into investment. It also implies that 
a gradually evolving system will require continual experimentation 
with alternatives in order to sustain its growth. Accordingly, 
alternative techniques of mobilising the economic surplus are 
reflected in different financial structures. 
2 Advocacy of inter- 
mediation as a development tool must be in the context of alter- 
native techniques which provide channels for the flow of savings 
or surplus to real investment. 
1. Gurley, John G., and E.. S. Shaw, "Financial Structure and 
Economic Development, " Economic Development and Cultural Change. 
15,3, April 1967. p. 268. 
2. Ibid., p. 261. 
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a. The alternatives stated 
As a means of mobilising and deploying the economic surplus, 
financial technique is one of four alternatives. The other three 
consist of central planning, fiscal technique and inflation. 
l 
Central planning is a means of directing saving and invest- 
ment which does not _zely on financial markets to transfer savings 
from the primary source to the investment use. Gurley cites self- 
finance, the pooling of surplus funds and their allocation to state 
enterprises' investment priorities, the appropriation of state 
enterprises' profits, and commodity pricing measures as the 
mechanics of resource mobilisation and allocation under the 
central planning alternative. 
2 
Fiscal technique may be used to mobilise the economic surplus 
by taxing those generating the surplus, which turns the surplus 
into government savings which may be allocated to the sectors to 
which the government accords priority. Allocation may be through 
grant, subsidy or direct investment, and the recipients may be in 
either the private or public sectors. The government budget rather 
than financial markets is used to capture and deploy the surplus. 
3 
Inflation is the third alternative to financial markets, and 
is in fact closely related to fiscal technique in the sense that 
it alters relative prices and incomes and hence changes the locus 
of savings and investment. 
4 
Financial assets with fixed nominal 
values suffer a decline in real value with inflation, penalising 
their holders and rewarding their issuers. 
b. The alternatives examined 
The examination of alternative techniques should be broad 
enough to identify "losers" and "gainers" from each channel or 
means, as required for normative judgements of the merits of 
1. Gurley, John G., "Financial Structures in Developing Economies, " 
in Krivine, David, ed., Fiscal and Monetary Problems in Developing 
States. Proceedings of the Third Rehovoth Conference. New York 
and London, Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. pp. 105-106. 
2. Ibid., p. 105, 
3. Ibid., p. 106. 
4. Ibid. 
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of each and positive considerations of the impact of ea, h on 
investment flows and portfolios of financial and real assets 
in the economy. 
At the outset of any examination of the four alternatives 
mentioned, it may be noted that financial technique is the only 
option which is potentially free of coercive or involuntary 
aspects. The other three are in varying degrees and ways 
inherently coercive. To be more precise, the financial technique 
is the only alternative which operates through markets -- "the 
automatic processes of self-expression and mutual adjustment"1 -- 
which means not that participants can do exactly as they wish, 
but that in most cases participants have a range of choice and 
some influence, however small, on the range of choices which will 
be available in the market in the future. The statement that the 
financial technique does not rely on coercion or behaviour which 
is not voluntary is based on this understanding of the concept of 
voluntary behaviour within human society, on a relative rather 
than absolute basis, consistent with the concern for workable 
mechanisms rather than with abstract perfection. Most important 
is the implication that the range of choice can be expanded, and, 
as discussed earlier, tends naturally to expand as financial 
technique is relied upon more fully and as financial markets 
are made more workable. 
For the saver, and assuming a given amount of economic 
surplus generated by the saver, 
2 
voluntary aspects of the use 
of the financial technique to mobilise the surplus he controls 
are seen in the fact that the saver is free to place his savings 
as he desires. In a workable financial market the saver will have 
access to several intermediaries whose facilities are "imperfect" 
1. Powell, J. Enoch, "Exchange Rates and Liquidity. " Occasional 
Paper 18, The Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1967. p. 17. 
2. Later in this chapter it will be demonstrated that "the 
economic surplus" is inferior, for the purposes of rural financial 
market analysis, to the concept of working balances, which are held 
by virtually all production units in an economy, as the basis for 
advocacy of financial deepening. 
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substitutes for each other, affording the saver several choices. 
If the behaviour of the financial sector is such that he chooses 
not to entrust his funds to intermediaries at hand, he may under- 
taken investment in real assets, dabble in direct finance, try to 
expand his range of choice by, say, evading exchange controls and 
obtaining access to intermediaries and financial services in foreign 
markets, hoard, or spend his money for consumption. 
The prospective investor likewise has potential access to 
several alternative sources of finance through the formal market, 
where his proposal will be judged more or less on its financial 
merits. 
Central planning and economic management has a coercive 
flavour. This aspect is seen mcst clearly in many of the 
economies which rely most heavily on this technique of mobilising 
and allocating the economic surplus, which appears to require the 
use of considerable police power. Central planning is frequently 
associated with the elimination or limitation of competing economic 
and non-economic centres of decision-making, and with the repression 
of the liberal intellect and the institutions compatible with 
popular participation in criti-cal"decision making. Even if en- 
lightened or benign, the monopoly elements in centrally planned 
systems tend, often purposely, to limit the range of choice 
compared with the range which otherwise might exist, and in so 
doing embodies coercion, however subtle. While the financial 
technique evolves a wider range of choices for savers and for 
investors and potential investors as financial deepening occurs, 
recourse to central planning and economic management as a means 
of mobilising and deploying resources tends in practice to keep 
the range of choices narrow. 
The fiscal technique also tends often in practice to embody 
preemptive elements as suggested by the popularity of tax evasion 
and the quest for tax avoidance in many developing countries. 
Taxes cannot be considered to reflect the will of the governed 
in many countries in which governments are not chosen via means 
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involving a significant degree of political choice for the 
electorate or citizenry. 
Several means of fiscal redistribution may be used; The 
government may direct the financial resources it removes from 
their owners towards investment in real assets or financial 
assets held by public sector institutions. It may also pass 
these funds to private sector investors in the form of subsidies. 
In either case the preemptive element is seen in the extent to 
which access to resources by the units preferred by the govern- 
ment may not be determined through processes such as markets and 
elections which are based on broad popular participation and 
meaningful alternatives, and in the extent to which preferred 
access to investment resources for a given purpose may restrict 
the access of those who do not enjoy preferred access but who 
otherwise would have sought or committed resources to the purpose 
for which another party enjoys preferred access. Controls, 
licensing systems, quotas and other access rationing devices 
abound in the typical developing economy, and as Friedman notes, 
"In many underdeveloped countries in recent decades the easiest 
route to wealth has been special access to import permits and to 
foreign exchange at pegged rates. "1 Given certain assumptions 
about the social costs and benefits of the use to which any 
surplus is put, preemptiveness is also present when the returns 
generated by those with preferred access are inferior to those 
which otherwise would have been generated using the same amount 
of society's resources. 
Changing the real value of money through inflation also 
provides a means of transferring resources, as noted above. 
Decreases in the value of nominal money transfer command over 
real assets from nominal money and financial assets denominated 
in nominal money to outstanding debt denominated in nominal 
money. Changes in the value of nominal money may reflect 
1. Friedman, Milton, Money and Economic Development. The Horo- 
witz Lectures of 1972. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1973. p. 53. 
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government policies in economies in which nominal money is 
issued by the state. Using increases in the nominal money 
supply through note issue or increases in the deposit liabilities 
of the central bank to finance government expenditure is a means 
by which the state appropriates for itself command over real 
resources and expropriates via the inflation tax a portion of 
the command over such resources enjoyed by holders of nominal 
money and other financial assets denominated in nominal money. 
In practice this process is frequently covert in the sense that 
it occurs without explicit "legislative approval or executive 
announcement, " to use Friedman's term. 
1 
Not all inflation is the result of government recourse to 
the printing press or of fiscal extravagence, of course, but 
whatever the cause the effect is a change in commandover_real 
assets between the issuers and the holders of debt. Also, 
inflation redistributes income in society in somewhat the same 
manner in which it redistributes capital value. The flows from 
capital asset ownership are affected, and economic groups are 
not equal in their ability to protect themselves from inflation 
or to capture the redistributive benefits it may create. In- 
flation tends to have a differential impact on the return to 
different types of productive factors, reflecting the cause of 
any particular inflation and the manner in which it spreads 
through an economy. 
It might be argued that, in theory, a constant rate of 
actual and expected inflation could be countered by economic 
units blessed with perfect information which would adjust their 
portfolios in such a way to compensate for the expected future 
effect of inflation. In practice, inflation rates seldom remain 
constant over any other than the short run. Protective behaviour 
over the longer run by those who can expect to suffer from 
inflation no doubt occurs, but cannot be finely tuned because 
of the imperfection of information and foresight upon which 
such behaviour is based. While of theoretical interest, the 
1. Friedman, Milton, op. cit., p. 48 ff. 
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possibility of perfect insulation of a portfolio from the effects 
of inflation has severely limited implementational scope. 
To the extent that inflation is used as a means of trans- 
ferring resources to the state, the same concerns noted with 
respect to fiscal technique apply to the deployment of the fruits 
of the inflation tax. To the extent that inflation transfers 
resources directly among private economic groups, the same 
reservations apply, and in addition the possibility of capricious- 
ness arises with respect to secondary effects. 
Some critics may suggest that the issue of coercion or 
preemptiveness, which is invoked here in support of the case 
for financial technique, is not very relevant to the case of 
developing countries which have a large proportion of their 
population living at levels such as those which prevail in 
Kenya. They may argue that non-market alternatives offer greater 
promise than financial technique for the mobilisation and deploy- 
ment of the economic surplus in a manner consistent with the goals 
and concept-of broadly-based rural development. These critics 
may argue that the sacrifice of present and future choice is 
justified by the benefits of--future-incremental production and 
by the type of society which they believe can be evolved through 
non-market means of whatever type they propose. Exchanges on 
these subjects show that they are matters "on which empirical 
judgement (are) frequently inseparable from fundamental political 
attitudes. "1 
It is not the purpose of this study to suggest that 
financial technique should be relied upon exclusively for the 
mobilisation and deployment of the economic surplus. Rather, 
it is to note that the use of financial technique appears often 
to be under-rated as a development alternative, that its use 
provides certain opportunities not available through non-market 
alternatives, and that it is by no means inherently in conflict 
1. Johnson, Harry G., "The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates, 
1969, " in Johnson, Harry G., and John E. Nash, "UK and Floating 
Exchanges. " Hobart Papers 46, Institute of Economic Affairs, 
London, 1969. p. 11. 
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with the desire to increase popular participation in the monetary 
economy -- in fact, quite the reverse. The particular emphasis 
of this study is to enquire to what extent and in what ways the 
use of financial technique may be enhanced and improved to accord 
more farmers -- Kenya's largest economic class -- access to 
formal farm credit in a developing mixed economy. 
But, before leaving the topic of the four alternatives, some 
further aspects of their operations and assumptions deserve 
consideration. 
Taxes as a means of raising funds for real investment and 
subsidies to support investment are frequently justified in 
economic theory by the divergence between private maximisation 
or optimisation and social maximisation or optimisation. This 
view is abstract and based on the assumptions that the government 
in question has the ability to identify socially desirable or 
socially undersirable investments, design appropriate taxes and 
subsidies to redress the imbalances created by divergences 
between private and social welfare, and efficiently implement 
the appropriate measures according to plan. Thus, the economist's 
model assumes a socially responsible form of government and an 
efficient civil service with relatively sophisticated analytical 
tools and implementational procedures at its disposal. The 
assumption is always of a "clean" or surgical mode of intervention 
which does not create unforeseen problems or secondary effects 
which outweigh or compromise the social advantages upon which the 
decision to intervene was presumably based. The interventionist 
model frequently assumes a disembodied state having perfect 
information and perfect foresight as well as a commitment to 
economic logic. This abstract state is unencumbered by bureau- 
cratic inefficiency or by pressure groups capable of blunting or 
distorting administrative initiatives or of capturing benefits 
intended for others. Even if the assumptions of perfection were 
admissable, transactions and administrative costs must be fully 
considered in any attempt to justify the decision to intervene. 
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The practice of endeavouring to maximise social welfare 
through the activities of the state often appears to be less 
elegant or comprehensive than the theory, and it is on this 
basis that fiscal technique and planning as alternative invest- 
ment technologies are frequently criticised. 
1 
The gap between 
the theory and the practice may be especially marked in less 
developed countries where the civil service may not be well 
educated; where data upon which to make intervention decisions 
is not complete and accurate; where administrative traditions 
may be complicated by ethnic loyalties, distorted by corruption, 
and limited by extreme risk aversion in bureaucratic behaviour; 
where governments are not constituted democratically; and where 
competition as a means of securing a measure of comparative 
performance is dampened by market structures as well as by 
cultural traditions. In these situations it may be asked 
whether the economist's models for augmenting social welfare 
where such is held to differ from private welfare have broad 
practical applicability. Shaw and Friedman are among those 
who note the, existence of "development monuments" in the form 
of loss-making public sector enterprises, and conclude that in 
general intervention is not in the public's best interest when 
government attempts to undertake investments which could con- 
veniently be undertaken on a private basis relying on self 
finance, direct finance, and most importantly, financial 
intermediation. 
c. Tactical devices which affect control over the surplus 
The four techniques listed above work on a more or less 
continuous basis. However, there are certain tactics which 
alter the command of financial assets over real assets and 
which tend to be invoked occasionally. Some by their nature 
provide no or only limited scope for repetition with respect 
1. "Government 'encouragement' to business is sometimes as 
much to be feared as government hostility. " Hazlitt, Henry, 
"Credit Diverts Production. " Ch. 6. Economics in One Lesson. 
New York, Pocket Books Inc., 1955. p. 27. 
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to any given financial asset. 
These tactics are not always amenable to precise classifi- 
cation as instruments of one alternative technology or another. 
To some extent they are hybrids. However, each is within the bag 
of tools of public sector interventionists given the manner in 
which mixed economies are commonly organised. These devices are 
frequently inherently neutral with respect to their ultimate 
effect on the workability of financial markets, but the manner 
in which they are employed may often be considered as financially 
repressive in that they make the operation of the financial 
technique more difficult. 
Command over real resources is redistributed between holders 
of financial assets denominated in different currencies when 
there is a change in the exchange parities between currencies in 
question, which is one such tactic. To the extent that entities 
in country A have long or short positions in foreign currency B, 
a change in parity between currencies A and B will redistribute 
the value in terms of currency A of opposite positions in currency 
B, and of these positions relative to portfolios denominated 
wholly in currency A. Opportunities for windfall gains from 
changes in parity are one cause of foreign exchange black markets 
in nations which restrict the financial freedom of their citizens 
through exchange controls, which tend to make the domestic currency 
less attractive as a financial asset by moving its functions away 
from the ideal of money as a means of exchange, unit of value and 
store of value. As in most developing mixed economies there is 
an "official" international value of the domestic currency, the 
tactics of changing official values rests with the government, and 
is beyond the day-to-day play of forces of-financial markets. 
Another tactic consists of changing the inclusiveness of 
money as legal tender as through demonetisation. Historical 
examples include the windfall gains of holders of monetary gold 
and silver, following their demonitisation by government 
authorities, when the market value of the metal content of the 
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former money exceeded its former value as legal tender. A not 
uncommon example is also found in the demonitisation of a paper 
currency series. A recent East African example was the replace- 
ment of the Kenyan Sh 100 note, involving the demonitisation of 
the former notes, within a short period of time in December 1974 
and January 1975. Those holders of the old notes who for whatever 
reason failed to exchange them for the new issue were left, following 
demonitisation, with only a piece of paper of possible decorative 
or historical interest. 
A very important tactic in certain developing mixed economies 
is simply expropriation without full compensation. The involuntary 
surrender or compulsory dispossession of specified financial assets 
on a once-and-for-all basis in real terms occurs most often through 
the action of the state and to the direct benefit of the govern- 
meant. An example is the failure of the Ugandan Government to make 
sufficient official provision for the expatriation of financial 
assets by Asians expelled in 1972. The blocking of bank accounts 
by the state is also a form of expropriation, although of course 
the loss to the holder may be only temporary and partial if the 
block is eventually removed. __ 
It might be possible to add further and more exotic specific 
tactics to this list, but it is unlikely that these would have 
much practical value because of their infrequent use. For example, 
it is conceivable that a government could intentionally and 
purposely cause the collapse of a financial institution in an 
effort to deprive depositors and other holders of claims against 
the institution in question of a portion of their financial 
assets and hence redistribute economic power. 
' 1, _ 
1. A variation on this theme is found in the treatment of the 
Italian banks in Ethiopia following the collapse of the Italian 
Occupation in 1941. Italian colonial currency was replaced by 
the East African shilling but the Italian banks were precluded 
from accepting shilling deposits. With their business restricted 
to dealings in a currency which was being withdrawn from circu- 
lation, they doubtless would have failed had they not been 
branches of large Italian banking groups. Details of currency 
and banking history during the Occupation and the succeeding 
British Administration in Ethiopia are included in Mauri, 
Arnaldo, I1 Mercato del Credito in Etiopia. Milano, Dott. A. 
Guiffre Editore, 1967.494 pp. 
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d. Problems facing the enhancement of financial technique 
The four alternative techniques for mobilising and deploying 
the economic surplus are imperfect substitutes. As substitutes, 
there is a degree of trade-off at the margin between them. For 
example, it is very difficult to build workable financial markets 
where inflation proceeds at a rapid rate. It is also obvious 
that by preempting the economic surplus through mechanisms of 
self-finance within the public sector, the opportunity for the 
development of financial markets is diminished by central economic 
management and planning. Likewise, fiscal technique may reduce 
the discretionary income of savers, diminishing the extent to 
which savers seek recourse to financial markets. The dynamic 
effects of competition between the techniques are more subtle, 
and their results more open to discussion, as suggested by the 
observations of Gurley and his colleague that the mix of tech- 
niques regarded as optimal by those in a position to determine 
the mix will change over time. 
If it is accepted that because of its decentralised nature 
and dependence upon voluntary responses financial technique is 
the most subtle and intricate of all of the alternatives, it 
should come as little surprise that it is also the most vulnerable 
in many important respects. Its vulnerability is also very apparent 
because of the role information plays in the financial marketplace. 
While it may be possible for a centralised system of economic 
management, for example, to commit fundamental errors in strategy 
and execution, these systems often work in such a manner that 
their performance cannot be impartially and thoroughly evaluated 
because the facts are never fully known or discussed publicly 
and hence are beyond the access of the interested layman in a 
society dominated by the Plan. Financial markets are very 
transparent, however, and are acutely sensitive to performance. 
They give signals to participants with the consummation of every 
transaction. Gurley calls the vulnerability of financial technique 
to public sector intervention -- in effect, to each of the other 
three techniques he discusses -- the "dark side of finance. 
"' 
1. Gurley, John G., op. cit., p. 110. 
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The vulnerability of the financial technique is illistrated 
by two lists compiled by McKinnon and by Gurley and Shaw. McKinnon 
discusses the "intervention syndrome, " while Gurley and Shaw point 
to ways in which centralised economic management and planning 
diminish the scope of financial markets. 
The intervention syndrome is defined to include seven 
common policies or measures found in developing mixed economies 
which circumvent domestic capital markets and hence deprive these 
markets of opportunities for development. 
' 
These measures con- 
sist of : 
1. Tariff protection for infant industries, which is frequently 
a key element in import substitution strategies. This form 
of intervention replaces reliance on capital markets to 
undertake the risks of infant ventures. 
2. Import licenses and financial (balance sheet) gearing pro- 
vided on a specific basis, in effect providing monopoly 
privileges for the favoured few or supporting fragmentation 
while discouraging competition among the many who might be 
interested in investing if such licenses were widely 
distributed. 
3. Corruption and monopoly privilege in the form of special 
access to concessionary channels in the rationing network. 
4. Cheapening of capital goods through foreign exchange and 
trade controls, which are non-market allocative devices. 
5. Manipulation of commodity prices in favour of industry and 
against agriculture, thereby shifting the savings capacity 
of agricultural producers into the hands of industrialists. 
6. Land reform not occurring through the land market. 
7. Reliance on foreign direct investment and commercial credits. 
These measures are ubiquitous in the development and planning 
literature and require little further comment. To the extent 
they are relied upon, even assuming they are not accompanied 
by inflation, they tend to reduce the scope and potential scope 
for financial development of a broadly based nature. 
Gurley and Shaw cite the case of a "socialist economy" in 
which the development of financial markets is retarded by the 
economic and financial policies of the state. They note that 
1. McKinnon, Ronald I., op. cit., pp. 22-29. 
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the centralised design of an economy is incompatible with 
relatively high ratios of financial assets to either income 
or wealth: 
1 
1. Private savings are of minor importance, as major emphasis 
is placed on internal finance and balanced budgets. 
2. Savings and investment are concentrated in the state sector. 
3. Division of labour in finance tends to be restricted by 
centralisation. 
4. Constraints are imposed by the state on personal income 
and wealth. 
5. State provision of services for which people save in 
capitalistic societies lowers the level of precautionary 
portfolios. 
6. There is insignificant accumulation of financial claims 
abroad by many socialist societies. 
Thus, the alternative techniques of mobilising and deploying 
the economic surplus given by Gurley cannot be considered as 
independent of each other. 
5. The Problem of Credit Rationing 
Price is the device which clears competitive markets, 
equating supply and demand. The preference for market rates 
of interest rather than "administered" rates is based on the 
observation that the market rate is the one which maximises 
allocative efficiency in competitive markets permitting the 
richest mixture of intermediation and the greatest flowering 
of finance. Prices not determined in competitive markets imply 
allocative distortions. Yet, it would appear that price is only 
rarely the sole allocative criterion in credit markets, or in any 
possible credit market that might be conceived as workable or 
realistic. 
What in fact predominates is credit rationing, defined as 
reliance to some degree upon non-price mechanisms to allocate 
credit. Does this observation invalidate the basis for the 
preference for market rates of interest? 
1. Gurley, John G., and E. S. Shaw, "Financial Structure. " 
pp. 262-263. 
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Consideration of this question begins with a discussion of 
the difficulties of identifying the price of credit, which leads 
into an examination of the areas of congruence and divergence 
between the interests of borrowers and of lenders. Areas of 
divergence prompt lenders to screen proposals carefully, invoking 
credit rationing mechanisms. The ubiquity of such mechanisms is 
generally misunderstood by observers who equate credit rationing 
with other non-price allocative devices. The role of information 
in the administration of credit rationing is then discussed, and 
the relationships between financial market structure and credit 
rationing are discussed within the context of uncertainty. 
Finally, it is noted that credit rationing by an intermediary 
or class of intermediaries is different from credit rationing 
by the financial market. 
a. Problems in the specification of the price of credit 
The problems attached to specification of a price for credit 
involve two dimensions: complexity or inclusiveness, and uncertainty. 
The first is most readily seen in the cost of credit to the 
borrower, the second in the return to the lender. Problems of 
complexity or inclusiveness make it difficult to specify a 
definition of the price of credit. An operative definition may 
be narrow or braod, and four levels of definition are presented 
here in ascending order of inclusiveness. 
i) Price equals interest charged. The first and most 
narrow is that the price of credit is the amount of interest 
charged on any particular loan. This definition, specified 
independently of the loan amount and with reference to a given 
unit of time, is the rate of interest. This form of specification 
of the price of credit is the one which is conventionally used by 
economists and which receives most popular attention. Even the 
rate of interest as the price of credit is not without ambiguity, 
however, because of the numerous ways in which a rate of interest 
may be applied to a given loan transaction to derive an amount 
payable. The difference between simple and compound interest 
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provides one illustration, the difference between interest on 
actual amounts outstanding and interest discounted in advance 
provides another, while the use of standard 30 day months as 
well as calendar months or 360 and 365 day years for calcu- 
lational purposes offers yet a third. Another area of distortion 
is the analytical convention of using a concept of the rate of 
interest rather than considering relevant rates of interest for 
particular cases or the band of rates found in the marketlace. 
1 
ii) Price equals the borrower's out of pocket costs. The 
second level definition is broader, including the interest paid 
for a loan plus other cash or out of pocket costs borne by the 
borrower. These additional costs may include an application 
fee, perhaps paid for the purchase of a loan application form 
as required by the Agricultural Finance Corporation in Kenya or 
in the form of an entry fee for cooperative members, some portion 
of which may be conceptually pro-rated to the access to credit, 
among other services, which is one of the benefits of membership 
in a cooperative society. To the extent that cooperative share 
holdings do not yield competitive returns they are also subject, 
conceptually, to pro-ratin of their cost over the various services 
to which they provide access. 
In addition to these formalised expenses of obtaining access 
to credit, there may also be other charges which the borrower must 
bear to secure and retain the favour of the lender. These would 
normally include travel costs to and from the lender's office and 
any related correspondence costs. Bribes2 and gifts may also be 
required, and it is normal practice as a gesture of hospitality 
to provide refreshment to any representative of the lender who 
visits the farm or premises of the borrower. 
1. Robinson, Joan, The Rate of Interest and Other Essays. 
London, Macmillan & Co., 1952. p. 5. 
2. The writer encountered no instances of alleged or actual 
bribery with respect to farm credit in Kenya, and heard no 
reports suggesting that corruption of this type is common in 
Kenya's farm credit mechanism or that bribery is involved in 
securing access to credit or in prompting public sector lenders 
to turn a blind eye towards lax repayment performance. 
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The borrower's cost may also involve outlays to third 
parties. Illiterate borrowers may have to hire the services 
of a scribe or other literate person to cope with certain loan 
application formalities. If the loan is secured, there are 
usually costs associated with the provision of security. Favours 
and obligations to guarantors may be common with respect to certain 
classes of farm credit. The borrower may have to pay the travel 
expenses of his guarantors from their farms to the lender's 
office in connection with the loan application process. 
Once a loan is obtained, stamp duties and other taxes may be 
payable in connection with the receipt of funds, as may legal fees 
relating to the execution of security documents and their verifi- 
cation. 
If the lender disburses loans in the form of cheques payable 
to the borrower, borrowers without accounts with a formal financial 
institution may have to deal with a third party to cash their loan 
cheque. The third party may well extract a commission for his 
services. If the lender disburses loans by paying suppliers 
directly, the borrower may not be able to obtain loan-financed 
goods at the best price. Some suppliers may not be interested 
at all in making any other than cash sales. Others may be willing 
to deal, but only after making provision for the disadvantages of 
delayed payment. For example, suppliers would not be expected to 
give any cash discount in such cases, and to the extent the lender 
is slow in honouring disbursement claims suppliers may impose a 
premium of loan financed goods. The premium may of course by 
payable by the borrower directly to the supplier so that the 
lender's accountants will not question the price shown on the 
invoice. P 
If the loan goes into default, defined as any breach of 
the loan agreement, the borrower may be liable for other out of 
pocket costs. These may include surcharges in the form of 
interest premia, charges for farm visits by representatives of 
the borrower, legal expenses, etc. 
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iii) Price includes the borrower's out of pocket and oppor- 
tunity costs. The third level definition of the price of credit 
includes interest and other out of pocket costs as outlined 
above, and also various opportunity costs borne by the borrower. 
The latter include the value of alternative uses of time which 
are foregone because of the time requirements of obtaining a 
loan -- time consumed travelling to the lender's office, filling 
in forms, undertaking correspondence, marshalling the security 
required, follow up visits as required, and planning and worrying. 
Another opportunity cost may be the loss of access to markets 
because of lender delays in credit provision. This type of cost 
may be especially important with respect to investment in non- 
homogeneous goods, such as land and cattle. A borrower with access 
to funds may not be able to secure disbursement quickly enough when 
the most favourable transactions might be concluded, leaving the 
borrower to take less attractive alternatives. Another type of 
opportunity cost results from requirements which tie up the 
borrower's funds, such as cooperative share capital and compensating 
balances in bank accounts, as well as devices which otherwise limit 
his freedom of economic action. Credit is often linked to specific 
marketing channels or input sources, and borrowers may not be per- 
mitted to shop around for inputs financed by credit or to dispose 
of produce through the outlet offering the best market price. 
iv) Price includes the costs of uncertainty borne by the 
borrower. The fourth level definition includes all of the above 
elements in the cost of credit to the borrower and also the costs 
to the borrower of uncertainty associated with credit access, which 
could include, for example, the level of lender efficiency. One 
variety of lender inefficiency may occur in seasonal production 
credit issued in kind at various times over the production cycle. 
The costs to the borrower of untimeliness may be substantial. If 
the achievement of yields required to make credit remunerative: to 
the borrower is sensitive to a number of input applications at 
critical periods, failure of supply of an input at a late stage 
in the production cycle jeopardises the investment in those 
inputs previously applied by causing an interruption :: 
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of the production process and reducing final output by shifting 
the enterprise to a lower production function. In addition, 
positive opportunity costs of the inputs applied up to the point 
of untimeliness by the lender work to the borrower's disadvantage. 
l 
Uncertainty associated with credit use includes the oppor- 
tunity credit may and often does offer for the borrower to under- 
take new practices or to adopt new enterprises. Changes of this 
sort, by virtue of their being untried by the borrower, frequently 
tend to increase the farmer's level of economic uncertainty. To 
the extent that credit permits the borrower to take risks which 
otherwise would not have been engaged or which would have been 
faced only on a much reduced level, and to the extent these risks 
eventuate adversely upon the borrower, the "cost" of credit may 
be very high indeed, including not only the unrequited outlay of 
expenses and effort, but also the accumulation of debt, the re- 
payment of which may have been expected from the fruits of the 
defunct enterprise. If the nature and level of uncertainty 
inherent in the loan-financed enterprise are perceived not at 
all or only very imperfectly by a naive 
borrower, the results 
may involve an element of pathos as well as of financial mis- 
fortune and of resource misallocation by giving an inept entre- 
preneur access to assets which he is not capable of handling. 
v) A digression on social costs of credit. The question of 
the social costs of credit warrants a bried discussion. Resource 
misallocation is possible through credit mechanisms, 
2 
and impose 
a cost on society. Misallocation based on access to credit may 
involve not only the provision of real resources to less competent 
operators, imposing. higher costs on the more competent in their 
efforts to obtain resources, but also impose problems of access 
on services which the user does not pay for directly. one example 
1. A simple statement of this general concern is found in 
"Credit Institutions and their Impact on Agricultural Develop- 
ment in Africa, " Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and 
Statistics. 22,10/11, October-November 1974. p. 13. 
2. Hazlett, Henry, op. cit., pp. 27-35. 
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of this type of service is the dispensation of justice. 
1 
Actions against defaulters may swell the queue of litigants, 
causing others to wait longer to receive a hearing. In the 
context of rural development this may involve delays in appli- 
cation of the law to routine claims such as boundary disputes, 
cattle theft and inheritance. 
2 
To the extent the court is 
unable to uphold loan contracts because of social considerations 
the basis for finance is weakened. To the extent the court 
upholds loan contracts in the face of great social opposition 
it may weaken its own status and that of the state as lawgiver. 
If the state is also the lender, and hence the plaintiff, rulings 
in its favour may tend to alienate groups of rural people who 
accord primacy to the welfare of their members, not the welfare of 
society as a whole. On the other hand rulings against the state 
as lender may diminish its authority and ability to provide the 
administration which many assume is an important element in rural 
development. 
These problems are transferred rather than solved if loan 
administration does not depend ultimately on the sanction of 
the courts. Administrative or legal arrangements which circum- 
vent the courts, granting special privileges to lenders to priority 
sectors, are also not without social costs, especially if there 
is no mechanism of appeal. Powers may be abused by administrators, 
1. Examples of problems in enforcing farmer loan repayment through 
the courts in rural development projects in Ethiopia and Malawi 
are found in Lele, Uma, The Design of Rural Development. pp. 93, 
95,96. 
2. In certain countries public sector agricultural credit 
institutions chartered under special acts, such as Kenya's 
Agricultural Finance Corporation, may be empowered to seize a 
borrower's assets pledged as loan security, without recourse to 
the courts. The broad powers given to the AFC in this respect are 
found in Section 33 of its Act, Cap. 323 of The Laws of Kenya: 
"... the Corporation may, without recourse to any court, enter 
upon the land and either take possession of or sell by public 
auction... the land upon such terms and conditions as the (AFC) 
Board (of Directors) may in all the circumstances consider proper. " 
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and consistency in application and impartiality in judgement 
may be more difficult to ensure through administrative rather 
than legal institutions. 
If the state as lender refrains from insisting on borrowers' 
compliance with loan contract terms, it undermines its own 
authority and also complicates the administration of any future 
direct intervention it may wish to take in the form of providing 
credit or with respect to those who are aware of its weakness in 
enforcing regulations of this type. To the extent things go 
wrong with public sector credit programmes, the state as lender 
places at some risk the position of the state as administrator 
and as guarantor of the rights of individuals under the law. 
b. Problems of the specification of the price of 
credit by the lender 
The theme of uncertainty introduced in the fourth level 
definition of the cost of credit to the borrower leads naturally 
to the consideration of the equally vexing problem of specifying 
ex ante the lender's cost of providing credit. Once again, the 
most convenient starting point is that provided by conventional 
economic theory, in which price is usually regarded as a quantity 
easily identified and unambiguous. At any given time, no un- 
certainty is attached to a current price. This approach is not 
well suited to primary securities in the form of debt instruments, 
however, as the essence of debt is delayed payment. Thus, the 
time element which characterises credit transactions automatically 
introduces uncertainty into the cost-benefit calculations of 
borrower and lender -- the future may be foreseen only imperfectly. 
Not all promises to pay carry an equal probability of fruition. 
These promises involve at least two elements: one is the obli- 
gation for payment of interest and other charges due the lender, 
and the other is the obligation to repay the principal amount of 
the loan. 
The probability of default with respect to these obligations 
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inevitably enters into the lender's calculations of the costs 
of lending. For analytical purposes the importance of the 
distinction between payment of interest and repayment of prin- 
cipal appears to be a function of the time perspective employed. 
In the short run non-payment of interest impairs the earnings 
of the lender, while non-repayment of principal poses a threat 
to the lender's capital. In the long run the return realised 
by the lender reflects his degree of success in collecting both 
interest and principal. 
However, the distinction operative in the short run com- 
plicates the application of conventional production cost theory 
to the operations of financial intermediaries. Loss of principal 
in the short run may possibly be accommodated by considering it 
as analogous to production for which there is no effective demand, 
in which case the costs of production are unrequited to the pro- 
ducer. This analogy is imperfect in one sense because the costs 
of production of credit also include administrative expenses 
which are one of the elements of interest rate determination 
in competitive markets according to interest theory and accounting 
logic. From the opportunity cost perspective the analogy remains- 
intact, as the casts of a failed investment include the returns 
which would have been realised from the resources were they 
devoted to their best alternative use. 
The lender's difficulty in ascertaining ex ante the cost of 
any particular transaction fall into several classifications. 
Exploration of these classifications suggests that there may be 
considerable uncovered ground between the banker's concern for 
the ability and the willingness of the borrower to repay and the 
economist's concern for the marginal efficiency of capital as a 
determinant of the rate of investment. 
Does credit rationing affect the rate or pattern of invest- 
ment? With the use of criteria other than price for the allocation 
of finance, the possibility arises that credit rationing distorts 
the pattern of investment away from that which might be expected 
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if price were the sole allocative criterion in a competitive 
market. This concern has not been very widely explored in the 
literature, but one interesting attempt in this direction was 
made by Catt in the construction of a static allocative model 
of homogeneous investment based on inherent elements of difference 
between the positions of borrowers and lenders. Catt attempts to 
reconcile the observations that the marginal efficiency of capital 
may be elastic with respect to changes in the interest rate, while 
individual entrepreneurs frequently indicate that their invest- 
ment decisions are not sensitive to changes in market rates of 
interest. 
1 
The existence of an "unsatisfied fringe" of rejected 
loan applicants suggests that the rate and pattern of investment, 
according to Catt's model, depends upon lenders' perceptions of 
investment opportunities facing perspective borrowers, not 
primarily on the perceptions of the borrowers. 
2 
The Catt model assumes that all investment is financed by 
borrowing, the limiting case in a real world of capital gearing. 
So long as the limiting case is the focus of analysis, the down- 
side risk -- i. e., the probability of unremunerative investment -- 
is identical for both borrower and lender, assuming away the 
existence of borrower net worth and the lender's costs of pro- 
viding credit. The borrower's potential loss is also the lender's 
potential loss. However, the upside possibilities diverge even in 
this case, providing a basis for greater risk aversion by the 
lender than on the part of the borrower. While the borrower's 
potential maximum return is the potential maximum return from 
the investment less the costs of borrowing, the lender's maximum 
return is limited to the repayment of principal plus receipt of 
interest and associated fees in a timely manner. Thus, the 
lender's schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital is held 
to be lower than that of the borrower as suggested by the greater 
risk aversion of lenders compared to investors. 
1. Catt, A. J. L., "Credit Risk and Credit Rationing: Comment, " 
Quarterly Journal of Economics. 77, August 1963. p. 506. 
2. Ibid., p. 507. 
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The marginal borrower's yield expectations on the marginal 
units of investment may be so much above the market rate of 
interest (to which he may or may not have access), that a sig- 
nificant increase in the loan rate would not cause him to abandon 
his project or his attempts to secure finance. Credit rationing 
makes funds "scarce" but not "too dear. "1 
With the relaxation of the limiting assumptions of the model 
the lender obtains the opportunity to vary his downside risk 
relative to that of the borrower. For example, the lender may 
require security in the form of other free assets owned by the 
borrower. More importantly, the lender may require the borrower 
to subscribe some of his own funds to the project. The borrower's 
contribution constitutes a cushion, or sacrifice to the lender's 
greater risk aversion, by permitting the lender to provide a 
smaller quantity of funds than he would have under the limiting 
assumption and by giving the borrower a greater incentive to see 
the project through successfully by virtue of his relegation to 
a residual position in the event of liquidation. The lender may 
be able to conclude that, within the possible range of uncertainty 
facing the investment, his own position as a risk taker with 
respect to the particular project is minimised to an extent con- 
sistent with the level of his expected returns from the loan. 
The Catt model dissolves into indeterminancy under these 
relaxations of assumptions, having served the useful purpose of 
focussing on the different perceptions between borrower and lender. 
These differences are hardly surprising, 
2 
and reflect larger 
divergences than simply those related to the mathematics of 
differential income and loss expectations as outlined above. 
One aspect of credit rationing which is not cited by Catt but 
which would add force to his assertion of differing expectations 
1. Ibid. 
2. Chase, Sam B., Jr., "Credit Risk and Credit Rationing: 
Comment, " Quarterly Journal of Economics. LXXV, 2, May 1961. 
p. 326; Hodgman, Donald R., "Credit Risk and Credit Rationing: 
Reply, " loc. cit. LXXV, 2, May 1961. pp. 327-329. 
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regarding the marginal efficiency of capital is that the 
borrower-investor presumably treats his own resourcefulness 
as a given or constant, built into his perceptions of investment 
opportunities. The more resourceful see greater scope for invest- 
ment than the less resourceful. However, the lender must weigh 
not only the investment opportunity as perceived by the loan 
applicant but also the ability or capacity of the applicant to 
meet the projections implicitly or explicitly contained in his 
loan application. This fact of lending is known as "lender's 
risk. "1 As it is unlikely that the lender would be more op- 
timistic than the applicant about the applicant's prospects in 
the applicant's industry, the lender would tend to project a 
lower marginal efficiency of capital with respect to any given 
project and also with respect to the totality of investment. 
Catt also suggests that lenders tend to be better informed 
about alternative investment opportunities than are loan appli- 
cants, as lenders are in the market continuously while applicants 
allegedly tend to think only in terms of their own proposal. 
2 
However, this is not plausible when Catt's unstated assumption 
of homogeneous investment is abandoned. Lenders are likely to 
be able to discriminate closely among applicants because as 
lenders, rather than equity holders excluded from Catt's basic 
model, they are concerned with the borrower as well as with his 
efficiency as an investor. However, to the extent lenders do not 
regularly and in a specialised manner undertake equity risks in 
collaboration with their borrowers it is unlikely that they would 
attain the specialisation necessary in the applicant's industry 
to have the ability to discriminate closely between investment 
alternatives in that industry. In practice, it is a brave lender 
who operates on the assumption that he knows his borrower's 
business better than his borrower does. 
In addition to problems of differential cultivation of 
1. "Lender's risk, that is, fear of partial or total failure of 
the borrower, " is Joan Robinson's definition. The Rate of 
Interest. p. 6. 
2. Op. cit., p. 508. 
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specialised knowledge, the lender's perceptions will tend to 
be more conservative than the borrower's because the lender does 
not exercise complete control over the borrower's activity or use 
of the funds borrowed. 
I 
In the narrow sense the lender can attempt 
to control loan use through a variety of devices ranging from loan 
disbursement through remuneration of suppliers of agreed goods, to 
disbursement in kind, and to field inspections to verify that 
funds have been spent as agreed. These precautions are prudent and 
useful, but they achieve no more than a limited control over the 
borrower's total expenditure. The fungible nature of credit 
implies that to the extent credit is a substitute for a portion 
of the borrower's own finite resources it permits him to undertake 
additional investments with his own resources which he would other- 
wise have been unable to undertake. On a broader basis the lender 
may impose and the borrower may accept certain restrictions under 
a loan agreement, such as a limitation on other borrowing and on 
the payment of dividends or of salaries to principals. However, 
the costs to the lender of securing total control over the 
borrower's activities is extremely high, both in terms of 
administrative expenses and in terms of the loss of borrower 
initiative such could involve. 
Another basis for differing approaches to risk between 
borrowers and lenders is that although they come together in the 
financial market, they are also dependent on other markets which 
they do not share. For example, the financial intermediary may 
bid for resources in a market segment which is quite different 
from the one in which he makes loans. The borrower may be most 
heavily oriented towards the market for his product. Because of 
the differences in the markets in which they operate, borrower and 
lender face different complexes of risks. The normal expectation 
would be that these risk complexes would be distinguishable from 
each other and that this difference would be reflected in the tactics 
1. Freimer, Marshall, and Myron J. Gordon, "Why Bankers Ration 
Credit, " Quarterly Journal of Economics. LXXIX, 3, August 1965. 
p. 413. 
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used by borrower and lender within their overall optimising 
strategies. Differences in tactics would influence their 
perceptions of any particular transaction. While a transaction 
normally implies an area of shared perception, 
1 
there is reason 
to suspect that relevant areas of differing perception would also 
exist. 
Consideration of the lender's market position in isolation 
may also explain the greater risk aversion of lenders relative to 
investors. To the. extent lenders compete for financial resources 
alternatives are created for depositors. The maintenance of 
the 
value of deposits is of course of great interest to depositors, 
regardless of whether their financial resources have been accumu- 
lated for reasons of convenience (money as a means of payment), 
precaution (money as a store of value), or speculation. If the 
intermediary receiving these deposits lends them out at high 
risk their value may be impaired. 
2 Thus, the intermediary must 
balance conflicting considerations. The quantity of funds he 
can lend will increase as he is willing to accommodate increasing 
uncertainty. At the same time, the supply of his loanable funds 
provided by deposits will tend to shrink. Hence, banker's con- 
servatism "may simply be the result of competition among rational 
institutions trying to attract customers on both the loan and 
deposit sides. "3 
c. The utility of credit rationing 
The lender's exposure on both sides of the market, as a 
competitor for financial resources and as a competitor issuing 
loans, provides special incentives for good credit decision making. 
The possibility that poor decisions will have repurcussions on 
I. Although it is conventionally held that a transaction in a 
competitive market occurs only when buyer and seller reach an 
agreement, it may also be argued that transactions occur only 
when the parties involved disagree -- the buyer being convinced 
that the price warrants a purchase, the seller convinced that 
the same price warrants the opposite response, a sale. 
2. Deposit insurance may offset this risk to the extent it is 
available for the amount of money and class of intermediary 
concerned. 
3. Chase, Sam B., Jr., op. cit., p. 326. 
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both sides of an intermediary's operations highlights the 
requirement of confidence for successful continuation of the 
intermediary's function. Given this vulnerability imposed by 
the fact that a relatively small number of errors in credit 
decision making will cause not only losses -- a normal business 
risk -- but also the loss of financial resources required for 
continued functioning, 
1 
lenders customarily employ screening 
devices designed to ensure that only those propositions and 
prospective borrowers most attractive to the lender's particular 
specialisation will receive serious consideration. 
These screening devices are credit rationing mechanisms. 
Common examples of such requirements include having a registered 
title deed to land to pledge as security, having a previously- 
established non-borrowing relationship with the lender in order 
to be considered for credit, membership in a credit cooperative 
or group, having an annual income above a certain minimum, having 
a demonstrable capacity to repay a loan within a specified period 
of time, and others known by all who have used modern formal credit. 
However, credit rationing is not usually defined in terms of 
these non-price screening devices. Price is the variable which 
is more familiar to economic analysis, and credit rationing is 
generally said to consist of the lender's establishing an interest 
rate (narrowly defined) and lending at this rate up to a limit 
determined by the borrower's financial circumstances. 
2 It must 
be noted that the implicit ceteris paribus convention upon which 
this definition is based means that this definition assumes that 
only one type of transaction is under consideration. For any one 
type of transaction, the lender would deal with all customers at 
the same rate or within 
,a narrow 
band of rates reflecting small 
projected differences in risks and other costs. In other words, 
1. While deposit insurance and central banks diminish this risk 
for certain types of intermediaries, they do not altogether eliminate 
it. The odium of being placed on bank examiners' and other author- 
ities' danger lists and the loss of executive control of management 
when this occurs also contributes to intermediaries' caution. 
2. Freimer, Marshall, and Myron J. Gordon, off, P. 397. 
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if a prospective borrower meets the non-price rationing criteria 
and as a result of or in conjunction with the application of these 
criteria is judged capable of meeting his obligations, he receives 
credit at the standard rate or within the standard rate range. 
The definition commonly used implies that the amount, the 
term to maturity and any other terms and conditions of the loan 
are subject to negotiation, while the interest rate is not negoti- 
able or negotiable within only a very narrow range. 
1 
In the ab- 
sence of non-price rationing, the interest rate would also be 
subject to negotiation, with considerable flexibility exercised 
by the lender in making opening bids and a resulting wide range of 
interest rates applied to different customers with whom the lender 
engages in otherwise more or less similar transactions as defined 
by loan agreements. The different rates charged to different 
customers would be a reflection of customers' differential 
bargaining powers, ceteris paribus. 
Freimer and Gordon's econometric treatment of credit ration- 
ing lead them to conclude that credit rationing is rational be- 
haviour2 for a profit and utility maximising lender. Their models 
include cases of fixed size investments as well as cases in which 
investment size is highly interest elastic, as where credit ration- 
ing is not applied. 
3 
An important aspect of the types of con- 
siderations with which they attempted to deal may be illustrated 
quite simply in an intuitive manner. 
1. Freimer and Gordon use the term "strict" credit rationing 
to denote the situation in which lenders will not vary their 
rate and "weak" credit rationing to denote cases in which lenders 
will vary the amount they are willing to lend with the interest 
rate, up to a limit. Ibid., p. 398. 
The contention that credit rationing is a cost saving mechanism 
through its removal of the interest rate from the subject of 
loan negotiation may be countered by the contention that this 
removal leads simply to more protracted negotiation of other 
loan terms. 
2. A review of various credit rationing models by Harris indi- 
cates that most models produce the conclusion that non-price 
rationing of credit by lenders is rational behaviour. Harris, 
Duane Gail, Credit Rationing at Commercial Banks: Theory and 
Evidence. Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Pennsyl- 
vania, 1971. (University Microfilms 72-06163). p. 38. 
3. Op. cit., pp. 398 ff. 
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The use of a standard rate of interest by credit rationing 
lenders would, ceteris paribus, paradoxically lead a rational 
"high risk" borrower to increase his estimation of his own debt 
capacity. If his costs of borrowing are restricted to a level 
appropriate to a low level of uncertainty, that portion of the 
high risk borrower's projected debt servicing capacity which 
would be available for the payment of loan principal would be 
larger than if his costs of borrowing were fixed at a higher 
level appropriate to his level of uncertainty. Under the same 
assumptions the lender may not be able to improve significantly 
the expected value of his returns from a loan by increasing the 
rate of interest charged. Increases in the borrower's costs of 
credit decrease the surplus or "free cash flow" from the bor- 
rower's investment which is a source of long run protection 
for the lender under conditions of certainty. Likewise, 
decreases in interest and other charges increase the portion 
of the projected free cash flow available for repayment of loan 
principal, which increases the borrower's debt capacity under 
assumptions of ceteris paribus. Given a certain projected free 
cash flow, a rational lender could seek to protect or enhance 
his position in ways other than charging a higher rate of interest, 
in ways not directly associated with the rate of interest charged 
on the loan. The lender's options include subjecting prospective 
borrowers to requirements relating to the provision of security 
or to the possession of certain qualifications or evidence of 
characteristics which are perceived by the lender as being 
associated with good repayment behaviour. Such requirements 
constitute the tools of credit rationing. 
d. Credit rationing as the norm 
Does the persistence of credit rationing imply that the 
price system is foresaken in financial markets? This suggestion 
is contained in Ladman's definition of "external non-price 
rationing" of credit (the phenomenon discussed here) as a 
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condition which prevails when1 
the suppliers. of credit for any reason limit the amount 
of money they will lend the farmer at going rates of 
interest where this limit keeps the farmer from borrowing 
the amount he wants to borrow and in fact would borrow 
in the absence of such limit. 
The same approach is manifest in Wilson's definitional discussion: 
2 
Under certain circumstances we find that banks and other 
credit institutions are only prepared to allow their 
customers a limited amount of accommodation at current 
rates of interest. For some reason it has been decided, 
either by the monetary authorities or... by the banks 
themselves that the demand for credit cannot be fully 
met at current rates and the authorities (or the banks) 
are unwilling that interest rates should rise. Partially, 
at least, the price mechanism is abandoned, but somehow 
or other a proportion of the demand for credit must be 
chocked off. 
Ladman's statement fails to recognise that the use of "going 
rates of interest" by formal lenders (the type of lender studied 
by Ladman) in itself implies credit rationing. If the interest. 
rate were the sole rationing criterion the range of rates charged 
by the lender would be broad, given an ample supply of loanable 
funds, reflectiTig differing levels of uncertainty associated with 
different loans in the lender's portfolio. In terms of equilibrium 
analysis, the diversity of rates produced in markets which are 
competitive but not enjoying perfect foresight would produce a 
uniform return to lenders over the long run because of lenders' 
differential loss experience. 
The opening phrase of Wilson's discussion (i. e., "under 
certain circumstances") suggests that credit rationing is an 
occasional condition in the credit market, occurring at the 
expense of the price system. However, this possibility is 
contradicted by his later observation that with credit rationing 
lenders "are only prepared to allow their customers a limited 
amount of accommodation, " as financial theory and experience 
1. Ladman, Jerry Ray, The Marginal Value Productivity of Short 
Term Credit and an Examination of External Credit Rationing for 
Representative Farm Firms in Two Mexican Municipios. Unpublished 
PhD dissertation, Iowa State University, 1968. (University Micro- 
films 68 - 14,803). p. 7. 
2. Wilson, J. S. G., "Credit Rationing and the Relevant Rate of 
Interest, " Economica. NS, XXI, 81, February 1954. p. 22. 
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offer no examples of unlimited accommodation. 
1 The credit- 
worthiness of governments may appear to be without bounds (at 
least within the geographical and functional confines of their 
monopoly powers as states), given the assumption that such loans 
are riskless, but even in this special case it may be argued that 
in any given short period lenders to government do not have un- 
limited access to or supplies of loanable funds because ipso 
facto they are not government and thus cannot issue riskless 
claims on themselves. This circularity returns us to Ladman's 
observation that credit rationing prevents a farmer from ob- 
taining all the credit he would like to have, apparently in the 
same sense that rationing of petrol would force some consumers 
to use less than they would in the absence of such a control. 
In fact, the amount of debt the farmer wants to incur and the 
amount that he would be able to borrow frequently diverge, 
given lender's risk. The amount that he would be able to borrow 
is a function of the lender's assessment of the farmer's debt 
capacity as well as of the farmer's willingness to borrow, while 
the amount the farmer wants to borrow is simply a function of 
his own willingness to incur a certain type of financial obli- 
gation. 
However, this approach to the problem of credit rationing 
does lead to an interesting consideration. If the prospective 
borrower and prospective lender honestly disagree in their per- 
ceptions of the borrower's financial circumstances, specifically, 
about the borrower's debt capacity, and the loan eventually 
negotiated is for a smaller amount than the borrower believes 
he can handle within the terms and conditions agreed, is non- 
price credit rationing present? The previous discussion of the 
inevitability of differences in interests and perceptions between 
1. Joan Robinson provides the justification: "A world in which 
entrepreneurs could borrow without limit at the regular rate of 
interest would be much unlike the world we live in. Unlimited 
borrowing would be possible only where there was no uncertainty 
about future profits, not only in the broad, but in respect to 
the fortunes of individual enterprises. " The Rate of Interest. 
p. 80. 
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borrowers and lenders suggests that haggling is bound to occur, 
even in circumstances of full disclosure and mutual goodwill. 
The financial market is a means by which such differences are 
reconciled. Non-price rationing is a device employed in the 
search and bargain process in the financial marketplace, and 
arises from uncertainty and reactions to uncertainty. 
Reflecting the unique nature of the "price" of credit, it 
is tempting to conclude that credit rationing is a special case 
of the general phenomenom on non-price allocative systems. 
However, credit rationing is in fact a different genus from the 
conventional type of rationing which occurs under the imposition 
of a ceiling price. Credit rationing is unique because: 
1 
i) the lender rations as a rational response to risk and is not 
denying himself or being denied an advantage which would other- 
wise be attractive -- e. g., greater returns from lending, and 
ii) the supply of loanable funds to some borrowers within the 
margin may remain interest elastic even after becoming completely 
inelastic to those at the margin. The ceiling price model 
assumes no scope for elasticity of supply. 
e. Specialisation as a means of reducing uncertainty and risk 
Credit rationing, as a response to uncertainty within a 
situation of divergent interests, operates through devices which sup- 
port specialisation in financial intermediation. Specialisation 
implies that the financial market consists of several reasonably 
well defined segments. Each segment involves a somewhat dif- 
ferentiated product or service and is served by a peculiar type 
of specialist intermediary. Development finance or venture 
capital companies, mainstream merchant bankers, commercial 
bankers, credit unions, mortgage bankers, housing finance 
institutions, savings banks, hire purchase companies and 
industrial finance companies are common examples of specialised 
1. These observations follow closely those given by Donald 
R. Hodgman in "Credit Risk and Credit Rationing, " Quarterly 
Journal of Economics. LXXIV, 2, May 1960. p. 275. 
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financial institutions. Each of these intermediaries tends to 
specialise both as a buyer and as a seller of financial assets, 
serving a certain type of borrower as defined by credit rationing 
criteria, as well as a certain type of purchaser of its own 
financial liabilities. 
There are two types of impetus for specialisation in 
financial markets: one is in response to market forces, while 
the other is in response to statutory limitations. 
i) Specialisation and survival in the market. Information 
occupies probably the most prominent position among the require- 
ment of a lender in a competitive market. A borrower or prospective 
borrwer's promise to pay may be evaluated only by access to 
information. Information of relevance includes not only the 
status of the borrower's own affairs, but of the nature of the 
markets in which the borrower deals and the forces acting upon 
these markets. While the lender's uncertainty with respect to 
a given borrower may be offset ultimately by the existence of 
some form of security, the value of security is also frequently 
not without uncertainty, and realisation is not a costless affair. 
Late repayment of even a fully secured loan may temporarily em- 
barrass the lender if the maturity of his assets and his 
liabilities are tightly balanced with insufficient provision of 
a margin for manoeuvre. This type of problem is not borne 
costlessly by an intermediary. Thus, there is an incentive to 
reduce uncertainty through specialisation in lending, to restrict 
the range of transactions to those about which the intermediary is 
best informed. Specialisation on this basis permits economies, as 
noted in a previous section, and contributes to the allocative 
efficiency of financial markets. 
Along with the premium imposed on information by market 
forces and its impetus towards specialisation, a strategy for 
reducing risk (in this case defined as the characteristic of 
combined uncertainties) is pooling. Diversification of activities 
is compatible with a strategy of growth, reduces the impact of 
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risk, and retains the advantages of specialisation in each of 
the activities combined within one firm. Thus, the financial 
sector is composed of a variety of institutions, some of which 
are narrowly specialised, such as mortgage banks or factors to 
the garment trade, while others are diversified, such as com- 
mercial banks. 
The concept of the optimum financial structure for an 
intermediary has been reasonably well explored. Specification 
of the optimum involves a balancing of conflicting goals and 
also includes achieving a satisfactory balance -- relative to 
the goals, capital structure and operating alternatives open to 
the intermediary -- between portfolio risk and portfolio yield. 
l 
The minimisation of portfolio risk and uncertainty is directed 
ultimately toward the avoidance of insolvency, defined as the 
inability to meet financial obligations as they fall due. Il- 
liquidity, the inability to convert assets into cash, poses the 
threat of insolvency. Given the need for some illiquidity, as 
a property of non-cash financial assets, financial management 
harmonises the probability of insolvency with the fruitful 
employment of financial assets, usually under a maximising or 
optimising strategy. 
However, the concept of an optimum financial structure for 
an economy involves more complexity and a multiplicity of goals 
and has not been so well explored. 
2 
The configuration of 
financial markets is the result of many forces with varying 
strengths peculiar to each economy. 
3 
In addition to market 
forces, perfect and imperfect, governments also generally play 
a role in determining the scope of intermediaries' activities. 
1. Consult any work on bank management. A discussion is found 
in Chapter 8, "Commercial Bank Liquidity and Lending Policy, " 
of Sayers, R. S., Modern Banking. 7th ed. Oxford, at the 
Clarendon Press, 1967. pp. 175-196. 
2. Cameron, Rondo, Banking in the Early Stages of Industriali- 
zation. pp. 2,307 ff. Since Cameron made this observation the 
work of Shaw and McKinnon has provided a framework for this type 
of consideration, of course. 
3. Ibid., pp. 290 ff. 
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ii) Specialisation enforced by intervention. Because of 
the critical nature of financial intermediation in a country's 
economic life, intermediaries are normally subject to statutory 
limitations or to administrative controls which limit their scope. 
Controls by government have frequently developed through efforts 
to protect the public from poor financial management stemming 
from a lack of specialisation. Poor management may result from 
management spread too thinly. Diversification, as reflected in 
a firm`s dealing in a wide variety of types of financial assets 
simultaneously, appears at times to be contrary to the public 
interest as when an intermediary has the opportunity to sub- 
stitute internal transactions for market transactions across or 
between various specialisations. This type of substitution 
(e. g., the use of pension funds managed by a bank to purchase 
shares or obligations of a faltering borrower indebted to the 
same bank) is frequently associated with financial imprudence. 
1 
Consequently, intermediaries are frequently prohibited by law 
from engaging in certain activities deemed to be beyond the 
range of their traditional expertise or which for other reasons 
public sector authorities wish to reserve for special sorts of 
institutions. 
2 
Statutory limitations usually begin with barriers to entry. 
In order to participate in formal financial markets as an inter- 
mediary, certain statutory requirements must usually be met, such 
as the possession of at least a minimum amount of capital. An 
intermediary's capital offers a "cushion" against insolvency, 
3 
1. The manipulations by IOS management as detailed in a popular 
expose provide ample illustration. See Raw, Charles; Bruce Page 
and Godfrey Hodgson, Do You Sincerely Want to be Rich? Harmonds- 
worth, Middlesex, Penguin Books Ltd., 1972.480 pp. 
2. Part III of The Banking Act of Kenya is entitled "Prohibited 
Business, " and the Acts applying to other financial institutions 
likewise place limitations on the type of business each is em- 
powered to conduct. 
3. "The concept of liquidity, although separate from that of 
capital adequacy, is very closely related to it in some aspects. 
The need for (bank) liquidity arises from: 
(i) the need to be able to meet overall increases in demand for 
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hence protecting to some extent those to whom the intermediary is 
indebted. The existence of an undercapitalised intermediary may 
threaten the solvency of many participants in the market, given 
the transactions linkages between intermediaries in an active 
market. A loss of liquidity through the insolvency of one par- 
ticipant may trigger a chain reaction of insolvencies, thus pro- 
viding a basis for barriers to entry based on capitalisation. 
1 
Statutory or administrative limitations which result in the 
rationing of credit to users of credit outside the financial 
sector are also common. In Kenya, for example, credit was 
rationed on the basis of race prior to independence. 
2 
Distinctions 
based on residence or citizenship and race have been used since 
independence. 
3 
In India as of 1969, the position of commercial 
banks as holders of charges on peasants' land was not at all 
secure, given that cooperatives could in many cases obtain a 
first charge regardless of any prior charges registered, and 
that commercial banks were in many cases not allowed to dispose 
(continued) advances and/or withdrawal of deposits or from 
timing differences in the maturity of assets and liabilities; 
(ii) a shortfall in the anticipated inward cash flow usually as a 
result of the inability of a borrower to repay on the due date; 
(iii) additional operating or capital expenditure; 
(iv) losses. " 
"The Capital and Liquidity Adequacy of Banks, " Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin. September 1975. P. 242. 
1. A rationale for special regulation of financial markets is 
well expressed by the following quotation: "The public interest 
is involved in the solvency as well as the competitiveness of 
financial institutions. We allow restaurants and grocery stores 
to fail freely, believing that free entry assures competition. 
The burden of their failure falls mainly on the owners of such 
enterprises. But the losses that result from the insolvency of 
financial institutions, particularly those'that handle the money 
of the relatively unsophisticated public, are throght to be 
socially it not economically intolerable. " Robinson, Roland I., 
and Dwayne Wrightman, Financial Markets: The Accumulation and 
Allocation of Wealth. New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1974. 
pp. 403-404. 
2. East Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955. Chapter 9. pp. 96- 
104. 
3. Central Bank of Kenya, Eighth Annual Report for the Year 
Ended 30th June 1974. pp. 57,58,62,65. 
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of foreclosed land. 
1 Naturally, Indian banks severely rationed 
their credit to peasant cultivators as a result. 
The existence of statutory limitations on intermediation 
should not be confused with the justification of such limitations. 
Intervention in this form also has its social costs: Prohibitions 
against horizontal and vertical integration in financial markets 
would appear to involve a sacrifice of economies of scale, judging 
from the general tendency of intermediaries to diversify on 
functional and geographical bases. 2 
Limitations on entry, for example, may permit the realisation 
of monopoly rents on equity capital, the existence of geographic 
differences in interest rates, or discrimination -- in terms of 
interest rates -- not related to the performance of various classes 
of borrowers, and differences in long run rates of return on 
equity capital among different classes of intermediaries subjected 
to different entry barriers. 
3 
Deposit insurance not paid for 
directly by depositors may make them indifferent to comparative 
lending performance, shielding poor lenders from the sanctions of 
loss of deposits and depositors. 
4 
On an historical basis the most rapid expansion of banking in 
industrialised countries appears to have occurred when entry into 
banking was relatively free and banks were not restrained by law 
from issuing their own banknotes. 
5 
While freedom of note issue 
is often considered to characterise one of the most irresponsible 
1. Reserve Bank of India, Report of the Expert Group on State 
Enactments. pp. 4-5 contain a summary. 
2. One motive for this tendency is suggested by the title of the 
annual world financial survey published by The Economist, 253, 
6851,14 December 1974 issue, in the wake of several spectacular 
failures of major banks and the efforts of others to reorganise: 
"When Bigger Looks Safer. " 
3. Borts, George H., "Agenda for a Commission to Study Financial 
Markets, their Structure and Regulation, " Journal of Money, Credit, 
and Banking. III, 1, February 1971. pp. 3-4. 
4. Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
5. Cameron, Rondo, Banking in the Early Stages of Industriali- 
zation. p. 305. 
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and socially harmful chapters in banking history, 
1 
it is 
frequently overlooked that the rapid expansion of banking 
that competitive note issue encouraged provided society with 
certain benefits, too, as manifested by the public's demand for a 
means o. f. payment as demonstrated by their willingness to 
hold and accept private banknotes -- a point apparently missed 
by commentators such as Hammond and Cagan. Their error, of 
course, lies in comparing the disadvantages of a non-unified 
national currency with the advantages of a unified one, of 
comparing a particular condition with its successors rather 
than its antecedents or with alternatives available at the 
time. Joan Robertson's comment that, "if the stock (of money) 
is inconveniently small, even an unsophisticated society soon 
finds ways to augment it with acceptable tokens, "2 provides a 
more useful approach to the problem. In any event, "unregu- 
lated" private note issues eventually engendered market re- 
sponses in the form of internal controls within the industry 
which bankers applied to each other. 
3 
The purpose of raising 
these issues is not to deny the case for bank regulation, but 
simply to point out various sides of the case and the existence 
of alternative approaches to the minimisation of the social 
risk inherent in private intermediation. 
iii) A summary of causes of specialisation in financial 
markets. To return to and summarise the theme outlined above, 
the relation between uncertainty and risk and the structure 
1. Hammond, Bray, "Banking before the Civil War, " in Carson, 
Deane, ed., Banking and Monetary Studies. Homewood, Illinois, 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1963. pp. 1-14; Cagan, Phillip, "The 
First Fifty Years of the National Banking System -- an Historical 
Appraisal, " loc. cit. , pp. 15-42. 
2. The Rate of Interest. p. 146. 
3. Hammond, Bray, op. cit., pp. 12-13; Cameron, Rondo, op. cit., 
on the development of Scottish banking, especially pp. 68-70. 
The chronicle of note issue, oligopoly, failure, bank wars and 
other aspects of the most colourful periods of Scottish banking 
history is found in Checkland, S. G., Scottish Banking: A History, 
1695-1973. Glasgow, Collins, 1975. See especially Ch. 5 and 6, 
pp. 89-135,137-179. 
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of financial markets is forceful but indirect. The main 
dynamics may be illustrated diagrammatically as shown in 
Figure II-a. 
Figure II-a. Uncertainty, 
_Pisk and 
Market Structure 
market 
forces 
?1 
Uncertainty I Market 
and risk 
Specialisation ---º structure 
statutory 
j 
limitations 
feedback -------- 
------------ -----I feedback - 
Uncertainty and risk induce specialisation in financial inter- 
mediaries, both through the operation of market forces and 
through statutory devices. Specialisation in turn determines 
market structure. Thus, secular changes in uncertainty and 
risk would be reflected in alterations in market structure, 
as through, for example, bank failure and amalgamation. The 
existence of specialisation and a certain market structure 
serve to modify uncertainty and risk through feedback processes, 
too. To this simplified model could be added the acknowledgement 
of interaction between market forces and statutory limitations, 
as indicated by the broken line in Figure II-a. 
Market structure based on specialisation and segmentation 
provides a basis for the specification of credit rationing 
criteria by financial firms. Each specialised intermediary 
is best equipped to take certain types of risks and to face 
certain types of uncertainties, reflecting the advantages of 
specialisation. Undertaking risks and becoming subject to un- 
certainties outside the established area of expertise could 
increase the probability of illiquidity and insolvency. An 
increase in the risk and uncertainty attached to an inter- 
mediary's portfolio could increase this probability in two 
ways. 
l The first is the effect of non-repayment on liquidity 
1. Chase, Sam B., Jr., op. cit., p. 326. 
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and solvency, and the second is the change in the lender's 
access to resources which could follow such an increase. 
Depositors and other purchasers of the intermediary's lia- 
bilities might react to an increase in risk and uncertainty 
by converting these liabilities to cash, which could also 
place strains on the intermediary's liquidity and solvency. 
f. Differential credit rationing inherent 
in specialisation in financial markets 
Prospective borrowers may find it in their best interests 
to negotiate with several lenders in an effort to obtain the 
most advantageous terms possible, 
' 
and the utility of such 
behaviour is enhanced by product differentiation in financial 
markets. Product differentiation, as reflected in a diversity 
of financial assets, and in more stringent rationing by any 
single-product intermediary, tends to offset the effects of 
credit rationing by any single intermediary or class of inter- 
mediaries. Prospective individual borrowers who cannot meet 
the requirements of a commercial bank may have access to hire 
purchase, and those who do not qualify for hire purchase may 
find accommodation at pawn shops. Firms which cannot obtain 
further debt may be able to raise additional equity capital 
with venture capital companies or investment banks, and so 
forth. 
A diversified and competitive financial market cannot 
exist independently of specialisation among intermediaries. 
Specialisation enhances the potential for the market as a 
whole to be an efficient allocative mechanism, even though 
each intermediary uses non-price criteria for the allocation 
of the resources under his control. Increasing diversity 
implies increasing specialisation, which provides an avenue 
for the reduction of uncertainty through economies of information 
access in each particular market segment. - Better information 
1. Wilson, J. F. G., "Credit Rationing, " pp. 21-31. 
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allows the market to function more efficiently as an allocative 
mechanism. Far from restricting the scope of borrowers, credit 
rationing is part of a mechanism which expands the range of 
choice and may enhance prospective borrowers' access to finance 
under workably competitive conditions. Credit rationing need 
not inherently distort investment allocation under conditions 
of uncertainty and workable competition. 
D. Financial Deepening from a Rural Development Perspective 
1. Toward a Concept of Saving Appropriate for Rural Development 
The relative neglect of the financial process as a contributor 
or potential contributor to economic progress would also appear to 
be related to the application to developing countries of the basic 
conventional model which envisages the composition of an economy 
consisting of households, firms and government. According to 
this typology, households are consuming units and firms are 
producing units. 
1 
Households are capable of consumption because 
they provide the factors of production required by firms. Returns 
to labour, land and capital flow from firms to households through 
factor markets, ultimately if not directly. 
a. Interdependence and functions of abstract economic units 
That this dichotomy between households and firms, or 
variations upon it found in basic textbooks, is not suited to 
developing economies is apparent. The model assumes a high degree 
of economic interdependence, and nowhere are these assumptions 
less tenable than with respect to the fragmented markets in the 
rural economies which constitute substantial portions of the 
national economy and occupy the majority of the population in 
1. A variation on the basic theme views economic units as 
consisting of the "public" and "business". See Samuelson, 
Paul A., Economics: An Introductory Analysis. 7th ed. New 
York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967. p. 44. 
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most Third World countries. The extent of the isolation in 
which economic activities take place varies between areas and 
over time, and perception of this isolation is also diverse. 
For example, Marx saw the mid-Nineteenth Century French peasant 
as having almost no economic links with the larger economy. 
' 
The smallholding peasants form a vast mass, the members 
of which live in similar conditions but without entering 
into manifold relations with one another. Their mode of 
production isolates them from one another instead of 
bringing them into mutual intercourse. -Their field of 
production, the smallholding, admits of no division of 
labour in its cultivation, no application of science and, 
therefore, no diversity of development, no variety of 
talent, no wealth of social relationships. Each individual 
peasant family is almost self-sufficient; it itself 
directly produces the major part of its consumption and 
thus acquires its means of life more through exchange 
with nature than in intercourse with society. 
Few observers of African peasantry today would accept this 
definition as applicable. The richness and complexity of the 
"manifold relations" of traditional society in Africa have been 
widely commented upon, as has the division of labour, by age and 
by sex, ordained by the same traditions. However, the validity 
of Marx's observation for narrowly economic, as opposed to more 
broadly social, relationships may approach the admissable in 
certain cases, the number of which is declining with the spread 
of markets. 
A more comprehensive view of the peasantry stressing inter- 
dependence on several planes, is offered by Firth. 
2 
'Peasant' describes a socio-economic system of small- 
scale producers with a relatively simple, non-industrial 
technology. The system is a rural one, though... it 
depends on a rural-urban antimony and interrelationship, 
particularly upon the existence of a market. Definition 
of a system as 'peasant' implies that it has its own 
particular local character, partly because of intricate 
1. Marx, Karl, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, " 
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Selected Works. Vol. 1. Moscow, 
Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950. Pp. 202-203. 
2. Firth, Raymond, "Capital, Saving and Credit in Peasant Societies: 
A Viewpoint from Economic Anthropology, " in Firth, Raymond, and B. S. 
Yamey, eds., op. cit., p. 17. 
160 
community interrelationships and partly because, in 
economic and social affairs, it both contributes to 
and draws upon a town in trade, cultural exchange 
and general ideology. (emphasis added) 
Firth would presumably not quarrel with the assertion that a 
major share of peasant agricultural produce is consumed on the 
farm rather than sold in the market, although the studies 
assembled by him and his co-editor suggest that Marx's view 
cannot be generalised as it does not accord with the data 
available from a variety of economies. 
Whichever view is taken of the extent of isolation of 
households in a rural economy, it is easily seen that the 
economically abstract household has little resemblance to 
reality. While the sociological abstraction of a household 
may perhaps be applied without great difficulty, at least for 
purposes of census enumeration, the economic abstraction of 
the household is less applicable to the rural communities of 
the Third World. But in spite of its distortion, the economic 
concept of the household appears to be in harmony with certain 
predilictions in current economic and political thought which 
put primary emphasis on consumption rather than production as 
the main focus in the development arena. Briefly, the popu- 
lation of the Third World are popularly viewed basically as 
consumers in the household sense rather than as producers. 
1 
Difficulties in securing superior levels of consumption for the 
masses are a matter of prime concern. Indeed, the direct 
relationship between consumption and survival, with the former 
a necessary condition for the latter, provides a basis for 
this view of a materially poor population and the rhetoric 
which this view produces. Concern for the Gross Domestic 
Product as an indicator of economic performance is being re- 
fined by concern for standards of living and the quality of 
1. Contrast "Seventy percent of the world's people get only 
302 of the world's income" (United Nations, "The Seventh Special 
Session of the General Assembly, 1-12 September 1975: Issues and 
Background. New York, 1975. p. 7) with "Roughly half the world's 
population are neither contributing significantly to economic 
growth nor sharing equitably in its benefits. " (McNamara, Robert 
S., "Address to the Board of Governors. " Washington, DC, IBRD, 
1 September 1975. p. 13). 
161 
life, which emphasises consumption. Levels of consumption on 
a global scale are being projected beyond the year 2000 in 
exercises which suggest that the present economic order cannot 
be sustained by the planet's material resources. 
Given these considerations and their obvious utility in 
identifying certain aspects of major current economic problems, 
it is not surprising that saving is generally thought of as a 
residual, a left-over after consumption is taken care of. Con- 
sumption is, after all, the ultimate purpose of economic activity 
-- saving and investment are only means to that end. It is also 
consistent with this view that the essentially negative definition 
of saving as an act of abstention is not conducive to identifying 
certain opportunities which are inherent in a monetised economy. 
The popular view should be considered by those concerned with 
development as a harmful simplification suitable only at the 
level of a Robinson Crusoe type of economy. 
b. Saving as a normal economic activity 
A more productive approach to saving is found in the nature 
of the financial function. To preserve the symmetry of simpli- 
city, a quaint quotation from Paish suffices to illustrate the 
point: 
Z 
Probably the only living creatures which do not require 
any form of finance are those for whom the enjoyment of 
the fruits of their efforts to obtain food is simultaneous 
with the making of the efforts. For all other creatures 
there is some interval of time between effort and enjoy- 
ment, and it is for the provision of the means of existence 
during this interval that we need finance. 
So, finance is necessary for human survival and its utility 
arises from the lack of simultaneity between the realisation 
of income and the act of expenditure. The existence of intervals 
between the occurrance of these two types of event is normal and 
virtually universal. Furness lists four reasons why differing 
1. Paish, F. W., Business Finance. London, Sir Issac Pitman 
and Sons Ltd., 1957. p. 5. 
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time patterns may characterise flows of receipts and flows of 
1 
payments: 
1. It is frequently inconvenient to pay for a continuous 
service on a continuous basis. Convenience favours periodic 
settlement. (This phenomenon also applies to collection of 
payment for a continuous service, of course, and Furness' 
statement could easily be expanded to include both sides of 
the transaction. 
2. Many commodities are characterised by indivisibilities. 
They are costly in relation to the amount of income earned over 
a short period, and their purchase requires a build-up of wealth 
or else payment out of expected future income. 
3. Flows may vary over life cycles. With reference to 
individuals, accumulation in the economically most productive 
years or periods is a rational response to the probability of 
diminished real income in the future due to illness, advanced 
age, uncertainty of employment, and similar factors. 
4. Time periods required for production may not coincide 
with the time periods applicable to producers' needs. Roundabout 
methods of production involve long gestation periods which must 
be financed so that shorter cycles may continue. Workers may be 
paid on a weekly or monthly basis in an industry in which units 
of production are considerably longer, as in construction and 
shipbuilding, for example. Lack of simultaneity of this variety 
is also easily illustrated by an agricultural economy in which 
harvests occur once or twice a year while consumption of agri- 
cultural produce occurs continuously. 
Thus, abstention from consumption is in fact an integral 
part of the economic process and cannot on a priori grounds be 
relegated to the position of a residual, especially a residual 
which may not always eventuate. Given the assumption of monetised 
income and expenditure and the lack of access to credit, saving 
in fact has precedence over consumption in terms of timing. 
Timing is an appropriate and valid context because of the lack 
of simultaneity in income and expenditure (i. e., a time dimension), 
which is the basis of finance. 
2 Still on a very simple level, 
1. Furness, E. L., An Introduction to Financial Economics. 
London, Heinemann, 1972. p. 9. 
2. It should be noted that the concept presented here has 
little connection with the notion of the obligatory surplus 
and optional surplus used by Clive Bell. By defining the former 
as the peasant response to direct taxes and industrially pro- 
duced agricultural inputs, its utility as an analytical device 
is diminished -- e. g., cash flows related to the exchange of 
inputs within the rural sector are ignored. By defining 
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any income not disbursed the moment it is received may be 
regarded as "saved" until such time as it is disbursed. 
The progression is illustrated schematically in Figure 
II-b, which defines income received but not yet disbursed for 
the purchase of consumption goods and services or for "invest- 
ment" purposes as working balances. These balances are saving 
in the traditional sense of representing an abstention from 
consumption, as well as an abstention from investment by the 
unit receiving monetary income. The inclusiveness of the 
various definitions of money poses no problem for this model. 
As money lies within the frontier provided by its definition, 
non-monetary financial assets lie beyond that frontier and 
consist of two types of claims: evidence of ownership and 
evidence of debt (other than that which constitutes money). 
Excepting deductions at source, which are common in 
developing countries only in monetary transactions involving 
governments or moneylenders as principals, monetary income 
provides the recipient with savings in a financial form. This 
observation adds other dimensions to the "real" model according 
to which income is used either for consumption or investment in 
real goods. These new dimensions include the length of time 
between receipt and disbursement. and the form in which the 
funds are held, and both lead directly to the consideration 
of the structure of an economy's financial sector. 
c. Time and form as keys to mobilising savings 
The form in which monetary income is held, other things 
remaining equal, is a function of the alternatives available. 
If no financial intermediaries are convenient to the location 
(continued) the latter as the "counterpart transactions of 
rural households' purchases of industrial consumption goods, " 
definitional awkwardness appears to complicate the dichotomy 
between industrial and non-industrial goods and services noted 
previously. See "Ideology and Economic Interests in Indian 
Land Reform, " in Lehmann, David, ed., Agrarian Reform and 
Agrarian Reformism. London, Faber and Faber, 1974. p. 210. 
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Figure II-h. Savings, Investment and the Finance Function. 
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in which monetary income is received, there is a higher 
probability that the transaction will involve cash than if 
an intermediary is convenient. Likewise, without convenient 
intermediation cash balances will probably be relatively higher 
than with such a service. With intermediation cash balances 
may be exchanged for alternative financial assets. 
The opportunities for intermediation provided by the 
length of time funds are held, other things remaining equal, 
depend upon the nature of intermediaries and the markets in 
which they deal. While in major financial centres it is possible 
to place funds at interest for periods as short as one night, in 
rural areas it may not be possible to find employment for funds 
during periods several months long between agricultural production 
cycles. Bottomley notes, for example, that rural moneylenders 
in areas where loan demand is greatest during the period between 
sowing and harvest may have no attractive use for their funds 
between harvest and sowing. 
1 
The length of the shortest feasible 
holding period for non-monetary financial assets tends to vary 
inversely with the intensity of financial market activity. When 
markets. are active the financial structure can mobilise resources 
which would otherwise remain idle for short periods, while inactive 
markets mobilise sluggishly or to only a small degree. The active 
market is also characterised by a wide selection of financial 
assets. One basis for differentiation of financial assets is 
maturity or term, and increasing the choice of maturities makes 
non-monetary financial assets relatively more attractive to 
holders of monetary savings, providing an impetus to the purchase 
of non-monetary financial assets, thereby making a more active 
market. As market activity increases over the medium and long 
term, more savings, as defined here, are translated into savings 
as erroneously viewed by those who maintain that peasants cannot 
save. 
1. Bottomley, Anthony, "The Cost of Administering Private Loans 
in Underdeveloped Rural Areas, " Oxford Economic Papers. NS, 15, 
2, June 1963. p. 160 f; "The Determination of Pure Rates of 
Interest in Underdeveloped Rural Areas, " Review of Economics and 
Statistics. XQ. VI, 3. August 1964. P. 302. 
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2. Indivisibilities and Agricultural Progress 
Are indivisibilities in rural investment a major barrier 
to development? Is intervention required to overcome any 
indivisibilities which may constrain rural progress? Do 
indivisibilities provide a grounds for justifying intervention? 
Evidence suggests that indivisibilities are frequently not 
an insuperable financial problem within the context of rural 
development. Savings capacities are often underestimated, and 
various social mechanisms help to overcome discontinuities in 
investment scale. 
Some problems of indivisibility may be overcome by joint 
action, as when people voluntarily join together to take ad- 
vantage of bulk buying and delivery. In Malawi, for example, 
the state-owned supplier of agricultural inputs has offered a 
discount to cash purchasers of lorry load lots of fertiliser 
and also delivers the fertiliser to the point designated by the 
buyer, which is an important consideration given the state of 
transport facilities in that country. Small farmers without 
access to formal credit for inputs or for farm development have 
in many instances spontaneously grouped themselves together for 
the'purchase of a lorry loan for delivery to their village, 
overcoming an indivisibility through joint action. 
In Kenya the experience of the Cooperative Savings Scheme 
suggests that farmers are capable of saving substantial amounts 
of cash. The absolute accumulation of savings lowers the 
relative threshold of indivisibility. Women's harambee 
societies formed in the countryside are also dedicated to 
overcoming indivisibilities. A Society of the Iron Sheets, such 
as encountered by the writer in Central Province, was formed as 
a rotating credit association for the purpose of assisting members 
to roof their houses with iron sheets. 
These examples may be criticised as being homely and humble, 
not relevant to "productive" investment and the problems of scale 
it may involve. Evidence to the contrary is found in the over- 
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whelming importance of self-finance of major innovations by 
smallholders in Kenya as. outlined in the next chapter. In 
addition, the existence of indivisibilities. is in fact an 
argument for financial liberalisation. McKinnon stresses 
that well functioning financial markets free entrepreneurs 
to overcome indivisibilities in a socially beneficial manner 
consistent with broadly-based development policies: 
1 
With indivisibilities so important in practice, however, 
financially isolated entrepreneurs can easily be caught 
in a low-level equilibrium trap, when innovation is com- 
pletely blocked except for a small handfull of the very 
wealthy, who get wealthier. 
The financial isolation of entrepreneurs is a function of 
financial markets which are performing poorly from the standpoint 
of rural development and the small scale activities found in rural 
areas. In the terminology of rural development, rural people do 
not have effective access to such markets. 
McKinnon's observations that indivisibilities are important 
in practice should not necessarily be interpreted as meaning that 
indivisibilities frequently constitute barriers to agricultural 
progress. In contrast to the modern, urban investor, the rural 
innovator or potential innovator is seldom entirely isolated. 
Kinship and friendship ties form a basis for informal financial 
markets and for his access to such markets. Such ties also pro- 
vide a basis for dealing with indivisibilities through group 
action, as noted above. While in certain cases, such as large 
scale irrigation, indivisibilities may be critical constraints, 
most development in rural areas is an incremental process which 
proceeds primarily through the addition of small units, as will 
be seen in the discussion of the development of small scale farming 
in Kenya. McKinnon's assertion that innovation may be completely 
blocked may apply in certain circumstances, but once again these 
cases are probably less frequent in rural areas than might be 
supposed. Innovation seems to occur in most rural areas most 
of the time, even without the benefit of dynamic formal financial 
markets. That financial markets can contribute to hastening the 
1. Op. cit., p. 13. 
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pace of innovation and accord a greater number of rural people 
access to innovation is obvious, though, as argued by McKinnon 
throughout his work on the subject treated here. 
E. Other Considerations Related to Financial Liberalisation 
1. The Track Record -- Without a Track or a Stopwatch 
Historically, a number of countries have achieved impressive 
real economic growth since the mid-1960's under regimes which 
have been highly repressive financially in the sense that the 
term is used in the literature. However, others following 
policies of financial repression have not achieved impressive 
growth, and some of the most financially repressive of the non- 
centrally planned economies are not, by their own admissions, 
sure winners in the development game. But, on the basis of 
recent experience the case for repression cannot be dismissed 
out of hand. 
The growth of financially repressed economies does not in 
itself vindicate repression; not does their laggardliness 
vindicate liberalisation. The measure required to vindicate 
repression or liberalisation is the rate and quality of growth 
which would have been achieved by the same economy had it taken 
the alternate fork in the financial road, from repression towards 
liberalisation or from liberalisation towards repression, and 
the comparison of performance under that alternative with that 
actually realised. The real world does not permit controlled 
experiments of this magnitude, and the close relationship between 
financial policy, fiscal policy and foreign trade policy destroys 
the basis for the ceteris paribus requirement essential for 
rigorous proof. Much of the argument for and against repression 
is based on perceptions of the sanctity and utility of individual 
liberty and on perceptions of the economic rationality and entre- 
preneurial initiative of the population participating in the 
national economy. 
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The case for liberalisation is possibly less ambiguous 
than the case for repression. Those developing economies which 
have undertaken liberalisation on a marked scale have prospered 
according to conventional measures of economic growth, as dis- 
cussed by McKinnon with respect to South Korea in 1964-1970, 
Indonesia for several years following financial reforms in 1968, 
and the Republic of China since the 1950's. Hong Kong, Singapore 
and Malaysia may be added to this list, and a number of lesser 
examples of small steps towards liberalisation could also be 
appended. None of these experiments seems to have "failed", 
although McKinnon demonstrates how foreign suppliers' credits 
can cause their course to get out of control at a critical stage. 
In must be noted, however, that liberalisation is not a one way 
street -- for various of their own reasons governments have found 
it expedient to reimpose repression when the non-economic cost 
of liberalisation appeared from the perspective of the government 
to be becoming too high. 
Each of the major examples of liberalisation conforms to the 
social scientist's expectation that the real world is complex. 
The cause or nature of certain features o. f experiments in 
liberalisation are open to dispute. One basis of attack is 
that it is not necessarily valid to conclude from trends before 
and after some measure of liberalisation that their difference 
reflects the impact of liberalisation. Other factors could well 
contribute, and a narrow view of causality is not acceptable. 
Pre-liberalisation Korea, for example, had been experiencing a 
decreasing rate of inflation from 1953 through mid-1961 with an 
attendant increase in real money balances, relative to units of 
output, over the period. 
' Other features of the Korean experience 
which complicate the analysis of the effects of the reforms are 
many. They include: the effects of Japanese occupation and of 
two wars, the clout of American foreign assistance, the monetary 
1. Campbell, Colin D., "The Velocity of Money and the Rate of 
Inflation: Recent Experiences in South Korea and Brazil, " in 
Meiselman, David, ed., Varieties of Monetary Experience. Chicago, 
The University of Chicago Press, 1970. pp. 343,349. 
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importance of a large stock of foreign currencies readily and 
easily available to private individuals, the role and peculiar 
bias of American advisors in devising responses to the monetary 
chaos which reflected South Korea's inability to govern its own 
monetary affairs in a socially useful manner, the increase in 
American investment following reforms, the spin-off of military 
spending by the Americans in Vietnam, and the simultaneous leap 
in Japanese investment in response both to the reforms and to the 
normalisation of relations, among other factors. 
1 
Other examples of marked liberalisation (among Third World 
nations limited primarily to those which are semi-industrialised)2 
may also be characterised by critics of liberalisation as being 
special cases in some way or another: accidents of geography, 
favourable cultural variables, special relationships with highly 
developed economies, and similar features. Nevertheless, this 
type of characterisation is not without weaknesses and it is 
unrealistic to conclude on a priori grounds that these examples 
are irrelevant to the problems of development in other countries. 
If any other countries had managed to devise policies and ad- 
ministrative arrangements which resulted in rapid growth, reasons 
would no doubt have been found to classify them as special cases, 
too, leaving critics no more willing to ask more searching 
questions. 
3 
That undisputed economic success is not necessarily 
1. Relevant chronicles include Bloomfield, A. I., and J. P. Jensen, 
Banking Reform in South Korea. New York, Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, 1951; Campbell, Colin D., op. cit.; Campbell, Colin D., 
and Gordon Tullock, "Some Little Understood Aspects of Korea's 
Monetary and Fiscal Systems, " American Economic Review. 47,1957; 
De Alessi, L., "An Analysis of Foreign Aid Administration in Korea, " 
Southern Economic Journal. 25,1958; Kanesa-Thasan, S., op. cit.; 
Youngil, Lim, "Foreign Influence on the Economic Change in Korea: 
A Survey, " The Journal of Asian Studies. XXVIII, 1. November 
1968, pp. 77-99. 
2. "Brazil, Chile, Pakistan and Turkey will be covered more 
directly than will the pristine economies of Africa. Socialist 
economies will be included insofar as they use prices to allocate 
resources in commodity and factor markets. " McKinnon, Ronald I., 
op. cit., p. 2. 
3. Jagdish Bagwati noted the tendency to rationalise planning 
non-success by recourse to the special case argument: "In the 
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a normal situation under any form of economic organisation 
needs little elaboration. The genius and fortuity. - which 
permit success are probably always a special case. If this 
proposition is accepted, it remains to consider the propriety 
of any given policy or recommendation in the particular circum- 
stances in which it is engendered. The number of special cases 
of success suggests that the uniqueness of each is essentially 
the precise manner in which growth was accelerated, not that 
growth was in fact accelerated. 
2. The Beat of the Different Drummer 
Another development of historical interest is the manner 
in which pressures for liberalisation which might have been 
expected to be generated within financial sectors in developing 
economies appear to have been diffused, notably by two related 
phenomena. The first is the movement of the public sector into 
the financial sector at the level of agricultural and development 
finance institutions and in commercial banking. As little 
published data is available on optimising strategies and 
management behaviour in state-owned financial institutions in 
general and in those in developing countries in particular, 
attempts to assess the impact of state ownership of such organi- 
sations must remain speculative and tentative. The following 
commets are offered with this qualification. 
While there is nothing inherent in state ownership which 
necessarily causes a lack of independence on the part of state- 
(continued) 1950's (Indian) economic programmes were considered 
by the progressive and democratic opinion abroad to be a model 
of what other developing countries might aspire to and emulate. 
Today (in 1973) many of us spend our time trying to convince 
others that somehow all the success stories elsewhere are special 
cases and that our performance is not as unsatisfactory as it 
appears. " Cited by Moynihan, Daniel P., "America in Opposition, " 
Commentary. March 1975. p. 42. Parenthetical insertions added. 
Hla Myint has implied that the tendency to look for special cases 
rather than general or common features was enhanced by the popu- 
larity of Rostow's "take-off" concept. See "Economic Theory and 
the Underdeveloped Countries, " Journal of Political Economy. 73, 
5, October 1965. p. 479. 
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owned enterprises, the effect would often seem to be one of 
emasculation. Perhaps the prospect of assured institutional 
existence or assured personal employment, with government or 
the civil service perceived as the most solid going concern, 
dulls the sense of enterprise or the desire for independent 
action. Such institutions are frequently monopolies or quasi- 
monopolies and hence may involve some of the problems with 
respect to the determination of the volume of their output which 
are suggested by the theory of monopoly. Schatz documents in 
detail the activities of Federal Loans Boards in Nigeria, where 
political interference was rampant and where their activities 
were eventually suspended (to arise later in another form) by 
a coup rather than by their own lagging performance. 
' 
It would 
also appear that the requirements of patronage, defined to 
include a preference for local staff over management contracts 
or qualified expatriates, may limit the competence of management 
in some respects and in the short or medium term. Laxity in 
accounting performance, manifested most simply in the length 
of time between the close of financial years and the subsequent 
appearance of annual financial reports, is symptomatic. The 
elevation of social goals, as perceived by politicians and 
civil servants, at the expense of market or financial goals, 
may also tend to diminish the independence and perhaps creativity 
of management of state owned financial institutions of the varieties 
mentioned above. Evidence in this direction often consists of 
management's approach to its borrowers and potential borrowers. 
Are such borrowers perceived as "poor and needy", as providing 
some "indispensable" good or service for the country, or are 
they perceived as a market for financial services, to be developed? 
2 
1. Schatz, Sayre P., Economics, Politics and Administration in 
Government Lending. 
2. Bureaucrats belonging to the non-market tradition often 
appear disturbed by peripheral issues, such as peasants' il- 
literacy and lack of formal education, and cite these as con- 
tributing to the failure of credit schemes to achieve financial 
viability or farm-level goals. Market-oriented players can offer 
greater insights into borrowers' decision making strategies, 
criteria and performance. 
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To the extent that management is not market oriented it will 
probably not perform very brilliantly in broadening its services 
in a viable manner, financially and socially. 
Related to this creation of client institutions of the state 
is the second weakening element: the willingness of external 
donors to support such intermediaries, often to the extent of 
overwhelming their ability to deliver (and collect). Such support 
may easily tend to decrease management's concern about its access 
to funds locally, in effect insulating these institutions from 
local financial markets. Insulation can easily lead to unconcern 
for market information and little attention to the development 
of methods of monitoring and interpreting local market forces. 
3. Perspectives on Performance under Intervention 
Finally, on the political side, the recent trend does not 
appear to have been one of increasing reverence for market per- 
formance. To the extent that financial liberalisation involves 
decontrol, the substitution of indirect for direct controls, and 
decentralisation and the encouragement of competition to stimulate 
the market, it is out of touch with important trends in political 
fashion and with the inertia of entrenched civil services and the 
ease with which they absorb a certain segment of the unemployed 
in the majority of developing countries. Thus, at the moment, 
to study the benefits of financial liberalisation or the con- 
sequences of financial repression does not appear to deserve a 
very high priority among many of those concerned with the 
production of policies palatable to present power configurations 
in many parts of the Third World. 
Controls and intervention have become the conventional 
wisdom with respect to private goods, and governments in developing 
countries and in donor countries appear often to prefer functionaries 
working several hours a day to market mechanisms working all the 
time or at least whenever competitive buyers meet competitive 
sellers in the search-and-bargain process in markets for private 
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goods. The quality of intervention is of course as important as 
the goal of intervention, especially in developing countries with 
high expectations relative to the ability of the public sector to 
deliver. The general nature of the key problem inherent in the 
nature of development administration has been summarised by 
Jackson with reference to Kenya: 
1 
Securing resources for public administration is one 
problem; putting them to their most productive ad- 
ministrative use is another and possibly the most 
difficult one confronting public officials and govern- 
ments in new states. The most striking feature of 
government administration (in Kenya) is... its rather 
rigid bureaucratic nature which is a contemporary 
legacy of the colonial past. This structure is well 
adapted to the quest for control but was not fashioned 
with the aim of initiating and guiding development 
change. The formal bureaucratic character of the civil 
service is revealed by the concentration of authority 
at the top and by the general resistence of top managers 
to the idea of delegating some decision-making respon- 
sibilities to subordinates and more junior staff. The 
bureaucratic character of the Kenya civil service is also 
revealed in its highly centralised organisational structure. 
But development administration, as indeed all administration 
which must service fluid, changing and uncertain environ- 
ments, would seem to require organisational patterns 
which significantly differ from the bureaucratic model. 
If bureaucratic structure, especially in technical 
ministries, can be viewed as an obstacle to the creation 
of a development administration, so can the norms and 
behaviour associated with such a structure. Bureaucratic 
administration requires and fashions leaders who tend to 
be preoccupied with procedure and routine and with 
correctly applying predetermined rules to every decision 
confronted. But development and social change generate 
novel problems and new situations for which pre-existing 
rules and decision-making precedents may offer no solution. 
Situations of novelty and uncertainty seem to demand 
leaders who are flexible, who will seek new solutions and 
are willing to take risks much as economic entrepreneurs do. 
If these somewhat severe judgements can be applied justifiably to 
1. Jackson, Robert H., "Administration and Development in Kenya: 
A Review of Problems Outstanding, " in Hyden, Goran; Robert Jackson 
and John Okumu, Development Administration: The Kenyan Experience. 
Nairobi, Oxford University Press, 1970. Excerpts from pp. 328- 331. 
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Kenya's not unimpressive public sector performance, what order 
of criticisms may be levied at the public sectors in many of the 
lesser nation-state contenders in the development game? 
Another aspect of the quality of intervention is the degree 
of subtlety, fineness or refinement of the tools employed. This 
consideration is important if it is assumed that private initiative 
has certain social advantages in certain situations over public 
enterprise and that one task of intervention should be to reconcile 
the advantages of private decision making with goals of social 
importance as perceived by a government. 
For example, one of the most notable developments in the 
financial sector in Africa since the mid-1960's has been the 
partial and total nationalisations with compensation of commercial 
banks, and it may be hypothesised that outright control through 
50%, majority or total ownership is the bluntest policy instrument 
available to a government, sacrificing any advantages which private 
decision making in a competitive market may have to offer. It 
may be asked, in those cases in which state ownership of banks 
was not perceived as an end in itself but rather as a means to 
an end, whether alternative approaches were seriously considered. 
Did governments consider experimenting with intervention or with 
liberalisation to stimulate competitiveness among banks or to 
make it advantageous, for offensive rather than defensive reasons, 
for banks to adjust their portfolios and services in a manner 
considered socially advantageous by governments? Were the financial 
and social opportunity costs of the sacrifice of private initiative 
considered? Was the selective use of reserve requirements, re- 
discounting facilities and government balances seriously reviewed, 
and was recourse to the power to tax and the power of the courts 
mooted in the cpuncils concerned with making the banking sector 
more responsive to priorities as perceived by governments? 
1 
1. Charles Harvey concluded that the powers of the central bank 
constituted as effective a means of chanelling credit to priority 
sectors as outright ownership of banks by the state in Zambia. 
See "State Participation and the Zambian Banks. " IDS Discussion 
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The history of many of these nationalisations has yet 
to be written, but it would appear that in many cases govern- 
ment interest has not brought about sweeping changes or improve- 
ments in the ability of commercial banks to serve the public. 
1 
In those cases in which state banking and private banking exist 
in the same market it is not always obvious that state banks are 
providing greater social benefits than private banks, 
2 
although 
they may simplify the tasks and perhaps relax the discipline of 
Treasury officials concerned with public finances. 
It may be useful at this point to note that, given a pro- 
pensity to intervene, the Kenya Government has in the past 
generally opted for plurality and subtlety rather than monopoly 
(continued) Paper, Institute of Development Studies at the 
University of Sussex, August 1972. W. T. Newlyn indicates that 
central banking legislation in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania pro- 
vides "adequate powers for the effective control of the commer- 
cial banks, " including qualitative and quantitative powers over 
advances. If Newlyn's statement is valid, nationalisation of 
banks in Uganda and Tanzania must have been for purposes other 
than ensuring effective control. See Newlyn's Finance for 
Development. Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1968. 
p. 25. 
1. Various aspects of administrative problems-encountered by 
the nationalised banking system in Tanzania in its first five 
years, which should give pause for consideration, are found in 
Mwapachu, Juma V., and Bruno P. Kwelukilwa, "Manpower Develop- 
ment and Training in the National Bank of Commerce, Tanzania, " 
Prajnan (quarterly journal of the National Institute of Bank 
Management, Bombay), II, 3, July-September 1973. pp. 329-351. 
Discussion of early problems faced by this system is also found 
in Binhammer, H. H., "Financial Infrastructure and the Avail- 
ability of Credit and Finance to the Rural Sector of the 
Tanzanian Economy, " Economic Papers. University of East Africa 
Social Sciences Council Conference, 1968/69. pp. 1-26. 
2. Gershenberg's interpretation of the role of the Uganda 
Commercial Bank comes to broadly this conclusion, and notes 
that its predecessor, the Uganda Savings and Loan Association, 
made so many commercially ill-advised loans that by the mid- 
1960's it had to curtail new lending because of the accumulation 
of overdue amounts, which resulted in a liquidity shortage. See 
Gershenberg, Irving, "The Impact of Independence on the Role of 
Commercial Banking in Uganda's Economic Development, 1960-1968. " 
Paper presented at the University of East Africa, University 
Social Sciences Council Conference, December 8-12,1969. pp. 
2,9. 
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and bluntness in controlling the banking sector. 
1 
By taking a 
majority interest in one of the three large banks and by forming 
a small bank wholly owned by the Government, the authorities have 
put their foot into the market and are in a position to stimulate 
competition and internal reforms they may deem desirable. At the 
same time, the powers and competence of central banking have been 
enhanced, and Government support for the Cooperative Bank has pro- 
vided special impetus in a priority sector (which is also served 
by the large commercial banks). The banking system is probably 
slightly more competitive than it was previously, although this 
assessment is quite subjective. Each of the major banks appears 
rather consistently in recent years to have exercised initiatives 
and to have attempted innovations in the spirit of Government's 
priorities in development. 
4. Linkages 
An extremely important consideration with respect to the 
implementation of financial liberalisation is that it implies, 
and to be very effective must be accompanied by, liberalisation 
in other key areas. Shaw and-McKinnon are both emphatic concerning 
the inter-relationship between various aspects of intervention. 
Neither advocates financial liberalisation alone as a satisfactory 
means of achieving a high rate of economic expansion. 
2 
In intro- 
ductory pages both stress the utility of liberalisation on three 
fronts: in financial policy, in fiscal policy and in foreign trade 
policy. 
(These relationships are not explored further here. This 
1. Something of a change in policy or approach is seen in the 
26 July 1975 instructions from the Central Bank to the commercial 
banks requiring them to increase agricultural lending to a level 
equal to at least 17% of net deposits by 30 June 1976. Levels 
prevailing at the close of years between 1972 and 1974 did not 
exceed 10%. See Central Bank of Kenya, Ninth Annual Report for 
the Financial Year Ended 30th June 1975. Nairobi, 1975. p. 75. 
2. Shaw, Edward S., op. cit., p. 4; McKinnon, Ronald I., op. cit., 
p. 3. 
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study is oriented primarily towards the question of whether the 
theory of financial deepening is relevant to the performance of 
the agricultural credit market in Kenya. Relationships between 
this market and fiscal and foreign trade policies would be in 
many cases indirect, and of secondary importance relative to the 
impact of financial policies. ) 
5. A Note on Farm Credit as a Cause of Inflation 
Unless a unique set of conditions apply, the provision of 
credit is inflationary. Under the conventional assumptions of 
resource agility and of no excess stocks or unutilised capacity, 
inflationary tendencies result from credit'provision except in 
those cases in which there is a coincidence of incremental, 
credit-based demand and of incremental supply in the particular 
markets and for the particular goods purchased by those receiving 
credit. 
The inflationary tendency of credit provision is seen clearly 
in Schumpeter's development model, according to which development 
is a structural phenomenon produced by entrepreneurs who rearrange 
existing resources in new combinations. 
1 
Through a different 
employment of existing resources total output is increased and, 
more importantly, the equilibrium of the previous situation is 
displaced through the intervention of the entrepreneur in such a 
way that the path from the old to the new equilibrium is character- 
ised by a discontinuity. 
2 
The intervention of Schumpeter's entrepreneur is possible only 
with the support of credit, given the assumption of fully committed 
resources in the stable circular flow of economic activity sketched 
in Schumpeter's model. The credit upon which the entrepreneur 
relies is defined to exclude circulating or trade credit (Betreibs- 
kredit), but is rather credit in the form of newly created pur- 
1. Schumpeter, Joseph A., The Theory of Economic Development: An 
Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest and the Business 
Cycle. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University. Press, 1934. P. 66. 
2. Ibid., p. 64n. 
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chasing power furnished expressly to enable the entrepreneur to 
bid resources away from their old niches in the circular flow so 
that their services may be rearranged in a more productive manner. 
l 
The process of outbidding those using scarce resources in the old 
equilibrium would, ceteris paribus, raise the general price level 
and hence is essentially inflationary. 
This inflationary impact is a short run phenomenon. The 
long run impact will depend upon the manner in which the post- 
intervention equilibrium is achieved. In Schumpeter's model the 
long run equilibrium is achieved as competitive initiatives swamp 
the entrepreneur's intervention and force his return down to the 
level prevailing in the competitive market. This process is in 
fact development by Schumpeter's definition, and the greater pro- 
ductivity of resources in the new as compared to the former equi- 
librium may result in a removal of the temporary inflation resulting 
from the creation of additional purchasing power. In fact, it may 
lead to deflation through increasing society's production on the 
one hand while on the other enabling the entrepreneur to repay his 
loan with interest, which diminishes the amount of purchasing power 
in the circular flow; and also remqves from the circular flow an 
entrepreneurial profit. 
2 
To return to short run inflationary effects, Schumpeter's 
model presents the situation at one extreme. At the other, for 
example, credit to farmers could be and at times is provided in 
kind, the goods involved being donated or furnished at a very low 
1. Ibid., pp. 103,107. Schumpeter relies on several different 
assumptions to simplify his presentation. At one point he indi- 
cates that in the stable circular flow no necessary gap exists 
between product and means of production, making credit for trade 
purposes superfluous; i. e., homogeneity prevails. He suggests 
elsewhere that the assumption that all transactions in the stable 
circular flow are cash transactions is acceptable for expository 
purposes. 
2. Ibid., pp. 109 ff. These assumptions are warranted given 
the unique and restricted role of credit and, by implication, 
of financial intermediation in his model. 
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cost by an external donor. 
l 
In this case the provision of credit 
occurs simultaneously with the provision of credit-demanded goods, 
through the tying device of provision of credit in kind. Assuming 
that the goods originate from outside the economy, this type of 
design of credit schemes is not inflationary to the economy in 
question except to the extent that the administration of the 
loan scheme or the transport, delivery and use of the incremental 
goods supplied diverts resources from other domestic uses involving 
positive opportunity costs. 
Between Schumpeter's model and its opposite in terms of the 
extent to which incremental credit reallocates a fixed or in- 
elastic supply of resources, there are many real world cases 
involving more or less inflation. The magnitude of inflation 
engendered by farm credit depends upon many factors. To the 
extent that credit is not provided in kind and is used to bid 
resources away from alternative uses having a positive oppor- 
tunity cost, it will have inflationary tendencies. Its in- 
flationary potential is especially evident in cases in which 
credit is used as a "supply leading" device specifically to 
stimulate growth through the transfer of resources from a 
2 
traditional to a modern sector including innovative agriculture. 
The inflationary impact of formal agricultural credit on 
the larger economy in developing countries is limited by its 
narrow scope. In India, for example, such credit is available 
for only roughly a quarter of the country's farmers, 
3 
while in 
Africa the proportion appears rarely to exceed 15%. 
4 The value 
1. FAO pilot fertiliser distribution programmes in Kenya fall 
within this category. For a description see Donaldson, G. F., 
and J. D. Von Pischke, op. cit., pp. 151-156. 
2. Patrick, Hugh T., "Financial Development and Economic Growth 
in Underdeveloped Countries, " Economic Development and Cultural 
Change. XIV, 2, January 1966. pp. 175-177. 
3. "Agricultural Credit Institutions in Asia and Latin America, " 
Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics. 24,6, 
June 1975. p. 6. 
4. "Credit Institutions in Africa. " p. 13. 
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of formal farm credit extended appears to be well below 25% 
of the value of agricultural output in most African countries, 
l 
but is apparently larger in Latin America due to the infusion of 
massive amounts of funds from United States' assistance and other 
donors. 
2 
Thus, the overall inflationary impact of farm credit pro- 
vision, as reflected in increases in the general price level of 
the economy, is generally not likely to be substantial. However, 
the impact of credit provision on prices in specific markets may 
be substantial, along Schumpeterian lines. Specific cases do not 
appear to be frequently documented, but it is apparent that an 
increase in the availability of credit for some given purpose, 
such as the purchase of land or cattle, could, other things re- 
maining equal, have the effect of raising prices in land and cattle 
markets. Such price changes would have a distributive and hence 
structural impact, similar in operation to those inherent in 
inflation, but the result in terms of rural welfare and develop- 
ment would depend upon the existing 
distribution of resources 
and the organisation of the rural economy. 
In the interests of economy no further or detailed consider- 
ation is accorded the inflationary impact of farm credit in this 
paper. One basis for justifying this simplification is that the 
central focus, i. e., farm credit, is inherently neither more nor 
less inflationary than any other sort of credit. A second 
rationale is that inflation has not traditionally been considered 
a problem in Kenya, although the country has since about 1972 been 
exposed to a higher rate than it previously had experienced, 
3 due 
1. Ibid. However, the basis for calculation apparently used by 
FAO seems quite generous. For an alternative attempt to quantify 
the situation with respect to Kenya, see Von Pischke, J. D., "A 
Critical Survey of Approaches to the Role of Credit in Small- 
holder Development, " Working Paper No. 145, Institute for Develop- 
ment Studies, University of Nairobi, February 1974. pp. 1-4. 
2. Adams, Dale W., "Agricultural Credit in Latin America. " pp. 
163-172. 
3. Central Bank of Kenya, Ninth Annual Report, 1975. p. 63. 
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in significant measure to external factors. Finally, the 
position accorded inflation by the approach to development 
taken here is clear. Inflation at any rate beyond a very low 
threshold is counterproductive in terms of financial develop- 
ment. Financial development is held to be an essential element 
in balanced and equitable growth and economic vitality. Imple- 
mentation of policies consistent with the promotion of financial 
deepening combat inflation at the same time they promote re- 
distribution and development through competitive markets. 
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CHAPTER III 
SOURCES AND FLOWS OF FINANCE FOR FARM 
PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA 
There is insufficient published data to permit, within the 
limitations of this study, the construction of a useful sources 
and uses of funds statement for the agricultural sector in 
Kenya. 1 Examples of two major problems which would arise in 
the construction of a sources and uses of funds statement suffice 
to indicate the magnitude of such a task. The first consists of 
the role of non-monetary inputs, and the second centres on 
classificatory problems. 
The importance of non-cash inputs in Kenya's agriculture 
would require an estimation of their value for useful economic 
analysis. However, the only figure found in national accounts 
presentation for capital formation outside the monetary sector 
appears under the heading "traditional dwellings. "2 Thus, a 
major farm investment flow, consisting of capital formation in 
kind, is not monitored or estimated, with the exception of the 
construction of traditional dwellings. The source of this type 
of capital formation consists of household labour and natural 
materials for physical capital formation obtained by the farmer 
at no cash expenditure. 
An additional barrier to the construction of a funds flow 
statement for agriculture is posed by the difficulty of inter- 
preting quantitatively the role of commercial banks in financing 
agriculture. The sectoral classification of commercial bank ad- 
vances is indistinct in the case of agriculture. While some of 
1. Data on inter-sectoral capital flows in Kenya is being 
developed by Jennifer Sharpley at Northwestern University 
and should be presented in a forthcoming PhD dissertation. 
2. Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1973. p. 47. 
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these shortcomings reflect the possibility of inconsistencies 
in reporting, a major cause is simply that banks frequently 
have little effective control over the precise use of their 
funds, as is the case for overdraft facilities. Another 
difficulty is interpretation of bank lending statistics stems 
from the convention of presenting outstandings (a stock) rather 
than turnover (a flow). 
1 
In view of the shortcomings of the data base, no attempt 
is made in this paper to assign anything but the most general of 
relative weights to different sources of funds tapped by agri- 
culture. What is not possible on the macro level may be attempted 
on a disaggregated basis, however, and the three subsector class- 
ification outlined in Chapter I provides a basis for considering 
broadly the problem of access to capital in each of these major 
types of farms. 
A. Formal Credit Schemes and Sources 
The major credit institutions. and programmes serving agri- 
culture in'Kenya have been outlined in considerable detail else- 
where, and for present purposes a brief recapitulation is suf- 
ficient. The array of formal credit sources available to Kenyan 
may be classified into three types. The first consists of structures 
which date from before the close of the colonial era which are 
oriented towards large scale agriculture. The second consists 
of a series of programmes formed to support the transfer of 
agricultural land from European to African ownership, and the 
third is composed of relatively new institutions and programmes 
serving smallholders. While this basis for classification is of 
greatest interest from a policy analysis or problem solving point 
1. A more detailed discussion of the problems of interpreting 
banks' agricultural lending statistics is found in Von Pischke, 
J. D., "A Review, " pp. 92,94-95. 
2. Donaldson, G. F., and J. D. Von Pischke, op. cit.; Von Pischke, 
J. D., "A Review. " These sources are not footnoted further in 
this section in the interests of economy. 
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of view, a discussion of credit sources is most conveniently 
structured around the institutional configuration on the supply 
side of the formal farm credit market. For practical purposes 
that latter type of classification is not greatly different from 
the former. In addition, the supply side of the formal farm 
credit market is organised largely according to the classificatory 
convention employed earlier in this paper, with separate insti- 
tutions and programmes directed towards large scale, settlement 
and small scale agriculture and towards differing loan terms. 
Thus, the latter three headings are also used for the purposes 
of this discussion. Attention is focussed only on the major 
formal lenders and schemes, which would have an aggregate market 
share, in terms of disbursements and amounts outstanding, probably 
exceeding 80%. 
An estimation of the total amount of agricultural credit in 
use in Kenya in 1972 is given in Table III-1. The reliability of 
the figures for the various schemes and institutions may be 
specified according to indicators of accounting standards employed 
or other, more subjective, data confidence indicators as follows: 
Highly reliable: Kenya Tea Development Authority 
Pyrethrum Marketing Board 
Reasonably reliable: Agricultural Settlement Fund 
Agricultural Finance Corporation 
Reasonable estimates: Commercial banks' 
Cooperative Production Credit Scheme 
Distribution of commercial bank 
credit between small and large 
farmers 
Guaranteed Minimum Return scheme 
Guesstimates: Other Government sources 
Cooperative societies' credit sales 
and other credit 
Merchant credit 
Other formal sector credit 
Total number of small farmer borrowers 
I. Commercial bank data is regarded as only a reasonable estimate 
because of the difficulties involved in identifying facilities 
extended to farmers for agricultural purposes and in specifying how 
these funds are actually used. Classification problems, not account- 
ing standards, are the basis for this qualification. 
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The table should be interpreted with caution. It is composed 
of hard figures as well as rough estimates. It also mixes apples 
and oranges (and perhaps a few lemons, too) by treating credit 
as a homogeneous commodity, implying that the grand total out- 
standing is calculable and meaningful. Although all types of 
credit have elements in common (just as do apples, oranges and 
lemons), their functions and significance differ greatly. Com- 
paring or adding together amounts offered by KFA on 90 day terms 
and by the Settlement Fund on 30 year terms, for example, suggests 
some of the conceptual problems involved. 
Another caveat concerns the quality of the portfolios of the 
various schemes and lenders, which to some extent reflects the 
efficiency of credit use. The Kenya Tea Development Authority, 
for example, collects from its borrowers over 99% of the money 
they owe the Authority, while the Agricultural Settlement Fund 
collects approximately 50%. 
The purposes for which credit is used in agriculture 
frequently vary with the terms for which it is issued. Long 
term credit commonly provides access to or control over land as 
a factor of production. Medium term credit frequently is used for 
the development or purchase. of farm assets other than land. Short 
term credit often facilitates commercial transactions. The 
statistics given in Table III-1 give an incomplete breakdown with 
respect to these variables and provide no indication of the 
qualitative problems of evaluating the impact of credit. For 
example, it has been observed that long term credit in Kenya is 
not sufficiently supplemented by short term facilities for working 
capital purposes, and that this absence of linkage may endanger 
borrowers' ability to repay their long term obligations. 
1 
An attempt is made in the table to eliminate double counting 
in estimating the total number of borrowers, but the totals 
showing credit in use are not so adjusted and thus include some 
1. Republic of Kenya, Department of Settlement, "A Memorandum 
to the Tootell Mission on Agricultural Credit from the Director 
of Settlement. " Nairobi, 1970 (? ). (mimeographed). 
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double counting. Commercial bank agricultural lending, for 
example, includes loans not only to farmers, but also to some 
suppliers and cooperatives which provide credit to farmers. 
(Reported commercial bank lending to agriculture has been de- 
flated in the table by an amount estimated to equal KFA's use 
of bank credit, thus eliminating or minimising one major 
potential source of double counting. ) 
The description of the agricultural credit system which 
follows is based on data collected between 1972 and 1975. The 
farm credit situation in Kenya is by no means static, and hence 
the material is inevitably somewhat dated. Nonetheless it is 
offered as a basis for the model sketched later in this study. 
The model will become dated at a much slower rate because of 
its abstract nature, and is sufficient to accommodate major 
changes in the system which have occurred since the data was 
collected, including the continued growth and expansion of the 
cooperative banking structure, the imposition of agricultural 
lending minima on the commercial banks by the Central Bank, and 
AFC's experiments in the provision of short term credit. 
1. Credit for Large Scale Agriculture 
Traditionally having a commercial orientation, large scale 
agriculture in Kenya has generally had access to credit on com- 
mercial terms. It is reasonably safe to conclude that of the 
3,000 or so large farms which comprise this sector, those which 
are operating in a commercial manner have access to several sources 
of formal credit, sufficiently differentiated by terms and con- 
ditions, to serve a variety of commercial purposes. Those which 
are not operating on a commercially viable basis are generally 
indebted, too -- an inheritance from the colonial era or from the 
transfer of large farms to Africans. 
1 Having noted this, no 
close counts of borrowers will be attempted in the following 
descriptions. 
1. "... AFC... provide(s) credit coverage to virtually 100% of 
the large scale farm sector. " Republic of Kenya, Development 
Plan 1974-1978. Part I. p. 212. 
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a. Long term credit "for the large scale sector 
Long term credit1 for the purchase of large farms is 
issued almost exclusively by the Agricultural Finance Corporation 
(AFC), a statutory body established under the Agricultural Credit 
Act of 1963 as a new institution to serve African farmers. In 
1969 the AFC was reconstituted and absorbed the Land and Agri- 
cultural Bank, which was formed in 1931 for the purpose of 
assisting European farmers requiring mortgage facilities and 
refinancing in those adverse times. The AFC is the major 
specialised lender to Kenyan agriculture. 
Financing large scale agriculture remains AFC's primary 
function in terms of amounts disbursed and outstanding, although 
in terms of numbers of accounts small scale loans approved or 
outstanding have predominated over the last decade. As of 31 
March 1971 (the latest data for which audited published data was 
available in early 1975) gross large scale loans outstanding 
amounted to Sh 179 million, while gross small scale loans out- 
standing amounted to Sh 24 million. 
2 
In percentage terms, 88% 
of AFC's portfolio consisted of large scale loans while 12% 
represented small scale loans. 
Carrying on the traditional functions of the Land and Agri- 
cultural Bank, but in a multiracial context, AFC provides farm 
purchase mortgage finance on terms of up to 30 years at an 
interest rate of 8% per annum. AFC provides financing for up 
to 80% of the purchase price of land obtained by borrowers. 
Land purchase loan disbursements to large scale farmers for 
various periods between 1967 and 1972 were as follows: 
27 months to 31 March 1969 Sh 11.7 million 
12 months to 31 March 1970 12.8 million 
1. Long term is defined here as greater than five years, 
medium term as one through five years, and short term as 
one year or less. 
2. Agricultural Finance Corporation, Report of the Board and 
Accounts, 31st March 1971. Nairobi, undated. P. 10. Small 
scale loans were issued in amounts ranging from Sh 1,000 to 
Sh 10,000 through the end of 1972, when the upper limit was 
raised to Sh 15,000. 
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12 months to 31 March 1971 Sh 13.0 million 
12 months to 31 December 1972 22.0 million 
l 
Fewer than 200 loans accounted for the Sh 22.0 million disbursed 
in 1972. Of course, most of these loans were not to individuals, 
but to groups of Africans organised under various forms for the 
acquisition of large farms. 
AFC's large scale long term land purchase lending is funded 
from its own resources and also from the proceeds of facilities 
provided by the'British Government under the Land Transfer Pro- 
gramme, the purpose of which was to assist the orderly transfer 
of farms from Europeans to Africans on a "willing buyer willing 
seller" basis. Between July 1966 and March 1971 loans made under 
the Programme amounted to less than half of AFC's land purchase 
loans approved. 
Long term credit is also available to large scale agriculture 
from AFC for development purposes, including the purchase of live- 
stock and machinery and the construction of farm buildings. 
Development loans are provided on terms ranging from between five 
and 15 years, at 8% interest per annum. Disbursements are made 
under two programmes. One is the large scale loan scheme under 
which land purchase finance is made available, and the other is 
an exercise supported by Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KFW), the 
development finance institution of the Federal Republic of Germany- 
The KFW large scale scheme is limited to assisting large scale 
African farmers in Trans-Nzoia District, one of the areas in which 
the German Agricultural Team in Kenya has concentrated its 
activities. Disbursements under these two long term land develop- 
ment and farm improvement schemes operated by AFC exceeded Sh 35 
million between 1967 and 1972, as summarised below: 
27 months to 31 March 1969 AFC scheme: Sh 7.8 million 
12 months to 31 March 1970 AFC scheme: 6.8 million 
12 months to 31 March 1971 AFC scheme: 5.7 million 
1. Birgegard, Lars, and Ralph Campbell, "The Agricultural 
Finance Corporation. " Nairobi, AFC, February 1972. (mimeo). 
Tables 2,7.1972 data is from other AFC sources. 
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21 months to 31 December 1971 KFW scheme: Sh 1.4 million 
12 months to 31 December 1972 AFC scheme: 14.2 million 
KFW scheme: (not available) 
Long term funds are also available to selected large scale 
African farms which have performed poorly and are in need of re- 
habilitation. The rehabilitation scheme, which has World Bank 
support, began in 19752 and is directed at the entire financial 
requirements of the farms in question. Hence, long, medium and 
short term funds are made available to these borrowers. During 
the project's projected five year disbursement period about Sh 90 
million is expected to be employed for on-farm investment on 90 
large mixed farms and on 36 coffee estates. Of this amount, about 
41.6 million is expected to be used for incremental working capital. 
Long term credit from other sources for large scale agri- 
culture is not well documented in the aggregate. Finance companies 
in Nairobi may provide some credit of this type, and indeed, one 
house began collaborating with AFC on the rehabilitation of coffee 
estates around 1974. Plantations of various types owned by multi- 
national corporations would of course frequently have access to a 
variety of sources of funds outside-Kenya. 
b. Medium term credit for the large scale sector 
Medium term credit for large scale agriculture is defined 
here as having a maturity of between one and five years. Ex- 
cluding a relatively small number of tractor loans, AFC is not 
a general supplier of funds on these terms to the large scale 
sector, but has provided working capital facilities, which may 
be outstanding for more than one year, to various ranching and 
fattening operations and also to large African farms included 
in its rehabilitation programme. 
1. Ibid. and Agricultural Finance Corporation, "KFW Loan to 
Large Scale Farmers in Trans Nzoia District, Half Yearly Report 
for the Period 1st July - 31st December, 1971. " Nairobi, AFC, 
1972. (mimeo). Data listed as not available refers to the data 
situation at the time research was underway. 
2. AFC had-been forced by borrowers' defaults into rehabili- 
tation activities prior to the advent of IBRD support, but on 
something of an ad hoc basis. 
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The AFC programme oriented towards ranching is supported 
by the World Bank and by the Swedish International Development 
Agency, as part of a larger range development project. The 
project became effective in 1969, and its budget envisaged loans 
of approximately Sh 24 million to be borrowed for working capital 
purposes. However, by the end of 1972 it was apparent that on- 
ranch investment requirements were small relative to working 
capital requirements. The project design assumed a 0.71: 1 
ratio of working capital to medium and long term lending, while 
the actual ratio was 1.44: 1. Fattening proved relatively more 
profitable than expected, and ranchers accordingly preferred 
investment in this enterprise, with a relatively rapid turnover, 
rather than in overheads required for alternative enterprises with 
a slower turnover. 
Commercial banks provide medium term finance to large scale 
agriculture in the form of loans for the acquisition of specific 
assets such as livestock and machinery, in personal loans having 
a term exceeding 12 months, and in overdraft facilities which are 
not "cleaned up" annually. The exact proportion of commercial 
bank lending which is used for medium term as opposed to short 
term purposes cannot be specified from published data with any 
great degree of accuracy. 
Medium term finance for the purchase of farm machinery was 
available from one finance company in Nairobi as of 1973 and is 
also provided by certain equipment dealers from resources made 
available by tied finance companies operated by manufacturers 
overseas. 
c. Short term credit for the large scale sector 
Short term finance is available to large scale agriculture 
from a variety of sources. The Guaranteed Minimum Return scheme 
(GMR) serves several thousand growers of hybrid maize and wheat, 
providing facilities up to a fixed limit per acre for specified 
inputs for each crop, as well as including crop insurance to the 
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extent of the per acre limit. The per acre limit of Sh 180 
prevailing in 1972 was subsequently raised to Sh 250, although 
this amount may still have provided less than half the working 
capital required on farms using recommended input quantities and 
husbandry practices. 
I 
Interest on GMR loans has been 8.5% per 
annum. The scope of this scheme is indicated in Table 111-2. 
The credit aspects of the GMR scheme are administered by AFC. 
Many large scale farming proprietorships and organisations 
are members of the Kenya Farmers (Cooperative) Association (KFA) 
which extends trade credit to more than 2,000 creditworthy members 
who have supply purchase accounts at KFA branches. Goods may be 
purchased from these branches on 90-EOM terms, up to limits 
specified by KFA's credit controller on the basis of past per- 
formance as a borrower and other indications of creditworthiness. 
Interest is levied at the rate of 10% per annum on amounts out- 
standing beyond 60 days EOM. 
Commercial banks come into their own in the provision of 
short term finance, and play an important role in furnishing 
working capital advances to large farms in Kenya which are 
sufficiently well organised and productive enough to meet the 
standard of creditworthiness demanded by the banks' role as 
custodians of depositors' funds. The banks have specialised to 
the extent of providing funds under specific schemes, such as 
Barley Growers Finance for growers supervised by the brewing 
monopoly and the Grazier's Scheme for livestock operators 
availing themselves of supervision given by a stock management 
company. However, the bulk of their facilities for large scale 
agriculture are not specialised in this manner but rather are 
conducted along customary bank-customer relationship lines. One 
of the commercial banks had a full time agricultural officer in 
1. This problem -- extensive credit rationing -- has characterised 
(fit credit for some time. When the limit for wheat advances was 
Sh 150 per acre in 1969, the Chairman of the Kenya Farmers Associ- 
ation estimated that production costs amounted to Sh 240-280 per 
acre. KFA, Directors' Report and Statement of Accounts 1968-1969. 
p. 4.1 
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in Nairobi as of 1975 and several specialists attached to 
main branches in agricultural areas, another had an agricultural 
loan officer operating out of its main Nairobi office, and a 
third was using the services of an agriculturalist on its London 
staff. 
Bank loans outstanding to agriculture, perhaps three- 
fourths of which are to large scale agriculture, have since 
independence remained fairly constant in relative terms at 
about 10% of total bank loans outstanding and at around 15% 
in relation to the contribution of monetised agriculture to 
GDP, as indicated in Tables 111-3,4, and S. However, Table 
111-5 suggests that the volume of bank credit outstanding to 
agriculture may have started an upward drift in relation to the 
value of marketed agricultural production in the early 1970's. 
These tables attempt to place bank lending in a financial and 
agricultural perspective, although data problems relating to 
loan characteristics and use render difficult the accurate 
analysis and interpretation of the statistics given. 
Other sources of short term funds for large scale agri- 
culture include several minor official credit schemes, external 
sources available to multi-national enterprises engaged in 
agricultural production in Kenya, and credit sales arrangements 
with individual suppliers of inputs and other resources. Not 
a great deal of detail is readily available regarding these 
latter two sources of short term credit in the literature. 
2. Credit for Settlement Agriculture 
Settlement agriculture is a child of credit. Settlement 
credit is the major example of facilities designed to support 
the transfer of land from European to African ownership. From 
the start of the settlement programme in 1961 through the end 
of 1970 land purchase loans approximating Sh 170 million and 
development loans approximating Sh 118 million had been issued 
to settlers by the Agricultural Settlement Fund through the 
Department of Settlement and its predecessor agencies as shown 
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Table 111-4. Commercial Bank Lending to Agriculture, 1946-1974 
Year Total Bank Bank Credit Agricultural 
Ending Credit Outstanding Lending as a 
31 Out- 
a/ 
to Agricultural % of Total 
December standing- Enterprises Bank Credit 
-- (Sh millions) --- (%) 
1946 56.2 17.1 30.5 
1947 109.6 25.5 23.3 
1948 167.6 36.8 22.0 
1949 219.2 44.6 20.4 
1950 228.4 35.2 15.4 
1951 410.8 42.3 10.3 
1952 406.7 55.0 13.5 
1953 406.9 96.0 23.6 
1954 619.2 104.9 16.9 
1955 825.4 114.5 13.9 
1956 713.8 97.6 13.7 
1957 784.7 118.1 15.1 
1958 685.0 124.4 18.2 
1959 749.7 121.7 16.2 
1960 844.5 129.0 15.3 
1961 780.2 144.9 18.4 
1962 833.4 88.3b' 10.6 
1963 1,007.2 117.6 11.7 
1964 1,092.9 144.8 13.2 
1965 1,148.14/ 139.9ýý d" 12.2 
1966 1,110.3 125.5 11.3 
1967 1,360.0 186.5 13.7 
19672/ 1,360.0 133-Of/ 9.8 
1968 1,335.8 155.5 11.6 
1969 1,400.5 172.4 12.3 
1970 1,738.9 185.7 10.7 
1971 2,402.5 251.5 10.5 
1972 2,427.5 240.3 9.9 
1973 3,228.1 356.0 11.0 
1974 4,163.2 481.4 11.6 
continued 
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Notes to Table 111-4 
Sources: Central Bank of Kenya, Economic and Financial Review; 
East African Statistical Department, Economic and 
Statistical Review and Quarterly Economic and 
Statistical Bulletin; Government of Kenya, Economics 
and Statistics Division, Kenya Statistical Digest. 
a/ Total Bank Credit Outstanding consists of bills discounted, 
loans and advances. (See d/ below. ) 
b/ Beginning in 1962 certain "indirect" lending to agriculture 
is omitted from the statistics for Bank Credit Outstanding to 
Agricultural Enterprises. 
c/ Beginning in 1965 statistics show gross amounts outstanding. 
Prior to that year the figures refer to amounts outstanding net 
of provisions for bad debts. 
d/ Beginning in 1965 Bank Credit Outstanding to Agricultural 
Enterprises includes bills discounted. This category of credit 
was not included in the data under this heading prior to 1965, 
and hence these figures may understate bank credit to the 
agricultural sector. 
e/ A new statistical series was inaugurated by the Central Bank 
in 1967. 
f/ In 1967 the reporting base for Bank Credit Outstanding to 
Agricultural Enterprises was altered to include only private 
agricultural enterprises. Prior to that date public sector 
institutions in the agricultural sector were included in the 
series. Borrowers in which the Government has a minority 
interest are classified as private sector enterprises for 
reporting purposes with respect to this series. 
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in Table 111-6. By the end of June 1972 the total of these 
two categories has increased to more than Sh 300 million. 
Collections on this massive portfolio -- the largest agri- 
cultural portfolio in Kenya -- have not kept up with the 
rate at which interest has accumulated and the total out- 
standing balance of Agricultural Settlement Fund loans as 
of the end of June 1972 exceeded Sh 310 million, as indicated 
in Table 111-7 on page 204. 
Settlers were installed on their plots heavily indebted. 
Three aspects of the settlement programme were responsible 
for the heavy debt burden of the settlers. One was the "willing 
buyer willing seller" basis for the acquisition of European farms 
by the authorities for settlement purposes. European farms were 
not to be sold at knock-down prices by their owners, but rather 
the changeover was to be made on an orderly basis and in line 
with market prices prevailing in the period immediately before 
the British Government's unexpected announcement of early 
independence at the Lancaster House Conference in January 1960.1 
European settlement in the Scheduled Areas had in fact been en- 
couraged right until 1960,2 a factor which made it morally 
imperative, in the climate of the times, for the British Govern- 
ment to ensure that those whose commitment to remaining in Kenya 
were reversed by the fact of independence were in fact compensated 
for their investment of labour and money in their farms. 
The second aspect which resulted in settlers' heavy indebted- 
ness was the use of settlement as a means of providing land to 
the lan. less. Although numerous difficulties of defining land- 
lessness in the context of African society and of in fact identi- 
fying those possessing this qualification complicated this aspect 
1. An interpretation which claims that this and other British 
initiatives had the effect of keeping power in the hands of 
moderates favouring a multiracial approach to Kenya's development 
in the 1960's is found in Harbeson, John W., Nation Building in 
Kenya. Evanston, Illinois, Northwestern University Press, 1973. 
2. Cone, L. W., "Two-Stream Development -- An Overview, " in Cone, 
L. Winston, and J. F. Lipscomb, op cit., p. 25. 
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of the ostensible purposes of the settlement programme, it would 
appear that many, many of the 35,000 settlers eventually in- 
stalled on the major schemes were people of modest means by 
Kenyan standards. 
The third aspect of settlement which resulted in settlers' 
heavy debt burdens was the decision that settlers should be made 
to pay for their land. The "settlement charge" was derived from 
the value of the land under European ownership and management. 
Farm budgets were drawn up which indicated that settlers could 
expect to receive a reasonable income by local African standards 
after the deduction of land purchase loan installments and 
development loan installments. Ignoring minor changes which 
have been introduced from time to time for reasons of political 
intervention and administrative convenience, land purchase loans 
are repayable over 30 years and development loans are repayable 
over ten years from the period when the settler taks up his plot, 
and carry an interest rate of 6.5% per annum. Financing was pro- 
vided for 100% of the purchase price of the land on the High 
Density schemes which incldue the great majority of settlers on 
individual plots, and for 90% of the purchase price in the case 
of Low Density schemes. Development loans were oriented towards 
capital items (housing, fencing, water supply and livestock) on 
Low Density schemes, but also included provision for seasonal 
inputs for the initial crop on High Density schemes. 
1 
Once launched on their debt-laden venture, settlers without 
other land or full time employment have been largely unable to 
obtain additional funds. The Settlement Fund Trustees hold 
charges over settlers' plots as security for land purchase and 
development loans, and most settlers have no other assets suitable 
for the security requirements of the main providers of formal 
credit in Kenya. (A few settlers, however, have prepaid in full 
1. An early summary of the mechanics of settlement implementation 
is contained in Storrar, A., "A Guide to the Principles and 
Practices of Land Settlement in Kenya, " Journal of Local Ad- 
ministration Overseas. III, 1, January 1964. pp. 14-19. 
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their settlement loans, probably in order to gain access to 
commercial bank credit. ) The lack of access to seasonal creditl 
may have been partially overcome by 1975 in some cases by settlers' 
belonging to certain primary cooperative societies, and it is ex- 
pected that the role of cooperative credit will expand in the 
settlement schemes throughout the 1970's. However, in general, 
it appears that settlers do not have access to seasonal credit 
from the formal sector, as the loans of the Settlement Fund 
were in virtually all cases made on a once-and-for-all basis 
with security requirements such that no unencumbered assets 
remained to support further debt. 
3. Credit for Small Scale Agriculture 
As noted elsewhere in this paper, the supply of formal 
credit to Africans was severely restricted by regulations in 
force until the closing days of the colonial era. As the small 
farm sector is exclusively African, these restrictions meant that 
no formal credit was available to smallholders until the 1950's, 
ignoring a few pilot and local schemes. 
2 
The implementation of the Swynnerton Plana beginning in 
1954 appears to have provided the real start of the tradition 
of smallholder credit in Kenya which is now strongly established. 
This tradition is centred on medium term facilities to individuals 
for "productive" on-farm investment, supported on the technical 
side by farm planning but without intensive supervision, and on 
the banking side by land pledged as loan collateral. The 
tradition is based on the assumption that government intervention 
1. Department of Settlement, "Agricultural Credit: A Memorandum 
to the Tootell Mission, " p. 1; Republic of Kenya, An Economic 
Appraisal of the Settlement Schemes 1964/65-1967/68. Farm Economic 
Survey Report No. 27. Nairobi, Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning, November 1971. pp. 92-93. 
2. Mention of early schemes is found in Colony and Protectorate of 
Kenya, Report of Committee on Agricultural Credit for Africans. 
Nairobi, Government Printer, 1950. pp. 3,26 ff. 
3. Swynnerton, R. J. M., op. cit. 
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as a lender is essential to the goal of increasing smallholder 
access to loans, and that smallholders "need" loans at rates of 
interest within a point or two of the prime lending rates of 
commercial banks. 
Since 1954 smallholder access to formal credit has been 
expanded rather slowly, by 1972 reaching perhaps 65,000 of Kenya's 
more than one million families on the land. In spite of the 
caution exhibited by the rate of increase, the financial results 
generally have not been encouraging. However, this point will 
be explored in later chapters, while the intent of this section 
is merely to outline the profile of the supply side of the small- 
holder credit market. 
a. Long term credit for the small farm sector 
Long term credit for land purchase by smallholders is not 
generally provided by any of Kenya's formal lenders. However, 
AFC has issued a handfull of loans to enable small farmers to 
obtain land contiguous to their present holdings, and funds from 
commercial banks and other sources are sometimes used by borrowers 
for the acquisition of land. The term to maturity of these loans 
is not especially suited to the financing of fixed assets such as 
land, as AFC loans to smallholders rarely exceed maturities of 
five years and commercial banks are quite reluctant to go beyond 
three years. However, the attractiveness of land as an invest- 
ment prompts some borrowers to use medium term funds for land 
purchase. Long term credit -- here defined as having a maturity 
in excess of five years -- for other purposes is likewise virtually 
unavailable to smallholders from formal credit sources. 
b. Medium term credit for the small farm sector 
Medium term credit for smallholder agriculture is provided 
by the Agricultural Finance Corporation, the commercial banks and 
the Cooperative Production Credit Scheme. 
AFC operates three credit schemes which specifically provide 
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medium term credit for small scale farmers. The major scheme 
is funded by the International Development Association, the 
second is funded by resources provided by West Germany through 
KFW., and the third and smallest is financed out of AFC's own 
resources. Accordingly, these schemes are known as the IDA, 
KFW and AFC small scale schemes. 
The IDA scheme began in 1967, the KFW programme commenced 
in 1969, and the AFC scheme, which is now more or less a residual 
programme used to make loans to farmers outside areas where the 
land is registered, was the major but still not very sizeable 
scheme in operation before these two initiatives in external 
assistance. Prior to the IDA and KFW involvement, AFC made few 
loans to small scale farmers (1964 - nil, 1965 - nil, 1966 - 
1,380,1967 - 523, as given in annual reports), and the predeces- 
sor small scale schemes which were taken over by AFC at its 
formation were also small in relation to the volume of lending 
and number of loans issued since the advent of the IDA and KFW 
schemes. The number of loans issued under the various small 
schemes designed to serve African farmers between the early 
1950's and June 1964 is given as 7,850 in the Lawrance Report. 
1 
However, earlier reports published by the Ministry of Agriculture2 
suggest ALDEV loans may have reached 5,365 borrowers rather than 
the 1,336 cited under the ALDEV heading in the Lawrance Report, 
which would boost the Report's estimate to approximately 12,000. 
As noted previously, the upper limit of small scale loans 
was increased from Sh 10,000 to Sh 15,000 in 1972, while for 
reasons of administrative economy the smallest AFC approval is 
Sh 1,000. Loans under these schemes have been generally pro- 
vided on five year terms, requiring repayment in five equal 
1. Republic of Kenya, Report of the Mission on Land Consolidation 
and Registration. This estimate excludes tea development loans 
given in kind. See p. 125. 
2. See the final chapters of Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, 
Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Water Resources, 
African Land Development in Kenya 1940-1955 and African Land Develop_- 
ment in Kenya 1946-1962. Nairobi, Government Printer, 1956 and 1962. 
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annual installments of principal and interest. AFC's lending 
rate was 6.5% through April 1967,7.5% through early 1973, and 
8% since 1973. In terms of coverage, the first phase of the 
IDA scheme reached over 8,000 borrowers between 1967 and 1973, 
and a further tranche of 8,000 borrowers was included in the 
programme's second phase by 1975. The KFW scheme, which is 
restricted to Kericho and Kisii Districts, where German Agri- 
cultural Team staff are deployed in extension activities, 
included more than 1,000 borrowers by 1972, when a second phase 
designed to reach 2,750 farmers was implemented. The number of 
AFC small scale loans issued since 1967 appears to have averaged 
not more than 300 per year. The number of these loans out- 
standing on 31 March 1969 was 2,785, and lending under the AFC 
scheme heading was sharply curtailed in the following years for 
which annual reports were avialable early in 1975. 
The great majority of smallholder medium term loans issued 
since AFC's formation in 1963 have been primarily for the pur- 
chase of grade dairy stock and for related on-farm investments 
in fencing, water supply and dairying equipment. The sizes of 
loans issued under the IDA and KFW programmes have averaged less 
than Sh 4,000 and have frequently included two in-calf heifers. 
An orientation towards the acquisition of grade cattle has 
also been apparent in commercial bank lending to smallholders, 
although no records are kept and little control is exercised by 
the banks concerning the use made of their facilities, in terms 
of items purchased, by their borrowers. Hence, specification of 
the impact of these loans on smallholder development, with respect 
both to asset acquisition and number of borrowers, is extremely 
difficult using published data. However, it was observed by the 
Lawrance Commission that the amount of commercial bank loans to 
smallholders -- many of whom had sources of income outside 
farming - exceeded that made available from official sources 
between 1959 and 1966.1 A Ministry of Agriculture estimate 
1. Republic of Kenya, Report of the Mission on Land Consoli- 
dation and Registration. p. 126. This comparison excludes 
tea development loans made in kind from official sources. 
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quoted by Vasthoff 
indicates that as of the end of 1965 about 
3,400 African farmers had commercial bank loans outstanding, 
1 
but this would not necessarily be incompatible with the Lawrance 
Report figures which represent the cumulative total number of 
loans issued by official sources, rather than the number then 
outstanding. 
The Lawrance Report's assertion was supported, although 
not conclusively because of non-random sample selection, by 
Fleming's field study. His sample of 5,077 plots and plot- 
holders in several smallholder Districts studied in 1966-1968 
included 379 farmers who were identified as borrowers, and of 
these 255 had received loans from banks. Of the remaining 124, 
most had borrowed from AFC. 
2 
It is quite possible that in many 
areas the commercial banks have remained a larger source of farm 
credit for a larger number'of farmers than has AFC, in spite of 
the growth of AFC based on external assistance. In Murang'a in 
1970 the District Agricultural Officer reported that banks made 
326 loans to small farmers in two of the four smallholder Divisions 
in the District, 
3 
while AFC made 124 loans under the IDA scheme 
and not more than a handful of other loans to farmers throughout 
the District. During the first quarter of 1973 a similar pattern 
was found during the"writer's examination of Murang'a Land 
Registry records. AFC accounted for only 11% of the total 
number of new loans secured by land and 5% of the shilling 
volume of such loans. 
4 
The two commercial bank offices in Murang'a 
town reported having a total of approximately 1,200 loans secured 
1. Vasthoff, Josef, Small Farm Credit and Development: Some 
Experiences in East Africa with Special Reference to Kenya. IFO- 
Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Afrika-Studien 33. Munich, 
Weltforum Verlag, 1968. p. 22. 
2. Fleming, J. T., "Analysis and Review. " p. 37. 
3. Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Agriculture, Murang'a District 
Annual Report, 1971. Nairobi, Government Printer, 1971. p. 21. 
4. Credit Use and Development. pp. 30-33. 
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by small farm plots on their books as of mid-1973, while as of 
that date AFC had issued approximately 1,000 IDA loans in Murang'a, 
and also had a number of additional loans outstanding under 
predecessor smallholder schemes discontinued or virtually dormant 
since 1967. As indicated above, however, the usage of bank loans 
is generally not monitored, and it is not possible to ascertain 
without further research the investments made by borrowers. While 
many plotholders in small farm areas may have used their bank loans 
for on-farm development, others hay have used the funds for other 
purposes. 
Commercial bank loans to owners of small farms are frequently 
given for periods of from roughly 15 months to three years, with 
repayment required monthly. The repayment terms have the effect 
of rationing credit to those with non-farm sources of income, as 
farmers' income is frequently not received monthly and smallholder 
cooperatives have frequently been administratively incapable of 
honouring stop orders under which members have given instructions 
for crop delivery proceeds to be remitted to specified banks for 
the settlement of loans. The rate of interest on small loans 
issued by the banks is 1% to 2% above the prime lending rate 
which was 7% for many years until raised to 8% in 1974, at which 
1 
time an interest ceiling of 10% was imposed on all new lending. 
A range of credit facilities are accorded to creditworthy 
members of qualifying cooperative societies under the Cooperative 
Production Credit Scheme which is in many respects the most im- 
pressive of the new institutions designed to serve the smallholder 
market for financial services. CPCS expanded into the provision 
of credit at maturities of three years on a routine basis in mid- 
1974, and it was envisaged that the primary demand for such credit 
would be for the purchase of grade cattle. The Department of 
Cooperative Development expects that medium term credit having 
maturities of from three to five years will be made widely 
1. Central Bank of Kenya, Eighth Annual Report for the Year 
Ended 30th June 1974. pp. 13,64. 
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available to qualifying cooperators during the second half of 
the 1970's. 
1 The basic credit facilities offered under CPCS 
are credit sales and loans having an 18-month maximum maturity. 
Credit sales are unambiguously short term in nature.. Some of 
the 18-month loans are probably repaid in a period of less than 
one year, but all will be considered as medium term facilities 
in this discussion. 
Eligibility requirements are such that virtually all loyal 
members of primary produce marketing societies which meet the 
standards of CPCS eligibility have access to loans. CPCS was 
operated on a pilot basis prior to 1972, and by the end of 1973 
over 26,000 members had loans outstanding. The average balance 
per loan account was less than Sh 500. Coverage is expected to 
increase as more unions and primary societies meet the eligibility 
requirements for participation. Credit limits of CPCS borrowers 
are fixed at two-thirds of the average values of their annual 
deliveries over the preceeding three years, with a minimum loan 
of Sh 100. Interest is charged at rates between 8% and 12% fixed 
on a decentralised basis at the discretion of participating unions. 
Repayments are deducted from members' individual deposit accounts 
at the time these accounts are credited with crop delivery proceeds. 
c. Short term credit for the small farm sector 
Short term formal credit for small scale agriculture is 
provided by the Cooperative Production Credit Scheme in the form 
of credit sales, by the tea and pyrethrum authorities for inputs 
specific to these crops, and under several minor programmes in- 
cluding, inter alia, cotton farmers and irrigation scheme tenants. 
Short term cooperative credit is extended in the form of 
credit sales facilities under which all members of produce 
marketing societies who are not in default may purchase inputs 
1. Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Cooperatives and Social Ser- 
vices, Department of Cooperative Development, "Policy for Credit 
Sales and Loans to Members, " and Revised Plan for Cooperative 
Development in Kenya with Nordic Assistance. Vol. 1. Plan of 
Operation. Nairobi, 1974? "Credit and Finance Division" section. 
pp. 2-3. 
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from specified cooperative stores. Credit limits are fixed 
in relation to the average value of each member's annual 
deliveries to his society, and credit sales accounts are 
cleared by deductions from the next payout for crop deliveries. 
l 
The limit is set at 10% in the case of coffee societies and 5% 
in the case of dairy and pyrethrum societies. As coffee payments 
are made roughly quarterly and dairy and pyrethrum payments 
monthly, these limits equal 40% and 60% of annual delivery 
proceeds. 
Before leaving the subject of cooperative credit, it should 
be noted that Table III-1 on pages 186-187 indicates a sizeable 
amount of "other" cooperative credit outstanding in 1972. This 
category is the legacy of the disorganised state of cooperative 
credit which prevailed in the mid-1960's. Little data is avail- 
able on the numerous uses and abuses of such credit, and no 
further discussion is warranted as this sad chapter is being 
progressively closed as more and more unions and societies 
formalise old debts and discontinue lending on a somewhat hap- 
hazard financial basis in order to qualify for participation in 
CPCS. 
Details of two minor seasonal input supply schemes suffice 
to outline the general nature of credit facilities operated by 
certain crop authorities and similar agencies involved with 
smallholder production. The Kenya Tea Development Authority 
(KTDA) operates the largest such scheme, under which growers 
obtain fertiliser on credit for their tea stands. The type of 
fertiliser required for tea is not usually used on other crops 
with the exception of coffee, and hence the possibility of 
diversion is minimised. Credit limits are established for each 
grower on the basis of the number of mature stumps registered 
in his name with KTDA. The loans carry no interest but include 
a 4% service charge. Deductions are made from tea delivery 
1. Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Cooperatives and Social 
Services, Department of Cooperative Development, "Policy for 
Credit Sales and Loans to Members. " 
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proceeds at a fixed rate per kilo of green leaf delivered 
beginning in October, one or two months following fertiliser 
application, and are virtually always cleared over a period not 
exceeding 12 months. Approximately half of the growing number of 
growers having mature stands usually participate in this scheme 
in any given year. 
The Pyrethrum Marketing Board distributes interest-free 
credit in the form of fertiliser and planting materials to py- 
rethrum marketing cooperative societies. Approximately half of 
the total number of such societies have availed themselves of 
this facility in typical recent years. These loans are recovered 
in months seven through 12 following disbursement, by deductions 
from delivery proceeds paid by the Board to societies. As of 1974 
little information had been collected by the Board or others con- 
cerning the nature of the relationships between pyrethrum societies 
and their members with respect to this credit, although it appeared 
on the basis of crop production rates and cycles that the terms to 
members might be somewhat longer than those extended by the Board. 
It should be noted that the assertion could be made that in 
AFC and commercial bank loans to smallholders there are included 
elements which are essentially short term in nature. The borrower 
in each case may use a portion of his facility for the purchase 
of seasonal inputs. (While typically being primarily for the 
acquisition of grade cattle and related on-farm investments, AFC 
loans to smallholders have generally included a small amount for 
arable enterprises, such as an acre of potatoes. ) As repayment 
begins within a month in the case of bank credit and within 
approximately a year in the case of standard AFC terms for small- 
holders, it might be argued that there is a short term element in 
these facilities in spite of the final maturity's extending beyond 
the short term. While this interpretation has some technical 
justification, it fails to note that the usual presumption with 
respect to short term loans is that such credit is renewable each 
season to support the production cycle. AFC and even commercial 
bank credit for small scale agriculture fail to meet this require- 
215 
ment. However, AFC has experimented with pilot seasonal small- 
holder credit schemes, and may well provide more facilities of 
this nature on a routine basis in the years ahead. 
B. Equity Finance from Sources Outside the Firm 
Kenyan agriculture in general does not have access to equity 
funds from sources outside the firm or extended farm family house- 
hold. Exceptions include several large corporations in the 
plantation sector and a handful of venture capital undertakings 
in ranching by foreign investors. These exceptions are suf- 
ficiently infrequent and their capitalisation sufficiently 
divorced from the main concern of this paper not to warrant 
further consideration. The acquisition of large European holdings 
by groups of Africans, including "hidden partners", also consti- 
tutes an exception, and is treated elsewhere in this paper. 
Agriculture's lack of access to outside equity capital is 
not peculiar to Kenya. The Wilson Report notes that the typical 
scale of operation of farm firms in Britain is small: 
l 
The consequences of small scale for agriculture's access 
to additional capital are that the majority of farm 
businesses obtain finance for additional capital for- 
mation either from retained earnings or by borrowing. 
It is not practicable for them to obtain finance by 
issuing equity or share capital, as it is possible for 
quoted companies. 
Small scale operations dominate Kenya's population of farm firms, 
too, which would lead to the same type of result as in Britain 
even if the Nairobi Stock Exchange and other institutions active 
in the provision of equity finance were of the same relative 
importance to the Kenyan economy as similar institutions in 
Britain are to Britain's economy. 
2 
1. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Availability 
of Capital and Credit to United Kingdom Agriculture. (The 
Wilson Report). London, HMSO, 1973. p. 2. 
2. The operation and performance of the Nairobi exchange is 
dealt with in Arowolo, Edward A., "The Development of Capital 
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An exploration of the reasons why agriculture in general 
does not have access to equity markets is beyond the scope of 
this study. However, a brief summary by Warriner cites techno- 
logical and economic causes. 
' 
On the technical side, agriculture 
does not face requirements for capital equipment in large, 
indivisible quantities, so large scale capitalistic forms of 
organisation possess few or no inherent advantages in agriculture. 
On the economic side, agriculture tends to be associated with 
relatively uncertain and low returns to investment, which fail to 
attract large scale capital. Uncertain returns reflect the nature 
of the production process in agriculture; low returns reflect the 
tendency of agriculture to expand the supply of food-stuffs more 
rapidly than the demand for them grows. Also, farming is 
characterised by a certain heterogeneity because of the different 
land and labour endowments of individual farms. The individual 
farmer, as the best judge of the risk of investment in his own 
enterprise, is also the logical source of investment funds. 
These observations, made in the late 1930's with respect 
to peasant farming in Eastern Europe, may be expanded upon with 
three basic observations concerning the nature of agricultural 
enterprises. The first is that, by and large, agriculture appears 
to be characterised by constant costs once a certain farm size is 
reached, given the technological characteristics of agricultural 
production. On a priori grounds one would expect that an industry 
with constant returns to size would be at a disadvantage in 
attracting capital, which would flow more readily to those industries 
characterised by increasing returns to size, i. e., by decreasing 
costs. 
Secondly, as an atomistic industry facing low and uncertain 
returns, agriculture does not generally permit the accumulation of 
large profits which might attract outside capital, except in those 
(continued) Markets in Africa with Particular Reference to Kenya 
and Nigeria, " IMF Staff Papers. XVII, 2, July 1971. pp. 420-472. 
1. Warriner, Doreen, Economics of Peasant Farming. 2nd ed. 
London, Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1964. pp. 4-5. 
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cases where technology changes rapidly and unevenly or where 
the technological and institutional constraints encourage large 
scale production, as in plantation agriculture. Among the 
institutional constraints is frequently the shortage of contigu- 
ous land for expansion. Expansion by multiplying locations may 
increase costs of management and operations unless distances are 
very short or indivisibilities convenient to common denominators 
or multiples. 
The third observation is also institutional. Starting from 
a base of family farms, it may be very difficult to change farm 
management structures in a manner conducive to securing outside 
finance. Farmers may be unwilling to risk their main asset, 
their land, in partnerships or corporate undertakings on the one 
hand and as security to support loans to operations organised 
according to those forms on the other. 
C. Informal Credit Mechanisms 
No comprehensive data is available concerning informal credit 
mechanisms in Kenya. Can this absence of attention be interpreted 
as evidence that rural indebtedness is not a social problem in 
Kenya? An affirmative conclusion appears warranted: three major 
and one minor official sources have dealt in some detail with farm 
credit for Africans during the last 30 years, with scant attention 
or reference to informal credit and its possible burdens) The 
minor source, known as the Ingham Report, noted in 1949 that: 
2 
The use of credit by the African agricultural community 
is still on a very small scale. So far as we can as- 
certain, there is little private borrowing, except in 
" the Coast Province where the practice of borrowing 
1. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Report of Committee on Agri- 
cultural Credit for Africans; East Africa Royal Commission 1953-55; 
Government of Kenya, The Economic Development of Kenya; Republic 
of Kenya, Report of the Mission on Land Consolidation and Registra- 
tion. 
2. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Agricultural Credit for 
Africans. p. 1. 
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from traders in anticipation of the harvest is 
prevalent.... 
The possibility that widespread rural indebtedness may have 
escaped official notice may be discounted. Colonial administra- 
tors were certainly aware of the scope of rural indebtedness as 
a social and economic problem in India. In the early phase of 
the colonial era Indian laws provided the basis for Kenya's 
legal system, 
2 
and the Rupee was used as legal tender. In the 
latter part of the colonial era the East Africa Royal Commission 
mentioned in passing the problem of massive rural indebtedness in 
India but gave no indication of any similar problem in East 
Africa. 
3 
That the Colonial authorities were not oblivious to 
the problems of massive rural indebtedness when these arose 
within the East African sphere is shown by the investigation 
undertaken by Bartlett and Last on behalf of the Government of 
Zanzibar in 1933.4 Their report, not accepted by that Government, 
alleged widespread rural indebtedness and recommended debt re- 
mission, land registration and licensing of lenders. 
5 
1. "Those who borrow live, those who 
Jan, Myths and Legends of the Swahili 
cational Books Ltd., 1970. p. 147. 
2. Administrative links between East 
mentioned in Ghai, Y. P., and J. P. W. B. 
127 ff. 
work die. " See Knappert, 
London, Heinemann Edu- 
Africa and India are 
McAuslan, op. cit., pp. 
3. p. 98. Diana Hunt confirms the absence of a tradition of 
rural indebtedness in Uganda in "The Ugandan Agricultural Co- 
operative Credit Scheme, " East African Journal of Rural Develop- 
ment. 5,1-2,1972. p. 2, 
4. Bartlett, C. A.; and J. L. Last, Report on the Indebtedness of 
the Agricultural Classes, 1933. Zanzibar, Government Printer, 
1934. 
5. The parallels between rural indebtedness in Zanzibar as 
described by Bartlett and Last, op. cit., and in India as de- 
scribed, for example, by the Reserve Bank of India, Report of 
the Agricultural Finance Sub-Committee, may to some extent 
reflect the similarity of financial practice in both areas as 
well as a coincidence of social, economic and other factors 
beyond the scope of finance and economics. Details concerning 
the role of Indian entrepreneurs as financiers in Zanzibar in 
the Nineteenth Century are found in Mangat, J. S., A History of 
the Asians in East Africa, c. 1886 to 1945. Oxford, at the 
Clarendon Press, 1969. See especially Chapter I, "The Nineteenth 
Century Origins. " pp. 1-26. 
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However, the fact that rural indebtedness is and has not 
been a problem in Kenya does not mean that informal credit does 
not exist. Culturally, giving and asking for assistance is a 
strong tradition which has been adapted to the monetisation of 
the rural economy. Several dimensions of informal credit can 
be identified: kinship and friendship credit, "traditional" 
credit, merchant credit, moneylender credit, and large farm 
purchase credit. Brief discussions of each type appear warranted, 
in spite of the paucity of information, to provide some per- 
spective both to informal credit itself and to the importance 
of formal credit. 
1. Kinship and Friendship Credit 
Kinship and friendship credit, surely the most informal 
type of credit, appears to be common. 
l 
It appears reasonable 
to assume that the amounts of kinship and friendship loans are 
generally small in relation to formal sector credit transactions 
and that they are frequently solicited to meet consumption needs, 
the payment of school fees, and for special opportunities which 
may arise from time to time, such as the acquisition of cattle 
or small parcels of land. No systematic or tightly-defined basis 
for these transactions appears to have been identified by social 
scientists, attesting perhaps the small scale nature of such 
credit and a lack of uniformity with respect to such trans- 
actions among Kenya's various ethnic traditions. 
2. "Traditional Credit" 
"Traditional credit" is defined to include three types of 
transactions. One contains arrangements under which the seller 
1. It has been hypothesised that visibly better-off individuals, 
such as civil servants, have an ill-liquidity preference which 
ensures that the cupboard is bare when less prosperous relatives 
and friends come to ask for gifts and loans. See Walden, Thorn, 
"Entrepreneurial Ill-Liquidity Preference and the Extended Family. " 
Working Paper No. 205, Institute for Development Studies, Uni- 
versity of Nairobi. December 1974. 
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retains certain options which render the transfer reversable. 
The reversable aspect gives those transactions a "future" element 
in addition to their "spot" characteristics, and the future element 
gives them something in common with credit as commonly understood 
in modern business English. The second involves unregistered land 
as a commodity and the third includes the rotating credit association 
and similar types of group arrangements. The following traditional 
credit arrangements, reported by farmers interviewed by the writer 
in Murang'a District, are illustrative. 
One case involved the "sale" of standing wattle trees. 
Wattle trees may be sold when they are quite young and left 
standing on the seller's farm by the buyer until they have 
grown to a size attractive for harvest, which may take as long 
as seven or ten years. While the trees are standing the seller 
may buy them back, in effect redeeming the loan. The seller 
mentioned that the price at which he could buy back the trees 
was their current market price, determined by the market for 
bark (used in processed form by the tanning industry), firewood 
and charcoal. He could also order the buyer to cut the trees at 
any time if he wanted to use the land for other purposes. 
The second type of traditional credit arrangement was re- 
portedly widespread with respect to land purchases and sales 
prior to registration of the land. One of the Murang'a re- 
spondents had obtained his land just prior to demarcation by 
survey and registration in his area, where the process was com- 
pleted in 1970. As purchaser he was allowed to occupy and work 
the land prior to paying for it in full. The arrangement he was 
a party to involved a down payment of about 30% of the agreed- 
upon purchase price. No fixed installment schedule was specified 
nor was there any provision for the payment of interest, although 
the price was specified in a written agreement witnessed by third 
parties. Payments in kind as well as payments in cash could be 
made, and the seller had an informal claim to an unspecified 
portion of the farm's produce while the debt was outstanding. 
An especially interesting feature of the transaction was that the 
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buyer had acquired his land in a serial fashion, several acres 
at a time. As he completed paying for one block, he would strike 
a new agreement for another block. Prices ranged from Sh 300 to 
Sh 550 per acre, according to the buyer, and one agreement re- 
quired the exchange of a cow in addition to the cash involved. 
The buyer had cultivated a patch of the farm on a rent-free basis 
prior to his undertaking to purchase it, but the land was mostly 
bush and had no building on it. The seller was reported to have 
sold the land in order to obtain money for bride price. 
Prior to registration "sellers" or their offspring could 
reclaim the unimproved land from the "buyer" simply by refunding 
the purchase price. (This arrangement of conditional sale is 
1 
known technically as "pledging" or "customary mortgage". ) 
Improved land could not be recovered in this manner, although 
certain types of recourse existed and special considerations 
were examined by the elders who would be called upon to settle 
any claims which might arise. 
2 
One scrap of historical interest, quoted by R. A. Bullock, 
indicates that Kikuyu tenants (ahoi) in the Nineteenth Century 
loaned out goats at one means of increasing their -herds, so that 
they might one day obtain a herd large enough to pay for a plot 
of land and cease to be tenants. 
3 
Lending out goats increased 
1. Private communication from Mr J. C. D. Lawrance, Ministry of 
Overseas Development, London. 21 May 1975. 
2. An official source suggests that before land registration 
covered Central Province land transfers paid for in stock were 
redeemable, while those paid for in cash were not. See Kolbe, 
L. H., and S. J. Fouch4, Land Consolidation and Farm Planning in 
the Central Province. Nairobi, Government Printer, 1959. Maini 
suggests that in Murang'a (formerly Ft 
Hall) District land for 
which more than 10 goats had been paid was not redeemable. See 
Maini, Krishan M., Land Law in East Africa. Nairobi, Oxford Uni- 
versity Press, 1967. p. 10. Further details regarding customary 
tenure arrangements are found in Fleming, J. T., "Analysis and 
Review, " especially Appendix I, pp. 94-115; and in Obol-Ochola, 
James, ed., Land Law Reform in East Africa. Kampala, Milton 
Obote Foundation, 1969. 
3. "Subsistence to Cash: Economic Change in Rural Kiambu, " 
Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines. 56, XIV, 4,1974. p. 702. 
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herds through the receipt of interest at a rate of one additional 
goat per goat borrowed per annum and through the dispersal of 
herds to minimise risks of disease, predators, etc. The anony- 
mous source cited by Bullock records that the ahoi loaned goats 
to landlords who used the livestock to pay for land acquired from 
the Ndorobo during the southward migration of the Kikuyu from 
Murang'a to Kiambu in the Nineteenth Century. 
In another instance reported to the writer in Murang'a, the 
wife of a respondent acknowledged being a member of a harambeeI 
group of ladies who worked together on each others' farms and 
also on the farms of non-members. The person having the work 
done by this particular group was required to pay the leader of 
the group a specified amount, and the leader distributed the sum 
to a different member each time. Three other respondents re- 
ported using groups of this sort for various tasks on their 
farms, but these other groups evidently did not have special 
payment arrangements -- the proceeds of each day's work were 
simply divided among the members by the group leader. The 
general impression given was that the numberoand cohesion of 
such groups is declining with the increasing sophistication of 
farming, deeper monetisation of the rural economy and greater 
demands upon members' time reflecting increased labour require- 
ments on their own farms. 
Another respondent reported that he and his two wives belonged 
to a mutual savings society, and the arrangements he outlined have 
much in common with the rotating payments practice of the work 
group described above. The savings group was reported also to 
consist primarily of women. Each member contributed Sh 16 monthly 
and the total accumulated at each monthly meeting is given to a 
different member each time until all have received the pooled 
amount, when the cycle is repeated. These types of procedures 
involve a credit element in that until the cycle is completed 
1. Harambee is Kiswahili for together, and is the motto of the 
Republic of Kenya. When applied to rural development, harambee 
denotes self-helf activities based on local initiative. Such 
activities play a significant role in rural development in Kenya. 
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and each member has received one payment, members who have not 
yet received payment are in effect creditors of members who have 
been paid. 
The savings group participant indicated that the group 
member who received the pool was chosen by lot at each meeting 
and that there were no arrangements within the group for de- 
partures from this method of selection. 
1 
However, a member 
especially in need of funds might be able to obtain a loan from 
the winner through private negotiation at the conclusion of the 
meeting. 
It is interesting to note that the respondent who belonged 
to the mutual savings group was also probably the most financially 
sophisticated cooperating member of the writer's sample. In 
addition to his participation in a traditional association 
specialising in finance, he also reported having substantial 
savings account balances and owning shares, in the firm for which 
he worked, quoted on the Nairobi exchange. Greater involvement in 
the modern sector is not necessarily incompatible with the 
maintenance or strengthening of traditional financial practices. 
Little published material is available about traditional 
credit in Kenya. While it includes devices to overcome indivis- 
ibilities involved in the adoption of certain enterprises and 
investments, hence constituting a traditional means of obtaining 
modernity, it may also be that the social organisation on which 
these arrangements are based ten sto weaken with increased 
mobility and economic individuality. Registration of land, for 
1. The absence of any such formal device contrasts with practice 
in Ethiopia and India where groups of this sort -- chit funds or 
rotating credit associations -- appear to occupy a larger social- 
financial role. A summary of the nature of these types of groups 
is found in Geertz, Clifford, "The Rotating Credit Association: 
A Middle Rung in Development, " Economic Development and Cultural 
Change. X, 3, April 1962. pp. 241-263, reprinted with other 
articles on the topic in Small Farmer Credit: Informal Credit. XV. 
AID Spring Review of Small Farmer Credit. June 1973. A typology 
of chit funds is found in Anderson, Robert T., "Rotating Credit 
Associations in India, " Economic Development and Cultural Change. 
XIV, 3, April 1966. pp. 334-339.. 
224 
example, has no doubt had the effect of rendering conditional 
sales legally unenforceable, and hence relatively unattractive 
as a means of obtaining "credit". In addition, increased 
access to formal credit by the economic upper stratum of rural 
society may dampen leadership initiative for the organisation 
of traditional groups oriented towards overcoming investment 
indivisibilities. 
3. Merchant Credit 
Harper's study of 169 shops in Nyeri and Machakos Districts 
indicates that more than three-quarters gave trade credit. 
' 
The 
sample was neither survey oriented nor random, being selected from 
"average" establishments open at the time of field selection visits 
in an experiment in providing business advice. In spite of this 
shortcoming from the point of view of this study, Harper's work 
provides some interesting insights. Of his 169 shops, 136 re- 
ported extending credit to customers. Of these 136, sufficient 
data was gathered from 125 to provide the basis for several 
observations concerning the position of credit in traders' 
finances. The first is that the 125 shops reported a 20% higher 
level of sales, on the average, than the remainder of, the sample. 
While the average monthly turnover reported for the entire sample 
was Sh 2,388, for the 125 it was Sh 2,498, yielding an average of 
only Sh 2,081 for the remainder. For the sample as a whole, the 
mean amount of credit reported outstanding at the time of the 
interviews, Sh 343, represented about 15% of average monthly 
sales and, interestingly, more than two-months' estimated average 
profits. For the 125 shops giving credit for which complete data 
was available, the reported average amount of credit outstanding 
1. Data provided personally by Malcolm E. Harper in 1974. 
Harper was at that time lecturing in the Faculty of Commerce 
at the University of Nairobi. Further details of his study of 
small shops and his field experiements in providing low cost 
extension assistance to small shopkeepers are avialable in his 
PhD dissertation submitted to the University of Nairobi in 1974, 
entitled The Development of a Cost Effective Extension Service 
for Small Business: A Kenyan Experiment. 
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was Sh 435, equal to about 17% of reported average monthly 
sales turnover. 
While only 36% of the sample reported having bank accounts, 
only 6% indicated having loans. Six percent also reported using 
trade credit extended by wholesalers. Thus, most of these shop- 
keepers giving credit appear. to be financing their customers out 
of their own resources rather than constituting a link in a chain 
of credit relationships. 
For the subgroup of 125 as a whole, manipulation of Harper's 
data suggests that those with access to credit had a higher level 
of credit outstanding, relative to sales turnover, than those 
lacking access to credit. On a District basis, however, this 
correlation applies only to sample shops in Machakos, while in 
Nyeri access to credit appears to be associated with relatively 
lower amounts outstanding to customers. However, the small 
number of Harper's merchants extending credit who also reported 
having access to loans and trade credit and for whom complete 
information was available -- seven in Nyeri, six in Machakos -- 
and the non-random nature of the sample make generalisations on 
this matter tenuous. The terms on which credit was extended and 
the merchants' loss experiences were not monitored by Harper. 
The Ingham Committee, which in 1949 investigated the 
possibilities of providing farm credit for Africans, received 
evidence from Sheikh Mbarak Ali, Liwali for the Coast, which 
suggests that merchant credit was not uncommon in that part of 
Kenya: 
1 
There exists, however, the undesirable practice of shop- 
keepers advancing sums ranging from Sh 10 to Sh 500 in 
any year on that year's crop which is sold to the shop- 
keeper at a lower price than would be obtainable in an 
open market. The credit is usually asked for either to 
pay for assistance in clearing and preparing the area or 
for purchase of food should the farmer's reserve of food 
be exhausted before the next crop. 
1. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Agricultural Credit for 
Africans. p. 53. 
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The Administration has for years tried to eradicate 
this practice, but it unfortunately exists and it appears 
that it is of some assistance to the borrower. 
Moock notes that farmers in Vihiga Division included in his 
samples appeared to use too little fertiliser and too much labour 
in maize cultivation, given rational economic goals. Moock 
suggests that this tendency is not the result of irrationality 
but rather of the bias inserted primarily by limitations on his 
range of cost data. Among the four unmeasured factors he suggests 
which might explain the tendency to use too little fertiliser he 
includes the costs of borrowing in informal credit markets. 
1 
The 
suppliers of credit in these markets would presumably be shop- 
keepers or pure moneylenders, as friendship and kinship credit 
probably would not carry any interest obligation. 
Six of the 19 respondents interviewed by the writer in 
Murang'a indicated having accounts with local shops for the 
purchase of provisions such as salt, sugar, cooking fat, fuel 
oil and other requisites. 
2 
Repayment was reportedly expected 
monthly in cases in which salary or tea cheques were major sources 
of regular cash income, or at the time when income was received 
from the sale or charcoal or similar goods sold on a frequent but 
irregular basis. Maximum balances due at month-end were less 
than Sh 40 in four cases, and Sh 80 in one case. Four respondents 
indicated that there were no interest charges or other conditions 
involved in this type of credit, and one felt that traders might 
charge slightly higher prices on household items sold on credit 
than on cash sales. The sixth respondent who reported using 
merchant credit had done so on a substantial scale, obtaining 
supplies from a merchant in Thika for his poultry enterprise. 
Payments were required monthly, and frequently amounted to Sh 500. 
The respondent reported that a bag of chicken feed could be pur- 
chased for cash for Sh 42, but that the credit price was Sh 43. 
The rate of interest represented by this premium would be a 
1. Moock, Peter Russell, op. cit., p. 244. 
2. "Credit Use and Development, " p. 76. 
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function of the time between the date of purchase and the monthly 
settlement date. If the balance were outstanding for a full 
month a rate of about 28% per annum would obtain. 
4. Moneylender Credit 
Moneylender credit appears to be relatively rare in rural 
Kenya. The term is used here to apply only to transactions in 
which the relationship between creditor and debtor is limited 
primarily to credit, as opposed to the carrying on of a trade 
or as an adjunct to relationships involving access to land or 
similar situations in which credit is an accessory. Only one 
of the Murang'a farmers interviewed by the writer indicated 
having recourse to a moneylender, who allegedly charged what 
amounted to an annual interest rate of 200%. 
1 
The Lindquist Report indicates that registered moneylenders, 
mostly Asians, operated in urban markets at the time of writing 
in 1967, while unregistered African moneylenders were found in 
the countryside who levied interest at 360% per annum and used 
physical force against defaulters. 
2 
However, Lindquist did not 
indicate whether this was a general occurrence in the countryside 
or limited to a small number of instances. The scant data which. 
does exist and the overwhelming silence of many of the most obvious 
sources suggest that the situation reported by Lindquist is one 
of infrequent occurrence. 
5. Large Farm Purchase Credit 
Large farm purchase credit arrangements arose in reponse to 
the opportunity to buy large farms which resulted from the fact 
of independence. As noted above, individual Africans generally 
had insufficient capital to purchase a farm in the former Scheduled 
1. *Credit Use and Development, ' pp. 80-81. 
2. Lindquist , Sven, Report on Credit and Finance in the Agri- 
cultural Cooperative Movement in Kenya. Nairobi, The Nordic 
Project for Cooperative Assistance to Kenya, 18 May 1967. p. 27. 
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Areas once the racial barriers to such purchases were removed. 
Various devices were used to solicit funds from a number of 
people for such purchases of farms from Europeans. Some of 
these devices are well within the realms of formal credit 
arrangements, such as cooperative thrift or savings societies 
which hoped in due course to accumulate sufficient funds to 
purchase a large farm. However, other devices were primarily 
informal. 
A common arrangement, described by Onyonka, 
1 involved the 
formation of a nuclear group for the purchase of a farm. The 
group would find it impossible or undesirable to obtain commercial 
bank credit to assist with the purchase. Banks felt the risk of 
such loans to be high and preferred fairly short maturities. In 
any event, potential borrowers frequently did not like the amount 
of disclosure required by banks. The Land Bank and later the 
Agricultural Finance Corporation, with which it was merged, pro- 
vided funds on 20 (later 30) year terms, but required a substantial 
deposit representing the intending purchasers' equity contribution. 
This deposit was as great as 40% of the purchase price, but was 
later reduced to 20%, and in addition borrowers were expected to 
have cash for working capital purposes. Ruthenberg noted with 
respect to the situation prevailing as of 1965 that2 
The Land Bank demands that the applicants possess 50% of 
the price of the land and the fixed assets in ready cash 
or readily available assets. The buyer then usually gets 
a loan of 70-80% of the land price. 
As the nuclear group was often unable to raise the required 
cash among themselves, funds were raised from a number of other 
sources. Of 60 farmers interviewed by Onyonka, 32 had obtained 
credit from kin and friends, and in 30 of these cases no interest 
charge was involved. Loan agreements were verbal. However, the 
relationship was frequently seen as involving certain obligations, 
as in at least 10 of the 32 cases the borrowers reported having 
been requested by their creditors to engage workers recommended 
1. Onyonka, Z. T., Agricultural Development Banking. 
2. Ruthenberg, Hans, African Agricultural Production Development 
Policy in Kenya. p. 92. 
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by creditors. These workers were frequently unpaid or paid only 
nominal amounts, which in effect made them squatters on the farm. 
Cash constraints encountered by the borrowers would also frequently 
lead them to default on their informal sources of funds, 
1 
who 
would then be accepted as partners in the venture rather than as 
creditors. Hence, the term "hidden partner" is used in this 
context. As partners, some of the former creditors would take up 
residence on the farm, or allow a kinsman to do so. The effect 
of this influx of retinue was to dismember 
collection of small family plots, which by 
sistence output requirement from the large 
the marketable surplus. 
2 
The owners would 
arrears with the Land Bank or AFC, attempt 
the large farm into a 
increasing the sub- 
farm could decrease 
then go further into 
to obtain more credit 
from a wider range of informal sources, or liquidate loose assets 
on the farm, etc., which often further impaired the debt servicing 
capacity of the operation financed by formal credit. This syndrome 
eventually led to the request to the World Bank for assistance in 
rehabilitating problem farms in the former Scheduled Areas, for 
which the Bank and IDA provided $15 million in 1975.0 
D. Self-Finance and Reinvested Earnings as Sources of 
Investment Funds in Kenyan Agricultural Development 
1. Self-Finance as a Residual 
While conceptually of primary importance, self-finance, 
including retained earnings, must be treated here as a residual, 
reflecting the absence of data on investment in the agricultural 
sector. Self-finance is obviously more important than credit as 
a motive force in increasing the productivity of land on the bulk 
1. Ruthenberg indicates that funds obtained informally to meet 
Land Bank deposit requirements were usually repaid out of loan 
proceeds when the loan was drawn down. This practice implies 
that many farms financed by the Land Bank would have quickly 
suffered severe working capital constraints. Op. cit., p. 93. 
2. Ruthenberg, Hans, op. cit., pp. 93-94. 
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of Kenya's farms. That this is the case may be inferred from 
the impressive development in small scale agriculture which has 
occurred and from the limited coverage of credit schemes and the 
relative lack of informal credit mechanisms extending much beyond 
the family. De Wilde, noting that increases in agricultural 
production in tropical Africa frequently occurred with little or 
no support in the form of formal credit, made an early attempt 
to quantify this argument. His- study states that credit ad- 
vanced to African farmers in Kenya did not exceed a cumulative 
total of Sh 22 million between 1948 and 1964, including lending 
by the banks and by public sector schemes. However, the annual 
value of African agricultural production was roughly nine times 
that amount as of the latter date. 
1 
Official statistics indicate that by the early 1970's the 
situation was in certain respects not greatly different from 
that prevailing in 1964, at least with respect to the small 
farm sector, which is essentially what de Wilde meant by his 
reference to African agriculture. Table 111-8 on pages 232- 
233 suggests some of the relative magnitudes involved. However, 
the data are suspect from many points of view and should not be 
considered a definitive statement of reality. In addition, the 
data are mixed in the sense that they include both stocks and 
flows, and some arbitrary assumptions have been applied to 
obtain the comparisons required for useful analysis. The 
table suggests that while formal sector short term credit a- 
mounted at most to 15-20% of monetised private sector gross 
agricultural output and of gross marketed agricultural output, 
short term credit to small farms probably amounted to not more 
than 5% of small farm marketed output. (Cooperative credit 
given outside the operations of CPCS would have the effect of 
increasing somewhat the 3% figure given in the table. The 
extent of such credit is not fully known. ) As noted in a 
previous section, small farmers receive little formal credit 
for working capital purposes. 
1. De Wilde, John C., op. cit., Vol. I, The Synthesis. p. 198. 
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Since the time of de Wilde's work the use of credit to 
support gross monetised capital formation on small farms has 
probably increased in relative terms. Quantification of the 
relationship between the supply of credit and levels of capital 
formation is difficult, but it appears that not more than 15-20% 
of gross monetised capital formation on small farms would be 
financed by formal sector credit. This very rough estimate is 
derived from Table 111-8, which attempts to outline some orders 
of magnitude. The very generous assumptions found in Item 35 of 
the table yield an estimation of a 37% level of financing. 
1 
This 
estimate must be deflated, however, to reflect problems of com- 
paring stocks of credit with flows of capital formation, and also 
to reflect credit rationing criteria which limit the access of 
small farmers to credit relative to the access enjoyed by large 
scale agriculture. 
In any event, the manipulations presented in Table 111-8 
suggest that self-finance rather than credit provides the bulk 
of financial resources for monetised agricultural capital for- 
mation. Credit support for working capital also appears to be 
quite small, especially in the small farm sector, although the 
expansion of the Cooperative Production Credit Scheme since 1971 
would have the effect of increasing small farmer access to credit 
on a significant scale. 
2. Self-finance and the Adoption of Major Innovations 
An alternative approach to assessing the role of self-finance 
lies in enquiring to what extent major innovations in-agriculture 
have been supported by credit. If formal credit has not been 
relied upon by farmers adopting new enterprises, it may be assumed 
that the financial requirements of adoption have been met by self- 
finance, including reinvested earnings, or by informal credit. 
1. Capital: output ratios by enterprise and subsector would permit 
a more sophisticated and less arbitrary set of assumptions to be 
applied. However, definitive data of this sort is not yet available. 
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Table 111-8. Comparisons of Credit Statistics with Selected 
Flows in Kenya's Agricultural Sector, 1971 
It em 
1 
Z 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
1$ 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
Contribution of the agricultural sector 
to GDP (at factor cost) in 1971: 
Outside the monetary economy 
Within the monetary economy 
Enterprises & non-profit institutions 
General government 
Total 
Gross marketed agricultural production in 1971: 
Small farms 
Large farms 
Total 
Gross capital formation by the 
agricultural sector in 1971: 
a/ Outside the monetary economy- 
Within the monetary economy 
Enterprises and non-profit institutions 
General government 
Total 
New (presumably gross) agricultural credit issued 
by parastatal corporations in 1971/72: 
To small scale farmers 
Short term credit 
Medium term credit 
Long term credit 
Total 
Total to all classes of farmers 
Short term credit 
Medium term credit 
Long term credit 
Amount in 
Sh million 
1,908 
1,470 
139 
3,517 
892 
842 
1,734 
n. a. 
247 
34 
281 
3.6 
14.6 
.9 
19.1 
28.6 
15.3 
35.2 
27 
28 
29 
Total 
Commercial bank credit outstanding to the 
private agricultural sector, 31 December 1971 
Cooperative Production Credit Scheme (CPCS) 
balances outstanding, 31 December 1971 
79.1 
251.0 
5.1 
(continued) 
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Table 111-8 (continued) 
Item Percentage 
30 Percentage comparisons of the magnitude 
of farm credit relative to key variables: 
31 Short term credit issued by parastatal corporat ions 
(Item 24) plus commercial bank and CPCS credit 
outstanding to agriculture (Items 28 & 29) as 
a percentage of: 
32 Private sector monetary agricultural 
GDP (Item 4) 19% 
33 Gross marketed agricultural production 
(Item 10) 16% 
34 Short term parastatal credit to small farmers 
(Item 19) plus CPCS credit outstanding (Item 
29) plus 10% of bank credit outstanding to 
agricultureb/ (Item 28) as a percentage of 
small farm gross marketed production (Item 8) 3% 
35 25% of bank credit outstanding to private 
agriculturecJ (Item 28) plus total para- 
statal medium term credit (Item 25) plus 
25% of total parastatal long term agri- 
cultural creditd/ (Item 26) as a percentage 
of gross monetary capital formation by the 
private agricultural sector (Item 14) 37% 
Sources: Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey 1973. Various 
tables. CPCS data (Item 29) provided by the Depart- 
ment of Cooperative Development. 
a/ Non-monetary capital formation (with the exception of 
"construction of traditional dwellings") is not included in 
Government statistics pertaining to non-monetised activity. 
b/ This calculation assumes that 10% of banks' agricultural 
lending is used to finance short term production inputs on 
small farms. 
c/ This calculation assumes that 25% of banks' agricultural 
lending is for medium term (exceeding one year). investment. 
d/ This calculation assumes that 25% of parastatal long term 
agricultural credit is devoted to capital formation. 
Note: The assumptions used, as given in footnotes b/, c/ and 
d/, are very inaccurate guestimates and are made in an attempt 
to avoid overstatement resulting from double counting. Banks 
lend to parastatal corporations in the agricultural sector, 
for example. Also, ambiguities in the classification of bank 
lending result in the inclusion in the credit data of some 
credit which is extended to entities in the production- 
processing-distribution chains beyond the point at which the 
flows in question are valued as agricultural production for 
national income accounting purposes. 
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As noted earlier in this paper, it appears warranted to assume 
that informal credit has in general played a very restricted role 
in small farm capital formation. 
Smallholder agricultural production has altered in volume 
and composition over the last 25 years. Kenya's African popu- 
lation growth rate is estimated at about 3% per annum, 
I 
and 
leaving aside the population drift from rural to urban areas 
(on the grounds that the African urban population approximated 
only 7.5% of the total African population in 1969), 
2 
it would 
appear that as a whole the smallholder sector was able to feed 
itself on at least the same scale between the late 1950's and 
the last 1960's. This conclusion is admittedly based on esti- 
mations of tons of maize and pulses produced for the market, 
which was variable in amount but with a flat trend over the period, 
3 
and on the assumption that home consumption of these crops on 
smallholdings takes absolute priority over sales in the market. 
Against this background, production of several cash crops has 
increased markedly in both physical and current money value terms, 
while no major crop other than sisal registered consistent decline 
in current money output value in the intermediate term in recent 
years. 
4 
The increase in cash crop production has to a large 
extent been based on the adoption of the crops in question, as 
smallholder access to these enterprises was frequently restricted, 
by administrative means or by economic reality or by both, until 
late in the colonial period. Thus, innovation, always carrying 
risks, is at the root of much of the dynamism exhibited in small- 
holder cash cropping in recent years. 
1. Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1973. p. 13.0- 
2. Ibid., pp. 14,15. 
3. The volume series for smallholder production of principal 
crops, found in Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey (annual), 
was unfortunately discontinued after 1967. 
4. See Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey (annual) and 
Statistical Abstract (annual). 
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The major innovations which have swept through smallholder 
agriculture in Kenya during the past 25 years and the probable 
role of formal credit in supporting the adoption of each may be 
summarised as follows: 
I 
Approximate 
Period of 
Enterprise Rapid Adoption 
Coffee Early 1950's to 1964 
Pyrethrum 1955 to 1962, 
1964 to 1968 
Tea 1963 to present 
Dairying 1963 to present 
Hybrid maize and 
fertilisers 1964 to present 
Estimated Level 
of Support by 
Formal Credit 
Low 
Low 
High to 1968, 
nil thereafter 
High for adoption 
involving the pur- 
chase of grade cattle 
Moderate 
Details of smallholder credit schemes not tied to specific 
crops were given in a previous section. At this point it may be 
worthwhile to recall that there was hardly any formal credit for 
African farmers before 1955, that commercial banks did little 
lending to Africans until the late 1950's in view of statutory 
limitations and other factors, that settlement credit began in 
1961 and that significant smallholder credit schemes not tied to 
specific crops got underway in the latter half of the 1960's. 
Thus, access to credit has tended to widen over roughly the same 
period in which cash cropping has spread among smallholders. 
However, this does not imply that credit has been responsible 
for this spread. In fact, credit's role has been varied, as 
examination of the evidence with regard to each of the major 
innovations indicates. 
1. The principal source of data on innovations and adoption is 
Heyer, Judith, "Survey, " with supplemental information pertaining 
to maize from Streeter, Carroll P., "Reaching the Developing 
World's Small Farmers, "pp. 45-49; The Pyrethrum Board of Kenya 
and the Pyrethrum Marketing Board, Annual Report and Accounts for 
the Period Ist October 1972 to 30th September 1973, p. 18; Garst, 
Ronald D., op. cit. , p. 122; and . Acland, 
J. D., op cit. 
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a. Coffee 
Coffee planting on African farms was severely restricted 
until late in the colonial era, whereas since 1966 smallholder 
production has accounted for 
clean coffee tonnage. 
l 
(The 
decade following 1964 reflec 
Kenya's participation in the 
approximately half of Kenya's total 
constancy of this percentage in the 
is limitations on plantings under 
International Coffee Agreement. 
2) 
The adoption of coffee by smallholders appears generally 
not to have been supported by formal credit. By 1964 the Agri- 
cultural Department was able to report the existence of over 
50,000 ha of coffee managed by more than 235,000 growers. 
3 
At 
the same time, the culumlative number of loans issued by the 
principal public sector credit programmes for African farmers 
approximated 8,000.4 If it is assumed that the commercial banks 
and minor Government schemes had provided funds for an additional 
8,000 African farmers by 1964, it would still appear that only a 
small portion of coffee growers were using credit, even if all of 
the beneficiaries of credit used the funds for establishing coffee 
plantations. That such would not have been the case is suggested 
by the fact that coffee requires roughly two to four years after 
planting to come into bearing, and full bearing for multiple- 
stemmed trees does not occur until between the fourth and eighth 
year. 
5 
As the establishment period is too long to be attractive 
to commercial banks, it is unlikely that commercial bank credit 
was available to many farmers for the purpose of establishing the 
crop and carrying the costs of adoption until production was 
1. Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey 1974. p. 64; Economic 
Survey 1966. pp. 30,35. 
2. Beyer, Judith, "Survey, " p. 29. 
3. Ibid., p. 59. 
4. Vasthoff, Josef., op. cit., pp 30-31. 
5. Minimum estimates are from :. Acland, J. D., op. cit., p. 
80, 
and maximum estimates from Government of Kenya, The Economic 
Development of Kenya. p. 84. 
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sufficient to repay the loan. It is possible that some farmers 
borrowed to assist with establishment, and in such instances two 
alternatives are implied. One is that the farmer would have de- 
faulted on his loan, not repaying -- if repaying at all -- until 
the crop was mature. This no doubt happened in a few instances, 
but widespread recurrence is unlikely in view of the banks' modus 
operandi. The second possibility is that borrowings would have 
been repaid from sources other than coffee earnings, implying 
another aspect of the probable role of self-finance. 
It appears that the theoretical maximum number of borrwers, 
16,000 as derived above, would have been expanded, in the case 
of coffee, by credit from the cooperatives which have been intimately 
associated with smallholder coffee production as monopsonistic 
marketing channels and operators of wet processing factories. 
Although' cooperatives provided credit to the point of imperiling 
their own solvency by the mid-1960's, de Wilde reported in the 
early 1960's that societies' advances to their members were 
generally restricted to seasonal loans for input supplies. 
I 
The 
mathematics of the rate of adoption of coffee and the time required 
for the crop'to come into bearing also suggest that few societies 
could have accumulated sufficient resources until quite late in the 
period of most rapid adoption to have been in a position to have 
extended sufficient loans to members to have had a material impact 
on expansion of crop acreage. 
Data from Kisii collected in a field survey employing random 
sampling procedures also indicate a very low correlation between 
reported credit use and adoption of coffee. The survey covered a 
portion of Kisii including an estimated 40,000 homesteads. From 
data gathered in short interviews with 1,935 cases, Garst estimates 
that as of 1950 fewer than 5% of farms in the study area were 
growing coffee. 
2 
By 1971 the proportion had stabilised at around 
1. Qp. cit. Vol. II, The Case Studies. P. 68. 
2. Garst, Ronald D., op. cit., pp. 106-107. 
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44%, the growth curve for the period showing rapid expansion 
between 1950 and 1964.1 Of the 485 farmers interviewed in depth 
by Garst and his colleagues, only 14 reported using formal credit. 
2 
A search of AFC files by the writer yielded an additional seven 
among the 485 who had received AFC loans as of the rime of the 
field interviews conducted by Garst and his colleagues. It is 
probable that the level of misrepresentation in responses by 
sample members with regard to credit is higher than suggested 
by this comparison (which discounts the possibility of enumeration 
errors), as the number and variety of names used by an individual 
pose- a major barrier to achieving accuracy in comparing lists of 
farmers. However, the level of misrepresentation implied is not 
surprising, given the sensitive nature of credit as a subject of 
inquiry and the fact that the interviews designed by Garst and 
his associates were conducted by Government employees. 
3 
Even under generous assumptions, Garst's data suggest a low 
reliance on formal credit for coffee adoption. Such assumptions 
might be formulated as follows. 
1. the 3% of the sample who reported using formal credit 
comprised only a quarter of those who had actually obtained loans. 
2. all sample members using formal credit were coffee 
adopters, and 
3. all sample borrowers used their loans for coffee 
adoption. 
Even under these assumptions no more than one in three coffee 
adopters relied on formal credit -- and these assumptions are 
such that this hypothetical upper limit exceeds greatly the 
actual level of reliance. 
Thus, the evidence suggests that de Wilde's observations 
1. Garst, Ronald D., o2 cit., p. 122. 
2. This count was obtained by the writer from the original field 
questionnaire forms, provided for this purpose by Miss Carolyn 
Barnes, one of Garst's co-researchers, formerly of the Institute 
for Development Studies, University of Nairobi. 
3. Garst's dissertation does not cite the data on credit use 
generated by the field survey. 
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that the spread of coffee in Nyeri District was not financed 
by (formal) creditI would also be applicable to other parts of 
Kenya. The formal credit delivery system was simply too un- 
developed at the time of the coffee planting boom to have con- 
tributed materially to its progress. 
That coffee could have been adopted so rapidly without 
credit is consistent with the scale on which adoption frequently 
occurred. Until 1958 new African growers were limited initially 
to 100 trees, and in that year the limit was raised to 280 for 
new growers on land which had been consolidated under the process 
which eventually culminated in land registration. 
2 
The financial 
requirements of adoption were thus also limited and it would appear 
that the scale involved was within the self-financing capacities 
of a large number of framers. 
Given the standard smallholder planting density of 540 trees 
per acre, these limits were indeed restrictive. Controls certainly 
diminished the planter's exposure to the risk of innovation, and 
such risks were further reduced by supervision of land preparation 
and planting by the extension service. Supervision no doubt con- 
tributed to the very high quality of coffee produced by the early 
adopters, 
3 
and to the establishment of a tradition of higher quality 
production from smallholdings than from estates, 
4 
a tradition no 
doubt preserved by price incentives and cost considerations. 
b. Pyrethrum 
Pyrethrum is another crop which was adopted on a significant 
scale by African growers after 1955. The spread of pyrethrum was 
more localised and had less overall impact than that of coffee, 
reflecting the more severe ecological limitations to which py- 
rethrum is subject. Specifically, pyrethrum requires rainfall 
1. Op. cit. Vol. II. The Case Studies. p. 61. 
2. Heyer, J., "Survey, " p. 23. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey 1974. p. 65, and 
corresponding tables from earlier editions. 
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quantities and patterns and also temperature levels which are 
found within a contour band of approximately ±1,500 feet from 
the optimum altitude of about 8,000 - 8,300 feet. 
1 
Field data gathered by Garst and others in Kisii, where 
nearly half of Kenya's pyrethrum is produced, 
2 
yields an estimate 
that while only about 1% of Kisii farmers had adopted pyrethrum 
in 1950, the level stood at more than 75% by 1970.3 The adoption 
curve plotted by Garst is quite steep between 1955 and 1970, 
indicating a very rapid spread of pyrethrum. The curve broke 
in 1960, and the slightly less rapid rate of adoption following 
that year is attributed by Garst to a decline in the price paid 
to growers. 
4 
Acland notes that seed propagation gave way to 
vegetative propagation in the 1960's, 
5 
but this change would not 
appear to be relevant to the behaviour of the adoption curve 
reported by Garst for Kisii. 
As for coffee, the Kisii data suggests that use of formal 
credit was not widespread enough to have contributed greatly to 
pyrethrum adoption. The assumptions listed for coffee, 
6 
applied 
to pyrethrum, suggest that no more than one in six adopters could 
have relied on formal credit,, and again this theoretical maximum 
no doubt greatly exceeds the actual level, as discussed below. 
Data from the Pyrethrum Board provides further evidence that 
growers tend not to rely on credit from the Board for replanting, 
as noted in an earlier section. 
7 
The lack of credit use may be 
related to the nature of the crop, which may be regenerated by 
"splitting" plant clusters at the conclusion of each three year 
1. A tänd,. J. D., op. cit., pp. 153-154. 
2. The Pyrethrum Board of Kenya and the Pyrethrum Marketing 
Board, Annual Report and Accounts for the Period 1st October 
1972 to 30th September 1973. p. 4. 
3. Garst, Ronald D., op. cit., pp. 122,149. 
4. Ibid., pp. 122,231. 
5. Op. cit., p. 154. 
6. See p. 238. 
7. See p. 214. 
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optimum biological yield cycle. Growers have been encouraged 
by the Board to do their own splitting. Thus, it is conceivable 
that the adoption of pyrethrum could have spread by transfers 
of splittings among friends and extended family members with only 
minimal demands on self-financing. The availability of surplus 
splittings is ensured by the nature of the crop. On the one hand, 
each cluster of mature plants can usually provide at least ten 
splits, each the nucleus for a further cluster during the follow- 
ing production cycle. 
' 
On the other hand, the labour requirements 
of the crop limit the amount the average smallholder grower plants 
to less than one acre. 
2 
The price for plants furnished by the Board was Sh 20 per 
100 plant lot collected at the nursery in 1972.1 It is probable 
that private nurseries supplied plants at lower prices. Fertil- 
iser appears to be rarely used by growers, even though it is 
available from the Pyrethrum Board on credit terms. 
4 
The costs 
of entry into pyrethrum production are relatively low, which no 
doubt also contributed to the rapid spread of this innovation 
and the low level of recourse to formal credit by adopters in 
the small farm sector. 
Pyrethrum is also a major crop on certain settlement schemes, 
which contributed between one-quarter and one-third of Kenya's 
production in the early 197O's. 
5 
Settlement producers became 
increasingly important during the second spurt in production 
which occurred between 1964 and 1968.6 This expansion reflected 
the transfer of large scale production units to settlers, as well 
as the suitability of the crop to exploitation by settlers. Von 
1. Acland, J. D., op. cit., pp. 154-155. 
2. Donaldson, G. F., and J. D. Von Pischke, op. cit., p. 132, 
Von Pischke, J. D., A Review. p. 116. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid., pp. 129,116, respectively. 
6. Department of Settlement Annual Reports for the period show 
an increase in settlement cooperative marketing societies' py- 
rethrum turnover from Sh 2.2 million in 1964/65 to Sh 22.1 million 
in 1967/68. 
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Haugwitz indicates that even in the case of credit-supported 
settlement farms, outlays on pyrethrum were small: 
' 
In the past few years next to no money has been spent on 
the establishment of pyrethrum on settlement farms. The 
farmers fetched splits from neighbours and then, by divid- 
ing their own plants, increased pyrethrum acreage. Fer- 
tilizers, almost without exception, were not used.... 
The control of pests and diseases is expensive, but 
until now it has hardly been necessary. 
In the cases in which pyrethrum adoption involved no cash 
outlay, there was obviously no role for credit. Farmers' labour 
would appear to constitute the primary path to adoption. 
c. Tea 
Tea adoption was fully integrated with credit for about ten 
years following 1959.2 The Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA) 
provided stumps to applicants within specified tea areas who met 
certain minimal requirements. Growers were charged 30 cents per 
stump and the first 3,000 stumps were issued to newly-licensed 
growers against a down payment of 12 cents per stump. Few allot- 
ments of fewer than 1,000 stumps were made, and all stumps in 
excess of the original 3,000 per grower had to be purchased for 
cash. The credit extended under the Stump. Purchase Programme, 
i. e., 18 cents per stump on the first 3,000 stumps per grower, 
was scheduled for recovery over approximately 15 years out of 
the proceeds of green leaf deliveries. 
The Stump Purchase Programme was discontinued with the change 
to vegetative propagation (VP) between 1967 and 1970.3 VP plants 
have been sold to growers for cash. It is interesting to note 
1. Haugwitz, Hans-Wilhelm von, Some Experiences with Smallholder 
Settlement in Kenya: 1963/64 to 1966/67. IFO-Institut für Wirt- 
schaftsforschung, Afrika-Studien 72. Munich, Weltforum Verlag, 
1972. p. 51. 
2. Data on the Stump Purchase Programme is found in the annual 
reports and other publications of the Kenya Tea Development 
Authority; in Vasthoff, Josef, op. cit., pp. 27-28; and in 
Donaldson, G. F., and J. D. Von Pischke, op. cit., pp. 127-128. 
3. The Kenya Tea Development Authority, Annual Report and Accounts 
for the Period Ist July 1968 to 30th June 1969. p. 14.; Annual 
Report and Accounts for the Period 1st July 1969 to 30th June 1970. 
p. 13. 
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that the annual increase in land area under tea and in the number 
of growers was not adversely affected by the discontinuation of 
the credit scheme, as shown in Table 111-9. 
Of greatest interest from the point of view of self-financing 
capacity is the increase in the number of new growers following 
the discontinuation of the credit programme. Established growers 
would have had tea delivery proceeds as a source of income from 
which to finance expansion of their acreage. New growers would 
not have had that source of income, of course, therefore opening 
to question their capacity to finance their entry into tea pro- 
duction. Between 1970 and 1973, following the introduction of 
VP, the average number of new growers each year was twice the 
1965-1967 average, suggesting considerable self-financing 
capacity. 
This conclusion need be modified only very slightly to 
accommodate the impact of other credit sources in facilitating 
the entry of new growers. AFC has given only a handful of 
smallholder loans containing a tea development element; the 
three year waiting period before new plants produce their first 
harvest makes the enterprise unattractive to commercial banks; 
and the maximum term of credit extended under the Cooperative 
Production Credit Scheme until 1974 was 18 months, also too 
short to finance tea adoption. Tea growers' access to cooperative 
credit would in any event be limited by institutional factors: 
excluding areas such as Kisii where coffee and pyrethrum occur 
within a common altitude zone, only those growers at the lower 
margin and in the upper altitude band of tea areas would be 
likely to have access to cooperative credit. Those at the 
lower margin may also be coffee farmers, and those in the upper 
band may also be pyrethrum growers. Both coffee and pyrethrum 
marketing societies provide credit to their members. (Dairy 
societies are generally not involved in the issue of credit to 
members. ) Given the three year waiting period it appears that 
in any event the financing of tea with cooperative credit alone 
would involve serious default. To the extent any cooperative 
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loans used for tea are repaid prior to or in advance of the 
cash flow from tea deliveries, self-finance is involved. It 
is unlikely that cooperative loans are repaid from other bor- 
rowings, given restricted small farmer access to alternative 
sources of formal credit and the unliklihood of using informal 
credit for such a low priority purpose. 
d. Dairying 
Dairying has spread outside the large farm sector with a 
degree of credit support which has varied greatly according to 
the context in which adoption has taken place. The absence of 
reliable data on cattle populations makes it difficult to assess 
credit's overall contribution very precisely, and the analysis 
must rest primarily on the extent to which credit for the 
establishment and expansion of dairy enterprises has been provided 
by public sector credit schemes. 
The spread of dairying is indicated by the remarkable increase 
in several data series. One consists of estimates of the small 
farm and settlement dairy herds. Peberdy, sometime head of the 
Animal Production-Division in the Ministry of Agriculture, is 
quoted as estimating a doubling of the small farm dairy herd 
from 49,400 to 100,000 between 1963 and 1967,1 and it appears 
that there are grounds for suspicition that these estimates were 
conservative. 
2 Settlement dairy cows and heifers numbered 9,000 
in 1963 and almost 100,000 by 1968.3 
The volume of milk sales to Kenya Cooperative Creameries (KCC), 
the apex dairy monopoly, by subsector between 1967 and 1969 
1. Smith, L. D., and R. von Kaufmann, "An Evaluation of the Kenya 
Artificial Insemination Service. " Draft report, Institute for 
Development Studies, University of Nairobi, March 1971. p. 13. 
2. Peberdy, J. R., "Animal Production: 1970-1980 and Beyond. " 
November 1970. (No publication data given). pp. 11 ff; Heyer, 
J., "Survey, " p. 36. 
3. Smith, L. D., and R. von Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 13. A some- 
what larger settlement herd estimate is attributed to Peberdy 
by Heyer, J., "Survey, " p. 36. 
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is given by Peberdy as: 
1 
Millions of Gallons 
Subsector 1967 1968 1969 
Large scale 31.0 32.0 31.4 
Settlement 6.7 6.8 7.0 
Small scale 6.8 8.4 8.2 
Total 44.5 47.2 46.7 
While the increase in settlement and smallholder deliveries are 
not so dramatic as the estimated expansion of the repsective 
herds, Peberdy notes and the writer's fieldwork confirms that 
expansion in output reaches KCC only after local milk demand is 
saturated. 
A longer time series is readily available for the value of 
dairy products marketed by small farmers. In the late 1950's the 
small farm sector's marketed output of dairy products was some- 
what below Sh 4.0 million according to the statistical series then 
in use, while by 1965 the same series recorded a volume in excess 
of Sh 16.0 million. 
2 
By 1969/70 the value of milk delivered to 
KCC by primary marketing societies was Sh 23.0 million. 
3 
The 
existence of a quota system with differential prices makes it 
futile to attempt to derive delivery volumes from payout and 
average price data alone. 
The expansion of smallholder dairying is based on the in- 
creasing popularity and more widely spread ownership of "grade" 
cattle. Grade cattle are defined by The Concise Oxford Dictionary 
as a "variety produced by crossing native stock with superior 
breed, " and the derivation of the term is suggested by Musangi's 
observation that "mating purebred sires with grade stock for 
several generations is termed 'grading up'. "4 A description of 
1. Op. cit., p. 70. Data on p. 69 suggests these figures may 
apply not to calendar years but to KCC accounting periods 
beginning in these years. 
2. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Economic Survey 1961. p. 22; 
Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey 1967. p. 47. 
3. Republic of Kenya, Department of Cooperative Development, 
Ministry of Cooperatives and Social Services, Report for the Year 
1968-1970. p. 49. 
4. Musangi, R. S., Dairy Husbandry in Eastern Africa. New ed. 
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the strategy of grading up is given by Williamson and Payne: 
1 
(Grading) is a method of crossbreeding which is particu- 
larly suitable when it is desired radically to change the 
character of a considerable number of animals rather than 
of individuals or small groups where, for economic or other 
reasons, it is not practicable to change one breed for 
another merely by supplanting individuals of the old breed 
for those of the new. 
Although not so resistant to disease and tolerant of heat 
as local varieties, grade cattle inherit a higher degree of-such 
resistance and tolerance than is found in pure European stock 
imported into Kenya. At the same time, crosses produced through 
grading up achieve a milk yield several times as high as that of 
their local ancestors. Peberdy estimated in 1970 that the average 
zebu (local variety) milk yield was 120 gallons per calving, while 
grade animals in smallholder areas averaged 300 gallons Per year. 
2 
While others close to smallholder dairying have given less op- 
timistic yields for grade dairy cattle, 
3 it would appear that 
grading up with proven bulls' semen frequently permits at least a 
doubling of yields compared to the average achieved by local 
varieties. 
Thus, for genetic and economic reasons grading up constitutes 
a suitable method of improving the productivity of Kenya's small- 
holder dairy herd, and even of starting a commercial smallholder 
dairy herd from a subsistence herd. Their characteristics made 
grade cattle attractive to many European farmers in Kenya when the 
Scheduled Areas provided the bulk of the Colony's dairy produce. 
The term "grade" appears to be applied rather loosely in 
Kenya, frequently to animals of mixed breed having visible traits 
(continued) Nairobi, Longman Kenya, Ltd., 1971. p. 97. 
1. Williamson, G., and W. J. A. Payne, An Introduction to Animal 
Husbandry in the Tropics. 2nd ed. London, English Language 
Book Society and Longman Group Ltd., 1968. p. 116. 
2. Op. cit., p. 16, app. 17. 
3. German Agricultural Team technicians estimated average yields 
of 250 gallons per cow per year in well developed dairy Districts 
in 1973. Meyn, Klaus, private communication, June 1975. 
248 
of European breeds but not sired by purebred bulls. Purists 
would distinguish between grade cattle and inferior crosses, 
but this distinction is seldom observed in rural parlance. The 
generally accepted technical application of the term is reserved 
for animals having more than 50% European ancestry and sired by 
proven bulls. 
1 
Smallholders have obtained grade cows primarily in two ways. 
The first is through purchase, and the second is through arti- 
ficial insemination (AI) services provided by the Kenya National 
Insemination Service (KNIS) of the Ministry of Agriculture. Through 
AI a farmer can grade up his herd with little or no cash investment 
in stock, although good husbandry and the reduced resistence to 
disease in grade as opposed to native varieties frequently re- 
quires investment in support facilities, such as water supplies, 
and in animal health and disease prevention. Writing in 1974, the 
Director of KNIS estimated that 9,000 AI dairy heifer calves were 
produced monthly, 
2 
and the great majority of these would be pro- 
duced in small farm and settlement areas, which are served by 
motorised insemination officers. An average of 91 routes were 
covered daily in 1973, and an average of 11.6 inseminations was 
performed per run per day. 
3 
. 
Building a grade herd through AI on a small farm requires 
considerable time. The time consuming aspects include the 
calving interval; the culling of male AI progeny in the interests 
of economy; and the increased probability of mortality among AI 
stock as opposed to native stock, especially when managerial 
capacity is not fully tuned to the requirements of adoption of 
this enterprise. Rather than depending upon natural reproduction 
cycles and their actuarial characteristics, many farmers prefer to 
purchase grade cows to begin or expand dairy enterprises. 
1. See, for example, Meyn, K., and J. V. Wilkins, "Breeding for 
Milk in Kenya, with particular reference to the Sahiwal Stud, " 
World Animal Review. 11,1974. pp. 24-30. 
2. Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Agriculture, Veterinary 
Services Division, National AI Service Annual Report 1973. 
Kebete, KNIS, 1974. (mimeo). p. 4. 
3. Ibid., p. 5. 
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General purpose public sector farm credit programmes have 
been characterised by a high degree of concentration in dairying, 
and it is probable that commercial bank lending to smallholders has 
also been devoted substantially to dairying. Data presented by 
Vasthoff suggests that this pattern was well established by the 
early 1960's. Under the German Loan Fund disbursed in 1963 and 1964, 
2,103 loans were made to smallholders, and approximately 1,450 or 
69% were for the purchase of cattle and equipment related to dairy- 
ing. Likewise, of Sh 3.2 million in loans to smallholders issued 
by AFC between July 1965 and June 1966, Sh 1.1 million (35%) was 
disbursed for the purchase of cattle and an additional Sh 0.8 million 
(25%) for the purchase of fencing and the installation of water 
supplies, and for dipping and spraying equipment. 
2 
Since 1967 the principal medium term smallholder credit scheme 
operated by AFC, funded largely by the World Bank Group, has also 
turned out to be mainly a dairy project. Between June 1967 and 
March 1973 an estimated 15,000 in-calf grade heifers were pur- 
chased by recipients of these loans. 
3 
In terms of amounts dis- 
bursed, Sh 14.9 million (44%) of the Sh 34.3 million loaned under 
the project was for the purchase of grade cattle, and Sh 10.4 million 
(30%) was provided for related investments. 
4 Smallholder enthusiasm 
for grade cattle loans has shown little sign of abatement under the 
second phase of this project which began in 1973. A parallel loan 
scheme funded by West German sources and operated by AFC in Kisii 
and Kericho Districts has also exhibited similar preoccupations 
with smallholder dairy development. 
5 
1. Op. cit., pp. 32-33. 
2. Ibid., pp. 34-35. Although not specified by Vasthoff, these 
cattle were primarily dairy animals. 
3. Agricultural Finance Corporation, "The IDA 105-KE Smallholder 
Agricultural Credit Project. " p. 3. This project is described on 
pp. 207 ff above. 
4. Ibid. These figures are estimates and the dairying component 
has also been reported to have included 19,000 head and to have 
accounted for 852 of AFC's disbursements under the project. 
S. Agricultural Finance Corporation, "KFW Smallholder Credit 
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Settlement credit has also included a substantial grade 
cattle element. As noted above, the transfer of European holdings 
to settlers was especially notable in the mixed farming areas, and 
dairying was an important enterprise on European mixed farms. In 
the Scheduled Areas and Coastal Strip from 1958 to 1960, for ex- 
ample, dairy products provided about 13% of gross farm revenue, 
in these terms the largest single enterprise after coffee. 
1 
Accordingly, dairying was incorporated into model settlement 
budgets and cooperatives were formed on the schemes to provide 
a channel for settlers' production. The importance of dairy 
products as a cash crop is suggested by a comparison of these 
societies' milk and butterfat turnover with the total turnover 
of settlement cooperatives, as shown in Table III-10. During 
the period between 1963 and 1971 dairy products accounted for 
between one-third and one-half of these societies' total turnover. 
The extent of purchases of dairy cattle from large farms 
by settlement farmers between mid-1964 and mid-1967 is shown in 
Table III-11. The data suggest that, in relation to the size of 
the settlement herd and its rate of growth, the volume of the 
acquisition of dairy cattle from large farms was significant. 
Unfortunately, the published series on the sale of cattle from 
large farms has been discontinued and it is not possible to 
indicate the extent to which large farms performed the role of 
supplying cattle to other farms since 1967. Such data would be 
especially interesting because the size of the settlement herd 
has grown greatly since 1967, having a net increase of 20,000 
in 1967/68 alone. 
2 
The initial build up in the settlement herd, during the period 
in which settlers were drawing their development loans, would have 
(continued) Project Loan No. AL 430 Half Yearly Reports. " 
Nairobi. (mimeo). This project is described on pp. 207 ff above, 
and in Donaldson, G. F., and J. D. Von Pischke, op cit., pp. 53-59. 
1. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Economic Survey 1961. p. 18. 
2. Republic of Kenya, Department of Settlement, Five Year Review. 
p. 60. 
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Table III-10. Dairy Products as a Proportion of Settlement 
Cooperative Marketing Societies' Turnover, 1963-1971 
Total Turnover Of which Milk, 
Year in Sh million Cream & Butterfat 
to May 1963 0.8 76% 
1963/64 4.3 81% 
1964/65 12.3 57% 
1965/66 23.6 45% 
1966/67 35.6 35% 
1967/68 48.5 31% 
1968/69 38.5 42% 
July-December 1969 16.7 52% 
1970 49.4 43% 
1971 60.9 54% 
Sources: Republic of Kenya, Department of Settlement, Five Year 
Review and Annual Report 1967/68. p. 37; and Annual 
Reports for later periods listed. 
Table III-11. Sales of Dairy Cattle from Large Farm Areas to 
Settlement Schemes, and Other Sources of Increase 
in the Settlement Dairy Herd, 1964/65 to 1966/67 
Mature Net Mature 
Settlement Purchases Increase (or Settlement 
Dairy Herd at from Large Disposal) from Dairy Herd at 
Year Start of Year Farm Areas Other Sources Close of Year 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
1964/65 25,896 6,342 7,186 39,424 
1965/66 39,424 10,415 (346) 49,493 
1966/67 49,493 5,228 9,371 64,092 
Sources: Columns (a) and (d) are taken from Republic of Kenya, 
Department of Settlement, Annual Reports and refer to 
cows having calved. Column (b) is from Republic of 
Kenya, Economic Survey 1968, p. 57, and probably in- 
cludes a small portion of bulls. However, this dis- 
tortion is probably not greater than 5% of the total. 
Column (c) is a residual. 
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been financed largely by credit, although some settlers brought 
animals to their plots from Trust Areas. Virtually all settle- 
ment dairy stock obtained from large farms would have been pur- 
chased with loan proceeds. (Indeed, the "shortage" of grade cows 
available to small farmers was probably to a large degree a 
function of settlers' credit-based demand for these animals. ) 
The role of commercial bank credit in the expansion of small- 
holder dairying is difficult to quantify because banks have little 
control over the use of their funds and do not keep records showing 
farm credit usage. Bankers indicate that many of their small loans 
to full time and part time farmers were requested for the purchase 
of grade cattle, which is consistent with the expression of small- 
holder interest seen in the high degree of concentration in dairy- 
ing found in the general purpose smallholder loan schemes rund by 
AFC. 
To summarise this discussion of the role of credit in small- 
holder dairy development, the impact of credit appears to have 
been highly concentrated in settlement agriculture and in that 
stratum of small farm operators having access to AFC and commer- 
cial bank funds. In contrast, self-finance and natural increase 
assisted by artificial insemination appears to have been a much 
more potent and generalised contributor to the adoption and ex- 
pansion of dairying based on grade cattle on small farms. This 
conclusion is drawn from a simple comparison of the number of 
female head financed by the settlement authorities through about 
1967 (estimated at not more than 30,000 head), when most settlers' 
development loans were drawn down, plus the number of dairy cattle 
financed by AFC between 1963 and 1974 in small farm areas (also 
estimated at not more than 30,000), with the estimated rate of AI 
calf production. Given the 9,000 AI dairy heifer calf production 
level estimated in 1974, AFC's efforts over the decade in terms of 
head transferred, plus the bulk of settlement credit-financed dairy 
animals together amounted to about seven months' AI activity at the 
estimated 1974 level. This simple statistic is probably the most 
powerful fact related to the role of credit in rural development to 
have been generated by Kenyan experience through the mid-1970's. 
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e. Hybrid maize and fertiliser 
Hybrid maize and fertiliser constitute the two purchased 
inputs which are most important from the point of view of rural 
development in Kenya. The importance of maize rests upon its 
place as a staple food and its consequent importance as a sub- 
sistence and as a commercial crop. The importance of fertiliser 
is, of course, based on its yield-increasing capability, rendering 
labour and land more productive. 
The adoption of hybrid maize by large farmers engaged in 
commercial production was virtually complete by 1967. Evidence 
for this assertion includes observations by those concerned with 
hybrid maize seed production1 and from the complete phasing out 
of ordinary maize from the Guaranteed Minimum Return seasonal 
credit scheme by the close of 1968.2 
Smallholders and settlement plotholders have not been far 
behind in adoption of improved varieties, although for a number 
of reasons, including consumer preference and risk aversion, 
3 it 
is not expected that the new varieties will assume the same 
importance in production for own use by smallholders as in 
commercial production by large scale operators. Nevertheless, 
small farm and settlement hectarage devoted to hybrid maize 
increased from nil in the early 1960's to over a third of small- 
holders' estimated one million hectares of maize by 1971.4 The 
growth of smallholder high yielding variety maize planting is 
shown in Table 111-12. 
The general shape and timing of the national trend outlined 
by data for selected years in Table 111-12 is confirmed by field- 
1. Wakhungu, J., and C. Nyambare, "Hybrid Maize Seed Production 
and Certification, " Annual Report for 1967. Kitale, National 
Agricultural Research Station, 1968. P. 22. 
2. See Table 111-2 on p. 195. 
3. Heyer, Judith, "Some Problems in the Valuation of Subsistence 
Output. " Discussion Paper 14, Centre for Economic Research, Uni- 
versity College, Nairobi, August 1965, discusses key variables in 
the farmer's decision making calculus. 
4. Allan estimated that more than 2.5 million acres (1.0 million 
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Table 111-12. The Expansion of Smallholder HYV Maize, 
a/ 
Selected Years, 1964-1971 
Hectares of Hybrid Maize 
Year Planted by Smallholders 
1964 700 
1966 37,000 
1967 134,000 
1970 250,000 
1971 344 , 300 
Sources: 1964 and 1971 - Streeter, Carroll P., Reaching the 
Developing World's Small Farmers. New York, The 
Rockefeller Foundation, 1973? p. 48. 
1966 and 1967 - Wakhungu, J., and C. Nyambare, 
"Hybrid 
Maize Seed Production and Certification, 
" Annual Report 
for 1967. Kitale, National Agricultural Research 
Station, 1968. p. 22. 
1970 - Allan, A. Y., "Fertiliser Use on maize in Kenya. " 
Kitale? National Agricultural Research Station? 1970? 
p. 16. 
a/ HYV = High Yielding Varieties 
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work conducted by Moock in Vihiga Division and by Garst in Kisii 
District. In addition, these field studies suggest that the rate 
of adoption in terms of the proportion of smallholders and settlers 
growing improved varieties exceeds the rate of adoption measured in 
terms of the proportion of total land under maize which is devoted 
to hybrids. Moock found in his random sample survey in an area 
containing very small smallholdings that whereas only 2% of Vihiga 
farmers reported growing hybrid maize in 1962,59% in fact did so 
in 1970.1 Likewise, Garst's random sample survey indicated that 
while in the area studied in Kisii District less than 15% of the 
farmers grew hybrid maize in 1960, more than 98% did so in 1970.2 
The high level of adoption reached by the early 1970's is also 
reflected in the estimation that approximately 85% of all farmers 
in Kericho District were growing hybrid varieties by 1972.3 
The spread of hybrid maize to settlement areas seems to 
have been particularly rapid. By 1968, "all maize planted on 
some 40,000 acres in the Western Province schemes was of the 
improved Hybrid varieties, "4 as opposed to only 13,500 acres the 
previous year in this major settlement maize area. 
5 
(continued) ha) of maize were planted in 1970,95% of which was 
on smallholdings. Allan, A. Y., "Fertiliser Use on Maize in Kenya. " 
Kitale? National Agricultural Research Station? 1970? p. 1. 
1. Moock, Peter Russell, op. cit., pp. 110-111. 
2. Garst, Ronald D., op. cit., p. 190. The levels of adoption re- 
ported by Garst for the early 1960's suggest that his respondents 
may not have been referring to the Green Revolution varieties pro- 
duced by contract growers for the Kenya Seed Company (the sole pro- 
ducer) but perhaps to earlier improved varieties which farmers could 
distinguish from local varieties. The first Green Revolution variety, 
Gil, was developed in 1963 and achieved a 30% higher yield than im- 
proved Kenyan maize. As account of this aspect of Kenya's agronomic 
history is found in Streeter, Carroll P., op.. cit., pp. 46-48. 
3. Ströbel, Herbert, et al., An Economic Analysis of Smallholder 
Agriculture in the Kericho District (Kenya). Berlin, Technical 
University of Berlin, 1973. p. 59. 
4. Republic of Kenya, Department of Settlement, Five Year Review. 
p. 7. 
S. Republic of Kenya, Department of Settlement, Annual Report 
1966-1967. p. 3. In 1968/69,72% of all settlement maize was 
planted in Western Province. See Annual Report 1968/69. p. 3. 
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The adoption of fertiliser in the small farm and settlement 
sectors has been less well documented than the spread of improved 
varieties of maize. However, it appears that fertiliser for 
maize production is adopted following the adoption of improved 
seed, 
1 
and that for many crops fertiliser is used not at all or 
only sporadically or in small quantities. 
2 
Allan noted around 
1970 that most small farm maize was not fertilised. 
3 
A lag in 
maize fertiliser adoption is consistent with the research finding 
that yields are responsive to fertiliser only when its application 
is accompanied by changes in traditional cultural practices, and 
that with unchanged cultural practices the impact of fertiliser 
alone is small. 
4 
Thus, farmers may choose to improve their 
husbandry practices by small increments which may not necessarily 
involve a cash outlay for purchased inputs such as fertiliser, 
but which nonetheless may increase their risks of production. 
In other cases farmers may not adopt fertilisers in spite of 
exhortations from extension agents and various officials because 
they have found out that fertiliser recommendations are often not 
appropriate, or if agronomically appropriate not finely enough 
tuned to their particular locality and circumstance to warrant 
serious consideration. 
5 
Nevertheless, use of fertiliser by smallholders and settlers 
1. Allan, A. Y., "Fertiliser Use on Maize. " 2 July 1970 circular 
of the National Agricultural Research Station, Kitale. Ref: MRS/ 
AGRON/118. p. 1; see also the Annual Reports of the Department 
of Settlement for 1966/67 through 1968/69. 
2. Fertiliser use on tea and pyrethrum is discussed in Donaldson, 
G. F., and J. D. Von Pischke, op. cit., pp. 121-126,129-139. 
3. Allan, A. Y., "Fertiliser Use on Maize in Kenya, " op. cit., p. 1. 
4. Ibid., p. 2; Allan, A. Y., "Maize Diamonds, " op. cit., pp. 18- 
19. Allan's findings are also given in Streeter, Carroll P., op.. 
cit., pp. 46 ff. 
5. The problem of the absence of appropriate recommendations is 
discussed on pp. 27-28 above. Details are found in Republic of 
Kenya, Report of the Working Party on Agricultural Inputs, pp. 3- 
7,11; and Report of the Select Committee on the Maize Industry, 
p. 3. The situation has no doubt improved to some extent since 
the appearance of these reports in 1971 and 1973, especially with 
the results from widely scattered field trials and demonstrations 
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has grown considerably. The exact extent of the adoption of 
fertiliser cannot readily be ascertained, as field surveys on 
the scale required are not available and because point-of-sale 
recording has not been undertaken. The basis for the contention 
that smallholder usage has expanded rapidly is the observation 
that fertiliser use on large farms had reached a plateau by 
the late 1960'x, 
1 
while the volume of imports has grown markedly. 
(Kenya has no domestic manufacture of inorganic fertilisers. ) 
However, the same rationality which led smallholders and settlers 
to adopt fertilisers may lead them to abandon them in the face of 
fertiliser price rises not offset by rises in the farmgate prices 
of produce, and this effect no doubt contributed to the flatten- 
ing of the fertiliser import trend by 1972. The trend is shown 
by data for selected years between 1962 and 1972 in Table 111-13. 
The contention that fertiliser use on small farms increased 
rapidly following the spread of hybrid maize is also supported by 
turnover data for the five largest Kenya Farmers' Association 
branches situated in smallholder areas. The number of 50 kg bags 
of fertiliser sold by these branches during a period of considerable 
expansion was as follows: 
2 
Year Bags 
1968/69 24,190 
1969/70 46,917 
1970/71 57,271 
1971/72 141,304 
The commercial response to the small scale market potential is 
seen in the introduction of smaller packages of fertiliser and 
hybrid maize seed, including a 10 kg seed packet, enough for about 
one acre, and fertiliser in sacks of 33.3 kg, also adequate for 
3 
one acre. 
(continued) mounted under FAO assistance. Details of this pro- 
gramme are summarised in Von Pischke, J. D., A Review, pp. 129 ff. 
1. Allan, A. Y., "Fertiliser Use on Maize. " p. 2; Republic of 
Kenya, Report of the Working Party on Agricultural Inputs. p. 11. 
2. Donaldson, G. F., and J. D. Von Pischke, op. cit., p. 151. 
3. The Kenya Farmers' Association (Cooperative) Ltd., Directors' 
Report and Statement of Accounts 1970-1971. P. 5. 
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Has the spread of improved maize varieties and fertilisers 
among Kenyan smallholders and settlers been supported by expanded 
access to credit? The evidence suggests that, at most, credit 
has played only a moderate role in adoption of these innovations. 
The most fundamental piece of evidence is the widespread nature 
of adoption -- Moock's 59% in Vihiga, Garst's 98% in Kisii, 
Western Province settlers' 100% and the tendency for the rate 
of adoption in terms of the proportion of farmers to exceed the 
rate of adoption in terms of land area under maize. No credit 
programme in Kenya, and no combination of credit schemes, has 
the coverage achieved by improved varieties. Also, there is no 
major credit programme to which smallholders and settlers have 
access which is oriented primarily towards hybrid seeds and 
fertilisers for use on improved varieties, and as noted previously 
there is no general seasonal or short term credit source for 
smallholders. 
The most widespread source of seasonal credit for small- 
holders is the Cooperative Production Credit Scheme, but even 
this innovative programme recorded only 26,100 loans outstanding 
at the end of 1973, up from 16,677 at the end of 1972, the. first 
year that CPCS was extended beyond the union in which it was 
initiated and operated on a pilot basis. Although CPCS credit 
is in theory provided in kind for specific uses according to 
priorities established on a District level, in fact it has often 
been disbursed in cash and used by farmers according to their own 
individual priorities, which have surely included the purchase of 
improved seeds and fertiliser. However, CPCS did not really get 
underway until 1972, several years after the level of adoption 
was such that hybrid maize occupied about one-third of small- " 
holder maize land. The role of CPCS credit in fertiliser adoption 
is probably greater, given the lagged adoption of fertiliser, but 
even in this case the growth of smallholder fertiliser usage 
appears to have been substantial prior to 1972. While CPCS funds 
may be used for purposes of convenience by smallholders to finance 
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purchases of seasonal inputs, it was not in existence at the 
time when substantial numbers of smallholders were purchasing 
their first sacks of hybrid planting materials. 
Two other sources of formal credit could have contributed 
to smallholder adoption of hybrids and fertilisers, but in each 
case the evidence suggests the contribution could have been no 
more than marginal. The first source is commercial bank credit, 
but access to this source is beyond the capacity of all but a 
small minority of smallholders, even in 1976, long after the 
initial wave of adoption had penetrated smallholder ranks 
rather deeply. The other source' consists of pre-CPCS cooperative 
credit, the extent and nature of which is not well documented 
in any aggregate sense. It is possible that many coffee and 
pyrethrum farmers had access to such credit, but this does not 
mean that such credit would necessarily have been used for 
purposes of adoption of improved varieties and it does not 
explain adoption by farmers outside the coffee and pyrethrum 
zones where cooperatives have tended to be weak or non-existent. 
The expansion of hybrid maize acreage on settlement schemes 
from 13,500 acres in 1967 to 40,000 acres in 1968 coincided with 
the experimental provision of Guaranteed Minimum Return scheme 
loans to many settlement farmers in Western Province, but 
obviously not all of the increase is attributable to access 
to a new source of credit, as adoption was already well underway. 
This experiment was discontinued after 1969 because of massive 
defaults, which no doubt helped many farmers to finance their 
crops themselves in following years. Of the 1969 settlement 
maize planting, only 1.5% was supported by GMR credit, while 
acreage continued to expand. 
1 
It should also be noted that a 
few settlement farmers, who took up their plots after the 
availability of hybrid maize in Kenya, may have used settlement 
credit for improved maize, but that the great majority of 
1. Republic of Kenya, Department of Settlement, Annual Report 
1968/69. p. 3. 
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settlers were already established by that time and would no 
longer have had access to settlement credit, having spent 
their allotments. 
1 
In summary, access to credit appears to have played 
a moderate facilitating role in hybrid maize and fertiliser 
adoption on settlement schemes as a result of an experiment 
which was financially unsuccessful and discountinued after 
only one year of operation. On smallholdings, self-finance 
appears to have been the dominant enabling force in the adoption 
of hybrid maize and fertilisers. 
f. Summary 
To summarise this series of observations, the general 
situation sketched by de Wilde, that of smallholder self- 
finance of the adoption of new enterprises, appears to have 
been the general case through at least the first half of the 
1970's with respect to coffee and pyrethrum. Per shilling of 
adoption costs, self-finance appears to have been slightly less 
important in the spread of hybrid maize and fertilisers and in 
the adoption of dairying based on grade cattle. Tea adoption 
prior to 1968 was accompanied by the use of credit in virtually 
all cases. Certain doubts remain about the importance of informal 
credit and pre-CPCS cooperative credit, but it appears improbable 
that these sources could have contributed more than a limited 
exception to the general rule of self-finance of major inno- 
vations by smallholders. 
The importance of self-finance does not constitute a con- 
demnation of credit authorities, lenders or planners, as resources 
(land, labour and cash) are manifestly available on a broad and 
general scale to those who want to try something new. Self-finance 
is simpler for the farmer and involves him in less financial risk 
than participation in a credit scheme. It also leaves the farmer 
in greater control over his activities, subject to the performance 
1. Republic of Kenya, Department of Settlement, Annual Report 
1966/67. P. 3. 
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of markets in supplying the things he is willing to pay for and 
in purchasing from him the things he is willing to produce. Self- 
finance is also compatible with gradual, risk-averting innovation 
with respect to enterprises not subject to indivisibilities. Even 
in the case of dairying based on grade cattle, the strategy of 
grading up overcomes what may appear to constitute an indivisi- 
bility. Judging from the performance of most efforts in Kenya 
to provide small farmers with credit, greater use of credit to 
stimulate innovation would probably have resulted in a greater 
number of faltering credit schemes and institutions, not without 
their social costs, as will be shown in following chapters. 
Reliance on self-finance provided a suitable strategy for 
stimulating the widespread adoption of most of the innovations 
which penetrated smallholder agriculture in Kenya through the 
mid-1970's. 
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CHAPTER IV 
FARM CREDIT POLICY AND 
INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE IN KENYA 
The previous chapter was addressed to the question of the 
sources of funds, including credit, used by Kenyan farmers. 
This chapter outlines the sources of funds available to the 
providers of formal credit to Kenyan agriculture. This subject 
must be viewed within the context of public policy, because of 
its pervasive influence on farm credit, and also cannot be di- 
vorced from the repayment performance of borrowers. Public 
policy greatly influences the structure of the formal farm 
credit market, while loan collection performance serves as a 
barometer of the financial success of farm credit provision as 
well as reflecting and influencing the sources of funds which 
may be tapped by financial institutions endeavouring to lend to 
farmers and to promote rural development through such lending. 
A. State Control and Public Policy 
1. Ownership of Financial Institutions 
Government ownership and control pervade the farm credit 
structure in Kenya. 
I 
The primary institution, the Agricultural 
Finance Corporation, is entirely owned by the Government and has 
a prominent civil servant as its Chairman. The Agricultural 
Settlement Fund is administered by the Department of Settlement 
in the Ministry of Lands and Settlement on'behalf of the three 
Ministers who serve as Settlement Fund Trustees. The Ministry 
of Finance is represented on the Board of the Cooperative Bank, 
and the cooperative structure in Kenya is closely regulated by 
the Government through the Ministry of Cooperatives. The Cereals 
and Sugar Finance Corporation is part of the Ministry of Finance 
and Planning. The Kenya Tea Development Authority is a para- 
1. See Republic of Kenya, Development Plan. 1974-1978, Part I, 
pp. 6-7, for an enumeration of the Government's portfolio of 
shareholdings. 
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statal body. The Government owns a small commercial bank and 
has a 60% shareholding in one of the three large commercial 
banks, and provides resources to the Cooperative Bank to assist 
it in its role as the apex financial institution in the cooperative 
structure. 
2. Administrative Controls 
In spite of this high degree of Government penetration or 
support in the farm credit market, agricultural credit policy or 
advice is not the domain of a specialised body. Of course, 
questions and debates touching farm credit occur from time to 
time in Parliament, but this interest largely takes the form 
of monitoring institutional performance and reacting to legislation 
drafted by civil servants. Responsibility for credit policy is as 
fragmented as the institutions providing credit. However, an ad- 
mirable degree of consistency in execution is ensured by the role 
of key members of the Ministry of Finance and Planning in various 
public sector credit institutions. Cooperative credit appears to 
operate to some extent outside this centralised policy framework, 
however. 
It is probable that the subjection of agricultural credit 
to greater centralisation of direction will occur over time. 
Suggestions for an advisory policy board or council were put 
forward by the World Bank in 1973, but had come to nothing 
through early 1975 in spite of two or more attempts by various 
concerned Government entities to set up a collaborative mechanism. 
That agricultural credit might be singled out for more intensive 
direction by Government is suggested by the fact that the agri- 
cultural sector is large, largely in Kenyan hands, and a priority 
sector in development planning and political life. An intensi- 
fication of interest in farm credit has occurred within the Central 
Bank, which in 1972 began an exercise to obtain more information 
about agricultural lending by commercial banks and other 
financial 
institutions. A marked change in Central Bank policy may be noted 
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between 1974 and 1975. In the former year the Governor issued 
a directive to the chief executives of commercial banks entitled 
"Monetary Policy -- Guidelines for Bank Advances, Loans, Advances 
and Investments, " and relevant excerpts indicated the nature of 
Central Bank "moral suasion": 
1 
Certain key sectors must be supported (in spite of a 12% 
limitation on the expansion of credit to the private 
sector). Agriculture and small African enterprises in 
general, should be protected from the effects of any 
shortage of credit, and it is well understood that the 
needs of industry for finance of raw materials at higher 
prices must also be met. 
Each bank will naturally plan the management of its funds 
in the light of its own position having due regard to 
necessary maintenance of required liquidity.... 
In 1975, however, the Governor sent another directive to the 
chief executives of commercial banks, announcing that, 
2 
Each bank is now required to bring its agricultural lending 
up to at least 17% of net deposits by 30th June 1975. This 
implies additional lending of the order of Sh 300 million.... 
The directive noted that at the close of March 1975 agricultural 
credit amounted to about 11% of net deposits. An accompanying 
circular defined agricultural credit in largely the same terms as 
previsouly specified for reporting purposes, 
3 
and the directive 
indicated that promissory notes of the Cereals and Sugar Finance 
Corporation held by banks would be considered as agricultural 
lending so that through the purchase of such notes the smaller 
banks dealing mainly in Nairobi and Mombasa could adjust their 
portfolios accordingly. Replenishment of Cereals and Sugar 
Finance Corporation resources may in fact have been the main 
expediency fostering this intervention, as tighter credit 
conditions and rising prices not accompanied by higher interest 
rates on deposits reportedly resulted in a drying up of deposits 
placed with the Corporation in 1974. 
1. Central Bank of Kenya, Eighth Annual Report for the Year 
Ended 30th June 1974. p. 62. 
2. Central Bank of Kenya, Ninth Annual Report for the Year Ended 
30th June 1975. p. 75. 
3. Ibid., p. 76. 
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The history of controls suggests that moves of this type 
are more often reinforced and strengthened than abandoned or 
permitted to decay gracefully as the difficulties they create 
are reflected in increased costs of enforcement and compliance. 
It is also improbable, given the importance of agriculture and 
access to land as a political issue in Kenya, that the 17% 
specification, once established, could be easily lowered without 
major changes in Kenya's political system. Its most probable 
trend is upward. Someone concerned with equity will no doubt 
ask why a sector that accounts for a third of Kenya's GDP has 
effective access to only a sixth of the country's commercial 
bank credit. 
3. Policy Goals and Format 
It is obvious that one of Government's major goals is to 
increase the supply of credit to agriculture. The activities 
of the Central Bank manifest this policy, as does the bold 
assertion in the Development Plan 1974-1978 that "the principal 
constraints in agriculture are knowledge, technology and credit, "1 
elaborated in the restatement that "the fundamental causes of low 
incomes include lack of land to cultivate, insufficient education 
and training, and insufficient access to credit and technical 
knowledge. "2 The Plan document states: 
3 
The monetary system has not contributed much to the development of the rural and informal sectors in this 
country. Yet these are important areas in the development 
strategy of the current plan. Therefore, during the present 
plan period it is the Government's intention to bring bank- 
ing to the people, especially in rural areas, to make them 
more credit conscious, and to awaken them to the oppor- 
tunities of operating within a modern, credit economy. 
1. Republic of Kenya, Part I. p. 18. 
2. Ibid., p. 97. 
3. Ibid., p. 28. It is difficult to understand how people would 
not already be acutely credit conscious if lack of access to credit 
in fact constituted one of the major constraints to their increas- 
ing their low incomes. It is also interesting that the planners 
apparently believe that Kenya's rural and informal sectors operate 
largely on a barter basis rather than on a monetary basis, as 
suggested by the initial sentence of this excerpt. 
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In fact, the Plan's comments on monetary policy and strategy 
and objectives make it abundantly clear that the Government is 
strongly committed to increasing the supply of credit to rural 
areas and that changes in the procedures and conventions in 
effect in the early 1970's would be expected to give way to 
greater prodding of financial intermediaries by Government. 
1 
It is interesting to note, in passing, that constraints 
cited in the current Plan are different from those mentioned 
in the previous Plan, which held that marketing and pricing 
problems were the major impediments to the rapid development 
of the agricultural sector. 
2 However, that Plan also devoted 
considerable attention to rural credit and its hoped-for role in 
rural development. 
To return to the current Plan, the chapter on strategy and 
objectives does not go very far beyond the exhibition of the big 
stick to the financial sector. With respect to rural credit it 
fails to recognise that the supply curve may bear some relation 
to the cost curve in markets which are workably competitive. 
Neither does it discuss cross-subsidisation of small scale lending 
by large scale loans or other, profitable, financial services 
offered by lenders. That the drafters of this section had con- 
siderable prior exposure to economics is betrayed, however, by 
their use of the conventional macro theory assumption that the 
financial function can be performed without cost. This approach 
bears the thumbprint of the academic economist -- it could not 
have been conceived by a profit seeking or even a loss avoiding 
financier or by an intuitive layman who places some value on his 
own time and who periodically finds himself in a queue in a post 
office or banking office in Nairobi to withdraw funds or make a 
deposit or transfer. 
1. Ibid., pp. 28-31. 
2. Republic of Kenya, Development Plan for the Period 1970 to 
1974. Nairobi, Government Printer, 1970. p. 179. 
268 
Agricultural credit in Kenya is, as a whole, provided to 
borrowers at less than cost, especially in the case of small 
scale loans. This generalisation may be supported by the 
financial statements of the AFC and by conversations with 
commercial bankers and officials of the Department of Cooperative 
Development. AFC and cooperative financial statements and 
reckonings exclude the overhead cost of time devoted to loan 
application formalities and other chores associated with credit 
by field staff and other staff of their respective Ministries, 
including the full costs of expatriates provided by donor 
agencies, etc. If an accounting profit is not earned by lenders 
even with the selective approach to costs found in traditional 
financial accounting, it is probable that credit is provided to 
farmers also at less than its economic cost measured in terms of 
alternatives foregone by not using the funds for other purposes. 
Considerations of social and political welfare should be in- 
cluded in opportunity cost reckonings, but there is presently 
little hard evidence that credit is helping a large or critical 
group of small farmers (excluding those on settlement schemes -- 
a special case), propelling subsistence farmers into the larger 
economy, reducing rural to urban migration, stimulating diversi- 
fication of production or otherwise playing a significant social 
welfare role. 
The official policy is one of preferential interest rates 
on loans to farmers, 
1 
i. e., rates not exceeding those charged 
on loans issued for non-agricultural purposes as exemplified by 
1. In spite of the fact that the system obviously operates 
under this constraint, it is difficult to find an official 
articulation of this policy. A draft paper on agricultural 
credit for the 1974-1978 Development Plan acknowledged that a 
preferential interest rate policy is followed, but the final 
version of the Plan does not contain the passage in question. 
The Five Year Plans and Republic of Kenya, African Socialism 
and Its Application to Planning in Kenya, Sessional Paper No. 
10 of 1963/65, Nairobi, Government Printer, 1965, are silent 
on the question of interest rates. A hint of the special status 
of agriculture is found in the interest rate structure applying 
to Central Bank discounts and advances. Bills and notes gen- 
erated by crop financing (i. e., financing the purchase of har- 
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commercial banking practice. The commercial bank prime rate 
had not exceeded 8% up to mid-1975, and most commercial borrowers 
have become accustomed to paying between 8% and 10%. The 
Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation charged 
between 8% and 9% on its loans through 1975. 
In the early part of 1973 AFC increased its lending rate 
on most loans from 711% to 8%, in accordance with conditions 
imposed by the World Bank in connection with a smallholder loan 
scheme largely funded by the Bank. Agricultural Settlement Fund 
loans, relatively few of which have been issued since 1968, carry 
a 611% interest obligation. Commercial bank loans to farmers are 
generally at 8-10%. Seasonal advances to large scale growers of 
wheat and hybrid maize administered by AFC under the Guaranteed 
Minimum Return scheme (GMR) are made at 8/%. Kenya Tea Develop- 
ment Authority planting material loans are interest-free. CPCS 
credit is available to loyal cooperators at between 8% and 12%, 
the highest rates on programmes serving large numbers of small- 
holders. Table IV-1 lists interest rates charged by various 
lenders and programmes. 
It should be noted that many quoted interest rates are 
relatively straightforward in Kenya. Discounting in advance 
is relatively rare, and interest is usually charged on actual 
balances outstanding. Interest premia or penalty rates are 
not usually levied on overdue balances. Fees and other charges 
for the account of the borrower do not appreciably raise the 
costs of borrowing from most formal lenders. Mortgage and hire 
purchase true rates may depart widely from nominal rates, however. 
Interest rate policy underlies much of the argument pre- 
sented here. Before continuing the development of the position 
taken in this paper, it may be instructive to consider the 
historical background of the official policy of low rates. 
(-continued) vested produce) carry a 0.5% lower rate than those 
relating to other commercial bills and notes. See Central Bank 
of Kenya, Annual Reports or the quarterly Economic and Financial 
Review 
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Table IV-1. Selected Comparative Lending Rates of Interest 
in Kenya, 1974 
Approximate True Rates 
Lender, Scheme or Purpose of Interest Per Annum 
Kenya Tea Development Authority 
Agricultural Settlement Fund 
Agricultural Finance Corporation 
Guaranteed Minimum Return scheme 
Commercial banks 
Industrial and Commercial 
Development Corporation 
Cooperative Production Credit 
Scheme 
Residential mortgages 
Kenya Farmers' Association 
members' accounts 
Hire purchase finance for 
new farm machinery 
Nil. A service charge 
of approximately 4% is 
included in the price of 
fertiliser supplied on 
credit by KTDA. 
6/%a/ 
6331% to April 1967 
7'/% to Decembgry 1972- 
March 1973- 
8% from January-April 1973bß 
8/% 
8-10% (7% prime rate to June 
1974,8% thereafter) 
8-9% 
8-12% 
831-11% and above 
10% after 60 days EOI 
/ 
Above 15% 
Sources: The data was gathered directly from lenders. 
a/ Loans issued by the Agricultural Settlement Fund after 22 May 
1967 carry a slightly lower true rate of interest because interest 
is capitalised at lower rates over the initial 18 month moratorium 
allowed on these loans. 
b/ The interest rate on the IDA 105 smallholder credit scheme 
was raised on 1 January 1973, and that applying to most other 
programmes followed on 1 April 1973. 
c/ EOM denotes End Of Month. 60 days EOM signifies that interest is levied on amounts outstanding for more than 60 days following 
the end of the month in which the debt was incurred. 
f 
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Interest rates in the colonial period were determined by 
those prevailing in the London capital market, to which Kenya 
was closely linked through the operation of the currency board 
system which made the East African shilling freely convertible 
into Sterling, and vice versa, at a fixed rate of exchange, over 
most of the colonial era. (Appendix A contains an outline of 
Kenya's colonial monetary arrangements. ) It may be argued that 
the rates at which funds were supplied to and available in Kenya 
were not a function of the domestic supply and demand for funds, 
as the influence of Kenya on London rates was quantitatively 
small, although the links between the metrolpolitan economy and 
the colonial economies were numerous and complex. It appears 
that except in cases of coincidence the London rate level and 
structure would not have been identical to that which would have 
developed in an isolated Kenya, as there is little reason to 
believe that the supply and demand relationship and institutional 
factors would in each case have produced the same result. Logic 
suggests that the Kenya rates would have been higher than the 
London rates, given the higher risks of a predominantly agri- 
cultural economy, the inefficiencies of a thin capital market, 
the problems inherent in poor economic infrastructure, and, 
presumably, a relatively greater demand for and smaller supply 
of capital in a young enclave economy. However, policies of 
cheap land, cheap labour and cheap capital stimulated colonial 
development and set the stage for policies after independence. 
Agricultural development was a primary theme of colonial 
economic policy. Although the immigrant farmers suffered many 
casualties to economic reality, they did form the backbone of 
an expatriate-settler sector which attained a higher standard 
of living on the average than that enjoyed by Englishmen at home 
by the time Kenya achieved independence. 
1 
Agricultural policy 
in the early colonial period seems to have been preoccupied . 
1. van Arkadie, B., and D. Ghai, "The East African Economies, " 
in Robson, P., and D. Lury, eds., The Economies of Africa. 
London, Allen and Unwin, 1969. p. 317. 
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with the development of land and the provision of African labour 
to support increased settlement. Capital was not neglected, of 
course, and some campaigns to encourage European settlement pro- 
vided loans on easy terms. 
1 
However, the public sector did not 
become significantly involved in the provision of credir prior to 
the formation of the Land and Agricultural Bank in 1931, which 
began in a very modest way, and the institution of the Guaranteed 
Minimum Return scheme of seasonal advances and crop insurance for 
large scale farmers during World War II. Loan schemes for Africans 
began very cautiously in the 1940's. 
2 
The present interest rate policy of the Government is a re- 
flection of the colonial past. 
3 
Early evidence of the thinking 
of African policymakers is perhaps found in the Ingham Committee 
Report published in 1950 concerning agricultural credit for Af- 
ricans. The committee consisted of six members with European 
surnames and one member with an African surname. The majority 
favoured the establishment of a credit scheme using Government 
funds supplied at not less than 3% and a lending rate to farmers 
of at least 8%, which was intended to ensure that Government funds 
would be recovered in full after an allowance for bad debts. The 
member with an African surname wrote a brief dissent: 
4 
1. Lipscomb, J. F., "Soldier Settlers, " in Cone, L. Winston, and 
J. F. Lipscomb, eds., 2p cit., pp. 55-57. 
2. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Agricultural Credit for 
Africans. pp. 31,34-35; African Land Development in Kenya: 
1946-1955. p. 213; African Land Development in Kenya: 1946- 
1962. pp. 288 ff.; Republic of Kenya, Report of the Mission 
on Land Consolidation and Registration. pp. 122-127. 
3. "The structure of interest rates which prevailed during the 
regime of the East African Currency Board has generally been 
maintained. This is mainly because the majority of commercial 
banks in Kenya have traditionally operated an arrangement whereby 
they collectively agree on maximum deposit rates and minimum advance 
rates.... " This quote, suggesting that the monetary authorities 
play a passive role with regard to interest rates, is from Central 
Bank of Kenya, Money and Banking in Kenya. Nairobi, 1972. p. 20. 
4. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Agricultural Credit for 
Africans. p. 9. 
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I disagree with the majority on the question of rates of 
interest to be charged on loans .... I hold the view that a 
rate of 4/% in cases where loans are secured on the land 
is reasonable. This is the rate at which European farmers 
borrow money from the Land Bank with land as security. In 
cases where land is not the security I think that 6% would 
be a fair rate. 
This sentiment is certainly in harmony with the Golden Rule 
implications of national sovreignty as opposed to colonial admin- 
istration. This approach may also be reflected in the view that 
if cheap credit contributed to the impressive development of the 
large farms owned by Europeans in Kenya, it must also be an ap- 
propriate tool for the development of African agriculture. 
Because of the importance of the agricultural sector as the 
source of about 30% of Kenya's GDP, the fact that 90% of the 
population is on the land, the traditional importance attached 
to landholding and the relative paucity of opportunities in 
other sectors for large numbers of people, 
' 
it is only reasonable 
that agricultural development is a major concern of Government. 
Preferential treatment and its political aspects, as in the colonial 
period for British settlers on the land, continue to be extremely 
important issues. Low interest rates are included in this area 
of policy and concern. 
In summary, Government policy consists of keeping interest 
rates low for agricultural borrowers and attempting to increase 
the supply of agricultural credit through the creation of special- 
ised public sector financial institutions and through an apparent 
crescendo of "moral suasion" and directives to commercial banks. 
B. Lenders' Sources of Funds 
The twin policy goals of increasing the supply of credit 
to farmers while keeping its cost low (and even negative during 
periods when rates of inflation exceed nominal interest rates) 
1. ILO, op. cit., pp. 33-104. 
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embody a conflict. As the supply will not increase dramatically 
at the rates of interest in effect, intervention is attempted to 
ensure the desired results. One form of this intervention is 
Government subscriptions of capital to. specialised farm credit 
institutions and the pouring in of resources by bilateral and 
multilateral donors to support institutions which are not able 
to compete for resources on their own strength in Kenya's financial 
and potential financial markets. Another form of this intervention 
is to force broad-spectrum lenders, such as the commercial banks, 
to adjust their portfolios in response to directives from the 
Central Bank rather than in response to the opportunities mani- 
fest in the market for commercial bank credit. The implementation 
of these directives may entail cross-subsidisation, especially at 
the high-cost margin of small loans to small farmers. 
Because Government policy forces the supply of farm credit 
beyond the quantity which is available in the domestic market in 
response to market forces repressed by artificially low interest 
rates, the question of sources of funds and dependence upon ex- 
ternal donors for agricultural lending assumes special importance 
in any analysis of the performance of the formal farm credit 
structure in Kenya. Accordingly, this section summarises the 
major sources available to major lenders. 
1. External Sources -- Dependence on 
Bilateral and Multilateral Assistance 
This discussion treats only the provision of funds by ex- 
ternal donors for on-lending by financial intermediaries serving 
the agricultural sector in Kenya. It excludes other aspects of 
external assistance, largely the provision of expatriate technicians 
at a financial cost to Kenya below that which would be required to 
obtain the services of these or similar specialists if the Kenyan 
authorities had to bid for them in the market. While the develop- 
ment of local expertise measured in terms of performance has pro- 
gressed at an admirable rate in AFC and in the cooperative structure, 
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it is abundantly clear that on a narrowly technical basis, 
if not on a wider institutional basis, AFC and cooperative 
lending could not have reached their present levels of quantity 
and quality, measured in terms of the financial performance of 
these lenders, without reliance on imported technical expertise 
for training and operations purposes. 
1 
a. External resources used by the Agricultural Settlement Fund 
The Agricultural Settlement Fund was established by the 
British prior to Kenya's independence, and it has provided the 
financial mechanism for the orderly transfer of land from Euro- 
pean farmers to Africans. The Fund has no continuing functions 
as a source of credit to individual farmers, as loans are made 
available on a once-for-all basis at the time the settler takes 
up his plot. Once the farmer has fully drawn his loan he has no 
further access to ASF credit. Disbursement of settlement develop- 
ment loans customarily takes several months or even two to three 
years, reflecting the time required for settlers to get their 
operations organised for. the effective use of credit, as well as 
the "shortage" of grade cattle which existed for many years since 
the advent of the settlement programme. 
While the sources of funds indicated on the ASF balance sheet 
consist primarily of loans from the Kenya Government, these in 
fact reflect loans and grants from abroad to the Kenya Government 
for employment through the Agricultural Settlement Fund. The 
sources of finance for settlement expenditure (land purchase, 
plot development, administrative expenses and purchase of loose 
1. This statement is not meant to imply any judgement concerning 
the quality of the expatriate technical assistance used by Kenya 
in developing its farm credit mechanism. It is based simply on 
a head count of expatriates and on the improvement in the per- 
formance of the AFC and the cooperative banking system over the 
last 10 years in disbursing and collecting loans. Likewise, ex- 
patriate technical assistance by itself could obviously never have 
accomplished what has been achieved by the mutual cooperation and 
efforts of Kenyans and contract personnel working together to 
serve Government priorities related to credit for Kenyan agri- 
culture. 
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assets) as of the end of 1971 included British grants and loans 
(69%), West German loans (4%), World Bank loans (3%) and also 
local funds (24%). 
1 
However, the balance of local funds (Sh 
156.2 million) was exceeded by the administrative expenses of 
the settlement programme (Sh 200.3 million), both viewed on a 
cumulative basis through the end of 1971, indicating the over- 
whelming role of foreign assistance in giving the settlement 
administrators a programme to run. 
b. External resources used by the Agricultural Finance Corporation 
Founded as an agency designed to direct its activities towards 
the small farmer, AFC has been dependent from the outset on the 
largess of donor agencies. Vasthoff indicates that at the time 
the AFC was founded in 1963 it took over the administration on an 
agency basis of four smallholder loan schemes, three of which were 
funded from foreign sources, as indicated in Table IV-2. Thus, 
even at such an early stage, on the eve of independence, World 
Bank, West German and American Government sources had supplied 
a large part of the resources for schemes under which the public 
sector distributed loans directly to individual African small- 
holders. 
2 
Vasthoff further indicates that foreign funds for such 
lending (excluding settlement and land transfer loans) were 
exhausted by 1964 and that Kenya Government funds were used 
during the following two years to make about 2,500 loans amounting 
to Sh 6.1 million. Beginning in 1967 the IDA smallholder loan 
project became effective, and in 1971 disbursements began under 
the KFW smallholder loan scheme. By that time AFC had been re- 
constituted through the merger of the Land and Agricultural Bank, 
in effect being charged with the provision of long and medium 
term credit to both the large scale and small scale agricultural 
1. Republic of Kenya, Department of Settlement, Annual Report 
1971. p. 6. 
2. Vasthoff does not indicate whether the externally financed 
schemes also involved a local contribution to the funds dis- 
bursed. 
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Table IV-2. Smallholder Loan Schemes for which the 
Agricultural Finance Corporation 
Assumed Administrative Responsibility 
in 1963 
Loan Disbursement No. of 
Scheme Period Loans 
ALDEV (Kenya 1948-1959 1,336 
Government) 
ICA (American 1959-1960 
aid) 
426 
IBRD 1960-1963 3,903 
West German 1962-1964 2,103 
Total 7,768 
Amount 
(Sh million) 
1.6 
.6 
6.4 
3.6 
12.1 
Source: Vasthoff, Josef, Small, Farm Credit and Development: 
Some Experiences in East Africa with Special Reference 
to Kenya. IFO-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Afrika- 
Studien 33. Munich, Weltforum Verlag, 1968. p. 28. 
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sectors, as well as with the administration of GNR advances. 
While external assistance funds the overwhelming share of AFC's 
small scale lending (75-80% of total lending under the IDA pro- 
gramme, 100% under the KFW small scale scheme), the resources 
of the Land and Agricultural Bank have permitted AFC to operate 
with relatively less dependence in its large scale lending 
operations. 
1 
Officials estimate that less than half of AFC's 
large scale lending was financed by foreign sources as of the 
early 1970's. AFC ranch loans are funded largely by IDA and 
the Swedish International Development Authority, and the re- 
habilitation scheme for large mixed farms and coffee estates is 
backed by the World Bank Group. 
Unfortunately for the purposes of this exercise, AFC annual 
reports do not provide a breakdown of its capital in a manner 
which permits precise specification of its reliance on external 
funds. The Kenya shilling proceeds of external funds are in 
fact provided to AFC by the Kenya Treasury under specific agri- 
cultural credit project agreements, which further obscures the 
analysis of published data. The application of reasonable 
assumptions to AFC's March 1971 statement suggests that resources 
provided by external assistance accounted for between roughly 
28-38% of AFC's balance sheet. 
The Guaranteed Minimum Return scheme of seasonal advances to 
large scale growers of wheat and hybrid maize has traditionally 
been funded locally by the Cereals and Sugar Finance Corporation 
and administered by AFC on an agency basis. C&SFC raises funds 
for this purpose by issuing short term obligations bought by the 
Treasury, financial institutions and other Government entities, 
a few members of the general public, and private businesses with 
funds to place. The drying up of these resources during tight 
money conditions and a period of relatively rapid inflation in 
1974 generated proposals from at least one external donor 
interested in supplying funds for seasonal credit to Kenyan 
agriculture through AFC and possibly through cooperative channels. 
1. Dependence is defined here as AFC's use of reimbursement 
facilities provided by external sources. Donors provide funds 
to AFC against proof of its loan disbursements. 
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c. External resources used by other major agricultural lenders 
Cooperative credit through the mid-1970's was entirely 
locally financed. No external assistance schemes had been 
designed to swell the coffers of the Cooperative Bank through 
the provision of external funds, although several proposals for 
Nordic and British assistance in the form of loans and/or grants 
were at various stages of design and discussion. The Cooperative 
Bank, characterised by a rapid turnover in members' accounts, 
had made it known that additional long term debt would make 
a desirable improvement in its capital structure. 
Commercial bank access to foreign sources of funds for 
everyday lending operations has been increasingly curtailed and 
discouraged. The establishment of the national currency and the 
inevitable imposition of controls on capital movement which 
followed from the country's national monetary arrangements have 
played their role. The efforts of first the Currency Board and 
later its successor, the Central Bank, to replace the London head 
offices of the major banks as lenders of last resort and as 
suppliers of funds to finance the seasonal peak demands for 
credit characteristic of economies with a relatively large agri- 
cultural sector have also been effective in this respect. Borrow- 
ing abroad to finance everyday lending by the banks has also been 
discouraged by the increase in market rates of interest in major 
financial centres beyond the repressed levels maintained in Kenya. 
The Kenya Tea Development Authority balance sheet includes 
loans from external sources. As of 30 June 1972 outstanding 
World Bank loans equalled 28% of KTDA's total assets, while 
Commonwealth Development Corporation and KFW loans amounted to 
25% and 4% respectively. 
1 
However, none of these sources is 
earmarked specifically to support the KTDA fertiliser credit 
scheme. 
1. Kenya Tea Development Authority, Annual Report and Accounts 
for the period 1st July 1971 to 30th June 1973. pp. 28,32. 
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The Kenya Farmers' Association and the Pyrethrum Board and 
Pyrethrum Marketing Board traditionally have not relied on ex- 
ternal funds. 
2. Dependence on the Treasury 
Dependence-on the Kenya Treasury is easily demonstrated by 
the balance sheets of major agricultural lenders. Table IV-3 
shows relationships which prevailed on the financial statements 
of the AFC, the Agricultural Settlement Fund and the Cooperative 
Bank as of recent dates for which data was readily available in 
published form. 
It has already been noted that external loans are passed to 
the AFC and the Agricultural Settlement Fund through the Treasury, 
as these entities themselves are not empowered to borrow directly 
from abroad. Also as discussed above, the Agricultural Settlement 
Fund may fairly be said, according to accounting and analytical 
convention, to have been funded entirely by external sources, while 
the Cooperative Bank had received no such external financial 
resources as of the date indicated. The AFC has received sub- 
stantial local resources from the Treasury, however. Some of 
these have been contributed under agreements with external donors 
whereby AFC claims reimbursement for 100% of loans made under 
specific schemes. AFC's claims are submitted to the Treasury, 
which in turn is empowered to draw on the relevant donor to the 
extent of 75-80% of the claims submitted by AFC. Other loans from 
the Treasury on AFC's balance sheet, however, were received long 
ago by the Land and Agricultural Bank and, without going into the 
mechanics of colonial public finance, may be considered as local 
sources. Table IV-3 indicates that Treasury loans from local sources 
probably exceeded the volume of Treasury finance from foreign sources 
on AFC's balance sheet in 1971. 
With the exception of the capital accounts of the small 
National Bank of Kenya, which is entirely Government-owned, the 
Treasury has not supplied the commercial banking system with 
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Table IV-3. Reliance on Treasury and External Funds 
by Major Agricultural Credit Institutions 
in Kenya 
(Sh 000) 
Agricultural 
Settlement Cooperative 
Item Balance Sheet Data AFC Fund Bank 
a. Date of balance sheet 31 March 30 June 30 June 
1971 1970 1974 
b. Total liabilities 
& net worth 232,300 346,058 146,585 
c. less: current 
liabilities 23,080 40,871 125,602 
d. Long term debt 
& net worth 209,220 305,186 10,983 
e. Long term debt owing 
to the Kenya Treasury 78,697 275,611 3,015 
f. Capital subscribed 
by the Kenya Treasury 124,761 3,607 - 
g. Total Treasury funds 203,458 279,218 3,015 
h. Estimated external loans 
supporting Treasury a funds 59,022- 279^218 - 
i. Local Treasury funds 
in use 144,436 - 3,015 
J. Treasury dependency ratio 
(Item g as a% of 
item d) 97% 91% 27% 
k External funding 
dependency ratio (Item 
h as a% of item d) 28% 91% - 
1. Local Treasury funding 
dependency ratio (Item 
i as a% of item d) 69% - 27% 
a/ The exact amount of external debt supporting AFC operations is 
not given in the annual reports of the Corporation. The figure 
shown in this table is the estimated minimum probable level. The 
maximum would not exceed 38%. Major smallholder schemes are finan- 
ced by external donors to the extent of about 75% of funds loaned 
to farmers. 
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resources other than in the form of working balances in accounts 
maintained for transactions purposes. Since the formation of the 
Central Bank in 1966 many Treasury accounts have been transferred 
from the commercial banking system to the Central Bank, although 
the volume of net public sector deposits held with commercial 
banks has expanded greatly with the expansion of the purblic 
sector at a more rapid rate than the economy as a whole. 
1 
Some of the smaller lenders to Kenyan farmers, such as KTDA 
and the Pyrethrum Marketing Board, have not customarily used 
Treasury funds to support their credit operations. KFA has 
enjoyed the use of short term Government credit, but only in 
connection with several of the commercial functions it has per- 
formed for Government entities such as crop marketing boards. 
3. The Mobilisation of Private Domestic Savings 
by Agricultural Lenders 
a. Agricultural lenders which do not rely on 
private domestic savings as sources of funds 
As noted previously, the Agricultural Settlement Fund pro- 
vides no services to the public other than issuing credit for 
settlement land purchase and development and several related minor 
purposes. It does not attempt to solicit deposits from the public 
or from settlers and thus plays no role in the mobilisation of 
domestic savings. 
The Agricultural Finance Corporation sells virtually no 
financial liabilities to the public, offering little scope for 
private domestic savings mobilisation. AFC has shown some deposit 
liabilities on its balance sheets, however. These arise in two 
ways. One is that AFC has very occasionally accepted deposits 
from other public sector institutions such as the Wheat Board. 
The other is that AFC requires applicants for large scale land 
purchase loans to place a deposit, consisting of the required 
1. Public sector deposit balances held with and advances out- 
standing from the commercial banks and the Central Bank are 
listed in Central Bank of Kenya, Ninth Annual Report 1975, pp. 
30,31., 37. 
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downpayment by borrowers amounting to up to 40% of the price of 
the land in question. This device ensures that borrowers can 
provide the downpayment, and these deposits are applied toward 
the purchase along with loan proceeds disbursed at the time the 
land transaction occurs. As of 31 March 1971 both types of 
deposits on AFC's balance sheet were of roughly equal size, and 
together equalled about 2% of AFC's total liabilities and net worth. 
Most of the crop authorities which have modest credit schemes 
for farmers, such as the Kenya Tea Development Authority, do not 
attempt to raise funds from the public. 
b. Agricultural lenders dependent on private domestic savings 
as sources of funds 
The commercial banks obviously rely on their ability to 
mobilise private domestic davings to support their lending 
operations. The relationship between deposits from and credit 
outstanding to the private sector at recent year-end reporting 
dates is indicated in Table IV-4. Data in the table indicates 
that the private sector provides the greatest part of commercial 
bank deposits and receives the great majority of commercial bank 
credit. However, the banks in Kenya, like commercial banks vir- 
tually everywhere, do not customarily issue credit amounting to 
the sum of the deposits they hold. This is largely explained by 
the necessity of maintaining some cash on hand and additional 
liquidity reserves in the form of government securities, which 
leaves only a certain portion of deposits balances available for 
credit creation. These requirements in effect transfer resources 
to the Government as the issuer of currency and securities and as 
the owner of the Central Bank. 
The proportion of commercial bank deposits arising from agri- 
culture is not known, and it is perhaps indicative of the convention- 
al wisdom of development finance and financial development in Kenya 
that while statistics on loans are collected on a functional, sec- 
toral basis, sources of funds are not, with the exception of their 
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classification into public sector and private sector sources. 
1 
Therefore, analysis of the net position of agriculture as a supplier 
and user of commercial bank funds is not possible from data presently 
maintained by the banks or collected by the Central Bank. 
However, one of the large banks very obligingly requested 
several of their offices selected by the writer and a colleague 
to conduct a modified random sampling of deposit accounts and to 
note the balance on hand during selected reporting dates in April 
1974. Each balance noted was to be classified as either "agri- 
cultural" or "non-agricultural" according to the criterion of 
whether or not the depositor's primary income was believed to 
be derived from farming, ranching or plantation agriculture. 
While the sampling was in principle random, the instructions 
being to note each 35th account, an element of non-randomness 
was introduced by another instruction that branch management 
should disregard accounts in overdraft and those accounts main- 
tained by depositers not well enough known to branch management 
to permit classification into either of the two categories. If 
either of these disqualifying conditions applied to a sampled 
account, the following account was to be chosen instead, and so 
on until a qualifying account- was found. 
The results of this survey were disparate, as shown in 
Table IV-5, which classifies agricultural and non-agricultural 
accounts on the basis of branch location. Interpretation of the 
data should be qualified by several observations about the nature 
of specialisation and competition in branch banking. The compo- 
1. Reporting categories applied to credit outstanding consist 
of 1) Public Sector borrowers, broken down into a) Government, 
including East African Community institutions and Local Govern- 
ment, and b) commercial statutory boards and other public en- 
tities; and 2) Private Sector borrowers, classified as being 
within a) agriculture, b) manufacturing, c) building and con- 
struction, d) trade, with subclassifications export, import, and 
domestic, e) transport, f) financial institutions, g) other 
business; and 3) private households, etc. See Central Bank of 
Kenya Annual Reports and the quarterly Economic and Financial 
Review. 
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sition of deposits at any single branch, especially in an area 
served by more than one bank, reflects history, commercial 
strategy and the effectiveness of a succession of managers. 
Certain banks or branches may develop special types of expertise 
or relationships which incluence the composition of their de- 
posits. Banks also face competition from other types of financial 
intermediaries in most of the agricultural areas they serve. 
Their depositors also have access to the Post Office Savings Bank 
and in many cases also to the Cooperative Savings Scheme, and 
competitive dynamics involving these institutions would influence 
the composition of the banks' deposit balances. 
As might be expected, Table IV-5 indicates that the relative 
importance of agricultural deposits is small at large urban 
branches. However, at the opposite extreme, certain branches in 
rural centres are deeply involved in providing deposit facilities 
to agriculture, both in terms of the numbers of accounts on their 
books and in terms of the shilling amount of deposits from the 
agricultural sector relative to the total deposit liabilities of 
such branches. The survey data suggests that commercial banks 
have a significant and at times considerable role in bringing the 
financial sector together with the agricultural sector through the 
provision of services to depositors. 
The Guaranteed Minimum Return scheme is funded entirely from 
local sources, through the Cereals and Sugar Finance Corporation. 
As of 1973 this intermediary was staffed by two full-time employees 
in the Ministry of Finance and Planning and managed by two senior 
Ministry officials who also had other responsibilities. The 
Corporation issues Government-guaranteed short term securities 
which are purchased by financial intermediaries and others with 
funds to invest. Under its charter the Corporation has access to 
the Treasury in the event that insufficient funds to finance its 
activities are forthcoming from the market. The Corporation's funds 
are used to finance the Guaranteed Minimum Return scheme administered 
by AFC, Cereals Finance Advances administered by the Kenya Farmers' 
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Table IV-5. The Relative Importance of Agricultural Deposits 
at Selected Banking Offices, April 1974 
Proportion of time, saving and 
current accounts classified as 
agricul tural 
Branch Location 
' 
No. of Accounts Total Balances 
Large urban branches 
large Nairobi branch 3% n. a. 
large Mombasa branch 1% 0% 
Urban branches in high potential 
agricultural areas 
branch in large farm & 
settlement area 45% 63% 
branch in large farm & 
small farm area 21% n. a. 
branch in small farm area 7% 1% 
branch in small farm & 
estate area 13% 9% 
Urban branches in other 
agricultural areas 
branch in small farm area 
including both high & 
low potential land 68% 35% 
Rural branches 
branch in high potential 
smallholder area 1% 0% 
branch in high potential 
small farm & settlement area 34% 857. 
a/ Most of the urban branches referred to are located in 
Provincial headquarters towns. Classification of agricultural 
land is based on Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1973, 
p. 99. 
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Association, and imports of cereals and sugar. Loans under the 
two credit programmes are made only to large scale growers of 
wheat and hybrid maize, as discussed elsewhere with respect to 
GRM advances. 
1 
The cooperative banking structure in Kenya has provided the 
most startling example of private domestic savings mobilisation 
among small farmers. 
2 
The Cooperative Savings Scheme (CSS) was 
started on a pilot basis in 1970 in the Kiambu Coffee Growers' 
Cooperative Union of primary coffee marketing societies. By the 
end of 1973 it had expanded to include seven unions, and savings 
account balances approximated Sh 36.9 million while the number of 
accounts stood at 112,500. Table IV-6 shows the growth of CSS 
from 1970 to 1973.3 
The bookkeeping mechanics of CSS are simple. Cooperative 
societies maintain an account for each member. Prior to the intro- 
duction of CSS these accounts were used simply to record payments 
made for crop deliveries and certain other transactions of the 
member with his society. Payments for crops were disbursed on 
fixed dates at specified local places, such as coffee pulping 
factories owned by primary societies. With CSS, introduced only 
with a majority vote of the membership of each society in par- 
ticipating unions, the function of these accounts was extended 
to allow the member to leave a portion of his crop delivery pro- 
ceeds on deposit, in his account, with the union with which his 
society is affiliated. This extension of function involved 
majority acceptance of a minimum balance requirement, generally 
Sh 50, to be accumulated in coffee societies over up to five 
payouts at Sh 10 per payout, and was accompanied by the provision 
of other facilities, such as the establishment of a banking office 
1. See pp. 193 ff. 
2. Further details are found in Von Pischke, J. D., "A Penny 
Saved.... Kenya's Cooperative Savings Scheme and Some Related 
Aspects of Rural Finance. " Working Paper 204, Institute for 
Development Studies, University of Nairobi, January 1975.49 pp. 
3. The rate of increase in savings mobilisation in unions where 
CSS was already established appears to have diminished in 1974/75 
according to partial data contained in The;. No. rdic Project for 
Cooperative Assistance to Kenya, Annual Report 1975. Nairobi, 
10 January 1976. (mimeo) Appendix 5. 
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at the union headquarters at which cash deposits and withdrawals 
can be effected, generally six days a week, and at which a very 
limited number of other banking transactions may be conducted. 
A striking feature of balance behaviour in CSS is that the 
required minimum balance has been exceeded quite rapidly by the 
average balance per account, not requiring retentions from five 
payouts to reach the required level. At the end of 1972, for 
example, average balances per account stood at Sh 148, while a 
year later the level was Sh 328. Examination of the records of 
individual societies also indicates that within two years, at the 
longest, following the introduction of CSS over half of the members 
succeed in maintaining balances in excess of the required minimum 
at the low point in total balances which occurs just prior to a 
payout. Given that perhaps 15% of the members of most societies 
appear on the basis of account activity to be inactive, this 
statistic suggests the existence of a high degree of willingness 
by farmers with a cash crop to save by accumulating financial 
assets other than currency, providing scope for intermediaries 
with appropriate cost and revenue structures and appropriate 
types of financial liabilities and-services to sell to small 
farmers. 
It should be noted that the type of saving done by probably 
the majority of CSS account holders is not yet of the pattern 
generally associated with savings accounts maintained with 
commercial banks, building societies or savings banks. The 
turnover of account balances is relatively high. As of 1973 and 
1974 it appeared. that members were leaving their payouts in their 
accounts for an average of between 60 and 90 days. Nevertheless, 
resource mobilisation does not require the long term point of 
view or motivation. It simply involves the institutionalisation 
of funds, an expansion of money holders' interaction with 
financial intermediaries. 
CSS has been so successful in mobilising rural savings -- 
and it is an entirely rural programme -- that it has generated 
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funds for employment elsewhere in the cooperative structure. 
Table IV-7 indicates the extent to which savings accumulated 
in CSS through the end of 1973 exceeded the amount of credit 
outstanding under the Cooperative Production Credit Scheme. 
CSS resources not required for funding CPCS loans to members 
and for till money, etc., in union banking section offices are 
pooled at the Cooperative Bank, the apex financial institution 
in the cooperative structure. With the expansion of CPCS into 
medium term lending in 1974 it was expected by cooperative 
planners that the difference between CSS savings balances and 
CPCS loans outstanding would be reduced, and that in the latter 
half of the 1970's the two schemes would be more nearly equal 
in balance sheet terms. 
Two minor suppliers of agricultural credit offer examples of 
alternative approaches to the mobilisation of private domestic 
savings. The Pyrethrum Board is in principle owned by those 
licenced to deliver pyrethrum, i. e., the growers and growers' 
cooperatives, and thus involves an element of resource mobili- 
sation through the issue of its shares along the lines of co- 
operative finance. However, Pyrethrum Board shares are trans- 
ferable and are traded from time to time in Nairobi through a 
share dealer. As of the end of September 1973 the par value of 
Pyrethrum Board stock stood at Sh 14.1 million, having increased 
by Sh 3.2 million over the previous five years. 
1 
The Kenya Farmers' Association has for many years accepted 
deposits from members and from the public, although it does not 
solicit these deposits at all vigorously. In fact, KFA appears 
virtually passive as a recipient of these funds. At the time 
that the rate paid by commercial banks on savings accounts was 
4%, KFA was offering 5%. The utility of these funds to KFA 
rests on the fact that they carry a lower interest obligation 
than bank overdrafts, which are traditionally heavily used by KFA. 
1. The Pyrethrum Board of Kenya and the Pyrethrum Board, Annual 
Report and Accounts for the respective periods. 
293 
Table IV-7. A Comparison of Cooperative Savings Scheme (CSS) 
Balances and Cooperative Production Credit Scheme 
(CPCS) Loans Outstanding, 1970-1973 
(Sh 000) 
e ý 
30 Nov. 31 December 
Union Members' Accounts- - 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Kiambu Savings balances 1,053 2,308 4,514 9,080 
Loans outstanding 2,167 5,081 1,790 3,630 
Net savings (1,114) (2,774) 2,724 5,450 
Embu Savings balances 589 1,458 
Loans outstanding 701 688 
Net savings (112) 769 
Machakos Savings balances 2,084 4,500 
Loans outstanding 561 1,000 
Net savings 1,523 3,500 
Murang'a Savings balances 3,946 13,400 
Loans outstanding 1,916 4,400 
Net savings 2,030 9,000 
Kiri- Savings balances 1,180 5,000 
nyaga Loans outstanding 796 1,400 
Net savings 384 3,600 
Other Savings balances 3,450 
CSS Loans outstanding 1,050 
Unions Net savings 2,400 
Total Savings balances 1,053 2,308 12,314 36,890 
CSS Loans outstanding 2,167 5,081 5,765 12,170 
Unions Net savings (1,114) (2,774) 6,549 24,720 
Non-CSS Loans outstanding 3,456 2,299 2,540 
Unions 
Total CSS savings balances 
less CPCS loans 
outstanding (1,114) (6,: 230) 4,250 22,180 
Refer to footnotes to Table IV-6 on p. 291, which also apply 
to this Table. 
e/ Under the Members' Accounts heading, savings balances refer 
to balances accumulated under the Cooperative Savings Scheme, 
while loans outstanding refer to amounts outstanding under the 
Cooperative Production Credit Scheme. 
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These accounts probably are included in the aggregated "unsecured 
loans" heading on KFA balance sheets, which have amounted to be- 
tween Sh 2 million and Sh 3 million in the years just prior to 
1975. The presumption must be that these accounts are rather few 
in number and not large in the aggregate relative to the scale of 
KFA's finances, as suggested by total assets of almost Sh 100 
million as of 31 March 1973.1 No published data is available on 
the administrative cost to KFA of maintaining these accounts, 
although KFA's computerised accounting system may enable the 
provision of this service at a very small marginal. cost. One 
wonders whether this little-known function of KFA did not begin 
as a service to European farmers in the pioneering days of Euro- 
pean penetration when commercial banking facilities were not 
readily available to some European settlers, in a manner remi- 
niscent of the circumstances in which merchant banks were spawned 
in Europe several hundred years ago. 
Several other types of financial institutions operating in 
Kenya also mobilise funds in the domestic market for local lending, 
some of which is to farmers. While such lending is primarily to 
large scale agriculture, although not in the aggregate of much 
quantitative significance, these lenders deserve brief mention. 
East African Acceptances, a finance company owned by Standard 
Bank, Arbuthnot Latham of London and Brooke Bond Liebig, is 
mentioned by Dillon as engaging in medium term lending (three to 
five years) to industry and agriculture, as well as acting as 
managing secretaries for large agricultural companies to which 
they also extend short term credit. 
2 
East African Acceptances 
is also involved in the provision of short term facilities to 
coffee estates under the large farm rehabilitation project funded 
primarily by the World Bank. 
Several other finance companies of various types also issue 
1. The Kenya Farmers' Association (Cooperative) Ltd., Directors 
Report and Statement of Accounts 1972-1973. P. 6. 
2. Dillon, B., "Financial Institutions in Kenya 1964-1971: A 
Preliminary Analysis. " Working Paper 61, institute for Develop- 
ment Studies, University of Nairobi, September 1972. pp. 15-16. 
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credit to farmers and provide other facilities useful to agri- 
culture. Hire purchase is one type of service such companies 
offer. 
The capital and liabilities sides of combined balance sheets 
constructed by Dillon for hire purchase companies and for the 
commercial finance companies indicate that the overwhelming 
majority of their resources come from local sources, although it 
is entirely possible that a portion of the local sources noted 
in capital accounts may have been funded externally. 
1 
No 
statistics are readily available to indicate the proportion 
of the assets of these institutions outstanding to the agri- 
cultural sector or the importance of agriculture as a source 
of funds for these intermediaries. The total credit outstanding 
from hire purchase companies in 1971 was roughly Sh 120 million 
according to Dillon, while finance companies' credit approximated 
Sh 45 million. 
2 
Central Bank data indicates that the credit out- 
standing to the private sector from private non-bank intermediaries 
in the formal sector trebled between 1971 and 1975.3 
C. Loan Collection Rates Achieved by Selected Agricultural Lenders 
Any discussion of lenders' sources of funds is incomplete 
without some attention to the turnover of loan portfolios. 
4 As 
1. Ibid., Appendix and Notes. 
2. Ibid., pp. A2, Dl. 
3. Ninth Annual Report, 1975. p. 42. 
4. No attempt is made here to construct flow of funds statements 
for the major lenders dealt with in this chapter as the points to 
be made for present purposes do not require that level of analysis 
for verification. To construct such statements would be a large 
task and involve many data problems. To be fully instructive it 
would require some measure or estimation of turnover rather than 
simply the net changes in different account headings from year to 
year as shown on financial statements. Flow of funds statements 
for major classes of financial institutions in Kenya have been 
developed on the conventional net changes basis by Dillon, B., op. 
cit., and the subject should be explored in detail by that re- 
searcher's forthcoming PhD dissertation to be submitted to Yale 
University. 
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loans mature and are repaid, resources are made available for 
the issue of new loans. A lender's success in recovering loans 
as they fall due will therefore be a major determinant of the 
supply of funds which the lender will have at his disposal in 
the long run. While some losses are to be expected, and are 
in fact a tribute to the lender's willingness to take risks, the 
margins upon which many types of financial institutions customarily 
operate are such that a failure to collect a relatively small pro- 
portion of total loans falling due can have very serious impli- 
cations for the intermediary's future standing, as noted previously 
in the discussion of credit rationing. 
1 
1. Problems of Measurement 
Three types of data problems compromise attempts to analyse 
the repayment performance of agricultural borrowers in Kenya. The 
first is simply that some key intermediaries have not been capable 
of keeping tight accounting records. Evidence for this assertion 
consists of the liberal use of suspense accounts, delays in postings 
and the consequent tardiness of the publication of annual reports 
and accounts. The reports of an apparently fearless Auditor 
General which are reproduced with the accounts of some public 
sector institutions also contain suggestions of this sort, although 
most of his observations are of a routine nature. The extent to 
which published financial data misrepresent the actual position 
would appear, intuitively, to be a function of the level of 
accounting performance achieved. (By "actual position" is meant 
the position which would be indicated by statements produced at 
a professional standard of accounting performance. ) 
The second problem of measurement is that the particular 
emphasis of this study may not be identical to those of the 
managements of the various lenders studied. This is in no way 
a criticism of these managements, for it must be assumed that 
their information systems have been developed with an eye to 
1. See pp. 143-144. 
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economy to give them the data they deem useful and no other. 
Commercial bankers, for example, may not feel it worthwhile in 
terms of accounting time and energy to produce separate per- 
formance data for agricultural loans. As the researchers' re- 
quirements vary from those of the manager, so would the accounting 
systems best suited for each. 
The third problem in measuring repayment performance is 
one of interpretation and comparison. Two lenders reporting 
the same collection ratio may not be achieving the same level 
of performance because accountancy provides a number of choices 
to those who wish to compute a collection ratio. The general 
case and a complex case serve to illustrate the range. The 
general case is simply 
C 
R 
Mn 
n 
(1) 
where Rn is the collection ratio for period n, generally expressed 
as a percentage, Cn is the volume of collections or repayments 
received during period n, and Mn is the volume of loans or install- 
ments maturing, i. e., falling due, within period n. 
The complex case may be represented as 
R- 
MCPýn 
+ Cin Zn - 4n 
n MPn + Min + An-1 - Zn 
(2) 
where Cpn refers to collections of principal during period n, 
Cin refers to collections of interest during period n, 
Zn refers to loans renewed or rescheduled during period n, 
Qn denotes prepayments included in C Pn and C in, 
M refers to amounts maturing during period n, with sub- 
scripts as for C in the numerator, and 
n-1 denotes amounts in arrears at the close of the previous 
period. 
Present purposes require no more than a realisation that 
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collection ratios should be interpreted as specifying no more 
than relative orders of magnitude unless the exact basis of 
computation is given. With these caveats in mind, it remains 
to examine loan repayment performance in Kenyan agriculture. 
2. The Repayment Performance of Large Scale Agriculture 
Repayment of seasonal Guaranteed Minimum Return scheme 
advances for the production of wheat and maize appears to have 
varied widely over the nine years ending in 1971.1 Comparing 
annual advances with repayments received during each of the 
financial years in question, the collection ratio ranged from 
76% to 103%, with a mean of 88%. Two analysts of GMR's financial 
performance indicated in 1972 that the ultimate recovery ratio for 
a given year's advances, with interest, exceeded 95% after five 
years. 
2 
The precise analysis of GMR performance is complicated 
by the lag in the payment of insurance claims by the Treasury, 
which permits the accumulation of a backlog of arrears, 
3 
and 
also by various accounting problems which appear to limit the 
amount and utility of data which is. available. Lax administration 
and inefficient procedures have also been taken advantage of by 
certain borrowers, as for example, by borrowing under different 
identities in different years so that their access to GMR funds 
is maintained in spite of non-repayment of amounts overdue not 
related to crop insurance claims which remain unsettled. Fol- 
lowing a large accumulation of arrears in the early 1970's, AFC 
began to take significant steps towards reforming GMR administra- 
tive arrangements. 
1. Von Pischke, J. D., A Review. p. 79. 
2. Birgegard, Lars, and Ralph Campbell, "The Agricultural Finance 
Corporation -- 1967 to 1971 to 1975. " Nairobi, AFC, 1971. (mimeo) 
p. 7. This calculation may be based on amounts due written down 
to reflect losses, thus overstating collection performance. No 
renewals of G, IIt credit overdue are given. 
3. Unpublished AFC data indicate that towards the end of November 
1973 claims validated but not paid amounted to about Sh 1.4 million, 
while claims submitted but not approved amounted to about Sh 1.8 
million. Arrears outstanding from periods before 1973 stood at 
more than Sh 80 million at that time. 
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The repayment performance experienced by KFA on its credit 
accounts appears to be within the realms of commercial viability, 
although KFA's published accounts provide insufficient information 
concerning amounts overdue to justify a definitive statement of 
portfolio performance. Bad debt provisions on KFA balance sheets 
between 1966 and 1972 ranged from 5% to 7% of total amounts due 
from members and other debtors, while the amounts written off 
ranged from roughly Sh 200,000 to Sh 1.8 million, averaging about 
Sh 600,000 per year. Against total credit sales of perhaps Sh 80 
million annually towards the end of that period, loss experience 
would not appear to have been excessive, assuming that arrears 
have not been permitted to accumulate in the portfolio. 
The situation with respect to commercial bank collection 
performance on loans to large scale agriculture cannot be specified 
precisely from information readily available to the public or to 
the Central Bank. There would appear to be little reason to 
suspect that loans to large farmers, ranchers and to plantations 
are of a quality grossly inferior to the general run. of commercial 
bank loans. Commercial bankers interviewed by the writer on 
numerous occasions provided no indications that loans outstanding 
to large farmers are especially troublesome, and there is apparently 
no local financial folklore concerning big losses suffered by the 
banks through lending to large farmers. Therefore, it appears 
that bank lending to large farmers is conducted on a commercially 
attractive basis. 
AFC collection performance on working capital loans to 
ranches and feedlots is also difficult to assess because of the 
use of the overdraft system. Balances outstanding fluctuate and 
turn over in a manner greatly infleunced by herd fluctuations and 
turnover. There need not be an annual "clean up" of these 
facilities because the production cycle of the borrowers is not 
characterised by annual fluctuations of this nature. 
AFC loans for development and land purchase have been typified 
by collection ratios, defined as amounts falling due during the 
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period plus amounts overdue at the start of the period as the 
denominator and collections received as the numerator, of approx- 
imately 80%. 
1 
However, for the large scale KFW programme col- 
lections at the end of 1971 stood at less than 20% of the amount 
billed. If the KFW figures are adjusted to remove billings which 
fell due at the end of 1971 the ratio would have stood at about 
40%, still indicating a low level of collection performance. 
3. The Repayment Performance of Settlement Agriculture 
Cumulative loan collection ratios as of the close of the 
accounting years of the Department of Settlement between 1965 
and 1971 were as follows: 
2 
through 30 June 1965 47% 
through 30 June 1966 46% 
through 30 June 1967 58% 
through 30 June 1968 60% 
through 30 June 1969 59% 
through 31 December 1970 53% 
through 31 December 1971 50% 
The annual collection rates, computed as collections during the 
year as a proportion of amounts billed during the year, appear 
to have ranged from about 39% to about 64%. 
3 
For the settlement 
portfolio as a whole, collections had failed to equal the amount 
of interest due from settlers by the end of 1971.4 As of 30 June 
1971 only 1,214 of the 31,251 plotholders billed were current in 
their payments, although there were notte billed who had not made 
at least one repayment. 
5 
Thus, it is apparent that the largest 
public sector creditor of the agricultural sector, the Agricultural 
1. Birgegard, Lars, and Ralph Campbell, "The Agricultural Finance 
Corporation: A Set of Revised Projections. " Tables 2,7. AFC 
rarely renew overdue balances. 
2. Republic of Kenya, Department of Settlement, Annual Report 
1970. p. 59; Annual Report 1971. p. 42. These collection 
ratios are computed as collections minus prepayments divided by 
amounts billed. Settlement loan arrears are never renewed. 
3. Von Pischke, J. D., A Review. p. 18. 
4. Ibid., pp. 18,20. 
5. Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Lands and Settlement, Settle- 
ment Fund Trustees, "Statement of Repayment Position as at 30 
June 1971. " Nairobi, Department of Settlement, 1971. 
(mimeo) 
p. 1. 
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Settlement Fund, has achieved loan collection levels far below 
the level required for financial viability. Although commercial 
viability was perhaps never expected of the Fund, it is obvious 
that loan repayments have been grossly below the level projected 
by the installment schedules on loans to settlers. 
4. The Repayment Performance of Small Scale Agriculture 
AFC collection ratios on small scale loans have varied 
greatly. Collections as a percent of amounts falling due under 
the IDA scheme approximated 75% in 1969/70 and 1971/72 according 
to Birgegard and Campbell, while comparative figures for the KFW 
small scale scheme for 1970/71 showed a 90% collection ratio, and 
those for the AFC small scale scheme ranged from 38% in 1967/69 
to more than 60% in 1970/71.1 During one quarter of 1974 the 
arrears on the IDA scheme were actually reduced by collections 
in excess of billings, suggesting that AFC's efforts to rationalise 
its loan administration and accounting procedures appears to be 
having the desired positive impact on financial performance. On 
the side of loan administration those efforts included a quantum 
leap in the number of foreclosure notices served on the most 
blatant defaulters. However, it would appear that AFC still 
has a considerable distance to travel before its small scale 
loan activities will be placed on a financially sound basis. 
Loan repayment performance under the Cooperative Production 
Credit Scheme is not centrally monitored and has not been an area 
of great concern to the cooperative authorities. The credit 
rationing mechanism employed by CPCS is such that loans are 
available only to active members of primary marketing societies. 
The short term nature of the facilities also creates an incentive 
for borrowers to play within the rules of the system so that their 
future access to funds is not jeopardised. An additional means of 
generating good repayment performance lies in the coffee payment 
1. "The Agricultural Finance Corporation: A Set of Revised 
Projections. " Table 2. AFC rarely renew overdue loans. 
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system, which in many cases involves a considerable lag between 
a member's delivering his coffee and the final payment to the 
member for the delivery. With substantial amounts in the pay- 
ments pipeline, CPCS loans are often in fact no more than ad- 
vances against deliveries already effected. 
While it is probable that CPCS loans are largely ultimately 
recoverable, barring catastrophic drops in prices paid for coffee 
and other cooperative commodities, the accounting information 
systems of the unions did nqt appear as of early 1975 to provide 
collection ratios as a measure of CPCS performance. In Murang'a 
in 1973 it was reported that about 45% of the union's portfolio 
was in arrears, although those responsible for its administration 
were confident that the amounts due would be recovered without 
difficulty in the normal course of events. 
1 
Commercial bank collection performance data for small 
agricultural loans are not available because the banks do not 
maintain their records on a basis which readily yields this 
information disaggregated by sector. However, several commercial 
bankers interviewed indicated to the writer that such loans in 
general achieve a break-even level of performance, defined as 
losses in the form of amounts uncollectable roughly equal to 
interest earned, i. e., around 8-10% per year. This comparison 
suggests that the banks are not directly compensated for the time 
and administrative overheads required to provide these facilities 
to small farmers. 
In certain instances the banks have incurred quite dis- 
appointing losses on small farm loans in specific geographic 
areas. The local financial folklore includes tales of experi- 
ences of this type by each of the three large banks as a result 
of their experimenting with small scale agricultural loans in 
response to government pressure and the banks' desire to attempt 
to sound out potential new markets. 
1. Von Pischke, J. D., Credit Use and Development. pp. 34-37. 
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Loans to small farmers by the various crop authorities 
have produced a variety of collection experiences. These range 
from the recovery performance of KTDA, which succeeds in collecting 
over 99% of amounts due under its fertiliser credit scheme, to 
generally disappointing results achieved by certain other para- 
statal bodies. 
S. The Impact of Repayment Performance 
The impact of repayment performance on the prospects for 
rural development are large, as indicated at various points in 
this paper. For example, it is apparent that there is a cost to 
the community of the abuse of credit access and of flaws in the 
design of farm credit schemes which result in a use of resources 
which diverges from the optimum, whether specified in social or 
economic or financial terms. In the context of this discussion, 
however, only those aspects of repayment performance which affect 
the performance of financial institutions are considered. These 
effects are summarised under two headings: institutional develop- 
ment and access to rural financial services. 
a. Institutional development 
The impact of poor repayment on institutional development 
may be illustrated by considering the 80% collection rate achieved 
by AFC, as computed by Birgegard and Campbell. Their repayment 
ratio cited here is computed simply as collections in any given 
period as a proportion of interest and principal falling due 
during the period. 
1 
Assume the following: loans amounting to 
9 units are disbursed annually at the start of each period and 
fall due at the close of the period in which they are disbursed. 
Interest is charged at 11% per period, but no interest is charged 
on amounts in arrears. Collections are achieved on 80% of the 
amounts of principal and interest falling due each period. The 
development of a portfolio with these characteristics procceds as 
1. "The Agricultural Finance Corporation: A Set of Revised 
Projections. " Table. 2. 
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follows: 
Arrears 
Carried Total 
Period Disbursed Due Collected Forward Arrears 
1 9 10 8 2 2 
2 9 10 8 2 4 
3 9 10 8 2 6 
4 9 10 8 2 8 
5 9 10 8 2 10 
This type of performance can be sustained only with re- 
course to other funds to keep putting into the hole. These may 
come from cross-subsidisation from a profitable line, from 
Treasury subvention, from continued access to the beneficience 
of external donors to fund new lending, etc. Without such re- 
course, the capital base of the loan scheme is exhausted by the 
accumulation of arrears. It is apparent that if the loan scheme 
were established with an initial and once-for-all funding and 
was designed to be self-sufficient, the 80% collection ratio as 
defined above would lead to its rapid decline: 
Principal & Available 
Interest for 
Period Disbursed Due Collected Relending 
19 10 88 
288.9 7.1 7.1 
3 7.1 7.9 6.3 6.3 
4 6.3 7.0 5.6 5.6 
5 5.6 6.2 5.0 5.0 
6 5.0 5.5 4.4 4.4 
Under these assumptions, the initial seasonal lending programme 
would be halved in size by the end of the sixth period. 
A financial institution which followed conservative account- 
ing procedures in this situation would write off uncollected 
amounts each year equal to 20% of the amount disbursed. These 
losses would exceed the amount of interest earned on an accrual 
basis, equal to 11% of disbursements under these assumptions, and 
hence a loss would be shown on the operation of the scheme. 
Financial institutions which consistently shown losses are in 
a poor position to attract funds in the market on their own strength. 
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Thus, private sector financial institutions dependent upon 
the quality of their lending performance as a means of securing 
resources will generally not be willing to undertake lending 
programmes which show little promise of being viable unless such 
programmes are small in relation to their total portfolio and carry 
some compensating benefit to other portions of their operations. 
Public sector lenders may be able to sustain consistent 
losses for a very long period. This posture requires dependence 
upon the Treasury in some respect. Perhaps the dependence extends 
only to Treasury guarantees of funds entrusted to such lenders by 
the market, as in the case of Kenya's Cereals and Sugar Finance 
Corporation. It may, however, take the form of dependence on 
Treasury rather than market funding, either in the form of loans, 
as is generally the case with AFC, or in the form of grants. This 
level of dependence appears to involve a cost in terms of the 
quality of lending decisions, if AFC's performance provides any 
indications which may sustain generalisation. The cost has two 
dimensions. One is the scope and quality of information which 
is available to AFC decision makers on a routine basis. If AFC 
were dependent upon rural people for a significant portion of its 
resources it would know more about the rural economy than it does 
simply from its activities as a lender. The other dimension is 
the relative absence of discipline applied to loan decision making. 
The Treasury is no doubt a more lenient source of direction and, 
correction than the market, and one suspects that the application 
of market discipline to decision makers produces better decisions 
and decision makers in the long run, not so much because of the 
negative sanctions on poor performance, but because of the greater 
scope and encouragement of creativity by the market than by bureau- 
cratic administration. 
With losses eroding capital available for lending, without 
access to funds in the market and without a very demanding hand 
on the till, financial institutions are hardly able to expand 
rapidly unless they have access to outside funds on public sector 
terms. When access to such funds is provided, the result may be 
that the managerial capacity of the institution is overwhelmed, as 
306 
0 
suggested by AFC's accounting difficulties and related problems 
which suggest that the size of the portfolio outran the pace of 
management development. With accounting problems of the magni- 
tude which characterised AFC through perhaps 1974 or 1975, 
management becomes preoccupied with housekeeping problems rather 
than with issues of long run policy and growth. Such preoccupation, 
however necessary, may have its cost in terms of long run growth 
foregone -- although of course long run growth is also repressed 
until a financial institution has its housekeeping in good order, 
too. Thus, poor repayment performance retards institutional 
development as well as being a symptom of a low level of 
institutional development. 
b. The development of rural financial services 
Poor repayment performance on agricultural loans is one 
factor which may discourage lenders from expanding their activities 
in rural areas. While poor prospects for lending profitably may 
not entirely discourage banks, for example, from expanding into 
the countryside to obtain deposits for deployment in urban areas 
of the modern sector, 
I 
the difficulties in rural lending doubt- 
less have some impact on the type and variety of financial services 
to which rural people have ready access. 
Poor repayment performance increases the administrative costs 
of lending as well as posing a threat to the recovery of resources 
committed in the form of balances in arrears. Given the interest 
rate repression imposed on formal sector lenders, rural loan port- 
folios are relatively or absolutely unattractive. This unattrac- 
tiveness is reflected in the standards of credit rationing 
1. M. D. McWilliam suggests that the commercial banks' rapid 
expansion of branch office locations from 12 in 1949 to 65 
locations in 1960 was in response to the growth of monetised 
African economic activity in general, as reflected in a growing 
wage bill, and in an increasing number of African trading and 
commercial farming enterprises. See "Banking in Kenya, 1950- 
1960, " The East African Economics Review. 9,1, June 1962. 
p. 24. 
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employed by such lenders and in the existence of specialised 
lenders which have no alternative but to lend in rural areas. 
Credit standards employed by commercial banks largely restrict 
their rural lending to businessmen who can provide reasonable 
security and a reasonable assurance of repayment, and to part- 
time farmers who have modern sector jobs, in the civil service 
for example, in addition to title deeds to land. The Agri- 
cultural Settlement Fund and the Agricultural Finance Corporation 
are examples of specialised lenders with no alternative but 
agricultural lending, created to fill gaps in the financial 
infrastructure beyond the margins of profitability limited 
by interest rate repression. 
The extreme selectivity forced upon formal lenders operating 
in rural areas may affect more than simply the availability of 
credit for rural people. To the extent it discourages the ex- 
pansion of intermediaries in rural areas it deprives the rural 
population of access to a wide range of financial services, in- 
cluding deposit facilities, money transfer mechanisms and safe- 
keeping facilities. This deprivation and selectivity are obscured 
by the wide geographical coverage of banks and the Post Office in 
Kenya. Few small farms would be more than 30 miles from an office 
of some sort of formal sector financial intermediary. However, 
the commercial banks have minimum savings account balance require- 
ments of Sh 300 and above which discourage many small savers from 
using deposit facilities, even though certain banks are lenient in 
enforcement and several waive the requirement for the operning of 
accounts with deposits below the minimum on the understanding that 
no withdrawals will be permitted until the minimum balance is ex- 
ceeded through the accumulation of several small deposits. 
The Post Office is also widely spread and provides savings 
and money transfer facilities within the reach of many rural people. 
The minimum balance requirement is Sh 50, and that amount and two 
photos are the main requirements for opening an account. The 
greater use of these facilities may be discouraged by the narrow 
range of financial services provided and also by lengthy queues 
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in urban post offices at which the majority of transfers 
originate or terminate. 
That the rural market for small scale savings and loans 
was not fully tapped by the facilities existing in 1974 is 
suggested by the rapid growth of the Cooperative Savings Scheme. 
An unspecified portion of the growth of CSS of course results 
from its performance as a competitor at the small scale end of 
the financial market, drawing business away from the Post Office 
and commercial banks. However, there are substantial grounds for 
assuming that a significant portion of CSS growth was innovative 
in the sense that it brought savings facilities to many who did 
not use such services previously or who would have ceased to have 
access to such facilities with the introduction in the early 1970's 
of the commercial bank minimum balance requirements mentioned 
above. By the end of 1973 there were approximately 112,500 CSS 
accounts, which indicates that perhaps as many as 10% of Kenya's 
rural households were being served. 
The profitability of the provision of cooperative financial 
services through CPCS, CSS and credit sales, etc., has. not been 
measured on a detailed or consistent basis by the Cooperative 
authorities. However, there are grounds for hoping that they 
could be commercially viable by conventional accounting standards. 
For a start, the interest rates paid by borrowers are high relative 
to those charged by banks, usually being at least 10% and ranging 
up to 12%. Interest paid on savings accounts is nominally equal 
to that paid by the banks and the Post office, although the non- 
payment of interest on accounts with only the minimum balance and 
the rounding of balances downwards to the nearest Sh 20 multiple 
for purposes of interest calculation no doubt lowers the effective 
rate significantly, given the size of the average balance. Delays 
in crediting interest at year end also reduce the amount of interest 
payable during the period between the end of the year and the 
addition of interest to the depositor's balance. (Delays of this 
type were noted by the writer during visits to several unions. ) 
The operating costs of CSS are also small in the sense that the 
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commodity marketing activities of unions require an accounting 
staff in any event. The addition of CSS to the activities of a 
union thus requires only a marginal bookkeeping staff increment. 
Overheads are minimised by the humble nature of most union banking 
offices and by the relatively small number of cashiers or counter 
clerks required. On peak days, additional staff can be drawn from 
other activities. 
But even if cooperative banking showed an accounting profit, 
the economic costs are such that shadow pricing would almost 
certainly seriously affect the reckoning, even if only moderate 
amounts of such costs were imputed for CSS. Cooperative banking 
receives certain subsidies. One of these is a major service, for 
which unions are not charged, which consists of the supervision 
accorded by the Ministry of Cooperative Development, including 
specialists from the Nordic Project for Cooperative Assistance to 
Kenya. This supervision is much, much more detailed and inno- 
vative than that exercised over the commercial banks by the Central 
Bank and other authorities, which puts the commercial banks and 
other financial intermediaries at a disadvantage in competing with 
cooperative banking. However, it may be argued that the super- 
vision requirements for cooperative banking are also marginal 
relative to the level of resources devoted to cooperative super- 
vision as a whole. 
6. Reasons for Poor Repayment Performance 
Agricultural loan repayment performance in Kenya varies 
greatly, as shown in Table IV-8. Performance ranges from the 
50% level achieved by the settlement authorities through the 
75-80% range typical of AFC programmes to the upper limit of 
virtually 100% realised by KTDA on its fertiliser loan scheme. 
What factors contribute to this wide range of performance? 
a. Project design 
The impact of unrealistic project design on repayment per- 
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Table IV-8. Estimated Repayment Rates for Selected Lenders 
and Farm Credit Schemes in Kenya 
Approximate 
a/ Scheme or Lender Repayment Rate- 
Kenya Tea Development Authority fertiliser loans 99% 
Pyrethrum Marketing Board credit to 
growers' cooperatives 99% 
Cooperative Bank CPCS lending to cooperatives 99%b/ 
Commercial banks' loans to African farmers 927ix' 
Guaranteed Minimum Return Scheme 75X 
d/ 
Agricultural Finance Corporation 75% 
Agricultural Settlement Fund 50% 
a/ The repayment rate is computed as: 
collections of principal and interest per period 
principal and interest falling due per period, 
including interest on arrears 
b/ The 99% applies to repayments to the ultimate lender, the 
Cooperative Bank, by cooperative organisations participating 
in the Cooperative Production Credit Scheme. Repayments by 
members to their societies are no doubt considerably lower in 
many cases. 
c/ The commercial bank performance estimate is probably in- 
flated by the occasional renegotiation of loans in arrears, 
which has the effect of reducing the denominator in the formula 
given in footnote a/ above. 
d/ Birgegard, Lars, and Ralph Campbell, "The Agricultural 
Finance Corporation -- 1967 to 1971 to 1975. " Nairobi, AFC, 
1971. (mimeo) demonstrated that recoveries for a given 
year's GMR advances approximated 997. after five years, although 
this may have been after certain debts were written off or 
written down. However, there is evidence that this record 
worsened considerably by 1975. As of 1974 no GMR balances 
had been written off since 1967. 
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formance is most notable in the case of settlement credit. 
Until the Presidential proclamation in 1967 of a two year 
grace period for all new settlers with respect to loan re- 
payments, settlers were expected to pay their first install- 
ment between six and 12 months after acquiring their land. In 
contrast to the constant level of installments required twice 
yearly on development and on land purchase loans, model farm 
budgets indicated that settlement farms would not reach full 
production for several years. Many farms were hardly in pro- 
duction at all by the time the first installment fell due, and 
the loan repayment schedules did not allow for any learning curve 
effect on farm cash flows. These problems and those of settlers' 
getting organised for the use of loans are reflected in the fact 
that development loan disbursement was planned to require up to 
18 months in normal circumstances. 
1 
Thus, settlers were in effect 
initially required to pay installments appropriate to the size of 
their development loan limit, not to the amount actually drawn. 
In addition, the realism of a six-monthly billing cycle may be 
questioned on most grounds other than that of administrative 
convenience. Settlers may find it very difficult on managerial, 
psychological and social grounds to accumulate sums adequate for 
twice yearly payments which are relatively large in relation to 
the size of routine financial transactions in the rural economy. 
The Van Arkadie Report summarises the effect of the design of 
loan repayment schedules by noting that "the system and timing 
of billing could not possibly lead to any other result but an 
arrears position. "2 
However great the impact of unrealistic expectations ex- 
pressed in loan repayment scheduling may be on repayment per- 
formance, there is ample evidence that settlement project design 
contained an even more fundamental flaw in the form of farm budgets 
which proved unattainable by the majority of settlers within the 
1. Republic of Kenya, Report of the Mission on Land Settlement 
in Kenya. pp. 152-153. 
2. Ibid., p. 57. 
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period of time envisaged by the architects of settlement. A 
Kenyan source suggests that settlement farmers failed to reach 
target incomes in the mid-1960's for several reasons: 
' 
The 
planners overestimated what the settlers could reasonably be 
expected to achieve, in the sense that target incomes after 
debt servicing were set too high in the early years of a settler's 
development of his holding. Budgets provided little margin for 
error and assumed that farmers would immediately adopt production 
techniques which would produce high yields, the greater portion 
of which would be marketed. In fact, farmers appeared to accord 
highest priority to ensuring that their own household subsistence 
requirements were met, and in doing so tended to diversify their 
production. The settlement budgets contained an emphasis on 
specialisation, often in enterprises new to many settlers, such 
as dairying based on grade cattle, rather than on diversification. 
The investment in certain inputs and capital equipment at 
levels below those projected also retarded the development of 
some farms. This shortfall is attributed to cash constraints on 
the part of settlers, not to supply problems. By using too few 
inputs, by stinting on short and medium term investment, farmers' 
output could not achieve the budgeted levels. The nature of the 
alleged cash constraint does not appear to have been explored in 
detail, although it is obvious that incomes below budgeted levels 
would not be sufficient to meet loan repayments as well as main- 
taining the farmers' use of purchased inputs and providing for 
projected levels of consumption. 
AFC loans to smallholders are subject to fewer of these 
problems. The main use of these loans has been for the purchase 
of in-calf grade stock, which promise to produce a return shortly 
after purchase, save in cases of early mortality. However, most 
AFC smallholder loans have annual installment schedules, and 
hence borrowers may find it quite difficult to accumulate the 
funds required for a large annual installment, especially as AFC 
1. Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 
Statistics Division, An Economic Appraisal of the Settlement 
Schemes 1964/65 - 1967/68. pp. 96-97. 
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does not provide deposit services to its clients. By the mid- 
1970's borrowers were being urged to prepay in small amounts at 
their convenience throughout the year in anticipation of their 
installments, and interest at roughly the loan rate was being 
paid on prepaid balances. However, exhortations to prepay are 
probably not greatly heeded by the majority of borrowers. 
Project design would also appear to contribute to the 
financial success of KTDA and Pyrethrum Marketing Board credit 
schemes and to the unconcern with whatever the CPCS arrears 
position may be. Loans extended under these schemes are limited 
in size, with the limitation being set in relation to past or 
present performance guidelines. As noted above, 
' 
KTDA permits 
growers to obtain on credit a number of bags of fertiliser on 
the basis of one bag per roughly 1,000 mature tea stumps culti- 
vated. CPCS loans to members of coffee societies are limited to 
not more than two-thirds the average value of coffee deliveries 
over the past three years. These types of credit rationing 
devices tend to reduce greatly the possibility that the borrower 
will not have the productive capacity to repay his loan. Indeed, 
CPCS loans are frequently more than covered by amounts due the 
coffee grower in respect of crop deliveries already effected. 
The monopoly marketing channels controlled by each of these 
lenders also helps to ensure a satisfactory repayment record, and 
loan repayments are deducted by the lender from the borrower's crop 
delivery proceeds. Borrowers may try to escape repayment obli- 
gations by delivering under other names or through other farmers, 
etc., but this possibility is minimised by the continuous nature 
of interaction between grower and the marketing channel with 
respect to these crops. Tea is frequently harvested, and picked 
up by KTDA lorries, on a daily cycle; pyrethrum flowers may be 
picked and delivered weekly during the main growing months; and 
coffee is delivered several times during the harvest period. In 
this type of situation the costs to the borrower of repayment 
evasion can be high in terms of inconvenience. The attractiveness 
1. See p. 213. 
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of evasion is reduced by the countervailing desire to ensure 
continued easy access to credit and to the monopsony marketing 
channel. In addition, the limits on these types of credit, 
related to the borrower's productive base, reduce the probability 
that the borrower will attempt to evade repayment because he is 
overindebted. 
Commercial banks are likewise in a position to expect 
reasonable repayment performance because of the multiplicity 
of relationships they have with borrowers. Few loans are issued 
to individuals who do not already have some relationship with the 
bank in question, such as a savings account or perhaps even an 
instruction to their employer (if they are employed in the formal 
sector) to make salary payments directly to a bank account. These 
types of arrangements facilitate the mechanics of timely loan 
collection by banks, while the general insistence on the borrower's 
pledging his land as security provides a means of ultimate control. 
' 
There are also examples in which project design failed to 
gauge accurately the requirements of production relative to the 
managerial performance of farmers. The level of grade cattle 
mortality experienced by smallholder borrowers under the IDA 
scheme appears to constitute one case of this type. While it 
was assumed in project design that an accidental mortality rate 
of 5% would occur with respect to mature stock financed, ex- 
perience led AFC management to adopt the informal rule of thumb 
that 20% of the animals financed would suffer accidental mortality, 
largely from tick-borne diseases. Part of the gap between ex- 
pectations in project design and those that developed during the 
later stages of implementation reflects the fact that tick-borne 
diseases were more endemic than suspected at the time of project 
appraisal, but a portion also may be attributed to farmers' 
inability to provide the management needed to protect grade 
cattle from disease. 
1. Usually -- but one bank in 1974 found itself holding some 
unregistered claims on non-existent plots, thanks to the private 
enterprise of an employee in one District Land Registry. 
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Pineapple loans made by AFC out of IDA funds also met a 
managerial constraint. Successful yields could be achieved 
only with strict adherence to eight husbandry requirements. 
Results proved to be extremely sensitive to failure with 
respect to any single element. Several of these requirements 
were beyond the control of growers, involving others in the 
supply-production-processing chain. 
AFC did relatively little lending in the late 1960's and 
early 1970's for the purchase of tractors by small farmers and 
contractors, so the usual problems associated with achieving 
economic levels of tractor utilisation by borrowers of this 
type have not been experienced to any significant degree. 
The problems which led AFC and the Ministry of Agriculture 
to approach the World Bank for funds for the large farm re- 
habilitation project also appear to have reflected faulty 
expectations related to the land transfer programme. The 
extent to which false expectations might have been a sacrifice 
at the altar of political expediency cannot be assessed here, 
but on the basis of the expectations embodied in the farm budgets 
of the settlement portion of the land transfer programme it 
appears not unreasonable to suspect that there may have been 
some premium on disregarding reality in order to put together 
a project or to effect the orderly transfer of land. Onyonka's 
observations with respect to the financing of the purchase of 
large farms suggests that the down payment requirements were too 
stringent from the point of view of the accumulated resources of 
small groups of farmers who banded together to purchase large 
farms. 
1 
However, the need for rehabilitation indicates that the 
down payment requirements may have been too low in view of the 
problems encountered in repaying the loans which filled the gap 
between down payments and purchase prices. 
1. Onyonka, Z. T., Agricultural Development Banking. 
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With regard to another dimension of project design, it is 
interesting to note that the ranking of lenders by the collection 
performance they achieve is similar to their ranking in terms of 
the opportunity they provide the borrower to establish an enduring 
relationship. The Agricultural Settlement Fund, which provides 
credit on a once-only basis, has the worst record. AFC, which 
issued medium and long term credit only to the bulk of its 
borrowers through the mid-1970's, falls in the middle of the 
collection performance range. Lenders providing seasonal credit, 
renewable annually, achieve the best collection performance. 
The importance of continued access should not be exaggerated, 
as many other factors also influence collection performance. How- 
ever, it is interesting to note the correlation between the promise 
of continuing access to credit and collection performance. On an 
intuitive basis and assuming some propensity to default, it appears 
plausible to ascribe at least some causal relationship to-the 
"relationship factor". 
Inflexibilities built into settlement project design which 
restricted settlers' access to seasonal production credit on a 
regular or on-going basis are alleged to have resulted in the 
inability of some settlers to increase their production and hence 
their loan repayment capacity. 
' 
Because of the unfortunate 
precedents established between settlers and the settlement 
authorities with regard to credit in general, unsecured credit 
to settlers appears to be out of the question. The settlement 
authorities, by their failure to provide short term credit 
themselves or to provide security to another lender to support 
short term credit operations, may not be entirely convinced of 
the seasonal credit shortage hypothesis as an explanation of 
their own collection problems, however. 
1. Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 
Statistics Division, An Economic Appraisal of the Settlement 
Schemes 1964/65 - 1967/68. pp. 94-95. 
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To summarise project design aspects of collection per- 
formance, it appears that collection performance is strongest 
when lending is linked with marketing channels, when the borrower 
is not loaned too large a sum relative to his managerial capacity 
as a husbandman, when loan repayment schedules are harmonious in 
size and timing with the cash flow from the enterprise or enter- 
prises being financed or from the sources at the command of the 
borrower, and when the lender and borrower have an opportunity to 
establish an enduring, multifaceted business relationship. 
b. Debt capacity perspectives 
An alternative way of looking at credit scheme design problems 
is provided by financial theory. The central concept of relevance 
is debt capacity. The specification of debt capacity involves 
objective and subjective inputs. The objective aspects are 
demonstrated in the projection of "free cash flow" from a given 
investment or for a given on-going production activity. Free cash 
flow is defined roughly as the amount of cash available at the 
close of each financial year or production cycle which may be used 
to service debt. Free cash flow should not be confused with 
accounting profit, and is in fact derived from cash flow statements 
which indicate how funds are made available as profits, from the 
liquidation of assets and the accumulation of liabilities, etc., 
and how some portion of these funds is required for the on-going 
operation of the enterprise. These requirements relate to the 
extent to which funds are absorbed by the acquisition of assets 
and the reduction of liabilities, excluding the servicing of the 
debt in question which prompted the calculation. The net sources 
of funds shown by cash flow statements, suitably rearranged, 
constitute free cash flow. 
Debt capacity is a function of projected free cash flow. 
The subjective aspect in the determination of debt capacity of 
course is present in the assumptions upon which free cash flow 
is projected, but is most apparent in the extent to which a 
318 
lender is willing to lend against the projected free cash flow. 
The lender's degree of risk aversion is the most important 
consideration of theoretical interest which contributes to his 
evaluation of the debt capacity embodied in a projection of free 
cash flow. A highly risk averse lender will discount heavily the 
projection, seeking a large margin between debt servicing 
requirements and projected free cash flow. One method of 
discounting heavily is to restrict lending to short maturities, 
so that only the early years in the projection are considered 
relevant. A lower degree of risk aversion would be reflected 
in a lower rate of discount, including a willingness to lend 
at longer maturities. 
1 
To illustrate this simple concept, assume that a project 
involves an initial investment of 100 and has a projected annual 
free cash flow of 20 projected over a 10 year life. The lender 
will attempt to ensure that repayment of loan installments of 
principal and interest would be possible within the range of 
situations which the investor's project is likely to encounter. 
To reflect the probability of adverse occurrences the projected 
free cash flow stream must be adjusted for analytical purposes, 
as the projected annual free cash flow of 20 assumes a constant, 
normal situation. Adverse situations may include economic down- 
turns, an increasingly competitive market, rising raw material 
costs, drought or disease (in the case of agricultural production), 
and so on. The lender may conclude that the free cash flow in 
the projected adverse situation would be only 10, rather than 20. 
In this case the competitive lender who does not wish to be 
subjected to an interruption in the receipt of loan repayments 
may be willing to provide that portion of the initial investment 
of 100 which equals the present value of an annuity of 10 per 
year for 10 years discounted at the rate of interest prevailing 
in the market for such financing. This amount may be defined 
as the debt capacity of the investment. Assuming a 10% interest 
1. This explanation of debt capacity specification simplifies 
greatly. For example, it assumes that lenders are homogeneous 
and follow independent maximising strategies. It also simpli- 
fies the mechanics of free cash flow derivation and ignores 
problems associated with inflation. 
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rate, the debt capacity in this example is roughly 60.1 
The remainder, in this case amounting to 40, of the 
initial investment of 100 (continuing with the simplified 
assumptions inherent in such a brief summary) is considered 
by the lender to involve an equity risk, in the form of variable 
and uncertain returns, which is appropriately borne by the in- 
vestor's own funds. The investor may be willing to accept the 
60 proffered by the lender, in spite of its being substantially 
less than the initial investment of 100, because the lender's 
contribution permits the investor to minimise his own commitment 
of funds to the project. Without incurring any debt, the in- 
vestor must provide the entire 100 -- with debt, his commitment 
is reduced, in this case to 40. 
Further refinement of this simple statement is not required 
here, although it may be worthwhile to note that lenders may 
apply more stringent criteria than suggested here. For example, 
lenders may not be willing to extend credit up to the final 
maturity of 10 years, equal to the project's life as projected 
above. The lender's liability maturity structure and its 
inherent liquidity requirements lead to some degree of risk 
aversion expressed as constraints on the lender's asset maturity 
structure. Also, lenders may be unwilling to lend the investor 
the full amount of the present value of the annuity equal to the 
projected adverse free cash flow, because of the desire to retain 
some flexibility. In the event the project is slow in starting 
or encounters other difficulties which require more funds, the 
lender who can provide additional resources without exhausting 
1. The calculus used by the financier in evaluating debt capacity 
is common to risk minimising strategies: "It would appear to be a 
reasonable -- if not axiomatic -- proposition that subsistence 
cultivators, dependent entirely or almost entirely on the produce 
of their gardens, tend to cultivate an area large enough to ensure 
the food supply in a season of poor yields. Otherwise the community 
would be exposed to frequent privation and grave risk of exterminat- 
ion or dispersal by famine, more especially in regions of uncertain 
and fluctuating rainfall. One would, therefore, expect the pro- 
duction of a 'normal surplus' of food in the average year. " (em- 
phasis added) See Allan, William, The African Husbandman. Edin- 
burgh, Oliver & Boyd, 1967. p. 38. 
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the debt capacity of the investment is in a more favourable 
position than the lender who initially extended credit up to 
the full amount of the investment's debt capacity. The wary 
lender will have developed through experience additional reasons 
for a conservative approach to debt capacity specification. 
As suggested by this simplified illustration and invoking 
the assumption of ceteris paribus, the lender's risks are a 
function of the portion which he provides of the total amount 
of finance used for the investment in question. As the lender's 
portion increases,. the lender faces an increasing probability that 
loan repayments will not be forthcoming as envisaged in the loan 
contract, and the risk of non-repayment according to installment 
schedules is here referred to as an equity risk. 
There is considerable evidence that providers of farm credit 
in Kenya have subjected themselves to equity risks. The case 
of the loans issued by the Agricultural Settlement Fund consti- 
tutes the prime example, as these funded 90-100% of land purchase 
prices and up to 100% of the cash costs of farm development in- 
puts. This risk was diminished to some extent by the long 
maturities involved, giving the borrower the benefit of the 
doubt in terms of the probable rate of inflation and in terms 
of the regenerative nature of livestock enterprises. However, 
the equity risk inherent in such loans is substantial. The 
generally slow growth of settlement farms to maturity, relative 
to farm budget expectations contained in the project design, has 
restricted settlers' free cash flows1 as reflected in some, 
presently unquantified, portion of the massive loan arrears 
on the books of the Agricultural Settlement Fund. 
AFC large scale loans also appear to have exceeded the debt 
capacity of a substantial number of borrowers. A variation on 
the explanation of debt capacity given above serves to illustrate 
this point. Assuming away indivisibilities and returns to size, 
the debt capacity for any particular investment may be validly 
1. Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 
Statistics Division, An Economic Appraisal of the Settlement 
Schemes 1964/65 - 1967/68. pp. 44 ff. 
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related for analytical purposes to the borrower's equity con- 
tribution. Under the simplified assumptions of the initial 
exposition given above, it could be said that for every four 
units of equity capital committed by the borrower-investor, 
the lender would be willing to commit six units of debt. If 
the borrower is not in a position to provide a bona fide four 
units of equity while the borrower contributes six units of 
debt, it is apparent that the proportion of debt to equity 
changes and debt capacity is overburdened. 
This aspect of the overburdening of debt capacity may be 
illustrated most cogently by reference once again to the events, 
as outlined by Onyonka, which led eventually to the large farm 
rehabilitation programme. 
1 
AFC's position was compromised 
relative to the equity capital base of many of its large scale 
borrowers through the following progression: groups of Africans 
banded together to raise sufficient capital to make a down payment 
for a farm in the former Scheduled Areas. The promoters desired 
to obtain a greater degree of control over the purchased farm than 
could be supported by their own equity contributions, and additional 
funds were raised in the form of loans from other Africans. The 
promoters' equity plus these loans were subscribed as the down 
payment, which AFC regarded entirely as an equity commitment. 
To continue using the quantities from the example above, assume 
that AFC was willing to lend six units of debt for every four 
units of equity subscribed. Assume further that the promoters 
provided only half of the funds which AFC treated as an equity 
commitment, raising the other half from informal lenders. Hence, 
the true debt-to-equity ratio was 8: 2 (4-to-i in conventional 
notation) rather than the 6: 4 (1.5-to-1) assumed by AFC. In 
other words, the projected free cash flow would have to service 
one-third more debt (eight units rather than six) than assumed 
by AFC. 
The mathematics of default so inexorably cast at the outset 
1. Onyonka, Z. T., Agricultural Development Banking. pp. 104 ff. 
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were compounded by difficulties, apparently not formally in- 
corporated into AFC's projections, which frequently arose 
because of the technical problems of large farm operation by 
new entrants to large farming and also because of organisational 
problems arising from the committee form of management and 
possible lack of centralised executive responsibility resulting 
from the ownership of the farm by a group, many of whom were 
resident on the land. These difficulties frequently meant that 
the operation of the farm required a larger quantity of funds 
than could be generated internally, which led to further informal 
borrowing by the promoters. 
Faced with demands for repayment from informal lenders, 
the promoters had several choices. One was to use whatever 
free cash flow was available to repay informal loans, thus 
leaving no funds to meet obligations to AFC. The other was 
to permit informal lenders to convert their claim into equity 
by allowing them to join the group of promoters. The possession 
of an equity claim generally carried with it the right to a 
small plot on the farm for oneself or for a member of the equity- 
holder's extended family., and the proliferation of small plots 
as a result of these debt conversions diminished the land available 
for large scale operations, swelled the number of those who could 
dissent in matters of policy and management, and consequently 
reduced the ability of the farm organisation (as opposed to 
individual owners) to generate free cash flow for the repayment 
of loans outstanding from AFC. Other options involved current 
financial expediencies which diminished future free cash flow. 
Further funds might be obtained informally to meet the demands 
of old creditors, compounding the problems outlined above. Or, 
loose assets, such as livestock and machinery, could be sold to 
obtain cash, thus diminishing future production. 
The concept of debt capacity, through its incorporation of 
free cash flow projections, is closely related to the concept of 
the ability to service debt. The ability to service debt refers 
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to the capacity of the borrower to repay interest and principal 
installments as they mature. Another way of approaching the 
repayment problems encountered by settlers and large scale AFC 
borrowers is to say that many of these borrowers did not achieve 
the levels of debt servicing ability projected by lenders in the 
credit decision making process. 
The debt capacity perspective on the relationship between 
debt and equity leads to consideration of the management problems 
faced by borrowers under the small scale loan schemes of AFC, 
under which about 85% of the funds disbursed have been for the 
acquisition of grade cattle and related investment goods by 
borrowers. To meet the repayment schedules specified, generally 
five equal annual installments, a certain level of production 
must be achieved. The biological aspects of these levels of 
production may be described in terms of the avoidance of accidental 
mortality and the attainment of calving intervals of no more than 
so many months. In addition, supplies of dry matter and water 
are required for milk production and for maintenance. The exact 
values in each case will of course depend on the host of factors 
which determine the borrower's free cash flow: milk prices, 
consumption of milk by the farm family, costs of purchased inputs 
for the dairy enterprise, availability of fodder and water, etc. 
Whatever the values of each contributing factor, however, a 
certain degree of managerial ability is required on the farm to 
achieve the production required to generate sufficient free cash 
flow for loan repayment. There are some grounds for suspicion 
that the staff of the Ministry of Agriculture, which play an 
important role in the AFC loan application process, and the 
staff of AFC frequently overestimated the managerial ability of 
prospective borrowers, Support for this assertion is probably 
most easily exhibited by stock mortality data, which led AFC's 
management to adopt an informal expectation that of the grade 
cows purchased by their smallholder borrowers, one in five would 
experience accidental mortality. Other causes also contributed to 
this incidence, but most can be viewed relative to some expectation 
concerning managerial ability. 
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c. Administrative causes of poor repayment performance 
Laxity in loan administration invites poor loan repayment 
performance. If the lender demonstrates that loan obligations 
need not be met in a timely manner, there is little reason for 
borrowers to be punctual in their repayment. 
Poor financial housekeeping is one aspect of administrative 
causes of poor repayment performance. AFC accounts could at one 
time have been accurately described as chaotic, as manifested by 
delays in billing and the inability of AFC to credit interest on 
amounts in arrears under the IDA scheme until approximately three 
years after the scheme's inception. The accumulation of more than 
Sh 197 million in GMR arrears -- equal to almost two years' ad- 
vances at the 1972 level -- by the end of 1973 is also testimony 
to the great record keeping difficulties which AFC has had with 
this administratively complex scheme. Likewise, various annual 
reports of the Department of Settlement allude to bookkeeping 
problems which doubtless resulted in poor follow-up of defaulters 
in certain cases. If management is unable to ascertain who is in 
default and by how much, effective loan administration is impossible. 
Reluctance to foreclose constitutes a second administrative 
weakness which is consistent with poor repayment performance by 
borrowers. Public sector lenders have been reluctant to fore- 
close in those cases in which title deeds are taken a loan 
security. Part of this reluctance in AFC's case may reflect 
faulty documentation and the lack of current figures on the 
repayment performance of individual defaulters. Part may also 
reflect the feeling that fully secured loans will eventually be 
repaid, a feeling that ignores the time value of money loaned at 
a low or even negative real interest rate. Another portion may 
no doubt be attributed to political pressures for lenient treat- 
ment of borrowers. While small scale borrowers were foreclosed 
at a rate of about one a month in 1971 by AFC, the rate had in- 
creased to ten a month in 1974, suggesting the attainment of a 
degree of institutional maturity by AFC. AFC officials indicate 
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that very, very' few smallholdings are ever auctioned, as 
defaulters almost invariably find the money to repay in full 
when threatened with this ultimate sanction. Also, foreclosures 
are said to have a salutory effect on the repayment performance 
of other borrowers in arrears who farm in the vicinity of the 
foreclosed property. 
The settlement authorities have likewise been very reluctant 
to use their powers of eviction. Prior to 1965 their reluctance 
was based on a lack of clarity with respect to certain legal 
points, but in that year an amendment to the Agriculture Act 
gave the Settlement Fund Trustees the power to repossess settlers' 
land without reference to the courts. 
1 
In the following year a 
Loan Defaulters Sifting Committee was established to advise the 
Minister of Lands and Settlement on foreclosure cases. By June 
1966,875 notices had been served, and these resulted in only two 
evictions. In the following year action was taken against 135 
defaulters who had made nil or only token repayments, and of 
these, 61 paid their arrears in full while 74 were evicted. The 
progress of settlement evictions through 1973 was as follows: 
2 
Period Evictions 
1965/66 2 
1966/67 74 
1967/68 0 
1968/69 14 
1969/70 0 
1970 (calendar year) 0 
1971 0 
1972 1 
It is probable that a much higher level of evictions could 
have been effected without causing hardship. Not all settlers 
were in fact among the very poor whom the programme was supposed 
primarily to benefit. A few owners of settlement plots are men of 
considerable means, while some are civil servants and others with 
regular incomes from off the farm. Given that as of mid-1972, 
1. Republic of Kenya, Laws of Kenya, Cap. 318, "The Agriculture 
Act, " Section 174 (3). 
2. Eviction data is from Republic of Kenya, Department of Settle- 
ment, Annual Reports for the periods cited. 
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30,673 of the 32,118 settlers who had been billed were in 
default, 
1 
it appears reasonable to assume that a least some 
of the defaulters were taking advantage of the leniency of 
the settlement authorities rather than demonstrating their 
inability to repay their loans. 
Foreclosure is of course the lender's ultimate sanction, 
and good loan administration will seek to avoid deterioration 
of the borrower-lender relationship to this level. The emphasis 
accorded foreclosure in this discussion is not intended to suggest 
that foreclosure is a panacea, but rather to point out that in 
the presence of widespread default on loan repayments it repre- 
sents one way of helping to restore loan discipline. Used in- 
discriminantly, foreclosure could have a high cost in terms of 
the intangible aspects of farm credit provision. However, the 
political economy of access to credit in Kenya, especially public 
sector credit, suggests that in many cases foreclosure would not 
impose an absolute hardship on the more prosperous defaulters, 
and by increasing the flow of repayments to lenders could be in 
the best interests of the agricultural sector by widening access 
to credit. 
Staffing problems are an additional administrative element 
in poor collection performance by lenders. The importance of 
administrative performance in terms of loan recovery is suggested 
by the experiences of AFC and of cooperative credit in Kenya. 
AFC has moved consistently, if slowly, towards a tighter approach 
to administration. One aspect of this effort since the early 
1970's has been the enlargement of the number of expatriate 
specialists engaged in training, accounting and computerisation, 
and also in general supervisory functions in the field. Co- 
operatives were in considerable difficulty by the mid-1960's 
due to poor management and control. With the reconstitution 
1. Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Lands and Settlement, Settle- 
ment Fund Trustees, "Statement of Repayment Position as at 30th 
June 1972. " The number of defaulters may be inflated by the 
fact that certain billings were due on the statement date and 
the lag in recording settlers' payments on the centralised 
accounting system in Nairobi. For a discussion of this lag as 
of 1966, see Republic of Kenya, Report of the Mission on Land 
Settlement in Kenya. p. 156. 
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of the structure under legislation passed in 1966; 
1 
the estab- 
lishment in that year of the Nordic Project for Cooperative 
Assistance to Kenya and its heavy emphasis on field assistance 
and on training, including the establishment of the Cooperative 
College of Kenya; 
2 
and with the Government's further commitment 
to strengthening cooperation as expressed in 1970,3 the stage 
was set for improved financial management of cooperative affairs 
and loan schemes. Eligibility requirements which cooperators, 
primary societies and unions must meet to participate in the 
Cooperative Production Credit Scheme are indicative of the 
importance attached to management by the cooperative authorities. 
4 
Along with these initiatives, cooperative credit has evolved from 
the confused state in which an estimated Sh 27 million was out- 
standing in 1969,5 often without adequate documentation and with 
a very poor collection rate, through the achievement in the mid- 
1970's of the relatively high degree of administrative performance 
required to run the Cooperative Savings Scheme. 
Sanctions against further access to credit are a further 
administrative aspect of the repayment performance problem. The 
concept and reality of a credit rating is not widely established 
in Kenya. While the banks do provide to each other and to those 
with a legitimate basis for enquiry, brief and rather superficial 
information on their clients, the other agricultural lenders do 
not routinely seek or provide such-information. This situation 
probably reflects the narrowness of the market, as, for example, 
AFC has very little competition in the provision of five year 
loans to smallholders. Finance companies are not an alternative 
1. Kuehn, Alfred, Evaluation of the Nordic Project for Cooperative 
Assistance to Kenya Paris, Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, July 1969. p. 58. 
2. Ibid., pp. 65-66. 
3. Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Cooperatives and Social Services, 
Cooperative Development Policy for Kenya. 
4. Republic of Kenya, The Cooperative Department, The Co-Operative 
Production Credit Scheme: Staff Manual -- Credit. Nairobi, August 
1971. (mimeo) pp. 3-14. A summary of eligibility requirements is 
given in Von Pischke, J. D., "A Description of the Cooperative Pro- 
duction Credit Scheme. " Working Paper No. 80, Institute for Devel- 
opment Studies, University of Nairobi, December 1972. 
5. Kuehn, Alfred, 1969. p. 105. 
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source of funds for small borrowers from the banks. Within the 
commercial banking community the tradition of British banking, 
including the restrictive practices formalised in the Bankers' 
Agreement, discourages borrowers from switching their custom. 
All of these factors related to the narrowness of the market 
tend to diminish the utility to lenders of formal credit ratings 
for borrowers or prospective borrowers. In many cases a lender 
need not go beyond his own files, and might not get much useful 
data if he were to seek detailed information from another inter- 
mediary. 
The practical aspects of establishing a credit rating system 
are also complicated by the wide range of accounting standards and 
performance among the various lenders. For example, AFC's account- 
ing performance in the early 1970's was so poor that any borrower's 
propensity to pay on time could be difficult to verify from loan 
ledgers. As AFC's accounting performance continues to improve 
and its functions expand, there would appear to be a basis for 
the exchange of information between AFC and the commercial banks 
concerning the repayment records of borrowers. The provision of 
credit information by AFC to anyone with a legitimate basis for 
enquiry could be a great service to small farmers who are good 
payers, as it could increase their access to credit and other 
financial services. At the same time, the provision of such 
data could be a great service to the financial and business 
community be permitting the reduction of the inconveniences 
resulting from incurring bad debts. Perhaps the encouragement 
of the exchange of credit information would be a fruitful area 
for Central Bank attention. 
d. Other causes of poor repayment performance 
In addition to the problems of agricultural economics and 
of finance which may depress repayment performance under any 
given farm credit scheme by reducing borrowers' ability to repay 
their loans as scheduled, there are also a number of factors which 
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may cause borrowers to be unwilling to repay. In any society 
there are some people who are not financially responsible, and 
some of these will occasionally gain access to formal sector 
credit, especially where credit ratings are not an established 
part of the market mechanism. Others may not be punctual payers 
in a society like Kenya's because they have not had much exposure 
to modern commercial practice. Excepting a few well-defined cases 
relating to crop cycles and funerals, there may be little sense of 
urgency in traditional life styles. With monetisation and commerce, 
propelled by considerations related to the time value of money, 
traditional life styles change. In addition, the nature of tra- 
ditional society may be such that the sort of relationship which 
binds a borrower to a lender is characterised by a high degree of 
negotiability. Although the broad outlines of such relationships 
may be well established and universally understood, the contents 
may permit a high degree of variation in the satisfaction of obli- 
gations, designed to ensure a certain equilibrium in a society 
dependent upon agricultural production with all its uncertainties. 
The possibility that traditional societies are more flexible than 
commercial societies in this respect is no more than onjee: tiýre 
and the suggestion that considerations of this sort may affect the 
collection performance of formal lenders in Kenya is no more than 
speculation. Any definitive explanation of borrower behaviour 
would have to explain why a small proportion of borrowers repay 
formal sector credit in advance of due dates, as found in AFC 
and settlement experience. 
(The writer's general impression is that lack of commercial 
practice is a much more useful approach to explaining borrower 
behaviour than is the general and vague invocation of "cultural 
factors" as explanatory variables. Cultural factors exhibit an 
almost unlimited range of variation among cultures, while com- 
mercial practice -- implying the procedures found in monetised 
markets -- appears to exhibit reasonably well identified common 
characteristics wherever modern money is employed. ) 
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CHAPTER V 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FARM CREDIT IN KENYA 
Can the effects of financial repression be identified in 
Kenya's farm credit system? Do financial repression and the 
body of financial market theory from which the concept is derived 
provide a satisfactory framework for an explanation of the state 
of Kenya's farm credit market and an analysis of the extent of 
access which rural people have to the types of services provided 
by the financial sector? 
Previous chapters have reviewed Kenya's agricultural sector 
and its development, various aspects of financial market theory, 
and the sources of funds used by farmers and by lenders. This 
chapter attempts to integrate these elements in an analysis of 
the farm credit system, and includes additional materials re- 
quired to complete the theoretical edifice and to indicate its 
utility and shortcomings. 
The analytical approach employed uses the rather broad 
context afforded by considerations of political economy, en- 
compassing questions of financial behaviour within the wider 
framework of economics, as well as including elements of public 
policy and questions of political power. Accordingly, the model 
which is constructed recognises that farm credit systems are 
shaped by political factors, defined broadly to include major 
aspects of the working of government. This set of considerations 
is called the political dynamics of farm credit. Of course, 
farm credit is also a specialised financial function and as such 
is subject to the general forces which determine the behaviour 
of financial institutions. Many of these forces stem primarily 
from the way in which financial assets and liabilities are 
created, and this process is termed the financial dynamics of 
farm credit for the purposes of this exposition. These two sets 
of dynamics form the framework for the outline of the model of the 
farm credit system developed in this chapter. 
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A. The Public Sector Farm Credit Complex 
Reflecting the over-riding importance of the Kenyan public 
sector in the country's farm credit system, the most convenient 
starting point for analysis is found within the political dynamics 
of the model. (Certain aspects of circularity between the 
financial and political dynamics are discussed later. ) Politicians, 
planners and administrators concerned with rural development fre- 
quently hold an interrelated set of beliefs, which are referred 
to here as the public sector farm credit complex. This complex 
constitutes the orthodoxy of farm credit, and appears to be based 
on four assumptions or ways of viewing the state of agriculture, 
the requisites of rural development, and the role of government 
as rural developer. 
The first view is that "farmers are poor". The political 
basis of this observation is seen in what it is not, i. e., a 
useful concept for economic analysis. Poverty is customarily 
defined in terms of consumption levels. By way of contrast, the 
most useful-approaches to rural development strategy and imple- 
mentation are generally focussed on production constraints. 
Concern for rural poverty is a less powerful. tool for rural 
development planners than is concern for variables such as 
rural peoples' aversion to risk, their optimising strategies, 
their feelings about and responses to change, their debt capacity 
and how it. may be increased, their cash flows and how they are 
managed, and implicit discount factors used in their decision 
making. 
Poverty has a certain utility as a concept for politicians, 
however, and provides a rationale for intervention on welfare 
grounds as well as suggesting areas in which government may wish 
to be seen as providing alleviation or relief. These concerns 
embody the second assumption of the public sector farm credit 
complex: as rural people are generally "poor", government should 
promote the development of rural areas. Of course, this concern 
is not the only rationale for intervention, which may also be 
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intended to increase foreign exchange earnings or to decrease 
foreign exchange outflows through changes in the level and 
composition of agricultural production, to transfer capital 
from agriculture to other sectors, to diminish the potential 
for insurgency, and to influence other areas of concern to 
government. 
Within the Kenyan context the politics of poverty have not 
overwhelmed the largely pluralistic basis of the society. Kenya 
has produced no "Arusha Declaration" or lurched to the left behind 
a "Common Man's Charter". Its manifesto on African Socialism1 
has served more as a political symbol than as an economic blue- 
print. Nevertheless, the politics of poverty are present, even 
if muted: 
The best of Kenya's African social heritage and colonial 
economic legacy must be reorganised and mobilised for a 
concerted, carefully planned attack on poverty, disease 
and the lack of education in order to achieve social, 
justice, human dignity and economic welfare for all. 
Prior to independence, the enemy of Kenyan people -- 
colonialism and political oppression -- was easily 
identifiable, and the energies of the nation could be 
readily marshalled in the fight against it. After 
independence, the enemies became poverty, ignorance, 
and disease which were much more diffuse. Systematic 
planning and sustained effort was, and still is, re- 
quired to overcome them. 3 
Outside entities, such as the ILO, at times feel even freer 
than the Kenyan Government to prescribe economic designs to help 
Kenya's poor: 
4 
The basic strategy proposed-is to redistribute gains in 
the income of the rich to investments which will raise the 
income of the poor, until the latter's income per head has 
doubled. The rich and the poor are defined respectively 
as the top 1% and the bottom third of income recipients, 
each of which received about 10% of total income. The 
incomes of the rich are to be frozen.... 
1. Republic of Kenya, African Socialism. 
2. Ibid., p. 1. 
3. Republic of Kenya, Development Plan 1974-1978. Part I. P. 1. 
4. ILO, op. cit., p. 365. 
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The third pillar of the public sector farm credit complex 
is the "farm credit need creed", which is supported and per- 
petuated by politicians, many rural developers and a surprisingly 
large number of economists. The need creed is the belief or 
article of faith that farmers' lack of access to credit on 
"reasonable terms" constitutes a binding constraint to rural 
development. 
Statements of the need creed are found in Kenyan five year 
plans and in the writings of many economists concerned with agri- 
culture and rural development. A sample of citations from the 
Kenyan literature indicates the nature of the belief: 
In Kenya, loan funds are needed by the farmer for such 
things as the purchase of fencing wire, improved live- 
stock, cash crop planting material, water tanks, sprays, 
the installation of water supplies and buildings. It is 
needed, too, for payment of hired labour to undertake bench 
terracing and cash crop planting and to finance the "wait- 
ing" or zero-income period before cash crops come into 
bearing. l (emphasis added) 
Smallholders in developing countries face the same problem: 
credit facilities upon which the development of their farms 
often depend, are very limited. In this respect Kenya is 
no exception. 
2 
If farmers are to adopt improved farming methods such as 
the use of improved livestock, better seeds and pesticides, 
etc., they will require credit, especially short term 
credit, to help them purchase these inputs. (emphasis 
added) 
The development of the model to this point confirms two of 
the hypotheses listed in the Introduction of this study. 
4 The 
first is that 
2. b) The concept of credit need is based upon political concern. 
1. Clayton, Eric, Agrarian Development in Peasant Economies: Some 
Lessons from Kenya. Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1964. p. 131. 
2. Vasthoff, Josef, op. cit., p. 21. 
3. Republic of Kenya, Development Plan 1970-1974. p. 217. 
4. See pp. 4-5. 
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The political concern is reflected in the predilection to 
view farmers as "poor", and the invocation of a concept of 
need is consistent with the desire to alleviate poverty. The 
second hypothesis supported by the development of the model to 
this stage reflects the approach taken in the 1970-1974 five 
year plan and supported by writers acquainted with Kenya's 
agricultural development policies: 
2. a) A concept of the "need" for farm credit permeates relevant 
public policy. 
The fourth element of the public sector farm credit complex 
is the belief that supply-leading finance can stimulate rural 
development. In other words, the injection of credit in advance 
of a proven demand for credit will engender development. The 
"demand" for credit is difficult to specify, as discussed above, 
but suffice it here to note that Schatz's definition says credit 
demand exists only when the loan applicant has a potentially 
viable project or use for the funds. 
2 
The term "supply-leading 
finance" has been popularised and perhaps even coined by Hugh T. 
Patrick, 
3 
to distinguish this entrepreneurial aspect of lending 
from the more commonly observed "demand-following" behaviour or 
many financial institutions as summarised by Joan Robinson's 
observation that: 
4 
There is a general tendency for the supply of finance to 
move with the demand for it. it is true, of course, that 
at any moment there are many excellent ideas which cannot 
be implemented because those who have conceived them are 
unable to back them up with finance. But, by and large, 
it seems to be the case that where enterprise leads finance 
follows. 
These four beliefs interrelate neatly and conveniently, 
justifying their description as a complex. One obvious pro- 
gression in reasoning is that farmers are poor, they need credit 
to develop their holdings, and that, among other measures, the 
1. See pp. 130 ff. 
2. Schatz, Sayre P., Economics, Politics and Administration in 
Government Lending. p. 119. 
3. "Financial Development and Economic Growth. " pp. 174-189. 
4. The Rate of Interest and Other Essays. London, Macmillan & 
Co., Ltd., 1952. p. 86. 
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government should promote such development by providing credit 
and directing credit towards small farmers. If follows logically 
from these concerns that farm credit should be "cheap", and that 
it would be wrong in principle and unfair on equity grounds to 
subject poor farmers to interest rates significantly higher than 
those levied on traders, manufacturers, and others less burdened 
by poverty. 
The financial analogue of the cheap farm credit policy is, 
of course, low interest rates. Interest rates are low when credit 
is provided at less than its accounting costs and below the rate 
which would prevail in a market free of government intervention 
in the form of limitations on interest rates, subsidies, and 
restrictions on other terms of loan contracts. 
The tenacity of the preference for low interest rates is 
seen in their prescription and use even for credit projects which 
are expected to yield the average borrower an internal rate of 
return of 30-40% on his investment, as suggested by project docu- 
ments relating to the IDA smallholder scheme, or when adoption of 
high yielding varieties is expected to double farmer's yields per 
unit of land. In such cases and lacking a tax on agricultural 
incomes on small farms, a case for high interest rates could be 
made on equity grounds, especially as credit access is generally 
severely restricted in such a way that the loans tend to go to 
the better off among the small farmers (excepting most settlement 
schemes in Kenya), as discussed later. 
The preference for low interest rates as a means of stimu- 
lating development in Kenya may be traced to colonial policy, as 
noted above, 
1 
even though that policy was designed to promote a 
very different kind of development from the type outlined in 
relevant publications of the Kenya Government. (Kenya's colonial 
monetary tradition is discussed in Appendix A. ) However, it would 
be a mistake to assume that this tradition carries great weight 
1. See pp. 271 ff. 
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today -- policymakers appear more sensitive to present than 
past politics, and external donors have been quite willing to 
accommodate Kenyan policy to the extent that only marginal ad- 
justments in real interest rates have evolved out of negotiations 
of farm credit projects funded multilaterally. 
The model as developed thus far is shown schematically as 
Figure V-a. Major linkages are indicated be solid lines, and 
the minor linkage between the colonial monetary tradition and 
low interest rates is shown by a broken line. 
Figure V-a. The Low Interest Rate Model 
Political Dynamics 
The public sector farm credit 
complex 
" Farmers Government should 
are poor" promote rural 
development 
1 X ý 
The farm Supply-leading 
! credit ---* finance stimu- 
need creed lates rural 
development 
Financial Dynamics 
The colonial 
monetary tradition 
II 
The cheap farm 
credit policy Low interest rates 
B. Low Interest Rates 
Low interest rates impede financial deepening. Their primary 
impact affects both sides of the balance sheets of financial inter- 
mediaries. The impact on intermediaries' lending operations is 
easily grasped, as low interest rates lead to low or negative real 
337 
returns on loans outstanding. Low nominal returns tend to 
restrict the ability of intermediaries to grow through re- 
investing their profits. The negative real returns which 
frequently accompany low nominal returns tend to shrink the 
ability of intermediaries to serve the community, as any given 
nominal level of financial resources diminishes in real terms. 
Lenders' propensities to expand the level of community 
access to financial markets and services are also easily 
constrained in low interest rate regimes. This may be illustrated 
by a simple exposition based on the assumption of ceteris paribus 
and on the observation that intermediaries tend to limit the 
variety of transactions they undertake and the clients they 
serve. In other words, product differentiation is prevalent 
in financial markets. These limitations reflect the utility of 
credit rationing to an individual intermediary, as experience 
provides a basis for identifying those types of business in 
which an intermediary has a market advantage. Assuming away 
the influences of any statutory or regulatory limitations, an 
intermediary's market advantage results from the use of speciali- 
sation to diminish uncertainty and to achieve certain economies. 
In commercial banking, for example, "prime customers" are those 
whose relationships are most highly valued and as a consequence 
they have access to credit at the prime or lowest commercial 
lending rate. When interest rate levels are low, intermediaries 
as a whole are not encouraged to expand their markets into 
activities involving higher costs, which typically include the 
costs of greater uncertainty. Assuming workably competitive 
market behaviour, higher lending rates would result in higher 
returns or the prospects of higher returns to lenders, which 
would provide a greater incentive to expand access to financial 
markets and services to a larger variety of clients and an 
expanded range of transactions. Low rates keep the margin 
between those who are served and those who are not served 
closer to the area of prime relationships. Liberalised rates 
offer an opportunity for an expansion of that margin, which 
could have the effect of increasing the community's access to 
financial markets and services. 
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In certain cases low interest rate regimes involve 
controlled maximum lending rates, as in Kenya where the 
commercial banks have been subjected to a 10% maximum loan 
rate. In this situation it is clear that unless the banks 
find ways of compensating for this limitation by extracting 
other revenues from their customers at the margin, they would 
not find it in their interest to expand that margin into new 
business which would involve higher costs, including the cost 
of uncertainty or credit risk. Any propensity the banks might 
have to experiment in expanding the range of their clientele 
and services would obviously be constrained by the interest 
rate ceiling, which, in effect, instructs the banks to keep 
the margin where it was at the time the limitation was imposed. 
This exposition simplifies to the extent that it assumes 
that the lender would in fact be willing to raise his lending 
rates to take on more risky business. The discussion also 
simplifies by assuming a certain homogeneity of transactions 
among all types of clients, at least to the extent that the 
lender is unable to circumvent the interest rate constraint 
with other devices which either diminish his risk or increase 
his operating efficiency. Also, it is assumed that lenders 
have access to more funds than those used to satisfy the debt 
capacities of prime customers and that progression towards the 
margin is possible -- a point discussed shortly. In spite of 
these qualifying assumptions, however, the model is not an 
unfamiliar one with respect to farm credit institutions in 
developing countries. Their case illustrates well the concept 
of the increasing costs and decreasing net returns -- well into 
the negative quadrant -- of dealing with clients progressively 
removed from the characteristics of prime borrowers, and hence 
progressively uncreditworthy. How institutions are able to 
venture into these realms, by not being subjected to the 
discipline of the market as a source of funds, will be discussed 
later. 
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The result of low profit margins or losses in the commercial 
context of financial optimisation by lenders is more stringent 
credit rationing than would otherwise occur. Relative to 
positions which would be attained in a liberalised financial 
market, intermediaries dependent on a repressed financial market 
will not move significantly outwards, in providng access to 
prospective borrowers, keeping their margin back at some point 
closer to prime relationships in an effort to ensure viability. 
Lenders not dependent upon the market will also be impeded by 
losses resulting from the inability to collect loans outstanding 
and other causes, thus slowing the rate at which new loans are 
issued. Losses may also restrict the public sector lender's 
ability to attain institutional maturity and some degree of 
operating independence. For example, weak lenders may find 
themselves unable to provide salaries which are competitive 
enough to attract staff capable of expanding operations on a 
significant scale and on a viable basis, which in effect rations 
credit available from the intermediary to a degree which is more 
stringent than would be achieved by an intermediary of greater 
financial strength. 
On the other side of the intermediary's balance sheet, low 
interest rates may tend to diminish the utility of deposits. 
This means that intermediaries may be less likely to market 
financial services aggressively under repressed interest rates 
than under liberalised interest rates. If deposits are less 
attractive, the rational lender will do less to attract such 
resources than when they are more attractive in terms of the 
returns they offer. 
This effect may be illustrated using proportions from the 
combined balance sheet of the commercial banks in Kenya as of 
the end of June 1975. The critical relationships are the portion 
of total liabilities upon which the banks pay interest, and the 
portion of total assets upon which the banks earn interest. 
Expressed in percentage terms, the combined balance sheet of 
commercial banks in Kenya on the reference date is given in 
Table V-1. 
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Table V-1. Percentage Composition of the Combined Balance Sheet 
of Commercial Banks in Kenya, 30 June 1975 
Liabilities & Net Worth 
Account Proportion 
Heading of Total 
Demand deposits 
Time deposits 
Savings deposits 
Total deposits 
Balances due to 
banks 
Bills payable & 
other borrowing 
Other liabilities 
(including contra 
items) & net worth 
Total 
Account 
Heading 
Assets 
34.3% Cash & due from 
15.3% banks 
14.3% Treasury Bills 
63.9% Bills discounted, 
loans & advances 
3.9% Investments 
Other assets 
1.3% 
(including contra 
items) 
30.9% 
100.0% Total 
Proportion 
8.6% 
5.1% 
50.3% 
3.3% 
32.7% 
100.0% 
Source: Central Bank of Kenya, Ninth Annual Report. pp. 33-34. 
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The minimum lending rate in Kenya at the reference date, 
30 June 1975, was 8% while the maximum rate on new loans was 
10%. Therefore, it may be assumed that the average bank 
lending rate was around 9%. Applying this rate to the pro- 
portion of total assets accounted for by loans yields a return 
of 4.5% on total assets (9% x 50.3% = 4.5%). The rate of interest 
paid on time deposits ranged from 5.125% to 5.875%, 
1 
and for 
present purposes it is assumed that the average rate for time 
deposits was 5.5%. Thus, in terms of total liabilities and net 
worth the cost of time deposits was roughly 0.8%, or (5.5% x 15.3% 
= 0.8%). The rate paid on savings deposits was 5%, yielding a 
cost factor of roughly 0.7%, or (5% x 14.3% = 0.7%). Combining 
these two deposit rates gives a deposit cost factor of 1.5%. 
While in terms of total assets the gross income from loans was 
4.5%.. The interest paid on deposits was 1.5%, giving a difference 
of 3.0% which may be treated as a return to the lender from the 
function of intermediation between savers and borrowers. 
To proceed with this example, the spread between the 
average lending rate of roughly 9% and the average deposit 
rate of roughly 5.25% (derived from the 5% savings rate and 
the 5.5% assumed rate on time deposits, each weighted about 
equally, given their approximately equal contribution to the 
balance sheet as seen in Table V-1), is about 3.75%. Assume 
that this rate spread is retained in a situation of financial 
liberalisation in which the lending rate rises to a nominal 30%. 
In this case, the arithmetic of the return to banks would be: 
Interest earning loans (50% of total assets 
x 30% lending rate) = 15% 
Interest bearing deposit liabilities (30% of 
total liabilities and net worth x 26.25% 
average deposit rate) = 8% 
Difference = 7% 
Under these assumptions the difference or return to the lender 
in terms of total assets would rise from a pre-liberalisation 
1. Central Bank of Kenya, Ninth Annual Report. p. 47. 
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level of 3% to a liberalised level of 7%. In other words, 
assuming a constant rate spread and balance sheet proportions, 
every shilling of additional deposits obtained would provide 
greater returns from lending as liberalisation replaces re- 
pression. 
However, in any real situation of this type it is un- 
likely that balance sheet proportions would remain constant. 
Data from Korea and Indonesia during periods of liberalisation 
indicates that time and savings deposits increase as a pro- 
portion of total deposits. In Korea in 1964 the real return 
on a one-year time deposit was -14.6%, and time and savings 
deposits constituted 23% of money supply (M2). In 1970 the 
real return on a one-year time deposit was 12.6%, following 
five years of positive rates ranging up to 22.1%, and the 
proportion of money supply held in the form of time and savings 
deposits was 66%. 
1 
Likewise, in Indonesia during a period of 
liberalisation between 1965 and 1970 the proportion of the 
money supply consisting of time and davings deposits grew from 
3% to 25%, 
2 
while in Taiwan between 1952 and 1970 the proportion 
grew from 29% to 65%. 
3 
If liberalisation were to result in a shift in the compo- 
sition of deposits in Kenya so that while total deposits still 
accounted for 65% of bank liabilities and net worth, time and 
savings accounts accounted for 40% and demand deposits 25%, the 
return to the lender would still be enhanced by about 1.5%, 
growing from 3.0% to 4.5%, or (40% x 26.25% - 10.5%, subtracted 
from 15% on loans outstanding). In relative terms, an increase 
of 1.5% on a base of 3.0% is an expansion of 50%, which is quite 
substantial in terms of the margins often found in finance. 
Detailed study of the behaviour of various headings on 
intermediaries' balance sheets during liberalisation is beyond 
1. McKinnon, Ronald I., op. cit., p. 109. 
2. Ibid., p. 112. 
3. Ibid., p. 115. 
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the scope of this discussion. Suffice it to note that in 
Korea's experience bank profits were squeezed by the rush into 
savings and time deposits by private households and others, 
following the rise in the nominal deposit rate and tax reforms 
favourable to financial deepening. 
1 
However, Korean central 
bank regulations were amended to provide some alleviation for 
the commercial banks. 
The effect of low interest rates on rural people is simply 
that their access to financial services is restricted. Lenders' 
earnings are easily constrained by low rates. Low nominal rates 
are frequently negative real rates, which limit the ability of 
the financial sector to keep pace with the expansion of borrowers' 
debt capacities. Also, lenders may not be stimulated to solicit 
deposits as vigorously as they might be under liberalised con- 
ditions. Rural branching to attract rural deposits is not 
given much priority, and cost considerations may prompt relatively 
high minimum balance requirements on savings accounts and relatively 
high minima prescribed for various sorts of transactions. Low 
interest rate levels and ceilings, whether established by central 
bank directive or by industry practice, also encourage lenders to. 
ration credit stringently according to commercial criteria within 
the confines of the limited returns available. Rural people tend 
in many instances to be rationed out of the formal financial 
market. Their exclusion reflects the fact that the bulk of rural 
loans are relatively small and relatively costly to administer. 
Rural loans are also often subject to less control by lenders in 
terms of use than loans to industry and commerce, given the 
spending levels and patterns of small borrowers. Lenders may 
perceive such loss of control as an augmentation of risk. Because 
formal intermediaries do not find such transactions attractive 
within the confines of repressed finance, they also take a more 
conservative view of rural debt capacities than they would were 
they more active in rural financial markets, in which case they 
1. Kanesa-Thasan, S., op cit., pp. 9-13. 
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would have access to more risk-decreasing information. From 
the lender's viewpoint, rural loans appear to involve greater 
risks than those to clients in certain other sectors. 
Restricted rural access to financial services in Kenya 
exists in spite of an impressive geographical distribution of 
offices of formal financial institutions: commercial bank branches 
in more than 100 places and Post Office Savings Bank services 
available at more than 150 post offices, for example. The 
limitations of the services provided to rural people by such 
intermediaries have been noted in Chapter III. Here it remains 
to note that the expansion of intermediaries in rural areas has 
been motivated largely by opportunities to employ rural funds in 
urban areas, in effect putting rural liquidity at the disposal of 
urban and public sector investors. While it is obvious that the 
provision of the services in question has benefitted rural areas, 
it may be argued that the financial technology employed has not 
been appropriate for penetrating rural financial markets very 
deeply, in that effective access remains restricted. 
The schematic diagram of the farm credit market model may 
be extended to indicate the progression through restricted rural 
access to financial services, as in Figure V-b. A refinement 
may be added at this point by noting that restricted rural access 
to financial services is a fact of political interest which re- 
inforces the public sector farm credit complex, as indicated by 
the broken line with an ascending portion. Without access to 
financial services rural people may find it difficult to save 
in monetary form. Their relative lack of financial assets 
"proves" that they are poor and may also lead observers to conclude 
that, since they have little savings in the form of cash, credit is 
obviously needed to stimulate rural development. This feedback 
channel adds an additional dimension to the interaction of 
political and financial dynamics in the model. 
The development of the model through this stage confirms 
the hypothesis that: 
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Figure V-b. The Restricted Access Model 
Political Dynamics 
The public sector farm credit 
complex `-I 
Financial Dynamics 
The colonial monetary tradition 
III 
The cheap farm credit policy Low interest rates 
Diminished Low or nega- 
utility of tive returns 
deposits on non-prime 
lending 
1 Repressed Stringent 
competition credit 
for deposits rationing 
(commercial 
criteria) 
Restricted rural access to 
financial services 
3. ) Public policy, as embodied in "low" interest rates... 
restricts the supply of funds available for lending 
to farmers. 
As non-prime customers of the formal financial sector, and more 
frequently as non-customers beyond the margins of direct inter- 
action with that sector, the bulk of the farm population find 
their access to formal credit, i. e., the supply of credit 
effectively available to them, rather limited. (This hypothesis 
will be touched upon again as the model is developed further. ) 
Also confirmed is the reformulation of the above hypothesis which 
indicates that the impact of the restricted supply of funds 
available bears most heavily on the small farm sector: 
1. c) Public policies relating to farm credit have worked against 
the interests of small farmers in the competition for 
scarce credit. 
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The margin, in terms of effective access, is in the small farm 
sector, and most in this sector are beyond the margin. 
C. Policymakers' Responses to the Restricted Access 
of Rural People to Financial Services 
The fact of restricted access reinforces the public sector 
farm credit complex and provides grounds for remedial inter- 
vention. Because the complex is of such a character that a 
cheap farm credit policy inevitably follows from it, the use of 
high interest rates to encourage intermediaries to operate in 
rural areas is dismissed at the outset in any considerations of 
policy. The apparently preferred policy response is to address 
the problem of restricted access directly. Indirect measures, 
operating through financial markets, which create incentives 
designed to secure market response in desired directions, are 
not trusted allies of the public sector farm credit complex. 
The most visible and forthright reaction of policymakers is to 
establish a specialised farm credit institution, which for our 
purposes will be referred to by the initials SFCI. In the Kenyan 
context, the AFC is the primary example of an SFCI, and the 
Cereals and Sugar Finance Corporation and Agricultural Settlement 
Fund are other examples. 
As public sector appendages, such institutions qualify for 
funds on concessionary terms from a variety of non-market sources. 
The Treasury is one such source, and external donors are frequently 
willing to lend additional and sometimes massive support, as in- 
dicated by the Treasury and external dependency ratings computed 
earlier for major Kenyan SFCI's. 1 Concessionary terms imply that 
the farm credit institution is able, under the public sector 
umbrella, to raise funds at lower rates and on easier terms than 
would otherwise be applied to such an enterprise. It may also 
1. See pp. 280 ff. 
347 
be possible that by establishing such an institution a government 
may be able to attract foreign exchange, in the form of loans from 
external non-market sources, which would not otherwise be forth- 
coming. In addition to responding to the public sector farm 
credit complex, such institutional creation may also contribute 
to a country's foreign exchange reserves. 
One disadvantage from the point of view of rural development 
to this otherwise expedient form of institutional arrangement is 
that SFCI's tend to operate on only one side of rural financial 
markets, providing credit but not deposit facilities. 
1 
The AFC 
follows this pattern, as_ does the Agricultural Settlement Fund. 
The C&SFC is a partial exception, in that it raises funds locally 
in the urban money market, but it conforms to the pattern in that 
its obligations have minimum denominations far above the level at 
which the rural economy operates on an everyday basis. One-sided 
intervention in rural financial markets is of course consistent 
with the public sector farm credit complex. Poor farmers are 
thought to need credit, not a place to keep their presumably 
scant supplies of money or the opportunity to purchase financial 
assets and services. In addition, the financial institutions 
already in place, such as commercial banks and the Post Office 
Savings Bank, 
2 
appear to provide such facilities, and it is not 
clear to policymakers that there would be any advantages in pro- 
viding further services of this type at public expense. The facts 
of the case, as shown by the fragmented and limited nature of 
rural access to financial services under the existing institutional 
network, tend not to be seen in a very broad context. Questions 
as to whether rural credit and rural savings could profitably be 
linked through new institutional forms or through liberalisation 
1. For this reason such institutions are properly described as 
specialised, rather than simply as farm credit institutions. 
2. Lest it be suggested that AFC and the Post Office Savings Bank 
complement each other by collecting small scale savings and dis- 
tributing small scale farm credit within the public sector finan- 
cial orbit, let it be noted that total POSB balances due depositors, 
urban and rural, as of 31 December 1971 amounted to Sh 118.1 million, 
while AFC loans outstanding to smallholders amounted to something 
less than Sh 19.2 million. The fact that AFC smallholder loans 
are largely funded by external donors has already been noted. 
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of the constraints on intermediaries already present in rural 
areas are of course more difficult to approach than the well- 
trod path of establishing an SFCI. 
I 
If the question of linkages 
is not dealt with, however, rural credit and rural saving within 
the formal institutional framework tend to remain separated and 
fragmented. 
Also, the level of administrative performance required to 
provide deposit facilities is more advanced than that which is 
in fact tolerated by the public sector in its provision of farm 
credit. If the records pertaining to a depositor's account are 
lost or shrouded in error, the reprecussions may be and often are 
much more serious than the loss of documentation of inefficient 
administration of a loan account by a public sector SFCI. AFC 
was unable to send out billings for loans outstanding in 1971/72,2 
and it is unlikely that this example of inefficiency elicited 
even one angry letter from an irate borrower. Had a similar loss 
of accounting control resulted in the inability of an intermediary 
to honour demands for the withdrawal of funds by deposit account- 
holders, it is unlikely that the problem would have gone unnoticed 
in the Kenyan press, Parliament and in public discussion. 
SFCI's tend to fragment rural financial markets, thereby 
diminishing the ability of these markets to allocate resources 
efficiently. By specialising in the provision of farm credit 
and by ignoring the possibilities of offering a wider range of 
financial services to rural people SFCI's fail to address two 
areas of development potential. The first is that they do not 
contribute to the incentives or facilities which encourage rural 
people to save. The access of rural people to interest-bearing 
financial assets is not directly enhanced by SFCI's. The physical 
and psychological problems encountered by rural people with 
1. External assistance is readily available from developed 
countries with farm credit institutions. As of 1.974 AFC was 
using the services of expatriates provided under the foreign 
assistance programmes of the Netherlands, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, the United States and West Germany, and could have 
used IDA funds to secure additional expatriate manpower had 
it chosen to do so. 
2. World Bank, "Survey of Successful Experiences in Assisting 
the Smallholder Livestock Producer. " Washington, DC, December 
1973. p. 39n. 
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respect to holding liquidity in financial forms is not 
alleviated -- the transactions and holding costs associated 
with non-cash financial assets in rural areas are not 
diminished. Hence, financial savings tend to remain repressed. 
In addition, SFCI's may help to translate the public sector 
farm credit complex into a popular belief among rural people that 
credit provides the only possible or feasible means of achieving 
progress, at the expense of the doctrine that self-finance and 
self-help among rural people as a community are effective vehicles 
for progress. The number of savers in the rural economy is of 
course greater than the number of borrowers who have access to 
institutional credit. Thus, one-sided intervention in rural 
financial markets by SFCI's limits at the outset the number of 
potential beneficiaries of such intervention. 
One-sided intervention also limits SFCI's access to funds. 
It is assumed that the volume of savings which might be forth- 
coming from rural people is too small to be of interest, below 
the threshold of the financial technology of an SFCI, and in any 
event the public sector farm credit complex provides no basis for 
viewing rural people as a market for financial services and 
claims. Rather, they are poor people who require government 
intervention to stimulate their advancement. By ignoring the 
savings potential of rural people and their actual and potential 
use of financial services other than credit, SFCI's limit their 
own growth and development. Such institutions are in effect 
denied access to funds in rural financial markets. In addition 
they suffer from being "alien", in the sense that rural people 
are not really the constituency of an SFCI and may be hesitant 
to regard an SFCI as a rural financial institution or as some- 
thing of their own. In operatiazg terms, SFCI's are alien in the 
sense that they do not act as rural intermediaries, but rather 
as bridges between their external or central sources of funds 
and rural people fortunate enough to be their (generally sub- 
sidised) borrowers. SFCI's do not have access to information 
about rural financial flows to the extent that an intermediary 
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would which was active on both sides of the rural financial 
market. Hence, an SFCI is generally not in a position to view 
rural finance in a very broad or creative context. 
By separating rural credit from rural savings, by limiting 
their own access to rural financial markets and by operating as 
alien institutions intruding from the fat side of the dual 
economy, SFCI's are forced to ration credit stringently. As 
noted earlier, stringency as used here refers to the exercise 
of a higher degree of restraint than would be required under 
more favourable conditions. Whereas the earlier example of 
stringent credit rationing assumed that lenders ration stringently 
for commercial reasons connected with the optimisation of financial 
returns from intermediation, the rationing phenomenon arising at 
this stage in the development of the model has a more complex 
basis. 
Stringent credit rationing by SFCI's reflects their political 
parentage. A government could hardly establish an SFCI without 
providing some capital to launch the institution. The use of 
Treasury loans and of external loans on softer terms than would 
be available locally is entirely consistent with the strategy of 
those establishing such an institution in the public sector. 
With the funds, of course, comes some sort of specification of 
lending programme or institutional design. Certain types of 
potential borrowers or investments are viewed as having higher 
priorities than others, which is of course a rational response 
to the realisation that the allocation of funds for use by an 
SFCI is not without bounds. The assignment of priorities of this 
type has its financial analogue in stringent credit rationing. 
Not all farmers can receive credit from an SFCI in a developing 
mixed economy. The mathematics of public sector budgets and 
population on the land ensure that SFCI loans remain a scarce 
development resource. 
Recapitulation of this cluster of relationships may be 
illustrated by an extension of the schematic representation. 
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Certain details explored in previous sections are omitted from 
the figure in the interests of economy. 
Figure V-c. The Stringent Credit Rationing (Political Criteria) 
Model 
Political Dynamics Financial Dynamics 
, The public sector 
farm credit 
complex 
_The cheap 
farm credit policy Low interest rates 
Restricted rural access to 
financial services 
y1 
Establishment of a specialised 
farm credit institution (SFCI) 
Separation of rural saving 
from rural credit 
ii 
Limited SFCI access to market 
funds 
SFCI dependence on Treasury 
,. and external support on soft` 
terms - -a SFCI "alienation" 
l Farm credit programme design I Stringent credit rationing 
(political criteria) 
To summarise, restricted rural access to financial services 
implies a separation of rural saving from rural credit. Evidence 
is found in the fragmented coverage of rural financial markets by 
the institutions of the formal financial sector. Restricted rural 
access also provides a rationale for intervention in the form of 
the establishment of a specialised farm credit institution. This 
mode of intervention is consistent with the public sector farm 
credit complex (as indicated by a broken line in Figure V-c). 
The specialisation of such institutions does little to integrate 
rural savings and rural credit, and in fact contributes to market 
fragmentation which impedes the ability of markets to allocate 
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resources efficiently. Such institutions have little access to 
resources in rural financial markets because of the limitations 
imposed by their specialised operations, and in fact the designers 
of such institutions may assume that reliance on resources from 
financial markets outside public sector control is not appropriate, 
feasible or realistic. Treasury and external funding is preferred 
for reasons of policy (as indicated by a broken line in the Figure). 
If a specialised farm credit institution for any reason languishes 
or fails to make timely responses to market forces it may in fact 
have difficulty in obtaining funds on its own strength in local 
financial markets, which further strengthens the case for re- 
liance on the Treasury and donors (as suggested by a broken line), 
or on central bank directive as a means of securing resources, 
as in the case of Kenya's Cereals and Sugar Finance Corporation 
in 1975. By operating on only one side of rural financial markets, 
specialised farm credit institutions are "alien" in the sense that 
they are isolated from the full flow of information in such markets. 
Lacking the knowledge that is available only through participation, 
and enjoying only limited, budgeted access to resources, the SFCI 
is forced to ration credit stringently. Stringent credit rationing 
is also inherent in farm credit programme design, which stems 
naturally from the major sources of funds used by SFCI's. 
The development of the model through this stage supports the 
hypothesis that: 
2. d) Public policy orientation, as manifested by the "need creed", 
supports the fragmentation of financial markets. 
Specialised institutions not articulated with the rest of the 
financial sector are found providing a very large share of the 
formal sector credit used by farmers. 
D. The Effects of Stringent Credit Rationing by SFCI's 
In contrast to the political desire to provide credit to a 
large number of people and to the queue of applicants eager for 
funds on easy terms, stands the paucity of funds for lending or 
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the paucity of the administrative capacity to mount and control 
a credit programme of sufficient size and scope to constitute a 
meaningful response to the political considerations which were 
responsible for the formation of the SFCI in the first instance. 
The stringent credit rationing which these conditions produce 
takes two forms, intensive credit rationing and extensive credit 
rationing. 
1. Intensive Credit Rationing 
Intensive credit rationing is an example par excellence of 
supply leading finance. It consists of limiting severely the 
number of borrowers and according each borrower relatively 
generous access to credit. Settlement credit constitutes the 
primary example of intensive credit rationing in Kenya. As 
noted above, settlers obtained 90-100% financing under land 
purchase mortgages with maturities of generally 30 years and 
development loans of 10 years' maturity for substantial portions 
of the cash requirements of on-farm investment in loose assets, 
livestock and facilities relating to livestock enterprises. 
1 
Intensive credit rationing can easily overwhelm the repay- 
ment capacity of the borrower, especially if repayment terms are 
not flexible enough to accommodate the uncertainties of agri- 
cultural production. The settlement credit example is again 
illustrative. Farmers were financed to undertake an innovative 
approach to small scale agriculture, and when the projected 
investments were not in fact undertaken or when the investments 
did not prove as fruitful as projected, because of management 
problems and difficulties external to individual farms, the 
projected free cash flow was not realised and poor repayment 
resulted. Credit intensively rationed can easily subject the 
lender to an equity risk in the borrower's farm enterprise, and 
it is apparent that the Agricultural Settlement Fund encountered 
exactly this type of risk through its use of credit to perform 
the function of equity capital. 
1. See pp. 197,201 ff. 
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At this stage is may be useful to digress a little in order 
to indicate why the intensive credit rationing path may appear to 
be politically essential and desirable in the Kenyan context, 
using the Land Transfer Programme as the illustrative case. 
Several of the points already included in the model came 
together in a manner which resulted in too much credit being 
given to borrowers under the Land Transfer Programme. The low 
interest rate policy in force throughout the course of the advance 
of monetisation in Kenya's economy for the last 70 years, state 
control of agricultural credit institutions, the dependence upon 
external and Treasury funds for lending to farmers and the con- 
commitant isolation of agricultural lenders from broader financial 
markets has operated through the credit rationing screen to con- 
sign to credit a role properly accorded to equity or ownership 
capital. The high debt to equity ratio and loan default rates 
in the large farm sector and on settlement farms is evidence of 
the suspension of prudent financial practice. Many borrowers 
were given more credit than they have been able to handle. 
Kenya's low interest rate history never made non-cash 
financial assets very attractive to Africans. Such assets, 
in themselves, have never been innovations which stimulated 
saving by large segments of the population. This is not to 
say that Africans eschew the accumulation of financial assets. 
Forrester's data indicate that urban households which can "afford" 
to save devote substantial portions of their savings to invest- 
ment in financial assets and also that urban workers on very 
modest incomes put considerable amounts aside during the year to 
take back to their families in rural areas each annual holiday. 
l 
The question is rather more complex -- what influences an 
individual to invest rather than consume, and what influences 
the rate at which capital is made available to increase the 
productivity and remuneration of labour? Returns on non- 
financial assets appear to have been more attractive than 
those available on convenient financial assets, especially 
1. Forrester, Marion Wallace, op. cit., pp. 127-130. 
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in view of the traditional basic preference for land. Cheap 
capital from London was available for those in a position to 
use it on the fat side of the dual economy, and reliance on 
external finance for capital projects was very great. 
1 
Various= efforts to stimulate local savings were not made 
until the prospect and later the fact of independence resulted 
in a precipitous withdrawal of funds from banks. Even in that 
situation the effort- to obtain increased access to liquidity 
in the hands of small savers was largely of a non-price nature. 
Repressive interest rate policies did not encourage Africans 
to accumulate financial assets, impeding monetisation of the 
economy and denying them certain opportunities which might have 
been available had a rate more suited to local conditions been 
allowed to evolve in the market. The local financial structure 
remained shallow as a result. Had methods been developed which 
would have lessened the skewness of the distribution of the fruits 
of the development which occurred during the colonial period, and 
encouraged greater African participation in and access to the 
modern sector, it is probable that the country would have a 
deeper financial'structure than that which exists today. In 
other words, the ratio of financial to non-financial assets 
would be higher. More citizens would have accumulated financial 
capital and the financial sector would directly serve more people 
and in a larger number of ways. 
If incentives and the ability to save were not developed 
among Africans to a great extent during the colonial period, their 
access to formal credit was likewise restricted under ordinances 
in effect from 1903 to 1960. Although probably based on paternal- 
istic considerations, the effect of these restrictions was to 
exclude many Africans from the formal credit market and thus 
diminish their opportunities to gain experience in the use of 
modern credit. In summary, the system contained elements which 
constrained the participation of Africans in the larger economy 
as savers and as borrowers. 
1. Ibid., p. 28. 
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Africans accumulated political power and control at a more 
rapid rate than they built up financial asset holdings, and when 
independence dawned Africans were not themselves able to finance 
the changes which they were able to effect through political means. 
Land transfer was one of the most important immediate changes 
which was implemented, in fact beginning two years prior to 
independence. 
Land transfer occurred in almost all cases at prices which 
reflected the productivity of European farms as European enter- 
prises. The capital intensity of these farms was equalled in few 
African agricultural enterprises, which was to have two effects 
on performance after transfer. The first was the need to provide 
large proportions of loans to finance the transfer, as African 
capital was scarce. The high debt to equity ratio which resulted 
meant that loan servicing requirements were large in relation to 
earning capacities of borrowers, with the effect that little 
"cushion" existed for the bad year, the replacement of livestock 
which succumbed to disease, the indisposition of the farmers, and 
all of the other uncertainties which characterise agricultural 
production. Misfortune or mismanagement lead quickly to loan 
default. 
Massive reliance on credit to farmers seems to have been an 
inappropriate response to the requirement that the land be trans- 
ferred. In view of the level and trend in land purchase prices 
since the bulk of the transfer of European farms was completed, 
it appears that the prices paid to European sellers were not in- 
flated by any elements peculiar to the Land Transfer Programme. 
If the prices paid were reasonable, the high incidence of loan 
default on settlement schemes and the poor repayment records of 
many of the African-owned large farms suggests that too much 
debt was used to finance the transfer. Political considerations 
of course contribute to the repayment situation, but official 
studies suggest that lack of ability to repay is a major factor 
in the financial performance of the land transfer loan portfolio. 
1 
1. Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 
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The political imperative of transfer would no doubt have 
overwhelmed the price system in any case, given the repressed 
level of capital accumulated by Africans at. the time of indepen- 
dence. However, the political problems created by poor loan re- 
payment, evidently within the ability of the Government to 
tolerate bnt outside the Government's ability to alleviate, 
might have been avoided if the role of credit had not been 
confused with the role of equity capital. The solutions which 
will eventually have to be found, such as debt cancellation, 
inflation of agricultural prices relative to farm operating 
costs, or conversion of settlers' interest to leasehold tenure, 
will have as their basis the equation of settlers' obligations 
with their ability to meet these obligations. In the large farm 
sector it may be possible in some cases to achieve this equation 
by replacing present management with skilled management capable 
of increasing the cash flow of ailing debtor enterprises. 
The prevalence of intensive credit rationing as suggested by 
the overwhelming importance, in shilling terms, of credit to 
settlers and to large scale agriculture, is an interesting con- 
trast with an important implication of the public sector farm 
credit complex. That implication is that credit should be widely 
distributed -- what other justification is there for invoking the 
poor farmer argument in a country in which 80% of the population 
are poor farmers? However, credit does not go to poor farmers, 
but rather to special groups of farmers, some of whom may be poor. 
Settlement credit, for example, has benefitted 35,000 farmers 
directly, most of whom probably fit the poor farmer image. What 
of the remaining one million? A handful has received loans from 
AFC, and a few are resident on deeply indebted large farms owned 
by groups of Africans. 
The only conclusion which can be drawn from the present 
distribution of agricultural credit loan portfolios is that small 
(continued) Central Bureau of Statistics, An Economic Appraisal of 
the Settlement Schemes, 1964/65 - 1967/68; An Economic Survey of 
African Owned Large Farms in Trans Nzoia, 1967/68 - 1970/71. Farm 
Economic Survey Report No. 28. Nairobi, 1972. 
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scale agriculture, especially those small scale farmers without 
off-farm employment or similar links with the larger economy, 
does not have effective access to a very important share of the 
resources of public sector farm credit institutions. Yet, 
according to the public sector farm credit complex, such 
institutions are established as vehicles of intervention to 
ensure a wide distribution of benefits. 
It is tempting to speculate that the confusion of the roles 
of debt and equity inherent in intensive credit rationing may be 
at the root of the poor farmer image or at least one of its major 
reinforcements. Large debt servicing requirements in proportion 
to income may indeed impoverish the debtor, and the poor repay- 
ment records may mistakenly be interpreted as evidence of abso- 
lute poverty rather than as evidence of relatively high ratios 
of debt to equity which overload borrowers' capacities to repay. 
The overburdening appears most marked in the large scale sector 
and in the settlement schemes. It may be argued that the settle- 
ment schemes are a special case, given their once-and-for-all 
use of gebt on special terms which would not be replicated in 
programmes designed to reach a larger portion of the farm popu- 
lation. However, large farms constitute an on-going situation 
in view of their commercial nature and the probability that they 
will change hands from time to time. The inability of a signifi- 
cant portion of large farm borrowers to repay their loans on 
schedule may be mistakenly interpreted as evidence that interest 
rates are too high or that returns in agriculture are too low, 
rather than as evidence that debt capacity is easily overestimated 
and overwhelmed. Erroneous conclusions based on the experience of 
these large farms may be generalised to the entire agriculture 
sector, penalising the small farmers who do not use formal sector 
credit, who are denied access to credit by the policies ostensibly 
designed to assist them, and who comprise the bulk of the rural 
population. 
While the Land Transfer Programme accounts for the largest 
elements of farm credit in Kenya, AFC's small scale lending also 
appears to be essentially intensive. Little conclusive data is 
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available to support this observation. However, the willingness 
of AFC to provide credit to the extent of 80% of the market price 
of an in-calf heifer and related equipment for dairying suggests 
that intensive rationing may be in effect, but the figure by it- 
self means little unless some indication of free cash flow is 
available for the projection of debt capacity. Some support for 
the contention that loans advanced under the IDA and KFW schemes 
follow the intensive credit rationing pattern is provided by the 
writer's field studies in Murang'a, where only two of the 13 sample 
borrowers appeared to be generating sufficient gross cash surplus 
from loan supported dairy enterprises in 1972, a normal year, to 
meet loan servicing obligations. 
1 
In certain of the cases in which 
surpluses were insufficient it could be argued that the loans were 
justified in view of the conservation of cash resulting from pro- 
ducing milk on the farm rather than purchasing it for home con- 
sumption, in effect providing cheaper milk on certain farms which 
may have had an overall gross cash surplus sufficient to meet 
debt servicing obligations. This type of lending of course 
raises other questions about rates of return available in agri- 
culture which are beyond the scope of this paper. 
Further evidence to support the assertion that credit is 
rationed intensively is found in the level of collection per- 
formance achieved, although the extent to which the failure to 
achieve a commercially viable portfolio reflects AFC's administra- 
tive shortcomings rather then low returns to farmers cannot be 
specified precisely on the basis of present data. 
2. Extensive Credit Rationing 
Extensive credit rationing consists of limiting severely 
the amount of credit each borrower receives while attempting to 
provide access to credit to a rather broad segment of potential 
borrowers. Extensive credit rationing is frequently manifested 
by credit limits specified in terms of a certain quantity of 
money per acre or hectare of land devoted to a particular enter- 
1. Credit Use and Development. pp. 83 ff. 
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prise. The most obvious example of extensive credit rationing 
among major schemes in Kenya is the GMR. GMR limits per acre 
are specified for various inputs and operations in hybrid maize 
and wheat production. As might be expected, these limits sum 
to something less than half of the cash costs of production of 
these crops on mechanised large scale farms, as noted proviously. 
l 
The shortfall and its magnitude are the usual result of the ex- 
tensive approach. From the point of view of debt capacity it 
could hardly be said that large scale growers of hybrid maize 
and wheat in Kenya have no more than a 50% chance of recovering 
their costs of production through the sale of their produce or 
that lenders' risks relating to large scale production of these 
crops could not be contained well within this limit, but yet the 
amount of credit available has been of an order amounting to 
roughly 50% of the cash costs of production in many years be- 
tween the mid-1960's and mid-1970's. 
3. Poor Loan Discipline 
Under conditions of stringent credit rationing, the proba- 
bility is enhanced that schemes will be mounted which are close 
to the opposite extremes of intensive and extensive credit 
rationing, rather than falling near a financially optimum mid- 
point determined by considerations of debt capacity in a situation 
of less stringent rationing. Relative to their debt capacities, 
borrowers will get too little or too much debt. 
The credit rationing dilemma under conditions of stringency 
may be shown graphically, as in Figure V-d. The quantity of 
borrowers is shown on-the horizontal axis and the amount of credit 
issued to individual borrowers, relative to their debt capacities, 
is shown on the vertical axis. The figure portrays a short run 
situation in which the stock of funds available for lending is 
fixed and assumes that the exposition is limited to one lender or 
credit scheme. The intersection of the horizontal and vertical 
asex at point 0 represents the optimum number of borrowers and 
the amount of credit issued, relative to the debt capacity of 
1. See p. 194. 
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Figure V-d. Credit Rationing and Borrower Debt Capacity 
under Assumptions of a Fixed Stock of 
Funds for Lending 
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each borrower. At point 0 the financial optimum is achieved, 
in terms of this static example, and each borrower under the 
particular credit scheme portrayed has access to an amount of 
credit optimally suited to his debt capacity. 
The use of this form of presentation raises questions which 
are not relevant to the context of this study, but which should 
be briefly explored to show the utility of this type of graph. 
One question concerns the labelling of the horizontal axis, and 
it should be_noted that this dimension could also be used to 
show the number of hectares or of crop enterprises benefitting 
from credit. Another question concerns the two remaining quad- 
rants in the graph: -, + and +, -. Too much credit for too many 
borrowers is inconsistent with the assumption of a limited supply 
of credit in the short run, given the usual SFCI context. However, 
this situation may well apply to private rural credit when viewed 
from a rural development perspective, as found in societies where 
rural indebtedness is considered a social problem. Too much credit 
for too many borrowers suggests perpetual rural indebtedness. Too 
little credit for too few borrowers, viewed from a financial per- 
spective, suggests opportunities for increasing intermediation. 
Relaxing the short term assumption of the presentation, financial 
development occurs through activities which shift point 0 so that 
the actual situation falls within the -, - quadrant, providing 
intermediaries with opportunities to increase the number of those 
having access to credit and increase the amount of credit to 
which each borrower has access, within the limits of an expanding 
debt capacity. Within the context of the model presented here, 
however, too little credit to too few borrowers is inconsistent 
with the political dynamics of the types of intervention in farm 
credit markets which are the primary concern of this study. 
To return to the development of the model, the farm credit 
programme designer or lender tends to depart from the financial 
optimum under conditions of stringent credit rationing. The 
political milieu of SFCI's provides an impetus for such a 
departure. If the limited funds available are for political 
reasons or for reasons of agricultural policy of development 
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strategy, to be issued to a small number of high priority 
borrowers, the departure from the optimum is in the direction 
of intensive rationing. Too few borrowers, relative to the 
financial optimum, tend to be given relatively too much credit. 
Debt is used to perform the functions of equity, and inability 
to repay as scheduled, i. e., delinquency, is the result. Be- 
cause the issue of relatively large amounts of credit is within 
some type of framework, provided by the loan scheme or programme, 
there is a very real possibility that investment priorities as 
seen by the programme designer and loan officers may not accord 
with those of the borrower. The economic implications of this 
disagreement include the possibility of departure from an economically 
optimum allocation of resources as well as the possibility of di- 
vergence between private and social optima. In the event of a 
difference of views between borrower and lender regarding credit 
use priorities, the possibility of loan diversion is increased. 
Borrowers use their funds for purposes other than those for which 
the loan was issued. (With respect to AFC loans to small farms 
studied by the writer in Murang'a, something over 10% of the 
total amount of the loans issued to sample farmers appeared to 
l) 
have been diverted by borrowers. 
If credit scheme design is not selective in the sense of 
identifying a group of prospective borrowers who are to be 
accorded a high priority in credit rationing, the basis for 
rationing may be generalised to include as many borrowers as 
possible, which is consistent with the political dynamics of 
the public sector farm credit complex. The resulting loans, 
extensively rationed, tend to be too small relative to the 
financial optimum. Farmers may find the loans too small to 
be worth applying to agricultural production or two small to 
be taken seriously in terms of a means of improving husbandry, 
in which case loan diversion is rampant. Farmers who do apply 
the loans to agricultural production may find the funds insuf- 
ficient to meet the financial requirements of improved techniques, 
and hence improved technology may be adopted not at all or only on 
an incomplete scale. "Economies" of this nature are reflected in 
1. Credit Use and Development. p. 69. 
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repressed levels of output on borrowers' farms, and yields may 
be such that the free cash flow necessary to meet loan repayment 
obligations is not realised. In this situation, inability to 
repay on schedule also occurs. 
Extensive credit rationing may also increase the possibilities 
of improprieties by borrowers in their efforts to obtain more funds. 
With respect to Kenya's GMR scheme, for example, relatively large 
numbers of borrowers were alleged to have planted fewer acres than 
those for which credit was provided, while others resorted to 
subterfuges such as using different names each year so that 
defaults in repayment from past years would not result in their 
being barred from further access to GMR funds. 
The difficulties which result from stringent credit rationing 
which is either too intensive or too extensive may be categorised 
under the general heading of poor loan discipline. Loan delinquency 
and loan diversion are evidence of poor loan discipline, as are 
improprieties committed by borrowers in attemps to improve their 
access to stringently rationed funds by deceiving the rationing 
authorities. 
4. Recapitulation of Stringent Credit Rationing by Political Criteria 
Stringent credit rationing by SFCI's involves the application 
of political criteria, inter alia, to financial decision: making. 
While it may be argued that political criteria effect a broad 
range of decision making in developing economies, the use of this 
perspective on the activities of SFCI's is warranted in view of 
the political basis of their establishment. At best they are 
contrived as devices to implement a broad range of development 
strategies, at worst they are a device for the dispensation of 
political favours. Hence, credit rationing at this stage of 
the development of the model is defined as being according to 
political criteria, as opposed to the commercial criteria applied 
by the financial sector as a whole which resulted in restricted 
rural access to financial services. 
1 
1. See pp. 343 ff. 
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Stringent credit rationing according to political criteria 
tends to be reflected in intensive and extensive issue of credit, 
departing from the financially optimal distribution. Intensive 
credit rationing tends to attempt to use debt as a substitute for 
equity, which is rationalised on policy grounds by the public 
sector farm credit complex. SFCI credit intensively rationed 
is seen as an entrepreneurial element in rural development. The 
substitution of debt for equity is reflected in poor loan repay- 
ment performance and to some extent in borrowers' use of their 
access to windfall amounts of credit to purchase things of 
importance to their own life styles rather than following strictly 
the priorities envisaged by credit scheme designers. Poor repay- 
ment performance of course reinforces the public sector farm 
credit complex: not only are farmers poor, but they are too 
poor to repay their debts. 
Extensive credit rationing diminishes the production impact 
of credit and hence presumably its economic return by according 
borrowers amounts which are insufficient to meet the investment 
programmes envisaged. Faced with inadequate access and. perhaps 
perceiving higher returns or lower risks attached to alternative 
uses of resources, borrowers may use the funds for other purposes 
altogether, concluding that half a loaf is no better than none as 
far as indivisibilities and production linkages between, say, 
early ploughing, selected seeds, fertilisers in prescribed pro- 
portions, etc., are concerned. Other borrowers may use extensively 
rationed credit for production purposes with respect to the speci- 
fied enterprise but suffer low returns as a result of indivisi- 
bilities and production process linkages beyond their willingness 
to invest, e. g., using HYV seeds but not applying fertiliser. In 
either instance credit extensively rationed stimulates borrowers' 
agricultural production less effectively than credit distributed 
at the financial optimum. Poor repayment performance is one 
result, as are activities aimed at "beating" the rationing 
system and securing greater access to credit through deceit. As 
the . -rationing system is basically alien to the rural economy, 
366 
Figure V-e. The Poor Loan Discipline Model 
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being designed and manipulated from the fat side of the dual 
economy, attempts at deception from the lean side are hardly 
surprising, especially if loan administration is lax. The 
results of deception -- hostility, suspicion, tougher regulation, 
greater supervision -- increase the costs of rural development 
administration and divert borrowers' and lenders' energies. 
Certain of these unfortunate aspects of extensive credit rationing 
may also be cited by adherents of the public sector farm credit 
complex in support of their belief and policies: more credit is 
obviously needed to stimulate agricultural production, while poor 
repayment performance again shows that farmers are poor. De- 
linquency, deceit and diversion of loans are aspects of poor loan 
discipline, which has its own consequences as outlined in the 
following section of this paper. 
Stringent credit rationing according to political criteria by 
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SFCI's reflects the peculiar nature of their access to resources 
in segmented financial markets. The development of the model to 
this stage, as shown in Figure V-e, permits a full statement of 
the hypothesis that1 
3. ) Public policy, as embodied in "low" interest rates and the re- 
sulting impediments to financial market integration, restricts 
the supply of funds available for lending to farmers. 
In addition, evidence suggests that 
4. a) The restricted supply of private domestic resources for agri- 
cultutal lending reinforces the requirement that lenders 
ration credit, 
and that 
4. b) Farm credit in Kenya is rationed according to commercial and 
political criteria. 
The conditions of stringency overwhelm any effect current or 
historic interest rates may have on credit distribution, although 
it would not be surprising if negative real rates encourage the 
popular thirst for access to farm credit. Thus, 
4. e) The interest rate plays virtually no role in allocating farm 
farm credit among borrowers or loan applicants. 
However, the alternatives by which credit may be stringently 
rationed do have an impact. on the quality of farm credit port- 
folios, and available data supports the contention that 
5. a) The nature of public sector involvement in the farm credit 
market in Kenya is conducive to poor repayment performance. 
The hypothesis that 
5. f) Poor payers include practically all borrowers who obtained 
funds under politically based credit rationing criteria 
may overstate the case. However, it has been shown that virtually 
all settlement farmers are in default, and that political criteria 
influence the design and operation of this scheme more than any of 
the others. It has also been shown that credit schemes based largely 
on commercial criteria, such as those of commercial banks, KTDA, the 
Pyrethrum Marketing Board and CPCS, are among the strongest in terms 
of repayment performance. These comparisons support the spirit of 
the hypothesis, in that repayment performance appears to vary in- 
versely with the extent to which political criteria are involved 
in the design and administration of rural credit schemes. 
1. See p. 345 for a partial statement of this hypothesis. 
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Repayment performance is a casualty of the inability of the 
public sector farm credit complex to embrace debt capacity as a 
basis for credit allocation. The distortions in borrower per- 
formance which result suggest that in social terms the efficacy 
and economic efficiency of credit as a tool in rural development 
intervention is open to question, however politically expedient 
the public sector's approach to credit provision may appear: 
2. c) The concept of credit need diverges sufficiently from the 
financial concept of debt capacity that it results in a 
financially unsound and economically questionable use of 
credit in an attempt to stimulate rural development. 
The concern for credit need embodied in the public sector 
farm credit complex implies that a rigorous justification for the 
use of credit in rural development strategy is not required. It 
implies that the tools of economics, which are not oriented directly 
to the evaluation of needs, are not essential in specifying whether 
credit offers an efficient means of realising rural development 
goals. In addition, the need creed suggests that criteria for 
making funds available, such as social return, equity or opportunity 
cost, need not be specified or precisely considered. The need 
creed does not provide a tool for determining how much credit should 
be made available for alternative on-farm investments or farm types, 
or to any particular farm. Belief in the need creed is a con- 
venient substitute for analytical approaches to such questions. 
4. c) Credit rationing by the public sector is not based on careful 
considerations of optimal resource use. 
Concern for optimality raises the question whether certain 
aspects of farm credit policy may be not only inefficient but also 
harmful in an absolute sense.: Restating the concern of several of 
the foregoing hypotheses, but in a somewhat broader context: 
1. a) Public policy designed ostensibly to stimulate rural develop- 
ment through the provision of credit to farmers on "reason- 
able" terms has in fact led to distortions in credit allo- 
cation by the formal sector which are dysfunctional to rural 
development. 
one major aspect of distortion of credit allocation from the 
point of view of broadly based rural development is the difficulty 
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that bona fide small farmers who devote full time to their land 
have in securing access to formal sector credit. In this respect 
public sector agricultural lenders other than the ASF added 
relatively little, between 1960 and 1975, to the accomplishments 
of private financial institutions rationing credit primarily on 
a commercial basis. These observations support the hypothesis 
that 
4. d) Farm credit rationing works to the disadvantage of the 
small scale farm sector in the competition for loans. 
Disadvantage is used here in the sense that the small scale 
sector does not have the combined political and economic 
importance which enables the large scale sector to obtain 
easy access to farm credit, nor does it have the political 
priority attached to settlement credit allocation. Other 
dysfunctional elements of public policy include the effect of 
discouraging mainstream financial institutions from penetrating 
rural financial markets more thoroughly and the difficulties 
imposed upon the healthy growth of SFCI's by the milieu in 
which they are conceived and operate, to which the discussion 
now turns. 
E. Consequences of Poor Loan Discipline 
Poor loan discipline is a factor of political interest. 
If an SFCI pursues collections vigorously it may encounter 
political opposition. Settlement credit in Kenya is a case 
in point. It would be impossible politically (and also un- 
warranted for moral and practical reasons since the planners 
have largely themselves to blame for putting a significant 
portion of settlers in a financially impossible situation) to 
evict all defaulters from their plots. However, it may be 
argued that some of the massive delinquency on repayment obli- 
gations by settlers could be cleared up without creating hard- 
ship because a significant portion of the defaulters are people 
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not wholly dependent upon their plots for their livelihoods. 
These same people, however, presumably tend to be more articu- 
late politically than those settlers without outside resources 
and incomes, and hence movement against them in the form of a 
more vigorous collection policy is not undertaken. 
Poor loan collection performance is of course the other 
side of the coin of poor loan discipline. Poor collection 
performance deprives an SFCI of funds for relending, reinforcing 
the need to ration credit stringently and to rely on the Treasury 
and external sources of funds for new lending. However, heavy 
dependence upon such sources of funds may also limit an SFCI's 
capacity for self-reform. Repayments from borrowers are not 
vital to new lending, as the Treasury and external donors fill 
this function. The expansion of SFCI programmes and the grace 
periods commonly allowed on the repayment of many SFCI obligations 
to the Treasury may delay the impact of the reality of a low 
quality portfolio. Not having to worry about raising funds 
locally, the SFCI need not be concerned about its reputation 
in the money market and is shielded from market pressure to 
improve. External donors may express dismay in diplomatic terms, 
but as the potential for smallholder development in many developing 
countries is considered substantial, and as product differentiating 
SFCI's often enjoy something of a monopoly position in their market 
segments, more funds are always forthcoming. Attempts at self- 
reform might encounter political opposition if there are widespread 
arrears on SFCI loans to farmers. 
An infrequently mentioned consequence of poor collection 
performance is its shattering effect on the morale of the staff 
of a credit institution. Low rates of recovery communicate to 
accountants and financial types that the situation is out of 
control. Perenniel massive default problems sap the will to 
succeed. Pessimism prevails. Fraud occurs more often. Manage- 
ment is preoccupied with day to day problems, leaving little energy 
for creative approaches to the future. If an SFCI is not staffed 
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by accountants and financial types, but with persons of other 
professions whose tolerance of ambiguity is much wider than 
those associated with the market-dependent financial sector, 
it is doubtful that the unconcern which results will provide 
the atmosphere conducive to good financial performance. 
Borrowers know that SFCI's are. government organisations. 
(Several AFC clients interviewed by the writer simply referred 
to the source of their loans as "Agriculture, " referring to the 
Ministry. ) A government that supports a low interest rate policy 
to benefit poor farmers can hardly be expected vigorously to 
follow a stern collection and foreclosure policy when borrowers, 
believed to be poor, default. The role of civil servants and 
parliamentarians (or colonels, depending on the regime) on the 
SFCI's board of directors ensures that the government's point 
of view is communicated to management. 
If the loan discipline required by public sector lenders 
is weak, it is unlikely that private sector lenders will be 
willing to risk vigorous enforcement measures in market segments 
in which public sector lenders are also present. Private sector 
lenders such as commercial banks which find themselves in this 
position will be especially cautious when they are relatively 
large and few, visible and foreign. The risk of lending is 
increased when security cannot easily be realised or prosecution 
of defaulters is costly and difficult. The increased risk cannot 
be offset by increases in lending rates, and the rational lender 
simply shuns some of the more challenging opportunities. The 
size and number of loans granted by private sector lenders are 
constricted. 
Poor collection records over the long term also indicate 
that a lender is out of touch with his constituency. Centralised 
financial institutions operating in the modern economy may 
certainly be out of touch with the rural economy of small farms 
and related activities. Financial intermediaries with a stake 
in the smallholder sector and with a long run approach to their 
functions would be unwilling to conduct business on a break-even 
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or loss basis, except of course in periods of temporary agri- 
cultural adversity or on pilot schemes, or if losses could be 
offset through cross-subsidisation. Poor collection performance 
is also consistent with the alien nature of SFCI's established 
for the reasons outlined above, for such institutions lack the 
knowledge of their borrowers required to obtain high rates of 
loan recovery within their borrowers' abilities to pay. Poor 
collection performance impairs SFCI development by sapping the 
financial vitality of the institution. This condition brings 
the argument full circle. A languishing SFCI demonstrates that 
farmers are indeed poor, refuelling the public sector farm credit 
complex. Such performance also perpetuates restricted rural access 
to financial services, does not help to integrate the institutional 
arrangements related to rural savings and to rural credit, and 
makes SFCI's unattractive competitors on their own strength for 
funds in the market. 
Little further detail is required to support the hypothesis 
that 
5. b) Poor repayment performance hinders the development of 
agricultural credit institutions in Kenya. 
An additional hypothesis, which could have been inserted in the 
development of the model at numerous points, but which is 
especially appropriate at this point, where public sector 
initiative is seen in yet a final unfortunate light, is that 
l. b) Public policy has contributed to imperfections and de- 
ficiencies in the organisation of formal financial markets. 
Lack of institutional viability and severely constrained oppor- 
tunities for generating growth internally certainly manifest flaws 
in market organisation viewed from the standpoint of the require- 
ments for workable competition in sectors which are of great 
importance to the growth of the national economy. 
These aspects are summarised in the final addition to the 
schematic diagram in Figure V-f. 
But, does loan recovery really matter? Surely the money lost 
by lenders helps farmers in any case? Surely the record can be 
justified in terms of social considerations, as the lenders have 
massive resources and tt; e farmers who default are very poor? 
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Surely the loans which are not recovered may be treated as an 
investment in the future of the nation's agriculture? 
There is little doubt that the poor collection performance 
of some of the major lenders permits borrowers to increase their 
rates of return. If a borrower pays only Sh 700 on a loan of 
Sh 900 for the purchase of a cow, the basic investment from his 
pocket is smaller by Sh 200, and the yeild on the investment is 
correspondingly increased. Delinquency in repayment also has 
the same effect, given the time value of money, especially in 
low interest rate regimes. Defaulting may even assist borrowers 
to increase the productivity of their farms if the money which 
should have been returned to the lender is used instead for on- 
farm investment which has a higher yield than the interest which 
accumulates on the arrears in their accounts, assuming that the 
day of reckoning cannot be postponed indefinitely. Delinquent 
amounts which are never recovered constitute a gift given by the 
lender to the borrower. 
At times it may even be in the lender's best interest to lose 
money. Experimental credit schemes designed to test new markets or 
new concepts which fail to achieve viability may be entirely justi- 
fied by their demonstration that apparently promising or attractive 
concepts are in fact not realistic or viable. Small amounts lost 
on a pilot scheme give the lender information and experience which 
he could not otherwise obtain and which should contribute to the 
design of alternative programmes which can be operated successfully. 
The lender is not the only one who suffers when his port- 
folio contains loans in arrears. The borrower in arrears may be 
forced to sell some of his assets to meet his obligations, but 
the sale may impair his ability to operate at a profit, especially 
if the sale is not selective. Losses may force the borrower to 
sell more assets, and eventually the borrower may be forced to 
sell his farm. Alternatively, if the borrower does not take the 
initiative the lender may seize the farm and auction it in order 
to liquidiate the bad debt on his books. As suggested earlier, 
indiscriminate credit policies benefit neither borrower nor lender. 
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A lender's bad debt losses also work to the disadvantage 
of parties other than the lender and the defaulting borrowers. 
Delinquencies diminish the amount of funds the lender has at 
his disposal for making new loans, for example, with the result 
that some creditworthy applicants may not be served at all while 
others may be subjected to delays in obtaining loans. Denial of 
credit for the unserved legions is especially apparent when major 
segments of a nation's agricultural credit schemes are in finan- 
cial difficulty. Lenders and prospective lenders are kept out of 
the market for new loans because of the likelihood of losing money. 
If farm credit programmes are closely identified with govern- 
ment, it may be argued that poor collection performance undermines 
the power of government in rural areas and diminishes the effective- 
ness of the government as rural developer by demonstrating that 
government is unwilling or unable to enforce contracts and laws. 
The situation is grave when most defaulters are able but unwilling 
to repay. In the opposite case, where defaulters are unable to 
pay (over the long run -- not due to poor weather or other 
temporary factors) the blame must lie on the lender and programme 
designer, who have obviously made poor decisions. 
Government credibility is jeopardised by rural credit schemes 
which involve widespread default or which involve the accumulation 
of large arrears by certain sections of the community. Government 
credibility is at stake to the extent that rural people are able 
to judge and respond to the quality of development administration. 
Good administration increases the area of consensus and builds 
confidence and cooperation. Poor administration leads to division, 
a lack of confidence and little incentive to cooperate, making it 
difficult to reach target groups. Poor administration also imposes 
a cost on the rural community in terms of the inflexibility of 
administrative responses and in terms of barriers to access to 
public services constructed by enterprising individuals within the 
public service who resort to corruption, a tax on the community, 
to increase their own incomes. 
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Low collection rates in public sector credit schemes are 
one means of demonstrating administrative incompetence to rural 
people, who carefully note the results: avoidance of repayment 
involves little cost and little risk to the defaulter. Accumu- 
lated defaults simply invite more defaults, 
1 
raising once again 
the costs to the community. Other government initiatives in 
rural development may be dulled if rural people discover that 
the government does not have the administrative means or will 
to p: l4y its part effectively in the process, or that the govern- 
ment may not be able to ensure that the fruits of its intervention 
are not captured by groups other than those which intervention 
was supposed primarily to benefit. 
Loan default also increases the cost of credit. This cost 
is generally reflected in constraints on the expansion of the 
rural community's access to credit from the source which is 
incurring default. Assuming that lenders make an attempt to 
recover arrears -- and this assumption is justified by the fact 
that credit, not grants, is the focus of this discussion -- such 
attempts obviously add to the lender's administrative costs. 
These costs include staff time, transport for visits to defaulters' 
farms or places of business, the hiring-of collection agents, 
correspondence, legal expenses, etc. It is frequently impossible 
under the usual type of loan contract and normal, legal custom to 
pass along to the defaulter all the lender's costs of collection 
of arrears, which makes it difficult to control collection costs 
efficiently. The lender can only very imperfectly specify at 
what point the costs of recovery exceed the benefits of recovery. 
In addition to out of pocket costs of collection of arrears, 
there is a social cost of arrears collection which consists of 
the tendency for collection activities to occupy the lender's 
staff and clog his decision making machinery. A portfolio in 
arrears can easily absorb management time, diminishing the effort 
available to devote to long range planning, the design of more 
1. Rice, E. B., "Summary of the Spring Review of Small Farmer 
Credit, " Small Farmer Credit SummaryPapers. XX. AID Spring 
Review of Small Farmer Credit. Washington, DC, Agency for Inter- 
national Development, June 1973. p. 22. 
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efficient accounting and information channels, and contemplation 
of or experimentation with other activities aimed at tapping the 
rural market for financial services. Thus, the cost imposed on 
the lender bi defaulters is ultimately borne by all others using 
the lender's services, or by taxpayers or consumers of the products 
of nationalised industries, etc., if losses are financed by public 
funds, and also by those who might otherwise have gained access to 
credit, at least to the extent the costs of default retard the 
development of the lender's ability to serve a wider segment of 
the rural community. 
Collection of loan arrears often creates ill-will between 
debtor and creditor, and public sympathy often favours the debtor. 
At least two countries -- Ghana and the Philippines -- have used 
their armies as collection agents. The lender's public standing 
may suffer if he gains the reputation of being "hard" on poor 
farmers. Public sector lenders, even if autonomous authorities, 
are not beyond criticism in parliament in countries having that 
institution and may be subjected to other pressures through the 
public service appointments structure, public sector planning and 
budgeting procedures, and similar rationing mechanisms. Lenders 
may feel compelled to devote considerable resources to maintaining 
a favourable image and counteracting any unpopularity caused by 
their efforts to meet standards of financial performance. To the 
extent such efforts are educational and succeed in promoting 
financial discipline they may constitute a socially beneficial 
activity. However, these resources are a scarce rural development 
input. Absorbing them in bureaucratic in-fighting may make them 
even scarcer from the point of view of rural development. 
It seems reasonable to assume that the existence of ill-will 
between rural people and central government complicates rural 
development administration. Government agencies and officials 
engaging in collection of arrears may be viewed with considerable 
scepticism by the public. Agencies associated with farm credit 
institutions, such as ministries of agriculture and rural develop- 
ment authorities, may have to absorb some of the animosity and 
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suspicion generated by a credit institution's collection 
activities. These types of problems increase the costs of 
rural development administration. Of all public sector re- 
sources devoted to rural development, it may be argued that 
administration is among the scarcest. The effectiveness of 
this very scarce input may be vulnerable to the collection 
problems of public sector lenders, at a great cost to rural 
society in terms of development opportunities foregone. 
The ultimate sanction of secured lenders is the realisation 
of their security. In the Kenyan context, land is a major form 
of security taken by SFCI's. Lenders in the public sector often 
have the power to realise security by administrative, as opposed 
to legal, recourse. In other words, major lenders may realise 
security without reference to the courts in circumstances in 
which private lenders and commercial banks would have to refer 
to the courts. This shortcut saves time and money from the point 
of view of the privileged lender and of government administration, 
but it may also involve disadvantages. The most obvious concerns 
the borrower's right of appeal, which often is more difficult to 
exercise than the right of appeal within the legal system. As no 
institution is perfect, SFCI's will occasionally abuse their 
administrative power, in which case the civil rights of borrowers 
are compromised. Specifically, the right to a fair hearing and 
the right to receive justice in due course and without undue 
expense may be jeopardised. 
Where lender's recourse is limited to legal means, lenders' 
demands upon courts for the collection of debts can have wide- 
spread repurcussions. At the least they require court time. 
Legal actions initiated by lenders swell the queue of litigants, 
causing others to wait longer to obtain effective access to the 
legal machinery. In the context of rural development, lenders' 
actions may cause delays in the application of the law to routine 
claims such as cattle theft, boundary disputes and the division of 
inheritance. Another cost to society is illustrated by Lele's 
accounts of how SFCI's in Ethiopia and Malawi which pressed their 
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claims against large numbers of rural people compromised the 
capacity of the courts to dispense justice and to be seen as 
dispensing justice, thereby diminishing the credibility and 
effectiveness of the legal system in rural areas. 
1 
Can court 
actions effectively be taken against a large portion of the 
community without weakening the role of the courts? To the 
extent the legal mechanism is unable to uphold loan contracts 
because of social considerations the basis of finance is weakened. 
2 
To the extent the legal mechanism upholds loan contracts in the 
face of great social opposition it may weaken its own status and 
that of the state as lawgiver. If the central government is 
also the lender, and hence the plaintiff, rulings in its favour 
may tend to alienate various groups of rural people. On the 
other hand, rulings against the state as lender may diminish the 
authority of the state's rural development arm and the ability 
of the authorities to administer rural development effectively. 
Deterioration of the legal system and its capacity to enforce 
contracts also entails social costs, in terms of development fore- 
gone, by räising the costs and hence retarding the growth of 
commerce. Commerce contributes to rural development by facili- 
tating the flow of inputs to agriculture, the flow of produce from 
rural areas to urban and export markets, and the volume of trans- 
actions within the rural economy itself. 
These unfortunate aspects of farm credit schemes and insti- 
tutions which do not perform very well financially have impli- 
cations which are intangible and within the general realm of 
social costs. These desultory secondary effects reinforce two 
of the hypotheses which were generally supported at previous 
points in the development of the model: 
3 
l. a) Public policy designed ostensibly to stimulate rural 
development through the Provision of credit on "reason- 
able" terms has in fact led to distortions in credit 
allocation by the formal sector which are dysfunctional 
to rural development 
1. Lele, Uma, The Design of Rural Development. pp. 93-95. 
2. Assuming finance is not based on unconscionable bargains. 
3. See pp. 345,367,369. 
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in the sense that they increase the costs of rural develop- 
ment administration, possibly affect the ability of the legal 
system to dispense justice and to be seen as dispensing justice 
(to the extent legal recourse is involved in the recovery of 
arrears), and also, through financially unsound rationing pro- 
cedures, put some farmers too deeply in debt while giving others 
too little and keeping most waiting in the queue of potential 
applicants. Again, 
1. c) Public policies relating to farm credit have worked 
against the interest of small farmers in the competition 
for loans 
in effect. impeding the ability of the public sector to 
administer rural development efficiently while attending to 
the traditional, limited functions of government. 
F. Summary 
The performance of the formal farm credit system in Kenya 
as measured by institutional behaviour and the degree to which 
rural people have access to financial services is consistent 
with the logic of finance and of financial markets under 
politically imposed financial repression. In fact, it appears 
that political and financial factors are sufficient to explain 
these aspects of the performance of the system. The relevant 
considerations and relationships are summarised schematically 
in Figure V-g, and may be reiterated as follows: 
The fundamental political assumptions relating to the role 
of farm credit in rural development constitute the public-sector 
farm credit complex, which comprises the belief that farmers are 
poor, that they need credit to innovate and expand, that the 
government should promote rural development and that supply- 
leading finance constitutes a suitable vehicle of intervention 
to stimulate rural development. Because poverty is seen as an 
important characteristic of the rural condition, it appears 
consistent that credit must be provided cheaply, at a low rate 
381 
Figure V-g. A Model of Formal Farm Credit in a Developing Mixed Economy 
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of interest, in spite of the great increases in productivity 
that credit is held to engender. The tradition of low interest 
rates in the formal financial sector may be traced to colonial 
monetary arrangements in Kenya's case. This tradition is not a 
major factor in decision making today, however, as present 
policy considerations are of far greater importance. 
Low interest rates yield low or even negative returns on 
non-prime lending by formal intermediaries, as the high costs 
of administering small relative to large loans and high risk as 
opposed to low risk loans tend to exceed intermediaries' rate 
spreads rather quickly as lenders attempt to develop new markets. 
Hence, lenders ration credit stringently, i. e., they are less 
likely to expand their clientele to include the less creditworthy 
than they would in a more liberalised financial regime character- 
ised by high interest rates. In addition, low interest rates 
may tend to diminish the utility of deposits from the point of 
view of intermediaries, although the exact impact of interest 
rates on deposit taking depends upon changes in intermediaries' 
balance sheet relationships as interest rate structures and 
levels change. 
Stringent credit rationing and the possibility of the 
diminished utility of deposits under conditions of financial 
repression result in restricted rural access to financial services. 
Intermediaries prefer to remain on the fat side of the dual economy. 
To overcome this reluctance on the part of financial institutions, 
government acts upon the assumptions which comprise the public 
sector farm credit complex by intervening in the financial 
market and establishing a specialised farm credit institution 
(SFCI). Because of its specialisation'in credit provision rather 
than in a more generalised approach to the rural financial market, 
such institutions perpetuate the gragmentation of the rural 
financial market which is inherent in restricted rural access 
to financial services. By looking at the market for loans to 
farmers (and even often failing to view that market as a market) 
rather than at rural savings capacity and at the potential market 
for other financial services, SFCI's deny themselves the oppor- 
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tunity of obtaining funds from the rural financial market. 
However, government funds are available to SFCI's, as would 
be expected given their public sector ownership. External 
donors are also prepared to support such intermediaries, and 
external funds, channelled through the government, are generally 
available on relatively soft terms. Recourse to such funds 
and intervention on only one side of rural financial markets 
ensures that SFCI's are alien to the rural economy -- as 
intrusions from the fat side of the dual economy -- and that 
this legacy of portliness may be manifested in flabby admin- 
istration and ponderous approaches to operations. 
Because of the constraints imposed by their limited sources 
and volume of funds and because of the types of credit programme 
design imposed by planners in ministries of finance and agriculture 
and in the service of external donors, SFCI's ration credit strin- 
gently. The distribution of credit does not achieve the financial 
optimum which could occur in liberalised financial markets. 
Credit may be rationed stringently on either intensive or extensive 
patterns. 
Intensive rationing is manifested in large loans, relative to 
borrowers' debt capacities. Because the loans are in this sense 
large, the number of borrowers is restricted and is small relative 
to the number who would have access to credit at the financial 
optimum. Loans which are large relative to borrowers' debt 
capacities place borrowers in the position of frequently not 
being able to meet repayment obligations as originally intended 
in the scheduling of maturities. Borrowers will tend to be unable 
to meet the demands made upon them by their loan contracts. Put 
in another way, intensive credit rationing substitutes debt for 
equity capital, and by sharing the equity risk in borrowers' 
enterprises the SFCI subjects itself to less stable and less 
certain returns than would be the case at the financial optimum. 
Extensive credit rationing involves the provision of credit 
to a larger number of borrowers than would have had access to 
SFCI credit at the financial optimum (and assuming a given amount 
384 
of funds available for lending). Hence, each individual ration 
of credit is smaller than at the financially optimum level. 
Extensive credit rationing tends to fail to stimulate agri- 
cultural production to the degree envisaged in programme design 
because it does not enable borrowers to overcome indivisibilities 
in agricultural investment or in the linkages in the production 
process, such as the use of fertiliser on improved varieties of 
seed. Faced with this situation, borrowers may only partially 
adopt an enterprise package or husbandry practice and realise 
disproportionately small returns relative to those projected, 
they may decide to divert loan funds for purposes not related 
to agricultural production which may yield no means of repayment, 
or they may engage in efforts to deceive the SFCI's rationing 
mechanism in the hope of obtaining more credit than they would 
receive by following the rules. 
Poor loan discipline, seen in borrowers' delinquency, deceit 
and diversion of loans results to the extent that credit is 
rationed intensively or extensively. This type of behaviour is 
really not surprising in view of the alien nature of SFCI's, either. 
Poor loan discipline is of course reflected in poor collection 
performance by SFCI's, and improvements in collection performance 
and other attempts at self-reform by SFCI's may be frustrated 
because of the political ramifications of attempts to enforce 
loan discipline. Any actions of this type against defaulters 
appears to conflict with the rationale for the establishment of 
an SFCI in the first instance, which was basically to improve rural 
welfare and enhance the image of government as an agent of develop- 
ment. Poor collection performance of course reinforces the public 
sector farm credit complex, while paradoxically retarding SFCI 
development by tying up funds in loan arrears, impairing SFCI cash 
flow. Funds which otherwise would have been available for the 
issue of new loans to rural people are absorbed by arrears, or 
not released by a slow portfolio turnover. In addition, poor 
collection performance may demoralise SFCI staff and retard 
institutional development by continuing heavy dependence on 
donors' benificence and dispensations from the national Treasury. 
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Poor collection performance, especially over the long run, 
also has other reinforcement effects. For example, it tends to 
reinforce SFCI isolation from the rural economy by retarding SFCI 
growth. Efforts to improve collections may engender ill-will on 
the part of defaulters, which may complicate government attempts 
to enlist the cooperation of rural people. Use of the legal sys- 
tem to recover widespread defaults may compromise the utility of 
the legal system in rural areas by delaying the processing of 
claims-. of other litigants or by offending significant portions of 
the rural population. Poor collection performance by an SFCI 
constitutes a demonstration of incompetence in government admin- 
istration, a demonstration which is probably readily grasped by 
rural people. 
The administrative and bad debt costs of a substantial 
arrears position in SFCI's portfolios renders such institutions 
less attractive as competitors for funds in financial markets, 
to the extent they are able to compete at all on their own 
strength. The retardation of their growth on a financially 
sound basis pushes even further over the horizon the time when 
an SFCI can shed its narrow specialisation and enter into broader 
segments of rural financial markets, possibly diminishing the 
fragmentation of such markets by uniting savings and credit 
operations. In the meantime, rural access to financial services 
remains restricted. 
The relationships outlined here are proposed as a model of 
formal farm credit provision in a developing mixed economy. While 
it is apparent that each developing mixed economy has its own 
configuration and pattern of development, that institutional 
arrangements to some extent differ, and that in the long run 
languishing SFCI's may develop into effective intermediaries 
which are less specialised in the sense that they provide a wide 
range of rural financial services, it may be asserted that the 
model provides a high degree of explanatory applicability to the 
phenomena it addresses for a wide range of developing mixed 
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economies. It is of course beyond the scope of this exercise, 
which is limited to the Kenyan case, to test the model over a 
number of different cases. 
It is also asserted that the model is adequate for identi- 
Eying the constraints which must be broken if a languishing SFCI 
is to develop into a self-sufficient intermediary, responsive to 
the forces and potential contained in rural financial markets. 
In fact, the main contribution of the model should consist of 
its demonstrating the interaction of key relationships in farm 
credit systems, thus providing a framework for changes in policy 
and operations in order to circumvent the unfortunate train of 
events it portrayst An example of progress in the desired 
direction is found in the cooperative banking system in Kenya, 
to which the discussion now turns, 
G. Epilogue 
The unrelieved scene of rural deprivation, political frus- 
tration and financial repression which constitutes the model 
developed here is happily broken by the promising performance of 
two relatively recent entrants into rural financial markets in 
Kenya: the Cooperative Savings Scheme (CSS) and the Cooperative 
Production Credit Scheme (CPCS), both of which are important 
components of the cooperative banking system. These interrelated 
programmes are referred to loosely here as the cooperative schemes. 
These schemes cannot yet be considered mature, as they have not yet 
(through the end of 1976) had to surmount any crises which would 
test their underlying strengths, weaknesses and resiliency under 
stress from forces outside the cooperative structure. Conclusions 
regarding the lessens to be drawn from their operation must be to 
some degree qualified and tentative. 
The growth of savings and credit operations in the rural 
portion of the cooperative structure has been documented and 
discussed in earlier sections. 
' 
At this point it remains only 
1. See pp. 212-213,288 ff. 
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to ask to what extent the development of the cooperative schemes 
does not fit the basic pattern of the model and whether their 
departures from the model help to substantiate the validity of 
the model. Before going on with this exploration, however, it 
may be helpful to outline the dimensions of the cooperative 
schemes and their rapid development: CSS began in 1970, and 
at the close of that year included 7,000 accounts containing 
Sh 1.1 million. By the close of 1973 there were about 112,500 
accounts containing a total of Sh 36.9 million. CPCS was 
initiated prior to CSS, on a union-by-union basis upon the 
fulfillment of certain minimum conditions relating to credit 
administration and with the consent of the membership of each 
participating society. By 1973 CPCS loans outstanding exceeded 
Sh 14.7 million, and the number of borrowers approximated 27,000.1 
The first difference between the cooperative schemes and 
the model is that the cooperative schemes appear to have been 
formulated on considerations which are more comprehensive and 
sophisticated than those which comprise the public sector farm 
credit complex. While the Lindquist Report (the document upon 
which the schemes were designed) is not entirely free of the 
complex, it does conclude after a survey of the farm credit 
situation in Kenya as of the mid-1960's that even given the 
improvements which might be expected to flow from land registra- 
tion and the expansion of existing credit programmes, "the main 
difficulty... will still be there, viz to reach the multitude of 
farmers with credits. To solve this problem it seems to be 
necessary to make an entirely new approach., 
2 
Lindquist also 
challenged the cheap credit policy by posing the rhetorical 
question of what constitutes a reasonable lending rate when 
in fact the costs of mounting a small farm medium term credit 
scheme then under discussion were projected at about 15% per 
annum of amounts outstanding. 
3 
1. See also Von Pischke, J. D., "A Penny Saved....: Kenya's 
Cooperative Savings Scheme and Some Related Aspects of Rural 
Finance. " Working Paper No. 204, Institute for Development 
Studies, University of Nairobi, January 1975. pp. 38-39. 
2. Lindquist, Sven, op. cit., p. 38. 
3. Ibid. 
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This irreverent approach is reflected in the maximum CPCS 
lending rate of 12% and in fact is complemented by the attention 
to business detail on the part of Nordic advisors and successive 
Commissioners for Cooperative Development. The agreement between 
Kenya and the Nordic countries which put the Nordic advisors in 
the field states: 
1 
An appropriate number of Cooperative Field Advisors will 
be stationed in the various Districts of Kenya for the 
purpose of supporting the personnel of the Department 
for Cooperative Development in its efforts towards im- 
proved management and operation of the cooperative 
organisations and better information for their members. 
District surveys by various Advisors, on file in the Ministry of 
Cooperative Development, indicate that they have tended to take 
a commercial approach to their functions and the problems they 
face. Although by the nature of their duties Kenyan cooperative 
officials have not produced such a volume of written material of 
this type, there is little reason to suspect that they , take a 
substantially different view of their functions. Oral presen- 
tations by the Commissioner for Cooperative Development at the 
Institute for Development Studies in Nairobi in March 1973 and 
January 1975 suggested a very functional and commercial approach 
to improving the business performance of cooperation in Kenya. 
The Government's cooperative policy is to an important 
degree based on the concept of performance: 
I 
The Government will therefore give every encouragement to 
the movement, as its efficiency increases, to enable it 
to play an extensive role in the agricultural sector... 
improve its performance and to compete unhindered on an 
equal basis with other state and private business organi- 
sations in those spheres of the economy in which it is 
allowed to participate. The movement will expect to 
retain (certain preferences, including monopsony with 
respect to certain smallholder cash crops) providing this 
does not endanger the efficiency of the industry concerned 
and providing it recognises that failure to fulfil the 
conditions set by Government will result in such rights 
being revoked. (emphasis and parenthetical insertions 
added) 
1. Quoted in Kuehn, Alfred, 1969. p. 66. 
2. Republic of Kenya, Cooperative Development Policy for Kenya. 
p. 2. 
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This approach has forced those responsible for the promotion of 
cooperation to adopt a marketing or promotional outlook. Rural 
people have not been viewed as financial basket cases, but rather 
as a potential market. Ministry files bulge with recommendations 
from and to the field on matters such as raising share capital 
and economising working capital, improving coffee factory per- 
formance, increasing the turnover of cooperative stores, strengthen- 
ing member loyalty by providing better service including faster and 
larger payouts for deliveries, etc. The Cooperative College and 
the Cooperative Bank have been established to assist this drive 
for greater commercial strength and higher standards of performance 
and accountability. 
Both CPCS and CSS were initially launched on a pilot basis, 
as a means of testing the market and determining the operational 
limits of feasibility. CPCS was initially funded by the Coopera- 
tive Bank, but has since been supplied by funds saved by rural 
people themselves in response to the provision of new financial 
services by the cooperative structure. 
1 
The cooperative schemes taken together do not constitute a 
specialised farm credit institution. They provide a range of 
financial services, although not a very wide range. In offering 
both savings and credit facilities they integrate rural savings 
and rural credit, and the result has been the accumulation of a 
much larger volume of deposits than the planners had equipped the 
system to accommodate. In terms of the size of the investment 
programme of the cooperative structure, the volume of funds at its 
disposal in rural financial markets between 1972 and 1975 in 
response to its innovating financially could hardly be described 
1. Was the introduction of CPCS before CSS an example of the 
public sector farm credit complex at work, or was it simply shrewd 
promotional strategy? Were cooperators believed to "need" credit 
more than they "needed" savings facilities? The evidence, in the 
form of projected loan balances and savings balances indicates 
that the complex was in operation -- savings of Sh 20 million were 
projected against a loan demand of Sh 35 million, when in fact by 
the end of 1974 the opposite relationship prevailed. However, in 
view of the strength of the complex the phasing which was adopted 
may have been good promotional strategy. See Republic of Kenya, 
Ministry of Cooperatives and Social Services, Department of Co- 
operative Development, Development Plan 1971-1974. Nairobi, 1971. 
p. 39; Von Pischke, J. D., "A Penny Saved, " -p. 11. 
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as limited. In fact, the schemes were overwhelmed by savings 
deposits. 
The cooperative schemes are also not alien to the rural 
environment. While the degree of member control of the structure 
is easily overstated in view of the extent of Government super- 
vision, the people who are involved, from cooperative leaders 
with political aspirations to union and society clerical staff 
paid in accordance with the limitations of the lean side of the 
dual economy, have firm rural roots. Clients of union banking 
sections visited by the writer were not infrequently barefoot or 
shod in rubber shoes sold locally for Sh 12 a pair. 
Loans disbursed are modest, limited by the size of borrowers' 
deliveries to their societies. This degree of perspective in 
project design suggests that the rationing criteria employed 
produce an allocation not greatly different from the financial 
optimum for relatively short term funds. Borrowers' debt capa- 
cities are not overwhelmed. Credit rationing cannot be described 
as stringent. 
Loan discipline has not been an issue of major proportions, 
although diversion was common in cases in which CPCS loans were 
issued entirely in cash. Since debt capacities are not strained, 
however, diversion is not of great importance from the point of 
view of financial performance, although it may be detrimental from 
the point of view of stimulating agricultural production if bor- 
rowers feel they do not have sufficient remunerative investment 
opportunities in agriculture. Control of marketing channels 
diminishes collection problems and reflects a propensity by 
cooperative planners to view the rural economy in a broader 
context than that which might produce an SFCI or a credit pro- 
gramme in isolation. 
Political dynamics are of course at work and are very much 
bound up with the role of cooperation in rural development. 
With respect to the cooperative schemes, however, they appeared 
between 1973 and 1975 to operate in a direction opposite to that 
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which ordinarily flows from the public sector farm credit 
complex. What are the political implications of having organised 
small farmers in the cash economy who are financially self- 
sufficient to the extent of having average savings deposit 
balances in excess of average loan balances, and whose primary 
societies are net lenders to the rest of the cooperative structure 
and ultimately to the rest of the economy? 
Thus, the cooperative schemes seem to be of an entirely 
different order from the Agricultural Settlement Fund and from 
the Agricultural Finance Corporation, and depart in many ways 
from the conventions of commercial banking. They constitute 
one example of the effects of slight financial liberalisation, 
in the form of marginally higher interest rates and spreads 
between deposit rates and lending rates, and also in the form 
of an institutional adaptation to market potential throu,, h 
financial innovation. However, it cannot be maintained that 
these schemes have really overturned financial repression in 
rural financial markets in Kenya, as interest rates have not 
been permitted to play an allocative role and the element of 
subsidy remains. substantial in the form of Government super- 
vision and Nordic assistance. However, these schemes repre- 
sent an alternative financial technology, and one that got off 
to a very promising start in rural Kenya. 
Farmers' response to the cooperative schemes strengthens 
the argument that higher interest rates are not against the 
best interests of rural people, but the lesson is not the 
obvious one which might be drawn from financial theory. CSS 
growth cannot be said to reflect the results of providing an 
attractive return on savings -- at a nominal 5% the real return 
has in fact been negative over most of the life of the scheme 
and has not been greatly different from the rates paid by the 
commercial banks and the Post Office Savings Bank. Rather, CSS 
has attracted funds because of the convenience it provides, 
lowering depositors' costs of liquidity. Some of the growth in 
deposits no doubt also reflects straightforward member loyalty, 
392 
as cooperative education and promotional activities have stressed 
the link between the credit and savings schemes, which means that 
expansion in deposit balances within the system provides a basis 
for growth in credit outstanding. 
The level of loan interest rates, fixed between 8% and 12%, 
but generally 10% or above and specified within these limits at 
the discretion of individual unions, indicates that rural people 
are willing to borrow at rates above those found in the commercial 
banking sector, and that such rates are not a source of rural 
hardship. At what rate level the rural demand for credit becomes 
elastic remains an unknown in Kenya, but it would appear from 
cooperative experience that the point lies somewhere above a 
nominal 12%. 
An important lesson from the schemes is that the spread 
between the deposit rate and the lending rate, which is large 
by the standards of the formal financial sector, helps to enable 
intermediation to occur where it did not take place before, 
thereby expanding rural access to financial services including 
savings and credit facilities. This fact suggests that even 
higher rates on the lending side could enable the mounting of 
even more adventurous attempts at rural financial intermediation 
among the segment of farmers who do not yet have convenient access 
to deposit facilities and who would be willing to keep some funds 
on deposit with appropriate intermediaries at low negative real 
rates of interest simply for the convenience afforded by the 
deposit facilities. Arguments concerning the elasticity of 
deposit balances to changes in the interest rate do not apply 
at this level, except to the extent they hypothesise inelasticity 
over the range of rates in question. At this level deposits appear 
to be more "institution elastic" than price elastic. 
A final hypothesis summarises major points of theoretical 
interest which are confirmed by cooperative experience in Kenya: 
6. A partial departure from the mainstream public sector farm 
credit policy, embodied in cooperative savings and credit 
experience involving smallholder growers or cash crops, 
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has yielded relatively satisfactory operating results 
consistent with the theory of financial liberalisation 
and has increased access to financial services in rural 
areas. 
By presenting a picture which is largely the opposite of 
that sketched in the development of the model, the cooperative 
schemes support the applicability of the model. When the 
negative propositions of the model are not applicable, neither 
are the dismal results they predict. In fact, success appears 
to occur for and to involve reasons just the opposite of those 
cited in the presentation of the model, suggesting that experi- 
mentation with financial liberalisation and a more comprehensive 
view of the rural economy could improve rural access to financial 
services and contribute to institutional vitality and viability 
in the rural operations of the formal financial sector. 
If the cooperative schemes continue to go from strength to 
strength and if they are able to weather. adversity without having 
to be taken over or rescued by government intervention which 
alters their form and function, the order of presentation taken 
in this chapter would no longer be valid or reasonable. In that 
fortunate circumstance the most fruitful form of exploration 
would consist of explaining the relatively unimpressive per- 
formance of settlement and AFC credit in terms of the lessons 
of financial intermediation by cooperatives, rather than, as in 
this study, explaining the recent success of the cooperative 
schemes in terms of the failures of the older institutional 
attempts to provide formal sector credit to large numbers of 
farmers. 
0 
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APPENDIX A 
KENYA'S COLONIAL MONETARY ARRANGEMENTS 
As of the mid-1950's the structure of Kenya's financial 
sector was characterised by Browning as involving: 
1 
1) domination by foreign banks, 
2) a currency system without a central bank, and 
3) no money market. 
This structure reflected the operations of the Sterling exchange 
standard and its implementing institutions, primarily the East 
African Currency Board and members or predecessors of the three 
large British overseas banking groups: Barclays, National and 
Grindlays, and Standard. 
2 
A. Financial Tactics in Colonial Development Strategy 
In 1919 the East African Currency Board was established, 
which put Kenya on the Sterling exchange standard. Board 
currency was backed by Sterling assets, and was freely con- 
vertible at par (less a small commission, usually only a 
fractional percentage) with Sterling. 
3 
This system was con- 
ducive to the development of Kenya with British capital, as it 
protected investors from exchange rate risks (between the East 
African shilling and Sterling) which could affect the value of 
1. Browning, P. R., "Banking and Money in East Africa, " The 
East African Economic Review. 1,1, July 1954. p. 24 
2. Standard works on the Sterling exchange standard which 
contain chapters specific to East Africa include Sayers, R. S., 
ed., Banking in the British Commonwealth. Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1952.486 pp; and the later work edited by W. F. Crick, 
Commonwealth Banking Systems. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1965. 
536 pp. 
3. Shannon, H. A., "Evolution of the Colonial Sterling Exchange 
Standard, " IMF Staff Papers. I, 1950-51. p. 342. The Board 
achieved solvency (100% cover for its note issue) only in 1946, 
having lost $1.5 million by 1926 through its retirement of 
predecessor rupee currencies at a value in excess of their 
value in the world market. See Shannon, pp. 342-348, and 
Clauson, G. M. L., "The British Colonial Currency System, " The 
Economic Journal. LIV, 1, April 1944. pp. 11-13. 
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their investments, while at the same time freely permitting 
repatriation of capital and profits. 
1 Such protection was 
important because of the profit-oriented uses and private 
sources of capital which were seen by British authorities 
as appropriate tools for colonial development. 
2 
The Sterling exchange standard gave Kenya access to the 
London financial market because the local legal tender was 
virtually identical to Sterling from the point of view of 
lenders and borrowers. 
3 
The advantages of this system to 
Britain and to investors in Kenya included, in addition to 
convertibility, the establishment of a banking system with 
resources beyond Kenya and the establishment of a "sound" 
banking tradition which still prevails in Kenya. Sound 
banking refers to the historical ability of banks to meet 
their financial obligations. 
4 
The most severe recent test 
of soundness occurred in 1960 when the prospect of indepen- 
dence resulted in substantial capital outflows. Loan to 
deposit ratios increased from 66% to 96% during 1960 and the 
banks relied on their London head offices to ensure the neces- 
sary liquidity. 
5 
Indeed, the flexibility contained in the 
colonial monetary arrangements promoted the growth of the 
banking system, as noted in the Blumenthal Report in the 
early 1960's: 
6 
1. Nevin, Edward, Capital Funds in Underdeveloped Countries. 
London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1961. pp. 8-9. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Crick, W. F., "The Framework of Inter-Relations, " Common- 
wealth Banking Systems. p. 4. 
4. The only bank failure in East Africa reported in the 
standard literature appears to be the 1949 demise of a small 
bank, the Exchange Bank of India and Africa, Ltd., which was 
incorporated in Bombay in 1942. See Newlyn, W. T., in Sayers, 
R. S., ed., Banking in the British Commonwealth. p. 449. 
5. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Economic Survey 1961. p. 6. 
6. Blumenthal, Erwin, The Present Monetary System and its Future: 
Report to the Government of Tanganyika. Dar-es-Salaam, Government 
Printer, 1963. pp. 8 ff; also quoted by Ridley, R. S., "Eastern 
Africa, " Ch. 10 in Crick, W. F., ed., Commonwealth Banking Systems. 
p. 404. 
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Hundreds of years of experience in banking and the 
possibility of recourse to head offices, coupled with 
the fact that the position in East Africa represents 
only an item in their world-wide activities, have per- 
mitted (the commercial banks') business, expecially the 
relations between deposits and lendings, to develop in 
the interest of East Africa in a way which would hardly 
have been within the powers of a local bank operating 
with limited resources and connections and acting under 
the necessary security regulations. 
Evidence in support of this assertion is found in the case of the 
transitional years from 1960 to 1965. As the East African 
Currency Board's 1961/62 annual report noted: 
1 
(the commercial banks') lending remained at a far higher 
level in relation to deposits than they could have pru- 
dently undertaken had they been based on, and been 
operating solely in, the currency area. Their ability 
to maintain this level was of course due primarily to 
their overseas connections.... 
However, the system developed along some lines more than 
others, reflecting the nature of the colonial economy. Import- 
export transactions were emphasised, domestic savings and invest- 
ment flows being of less interest. 
2 
In this connection, it may 
be asked whether, in effect, the system hindered the development 
of a local financial market. Key factors, from this perspective, 
in the operations of colonial monetary arrangements included the 
determination of interest rates and the banks' reliance on their 
London head offices. 
1. Low Interest Rates and their Determination 
Regarding colonial bank interest rates, Nevin observed: 
3 
.. the policy adopted by the expatriate banks in colonial 
territories has been determined by their head offices pri- 
marily with regard to monetary conditions prevailing in 
the country in which the head office was situated. That 
is to say, if interest rates were raised in, say the United 
Kingdom as a result of a rise in Bank rate and usual 
accompanying measures, interest rates would be raised 
more or less equally by all the branches of that bank 
1. p. 12. 
2. Engberg, Holger L., "Commercial Banking in East Africa, 1950- 
1963. " Journal of Modern African Studies. 3,2,1965. p. 199. 
3. Capital Funds. p. 46. 
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operating throughout the world, without any special 
reference to the needs or circumstances of the individual 
overseas territories involved. (emphasis added) 
Ridley provides details of how the banks in East Africa set 
their rates, noting that the primary reference base was the London 
rate, but that local conditions were reflected in changes in the 
spread between local and London rates. 
1 
Until recently there was no local money market, and with 
East African currency tied to Sterling by only a small 
commission charge, the major factor governing East African 
interest rates for many years was naturally the Bank of 
England rate. The minimum overdraft interest rate was 
therefore reviewed as and when any change occurred in the 
Bank of England rate. There were two factors that had to 
be borne in mind. When the local ratio of advances to 
deposits tended to fall and the banks' liquidity was 
higher than usual, the margin between the Bank of England 
rate and the local minimum interest rate could be narrowed, 
but it was never less than 1%. In the reverse of these 
circumstances, the margin was widened and has been as 
much as 3/%. Due to higher recurrent costs in East Africa, 
as compared with the United Kingdom, it was impossible to 
allow the local minimum interest rate on advances to 
follow the Bank of England rate down beyond a certain 
point. The minimum rate in East Africa has never fallen 
below 5% per annum. 
This description by a commercial banker invalidates Nevin's 
view that the process of setting interest rates was based entirely 
on external factors. Thus, local interest rates to some extent 
reflected the liquidity position of the local banks as well as 
local operating costs. Unfortunately, Ridley does not provide 
any detail of why the cost of banking in East Africa was higher 
than in Britain. A relative absence of economies of size may have 
contributed, as well as higher loan losses and expatriate staff 
costs. It is also probable that the financial structure of East 
African operations would have differed from that which applied to 
domestic banks in Britain, as, for example, the necessity of 
maintaining higher cash ratios, and that the cost of funds to 
branches in East Africa may have been higher than those typical 
of domestic banks in Britain. 
1. Op. cit., p. 491. 
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, 
However, the flexibility and responsiveness of local 
lending rates appears somewhat limited, as rates stayed within 
the 5% to 9% range, never greatly different from those pre- 
vailing in London. 
It should be noted that the levels of Sterling balances 
held by the colonies were by no means insignificant, standing 
at more than c 1c. 600 million in the years immediately after World 
War II. 
1 
During the same period the level of total deposits at 
London clearing banks ranged from 25.0 to £6.0 thousand million. 
2 
This comparison suggests that the colonies' Sterling balances and. 
their management would have influenced the level and structure of 
interest rates prevailing in the London market, but that their 
influence would not have been large. 
3 
The evidence indicates that the rates at which funds were 
supplied to and available in Kenya were not a function of the 
domestic supply and demand for funds. Except in cases of coinci- 
dence the London rate level and structure would not have been 
identical to that which would have prevailed in Kenya under the 
absence of a monetary standard which in effect made transfers to 
and from London analogous to domestic transfers. There is little 
reason to suppose that supply and demand factors and institutional 
arrangements in Kenya under such a hypothetical alternative 
arrangement would have produced the same result as the market 
forces and institutional arrangements determining interest rates 
in London. Logic suggests that Kenya rates would have been higher 
than London rates, reflecting four factors: 
1) the higher risks in a predominantly agricultural economy, 
1. Greaves, I. C., "The Sterling Balances of Colonial Territories, " 
The Economic Journal. LXI, 2, June 1951. p. 434. 
2. Annual Abstract of Statistics. 89,1952. London, HMSO, 1952. 
p. 279. 
3. Whether the 110% cover requirement for Currency Board note 
issues had a repressive effect on the development of Kenya's 
financial system is not treated here, as the present focus is 
on interest rates directly. For discussions of this aspect of 
the Sterling exchange standard see Nevin, Edward, op. cit., 
especially pp. 13-21 on the repatriation of currency reserves, 
and Hazelwood, Arthur, "The Economics of Colonial Monetary Arrange- 
ments, " Social and Economic Studies. 3,4,1954. pp. 290-314. 
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2) the inefficiencies of a thin financial market, 
3) the problems inherent in a poor economic infrastructure, and 
4) presumably, the relatively greater demand for a smaller supply 
of capital in a young enclave economy compared to a mature 
metropolitan economy. 
The low rates of interest provided by London appear not to 
have given much stimulation to domestic savings. The enclave 
had no special incentive to maintain more than working balances 
in Kenya, although of course the free convertibility provided 
by the system offered no disincentive, either. The Africans who 
entered the monetary sector, however, would probably not have 
found the deposit rates very exciting, and economic logic suggests 
that the low rate levels would not have provided a stimulus to 
the accumulation of non-cash financial assets by Africans. Of 
course, these effects were to some extent -- some would argue 
to a large extent -- offset by the virtually absolute security 
for depositors' funds provided by the large expatriate banks. 
l 
Local banks established under the hypothetical alternative 
situation mentioned above would not have been able to provide 
such a degree of security, although it is by no means certain 
that they would have failed to inspire depositor confidence, or 
that deposit insurance schemes could not or would not have evolved. 
Regardless of the stimulation which might have been furnished by 
the size and solvency of the banks, access to banking services 
was geographically severely limited over most of the colonial 
era. In 1949 only 12 places were served by banking offices, 
2 
although by 1960 coverage had extended to 65 centres. " 
To summarise these observations on the effect of the 
mechanism by which interest rates were determined in colonial 
Kenya: The Sterling exchange standard was not designed to mobilise 
domestic savings and by the imposition of interest rate levels and 
structures prevailing in Britain was in fact not conducive to such 
mobilisation, thus repressing the potential development of a local 
financial market. 
1. McWilliam, M. D., op. cit., p. 16. 
2. Ibid., p. 24. 
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2. Financial Links between Local Offices and London 
The major banks' reliance on their London head offices for 
money market type transactions and as lenders of last resort 
was a natural part of the Sterling exchange standard. The links 
between the branches in the territories and the London head 
offices constituted a major part of the system. Head offices 
benefitted from the lack of simultaneity in the financial flows 
of the different colonial economies, being able to pool surpluses 
and deficits which arose from the seasonality of the many pri- 
marily agricultural exporting colonial economies. Local branches 
benefitted by having a ready source of and use for funds, enabling 
them to finance larger volumes of trade than might have been 
possible were they independent banks with no special sources of 
external finance. 
Economic logic suggests that the fact of ready access to 
London did not encourage Kenyan branches to compete for depos- 
itors' funds. The utility of local deposits may be assumed to 
be a function of the degree of reliance placed on them and the 
necessity attached to such reliance. Access to London diminished 
this reliance. It may also be that any banking system which might 
have evolved under the hypothetical alternative outlined above 
would also not have been competitive in this respect, but com- 
parison of the two cases involves an asymmetry in that the 
Sterling exchange standard banking system was no doubt discouraged 
from being very competitive locally, while the alternative system 
might not have been so discouraged. 
In certain colonies the settlements for local clearings were 
effected by Sterling drafts on London, representing probably the 
most extreme practice antithetical to the development of a local 
money market. 
' 
The general practice of using transactions with 
London in much the same way as branches in, say, Bristol, did not 
provide a basis for local money market development. However, the 
exchange commission charged by the Currency Board -- each way 
over most of the period -- was sufficient to promote local clearing 
on a routine basis in Nairobi. In fact, the banks frequently 
1. Nevin, Edward, Capital Funds. pp. 68-69. 
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maintained higher cash levels than otherwise required simply to 
avoid the Currency Board commission, a practice which was rational 
in view of the level of the commission, the level of rates in 
London, and the clearing interval. 
1 
The Currency Board issued 
special Sh 10,000 notes which were not circulated publicly but 
retained by the banks for local clearing purposes. 
B. Roots of Monetary Independence 
With the approach of the late 1950's the East African 
Currency Board took certain steps which were a departure from 
the classical currency board system2 and which provided a basis 
for a local money market. 
3 
In 1955 a fiduciary issue limit was 
established and the Board broke the tradition of not purchasing 
securities issued by constituent territories. 
4 
In 1960 additional 
impetus to local money market development was given by the Board's 
reconstitution with East African membership, the removal of its 
head office from London to Nairobi and the institution of a crop 
finance facility. 
5 
This facility put the Board in the position 
of promoting exports and, by moving it away from acting solely 
as a moneychanger, opened the way towards its becoming a lender 
of last resort. In 1962 the Board began to establish itself as 
a local clearing house by requiring that banks using its services 
open clearing accounts, 
6 
and while the banks continued to clear 
1. Ridley, R. S., op. cit. 
_, 
p. 392. 
2. The Boards insolvency for roughly 20 years. before it achieved 
100% cover for its note issue was also a departure from the 
classical pattern, of course. 
3. Kratz, Joachim, "The East African Currency Board, " IMF Staff 
Papers. XIII, 1966. pp. 229-255 contains a summary of these 
developments. 
4. East African Currency Board, Report of the East African 
Currency Board for the year ending 30th June 1955. London, 1955. 
5. East African Currency Board, Report of the East African 
Currency Board for the year ending 30th June 1960. Nairobi, 1960. 
6. East African Currency Board, Report of the East African 
Currency Board for the year ending 30th June 1962. 
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bilaterally, 
I 
by 1964 all the banks in the main centres in 
East Africa were reported to have opened clearing accounts 
with the Board. 
2 
In addition to these movements towards the establishment 
of central banking functions., the Board in 1962 reduced its 
rediscount rate from 7% to 511% and changed its transfer commis- 
sion structure to make it less attractive to send funds to 
London. 
3 
The effectiveness of these departures is seen in the 
scope they provided for the development of a local money market. 
A grey market in short term funds is reported to have developed 
in Nairobi among firms seeking to minimise transfer charges 
between Nairobi and London. 
4 
In addition to this type of loan 
transaction, the local market also dealt in spot "exchange 
compensations" whereby Sterling was bought and sold privately 
at commissions undercutting those levied by the Board. 
5 
In summary, the Sterling exchange standard, while 
attracting formal intermediaries to Kenya, did so on terms 
which did not particularly encourage the development of an 
active formal domestic financial market. Developments late 
in the colonial period and in the first years of independence, 
before the creation of a central bank, provide an indication of 
the steps involved in the creation of a more vital financial 
system. 
I. East African Currency Board, Report of the East African 
Currency Board for the year ending 30th June 1963. pp. 7-8. 
2. East African-Currency Board, Report of the East African 
Currency Board for the year ending 30th June 1964. p. 24. 
3. East African Currency Board, Report of the East African 
Currency Board for the year ending 30th June 1962. pp. 7-8. 
Alterations of transfer commissions to discourage redemption 
of East African shillings for Sterling was used as early as 
1931 when it appeared that redemptions might exceed the Board's 
ability to honour its pledge of convertibility. See Newlyn, 
W. T., "The Colonial Empire, " in Sayers, R. S., ed., Banking in 
the British Commonwealth. p. 433. 
4. McWilliam, M. D., op. cit., p. 37. 
5. East African Currency Board, Report of the East African 
Currency Board for the year ending 30th June 1972. p. 7. 
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APPENDIX B 
THE REPAYMENT INDEX 
A. Integrating Financial Analysis with Other Social Sciences 
Analysis of the role of credit in rural development is 
generally conducted on two planes. The first concerns the impact 
of credit on the operations of the borrowers, and numerous field 
studies have been conducted around the world to relate credit 
access and use with crop yields, patterns of innovation adoption, 
rates of return on on-farm investment, and other aspects of farm 
performance and borrower attributes of relevance to those con- 
cerned with the provision of credit to farmers. 
1 
Concern for the 
1. Four classes of examples of this approach to evaluation of 
farm credit suffice to demonstrate its widespread use: 
a) The massive All-India Rural Credit Survey and subsequent 
follow-up activities of the Reserve Bank of India constitute a 
. major example of field studies having very broad research aims, 
including enquiry concerning many aspects of the financial, 
agricultural and social status of borrowers. See, for example, 
Reserve Bank of India, All-India Rural Credit Survey: Vol. I, 
The Survey Report, Part I (Rural Families). Bombay, 1956.1067 
pp; Report of the All-India Rural Credit Review Committee. Bom- 
bay, 1969.1073 pp; and comment and criticism in Thorner, Daniel 
and Alice, Land and Labour in India. New York, Asia Publishing 
House, 1962. Chapters XIV and XV. 
b) The United States Farmers Home Administration, and many of the 
supervised credit programmes in developing countries engendered 
with FHA assistance use before-loan and after-loan comparisons of 
borrowers' net worth and various measures of income to monitor 
borrower and programme performance. See, for example, the Operating 
Loan Progress Report Form contained in Hartman, Jack, et al., 
"Agricultural Supervised Credit, The Farmers Home Administration 
Way, " Small Farmer Credit Additional Papers. XVI. AID Spring 
Review of Small Farmer Credit. Washington, DC, Agency for Inter- 
national Development, June 1973. p. 26. 
c) Much of the fieldwork undertaken in Latin America by re- 
searchers from the Ohio State University has been devoted towards 
ascertaining this aspect of credit impact. See, for example, 
reports of the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural 
Sociology issued as AFC Research Reports and as Studies in Agri- 
cultural Capital and Technology, by authors including Dale W. 
Adams, Norman Rask and others. A partial list is given in the 
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impact of credit on the operations of the borrower is of course 
warranted, especially in those cases in which credit is viewed 
as an innovative device or a means to some innovative end. Loans 
of this variety issued under supply-leading strategies frequently 
depend upon the productivity of the loan-supported innovation to 
generate the means of loan repayment. 
The second type of analysis is fundamentally and at times 
narrowly financial in nature, being oriented towards loan port- 
folio and institutional performance by suppliers of agricultural 
credit. Enquiries of this sort frequently centre on the financial 
health and capacity of credit institutions to serve and expand 
their clientele. Common measures of portfolio performance used 
as key indicators in this sort of study include the collection 
ratio (defined broadly as repayments received as a proportion of 
amounts due), the percentage of amounts outstanding which are' in 
arrears, and the proportion of loan accounts having balances in 
arrears, as well as various measures of portfolio and institutional 
growth. Ageings of amounts in arrears constitute another useful 
measure of this sorb, but are frequently not found in such studies 
because farm credit institutions in many developing countries lack 
the accounting capability required for a periodic ageing of accounts 
in arrears. 
While certain aspects of this type of approach, generally 
confined to measures of portfolio performance, are also commonly 
found in the literature, including the examples footnoted on the 
previous page and below, detailed analyses of this type are not 
so frequently seen. Technical analyses of financial and insti- 
tutional performance are generally confined to doctoral disserta- 
tions, project documents involving external donors and to exercises 
(continued) footnote on p. 15 of this dissertation. 
d) Various country studies in the AID Spring Review of Small Farmer 
Credit were concerned with borrowers' performance as farmers, and 
other examples appear under relevant headings in Dissertation Ab- 
stracts (periodical) and in Agricultural Credit and Rural Savings, 
AID Bibliography Series, Agriculture No. 7. Washington, DC, 1972. 
Guidelines for field investigations of this sort are found in Rao, 
T. S., Guide to Methods and Procedures of Rural Credit Surveys. FAO 
Agricultural Development Paper No. 73. Rome, Food and Agriculture 
Organisation of the United Nations, 1962.107 pp. 
4 05 
in corporate planning. Studies of this sort tend to be highly 
specialised, 
1 
and to have a limited readership. Their lack of 
broader appeal may also be associated with the view, discussed 
in Chapter II, that the financial sector really does not matter 
very much in the development process. The viability of an inter- 
mediary providing credit may be of less interest than the fact 
that it is able or notable to meet disbursement targets, for 
example. 
2 
However, technical enquiries of this type are cer- 
tainly warranted. It is difficult to conceive of agricultural 
programmes successful on a broad front without viable admin- 
istrative frameworks and relatively efficient decision making 
units on the lending as well as on the borrowing side. Hence, 
the health of institutions providing agricultural credit would 
appear to be a necessary condition for successful programmes. 
The two approaches identified above may be equated with the 
demand side and the supply side of agricultural credit. Farmers 
and their production techniques constitute the demand side, while 
lenders and their performance constitute the supply side. Given 
a concern for market conditions and performance, economic theory 
indicates that consideration of either demand or supply in iso- 
lation is of very limited usefulness. Agricultural credit supply 
and demand appear to be no exception to this situation. However, 
there is something of an analytical void between the two approaches 
to farm credit outlined above. Few studies or analyses encompass 
farm credit programmes in their entirety, looking at the'impact 
on farmer borrowers and also on the lender, and integrating these 
1. See, for example, Brinegar, George K., and Lyle P. Fettig,: 
Some Measures of the Quality of Agricultural Credit. Technical 
Paper 19. New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1968. 
52 pp. 
2. An echo of this view was stated by E. B. Rice, who, however, 
generally stresses the importance of the financial viability of 
agricultural lenders: "Rising farmer incomes on a few occasions 
could co-exist with high delinquency rates and institutional in- 
solvency, and the failure of the (credit) institution does not 
necessarily imply the failure and end of the (farm credit) pro- 
gram. " See "Summary of the Spring Review of Small Farmer Credit, " 
p. 6. 
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relationships rigorously. 
' 
An example of integrated analysis 
might include an evaluation of borrowers' farm performance and 
its impact on the lender's rate of return or the effect of poor 
performance by the lender, e. g., the late issue of seasonal 
credit, on borrowers' rates of return. 
One manifestation of this void in the literature is the 
lack of application of portfolio or financial performance 
indicators both to borrowers and to the lender. The repayment 
performance of the borrower is also the collection performance 
of the lender, and any simple measure which could rigorously 
quantify the rel tionship between expected and actual repayment 
performance on individual loans, as well as for a portfolio as 
a whole, would permit greater analytical integration of the 
performance of borrowers as debtors and the performance of the 
lender as a portfolio manager. One step in this direction would 
consist of the incorporation of the time value of money in any 
kit of analytical tools to be applied. Only through this concept 
can the economic aspects of repayment performance be fully dealt 
with. However, the common measures of portfolio performance -- 
collection ratios, percentage of the portfolio in arrears, 
proportion of borrowers in arrears -- lack this dimension. 
As a starting point for this type of approach, a Repayment 
Index is outlined below which allows rigorous quantification of 
repayment performance. (In Appendices C and D the Repayment 
Index is applied to empirical data from the files of the Agri- 
cultural Finance Corporation in Kenya. ) The major utility of 
the Repayment Index in the empirical context used here is the 
basis it provides for the quantitative comparison of the repay- 
ment performance of different borrowers, permitting the correlation 
of repayment performance with other variables of interest to 
social scientists, lenders, agriculturalists and others concerned 
with financial and technical aspects of rural development and 
credit decision-making. Repayment Index rankings indicate the 
extent to which borrowers honour their loan repayment commitments: 
1. One useful first step in this direction is the use of actual 
rather than scheduled loan repayments in the cash flow data used 
for the ex-post calculation of borrowers' internal rates of return. 
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0.00 indicates not at all, 1.00 indicates to the letter or 
overall performance consistent with full and timely repayment 
over a series of installments, with cases in between ranked 
by their Index numbers according to their relative standing. 
The assumptions behind the Repayment Index are three: 
1) The borrower's opportunity to deviate from loan repayment 
commitments as specified in the loan contract is a function of 
the timing or scheduling of installments. 
2) The borrower's opportunity to deviate from loan repayment 
commitments as specified in the loan contract is a function of 
the magnitude of installments falling due. 
3) The extent of deviation from loan repayment commitments as 
specified in the loan contract is capable of quantitative 
expression in relative terms defined with reference to the 
maximum possible default. 
This statement of assumptions is phrased so that it is applicable 
to deviations either above or below the expectations contained in 
the repayment schedule or the loan contract, i. e., to prepayment 
as well as to delinquency constituting default. 
I 
As default is 
a problem of infinitely greater magnitude than prepayment in the 
realms of farm credit in developing countries, however, the 
following exposition assumes for convenience that deviations 
from loan contract installment schedules are in fact defaults 
as indicated by balances in arrears. Cases of prepayment may 
be considered as negative arrears. Hence, the first two assump- 
tions behind the Repayment Index establish the dimensions of a 
stock, i. e., arrears, from which a flow, i. e., interest on arrears, 
is generated for purposes of comparison. 
B. Algebraic Statement of the Repayment Index Formula 
The general notation for the Repayment Index formula is 
1. Default is defined here in the legal sense as any breach 
of the loan contract. The most common manifestation of default 
in farm credit is probably late repayment. 
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n 
EI 
Rt =1- 
tl a 
n 
(1) 
EI 
a t=1 max 
where R is the Repayment Index number, Ia is the interest 
compounded on amounts in arrears (net of any interest credited 
on prepaid balances) over the life of the loan, i. e., extending 
from period 1 to period n, and Ia is the amount of interest 
max 
which would be compounded on amounts in arrears if no loan 
repayments were made, as in the case of total default on the 
amount due. 
Examination of the meaning of each element in the formula 
shows more precisely how the Index is constructed. Interest on 
arrears ZIa is computed by applying the relevant interest rate i 
per period to the amount in arrears A for any given period t, 
and accumulating the total for all periods through n. 
n 
t 
ElIa = iAt + iAt+l +.... +iA (2) 
n 
The essential characteristics of a period as defined here 
is that an installment falls due on the opening date and that 
interest on arrears is calculated and debited to the loan account 
at or immediately following the close of the period. This 
definition will be modified later, but for purposes of illustration, 
assume that repayments are received only on the first day of any 
given period, and that no repayment is received on a given loan 
for the first period beginning on the date the first installment 
falls due. The calculation of the numerator of the general 
formula (1) is then simply 
Ia = iDI 
1 
(3) 
where D1 is the amount due at the start of period 1. Since no 
repayment was received, this notation also yields the denominator 
in formula (1), and the Repayment Index number would be 0.00, 
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indicating total default: 
Ia iD 
R1 =1-1 I1=1- 1D =0 (4) 
a1 max1 
Alteration of these assumptions to reflect the case of 
partial payment is required in the interests of general applicabil- 
ity. In this case M will be used to signify payments received, 
still retaining the assumption that payments are received only on 
the opening day of a period. The numerator for the situation at 
the close of the first period then becomes 
Ia1 
= i(D1 - M1) (5) 
while the denominator remains as in formula (3) because the 
denominator reflects the maximum adverse possibility of no 
repayment whatsoever. Thus, 
i(D - M) 11 
R1 =1- iD1 (6) 
Given the case of serial maturity loans (i. e., loans 
repayable in several installments), the exposition may be 
expanded to include the calculation of Ia for the second or 
any subsequent periods. While the amount due at the opening 
of the first period was simply the amount of one installment 
at the opening (signified by the additional subscript 
0) 
of 
the second period, assuming no repayment, the amount due is 
equal to two installments plus interest on the arrears con- 
stituted by the first installment which was due but remained 
unpaid throughout the entire first period. Thus, 
A2 =0 i(D1 - M1) + (D1 - M1) + (D2 - M2) (7) 
with M1 and M2 both equal to zero. The calculation of interest 
on arrears, i(D1 - M1), is assumed to occur at the close of 
each period. This amount is compounded, i. e., also treated as 
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an amount in arrears, in all subsequent periods until adequate 
repayment is received. Formula (7) simplifies into 
A2 = (D1 - M1) (1 + i) + (D2 - M2) (8) 
0 
and use of the quantity (1 + i), a centrepiece of discounting 
and compounding formulae, simplifies presentation as the formula 
is generalised. At the close of the second period the Repayment 
Index may be derived as 
2 
EI 
R2 =1- 
t=1 a 
t=1 amax 
{(D1-M1)(1+1)2 
- (D1 1)} 
+ {(D2-M2)(1+i) - (Dz M2)} 
=1- 
{D1(l+1)2 - D1} + {D2(1+i)2 - D2} 
which permits further simplification by factoring out the 
subtraction. of arrears for each period: 
2 
EI 
R2=1- t=1a 
2 
EI 
t=1 amax 
1- 
i{(Dl M1)(1+i) + (D2-M2)} 
(lo) 
i{D1(1+i) + D2} 
The notation may be extended to cover a multiplicity of 
periods, through j, in which installments fall due: 
3 
EI 
R3 =1- 
t31 a (11) 
EI 
t=1 amax li 
i{(D1-M1)(l+i)j-1 + (D2-M2) (1+i) 
J-2 +... + (D1-M1)} 
=1- 
i{D1(1+1)i-1 + D2(1+1)j-2 +... + Dj} 
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In the event that the analysis is extended beyond the final 
maturity date of the loan, i. e., the date upon which the final 
installment falls due, the only accommodation required is 
setting D equal to zero for all periods beyond j through final 
period n. 
While this form of notation is perhaps useful from a 
mathematical standpoint and for the computation of the Repayment 
Index from historical records, the type of presentation found 
in formula (2) is the most useful statement for the generation 
of Repayment Index data on a current basis, as for example might 
be done periodically for administrative, control and other mana- 
gerial purposes. The essential aspect of this approach is simply 
that the arrears at the close of any given period t is the sum 
of the arrears at the opening of the period and amounts falling 
due during the period less payments received during the period. 
At = At + Dt - Mt (12) 
0 
This notation assumes that interest on amounts in arrears during 
the preceding period, t-1, are included in At A. so that At, the 
amount in arrears at the close of period t is one element in the 
computation of Iat* 
Iat = iAt (13) 
The assumption that payments are received only on the 
opening day of any given period must be dispensed with in 
practice, as payments may be received at any time. At the 
same time, the assumption that the periodicity of installments 
falling due is identical to the periodicity of the calculation 
and debiting of interest on arrears may be dropped. Interest 
on arrears could be computed and debited to borrowers' accounts 
monthly, for example, while installments are scheduled on an 
annual or quarterly basis. It would be highly unlikely for 
reasons of accounting convention and the financial logic of 
compounding that the period between scheduled installments would 
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be shorter than the period between the calculation and debiting 
of interest on amounts in arrears, and this fact simplifies the 
basis for calculating interest on arrears in practice. 
The relevant operational period is that used for the calcu- 
lation of interest on arrears, and this -- the compounding 
period -- will be considered the basic time unit for calculations. 
If a payment is received within such a period, the interest on 
arrears for the entire period is found by applying the interest 
rate per period on a pro-rata basis to the various levels of 
arrears during the period. Assuming that only one payment is 
received during a period, 
lp {14) tat 
t-p 
At-p +p Ap 
with p signifying that portion of period t not yet elapsed at 
the time the payment was received, i. e., t>p>0. Where more 
than one payment is received during a period, the period must be 
broken into a number of parts equal to the number of payments 
received plus 1, with separate iA's calculated for each and 
summed in the format provided in formula (14). 
If the rate of interest charged on a loan or on amounts in 
arrears changes, the formula must be modified, because a change 
in i in expression iA introduces an inconsistency between Ia's 
computed for periods before and after the change. The rate of 
flow, Ia, is changed for any given stock of arrears, A. Elimin- 
ation of this inconsistency is achieved by applying an inflator 
or deflator to the calculation of Ia 's to place all periods on a 
consistent "basis. 
I 
Eia = Eiar + Eiar, (r/r') 
where r is the unadjusted rate applied to a portion of the life 
of the loan and r' is the other rate which applied to another 
portion of the life of the loan. Consistency requires that 
Eia be calculated using r. 
max 
1. Any rate may be used for purposes of calculation. However, 
calculations are minimised when a rate is used which was in force 
over at least a portion of the life of the loan. 
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C. A Mathematical Restatement of the Repayment Index Formula 
Mathematical and graphic explanations of the Repayment Index 
help to clarify its derivation. For purposes of illustration, 
assume a five year loan due in five equal annual installments of 
100, Bach installment consisting of a principal repayment and an 
interest payment, as computed on a mortgage basis. 
1 Assume also 
a certain repayment performance by the borrower, say, of 50 at the 
start of each period. This situation is shown in Table B-1, and is 
also illustrated in Figure B-a, where the amount due is represented 
by line Amax and the amounts received by line P. 
As indicated above, amounts due and amounts received are 
treated as stocks in the computation of the Repayment Index. The 
Index formula simply compares the flows derived from a) the in- 
stallment schedule, and b) the difference between that schedule 
and repayments actually made, by, applying a uniform rate of 
interest to each stock. In the following example a 10% rate of 
interest per period is used. 
The calculation of Ia provides the most useful starting 
max 
point for elaboration. As noted above, Ia is computed on the 
max 
assumption that no repayments are made, and is simply the result 
of compounding interest on the installment schedule. Table B-2 
illustrates the mathematics of the calculation of I a 
max 
The derivation of I follows the same format but includes 
a 
the deduction of repayments received from the installment schedule 
of amounts due, as indicated in Table B-3. For convenience of 
illustration it is assumed that repayments are received on the 
opening date of each period. 
1. Installments of principal and interest due on a mortgage 
basis (i. e., equal total payments each period) are derived by 
applying to the original principal amount the capital recovery 
factor for the relevant rate of interest and number of periods. 
The capital recovery factor is the reciprocal of the annuity 
factor, and is expressed algebraically as: 
I 
1 
-1 nI 1- (1+i)' 
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Table B-l. Illustrative Loan Repayment Assumptions 
Start of 
Period 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Amount Due as per 
Installment Schedule 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
Table B-2. Calculation of I 
a 
max 
Arrears 
Brought 
Period Forward 
1 -0- 
2 110.00 
3 231.00 
4 364.10 
5 510.51 
Falling Due 
at Start of Period 
as per Installment 
Schedule 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
Table B-3. Calculation of I 
a 
Arrears 
Brought 
Period Forward 
1 -0- 
2 55.00 
3 115.50 
4 182.05 
5 255.26 
Falling Due at 
Start of Period 
as per Install- 
ment Schedule 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
Amount 
Received 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
Arrears for Ia @ 10% 
the Period (Carried 
(Carried Forward) Forward) 
100.00 10.00 
210.00 21.00 
331.00 33.10 
464.10 46.41 
610.51 61.05 
EI = 171.56 a 
max 
Arrears 
for the 
Period Ia @ 10% 
Payment (Carried (Carried 
Received Forward) Forward) 
50 50.00 5.00 
50 105.00 10.50 
50 165.50 16.55 
50 232.05 23.21 
50 305.26 30.53 
EI - 85.79 a 
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The values given for Ia and Ia in Tables B-2 and B-3 
max 
are plotted in Figure B-b. (Note the difference in the left 
hand scales between Figures B-a and B-b. ) It is obvious that 
Ia/Ia represents the area under the lower curve as a pro- 
max 
portion of the area under the higher curve. In other words, 
interest on actual arrears as a proportion of interest on 
arrears in the worst possible case, that of nil repayment. 
From Tables B-1 and B-2 it is apparent that, under the assumption 
that repayments are received at the start of each period and 
equal half the amount falling due at the same time, the area 
under Ia for any given period and also on a cumulative basis 
is half the area under I. Hence, the value EI /EI = 0.50, a 
max aa max 
(the rounding error is significant only at the fourth value to 
the right of the decimal point) and in this and only this case 
R=0.50 also, given that R=1- (EI/EL ). Subtracting 
max 
the factor from 1 is a useful device which equates timely re- 
payment in full with a Repayment Index number of 1.00, nil re- 
payment with 0.00. 
D. Limitations 
In the empirical application of the Repayment Index in the 
following appendices, the Index is used only over the period up 
to the due date of the final installment under the original 
maturity schedule or up to the close of the period studied, 
whichever is earlier. The utility of cutting off the calculation 
at or prior to the final maturity date rests on the obser- 
vation that after this date, assuming no further repayments, the 
Index number will change from one period to the next to the extent 
that the marginal addition of area under each curve alters the 
average relationship expressed by the cumulative Index number. 
The fact that the Index number applies to a given time horizon 
involves an element of simplification, as indicated by the sig- 
nificance of a Repayment Index number of 1.00.. The lender's costs 
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Figure B-a. Illustrative Comparison of Amounts in Arrears 
Amount 
600 - 
5 00 - 
400 - 
300 - 
200 - 
100 - 
0 -Q 
A 
max 
A 
Period 
Source: Tables B-2 and B-3. p. 414. This Figure is based on 
the Arrears for the Period column in the Tables. 
Figure B-b. Illustrative Comparison of Interest Accumulated 
on Amounts in Arrears 
Amount 
180 - 
160 - 
140 - 
120 - 
100 - 
80 - 
60 - 
40 - 
20 - 
0 -0 
EI 
a Max 
EI 
a 
Source: Tables B-2 and B-3. p. 414. 
123456 
Period 
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of administering a loan, including collection expenses and 
portfolio and liquidity planning would tend to rise, other 
things remaining equal, with increasingly erratic repayment 
performance by the borrower. Thus, a lender would presumably 
not be indifferent between a cumulative Repayment Index number 
of 1.00 reflecting an unbroken series of R's of 1.00 for 
individual periods and a cumulative Repayment Index number of 
1.00 resulting from an erratic series of R's reflecting arrears 
during certain periods and prepayment during other periods. If 
experience indicated that wide variations in repayment per- 
formance from year to year or period to period on individual 
loans substantially offset the indication of repayment per- 
formance given by the Repayment Index, the complementary use 
of some measure of variation, such as the range of individual 
observations for each period, might be introduced. 
E. Applications of the Repayment Index 
Two major applications of the Repayment Index are proposed 
here. The first is as a management tool. Calculation of Ia for 
each compounding period is routinely undertaken by accounting 
systems which generate interest charges on amounts in arrears, 
and computing Ia and the cumulative totals of both over the 
max 
life of an installment schedule would impose only a small added 
burden on such accounting systems. Computerised systems could 
provide Repayment Index data quite easily. Thus, routine com- 
putation of the Index would involve only small increments to 
bookkeeping costs. 
Applied to individual cases, the Index could be used as a 
decision making tool for determining the extent to which a borrower 
may enjoy continued access to credit in view of his past repay- 
ment performance. For example, all borrowers with historic repay- 
ment performance yielding an Index value of 0.95 or above could 
automatically be accorded credit equal to 125% of the principal 
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amount of their previous loan. Those with Index numbers below 
0.70 could automatically be excluded, and those in between could 
be interviewed prior to being issued loans up to 80% of the 
principal amount of their last loan, etc. 
In addition, Index numbers indicating poor levels of repay- 
ment provide a basis for various types of follow-up or borrower 
supervision by management. These initiatives could be oriented 
narrowly towards collection of amounts in arrears, or more 
broadly towards ensuring that the borrower's productivity in 
agriculture can be increased to a point at which adequate cash 
flow would be available to provide for loan repayment, etc. 
The Index is also useful as a measure of portfolio per- 
formance. Index numbers may be computed for different classes 
of loans within a portfolio; for portfolios under different 
managers; for groups of loans to borrowers in different regions, 
at different levels of agricultural sophistication, with various 
types of farm enterprise mixes, with differing levels of extension 
support or with differential degrees of access to inputs and to 
produce marketing channels, and so on, in an effort to identify 
weak spots in the portfolio and in credit decision making and 
loan administration. Attention could be directed towards re- 
moving constraints associated with any particular category of 
poor payers. In addition, outstanding performance by borrowers 
and by lending officers could be rewarded. 
The main use of the Repayment Index for the purposes of this 
paper, however, lies in its application as a social science 
research tool. By quantifying repayment performance on a compara- 
01 tive 
basis, the Index permits comparison of this aspect of 
borrowers' behaviour with quantifiable aspects of their economic, 
social, technical and personal characteristics or situations. 
Farm size in terms of land area, tenure status, farm income, family 
size and composition, educational levels achieved by borrowers, 
herd size and composition, off farm income and employment types, 
use of hired labour and a host of other variables of interest to 
rural developers and researchers may be compared with loan repay- 
ment performance in a"statistically rigorous manner through the 
use of the Repayment Index. 
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APPENDIX C 
A STATISTICAL STUDY OF REPAYMENT PERFORMANCE AND 
LOAN, FARM AND BORROWER CHARACTERISTICS UNDER 
THE IDA 105 AND KFW SMALL SCALE LOAN PROGRAMMES 
A. Summary 
A statistical study of loan repayment performance under 
two small scale loan schemes run by the Agricultural Finance 
Corporation (AFC) was undertaken using a sample of approximately 
400 randomly selected borrowers stratified geographically into 
four subsamples of roughly equal size. The loans studied were 
issued between 1967 and 1972 in selected parts of Central and 
Western Provinces for borrowers in.. two of the subsamples 
under the IDA 105-KE scheme, supported by the International 
Development Association, an affiliate of the World Bank. Loans 
issued between 1969 and 1972 to borrowers in Kericho and Kisii 
under the KFW small scale scheme, supported by West Germany's 
Kreditanstant fair Wiederaufbau, were included in the remaining 
two subsamples. 
1 Repayment performance was studied through 
2 
June 1974, and quantified using the Repayment Index. 
Loan sizes under the IDA and KFW schemes ranged from Sh 1,000 
to Sh 10,000. However, the sample includes no loans of more than 
Sh 9,000 but contained several of less than Sh 1,000 because some 
borrowers failed to draw the full amount to which they were en- 
titled. However, borrowers who failed to spend 50% or more of 
their loan were excluded. The sample included only loans issued 
for a five year term, repayable in five equal annual installments. 
Loans which were prepaid greatly in advance were excluded from 
the sample because the primary interest of the study was in the 
normal situation ranging from modest prepayment through the 
Thanks are due to my wife, Gretel, who spent many hours collecting 
the data used in this study. 
1. See pp. 207 ff for descriptions of these credit programmes. 
2. See Appendix B for a description of the Repayment Index. 
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accumulation of large amounts in arrears. Loan purposes were not 
precisely identified, but almost all loans approved had more than 
half of their proceeds designated for the purchase of grade cattle 
and equipment to support a dairy enterprise based on grade cattle. 
The primary purpose of the exercise was to associate Repay- 
ment Index values, the dependent variable, with selected loan, 
farm and borrower characteristics to identify those character- 
istics and values which might be used as a basis for screening 
loan applications so that potentially poor payers would be denied 
access to credit, a scarce rural development resource. Can small- 
holder repayment performance be predicted from information given 
on loan application and farm planning forms used by AFC during the 
period under review? To be more precise, can methods be devised 
which would allow the formulation of additional guidelines to 
exclude from loan schemes those who would otherwise gain access 
to credit but who would not achieve good repayment records? The 
exercise was not successful from this perspective, as no strong 
and significant correlations which might serve the desired purpose 
were found between the Repayment Index and independent variables, 
using relatively simple statistical methods. 
The results which were derived tended to support the assumptions 
of conventional credit rationing, but not very strongly. The study 
failed to provide any clear justification of innovative lending 
criteria applied to small farmers. 
A secondary purpose was to identify the type of farmer and 
farm which have access to smallholder credit. Here, the study 
yielded considerable descriptive data. Borrowers tended to have 
cash crops, and half were bona fide smallholders in the sense of 
having no off-farm income according to the data provided. 
B. The Data Source 
The data source for the independent variables, i. e., loan, 
farm and borrower characteristics, was AFC's LON 201 forms. These 
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forms underwent several revisions following the introduction of 
the IDA scheme in 1967 and were phased out in 1975 in favour of 
a greatly simplified application which omitted farm planning 
information. During the period under review, however, the eight 
or more pages of information they contained on farm and borrower 
status and on the proposed loan-financed investment constituted 
the basis for credit decision making by AFC management. LON 201 
forms also served as a focus for the promotion or credit-supported 
innovations by Ministry of Agriculture extension staff who have 
been deeply involved in the small farmer loan access mechanism. 
The farm planning and budget material required on the form was 
thought to provide the best basis for small farm development and 
for the best use of credit. 
Repayment performance data was obtained from AFC ledger 
cards for each loan and from computer print outs for the latter 
part of the period studied, following the computerisation of 
small scale loan accounts by AFC. 
C. Sampling Procedures 
The study uses four randomly selected geographically 
stratified samples of approximately 100 observations each. 
Geographical stratification was used in an effort to isolate 
different types of agriculture or other differences which occur 
over space. In addition, this type of stratification provided 
an opportunity to compare repayment performance under the KFW- 
supported loan schemes in Kericho and Kisii with the IDA- 
supported schemes in other parts of the country. Both schemes 
are limited to areas in which smallholders have title deeds to 
their land. The relative importance of various Districts, in 
terms of loans approved under these schemes is indicated by 
statistics as of 31 December 1973 as shown in Table C-1. 
The sample included areas in four of the five Provinces 
having registered land in smallholder areas, as outlined below. 
The Districts included were selected primarily on the basis . 
422 
Table C-1. Cumulative Distribution of Lending by District 
under the IDA 105 and KFW Small Scale Schemes 
at 31 December 1973 
Loans Amount 
Province and District Approved Approved 
(Sh million) 
Central Kiambu 1,269 5.6 
Kirinyaga 875 2.2 
Murang'aa/ 909 3.6 
Nyer / 1,591 5.0 
4,644 16.4 
Eastern Embu 1,614 4.1 
Meru 1,409 4.1 
Others (2) 355 1.0 
3,378 9.2 
Nyanza Kisiia/b/ 1,036 2.7 
Others (3) 210 .6 
1,246 3.3 
Rift Kericho-a/b/ 523 2.1 
Valley Nandi 507 2.9 
Others (3) 768 3.1 
1,798 8.1 
Western Bungomaa/ 226 .8 
Busiaa/ 125 .3 a/ Kakamega- 504 1.7 
855 2.8 
Total IDA 105 and KFW Small 
Scale Loan Schemes 11,921 39.8 
a/ Sampled Districts included in this study. 
b/ Districts in which the KFW Small Scale scheme operates. 
The IDA scheme does not operate in these Districts, but does 
cover all of the other Districts for which figures are given 
above. 
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of their importance as areas of loan concentration and data 
suitability. Smaller Districts in terms of loan concentration 
were excluded at the outset, and the remaining areas were 
selected as follows. 
One major area of smallholder lending is Central Province 
and the contiguous upland Eastern Province Districts of Meru and 
Embu. However, not all of this area was included in the sample. 
Kiambu District was excluded on the basis of its closeness to 
Nairobi, which is reflected in its agriculture by many absentee 
land owners, many farmers with outside income, relatively high 
levels of on-farm investment and a sophisticated market-oriented 
production strategy on the part of many operators. These factors, 
however interesting from the point of view of rural development, 
were considered to be too strong in Kiambu to regard the District 
as at all representative of smallholder agriculture in Kenya. 
Meru, Embu and Kirinyaga Districts are excluded because of the 
relatively high degree of fragmentation of agricultural holdings 
typical of these Districts. In most cases AFC borrowers in these 
areas do not pledge their entire 
holdings as security for their 
loans, and the loans are generally issued as if for the develop- 
ment of a single plot. Therefore, the LON 201 form does not 
usually contain farm data which applies to the borrower's entire 
operation when the operation is spread over several parcels. As 
one, purpose of the study was to compare farm characteristics with 
repayment pefformance, Meru. Embu and Kirinyaga borrowers were 
excluded on the grounds that LON 201 data would not be repre- 
sentative of their entire farms. One subsample was drawn from 
the portions of the Central Province-Mt Kenya area which remained, 
served by AFC branches in Nyeri, Murang'a and Karatina. 
Another area where loans are made under the IDA programme is 
Western Province, which is served by AFC branches in Busia, Bungoma, 
Kimilili and Kakamega. (Kimilili is a sub-branch of Bungoma, and 
both are referred to as Bungoma in this study. ) Western Province 
was used for the selection of a subsample more for its type of 
agriculture than for its importance as an area of loan concen- 
tration, however. 
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The KFW-supported small scale loan scheme is similar in 
virtually all respects to the IDA scheme, although the level 
of extension input in the two Districts covered, Kericho and 
Kisii, as measured by the intensity of farm planning and level 
of staff qualification, is higher than in the Districts included 
in the IDA scheme. The two KFW Districts receive German Technical 
assistance for extension activities. A separate subsample was 
drawn from each of these Districts. 
The sampled areas, then, included the hinterland of the 
Central Province branches of Nyeri, Murang'a and Karatina in 
one subsample, and the Western Province branches of Busia, 
Bungoma and Kakamega as another. Both of these areas are 
covered by the IDA smallholder credit scheme. The other sub- 
samples, drawn from Kericho and Kisii Districts, are served by 
the KFW smallholder credit scheme, which is essentially identical, 
from the borrowers' point of view, to the IDA scheme. Sampled 
areas accounted for 41% of the total amount of loans approved 
under the two schemes as of the end of 1973. 
The subsamples were drawn as follows: The reference period 
for the study ran from the beginning of the schemes in question 
(1967 for IDA borrowers, 1969 for the KFW scheme) and terminated 
at the end of June 1974. It was for this period that repayment 
performance was studied. Loans under these schemes are usually 
repayable in five equal annual installments including principal 
and interest. Therefore, borrowers who received their loans in 
1973 and 1974 were excluded from the study because there would 
have been little or no relevant repayment performance data 
available. A farmer receiving a loan in January 1973, for 
example, might be billed for his first installment in March 
1974, which is quite close to June 1974, the close of the 
reference period. The number of loans approved in each of the 
four sampled areas between 1967 and the end of 1972 are given 
in Table C-2. 
For each of the four geographical areas a separate subsample 
was drawn. Loans were listed in chronological order by file 
number, which in those areas served by more than one branch meant 
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Table C-2. Numbers of IDA 105 and KFW Small Scale Loans 
Approved Annually in Sampled Areas, 1967-1972 
Number of Loans Approved Sampled Area 
and Branches 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 Total 
Central Province 
Nyeri & Karatina 
Murang' a 
--- 598 560 315 1,473 
68 344 229 123 106 75 945 
Kericho - 
Kis ii - 
Western Province 
Bungoma & Kimilili - 
Busia - 
Kakamega - 
2418 
25 43 209 181 458 
69 149 246 287 751 
26 81 47 46 18 218 
12 55 14 24 5 110 
42 97 133 72 67 411 
739 
Total 4,366 
that all loans issued by one branch were listed in chronological 
order, then the loans from another branch, and so on. A random 
number table was used to draw each subsample. Subsample sizes 
were fixed arbitrarily at approximately 100 in an attempt to 
ensure that the results would be statistically valid, and more 
than 100 were drawn for each geographical area on the expectation 
that some observations might involve data problems which would 
render them unsuitable. 
Even in spite of this allowance, additional observations 
had to be chosen in each case as the exercise proceeded. With 
regard to Kisii, for example, a batch of LON 201 forms could not 
be located, and the random number table was used to select a large 
number of alternative observations. This problem of lost records 
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resulted in the Kisii subsample's covering only the period from 
1969 through the first nine months of 1971. In other cases 
missing files or loans with data problems were replaced by the 
next loan approved. In cases in which the next loan approved 
also had data problems the following loan was chosen, and so 
on. If a replacement was not found before the occurrance of the 
next loan contained in the original sample, the loans preceeding 
the deleted observation were examined in the same manner but 
moving in the opposite direction. 
The second step in the data gathering routine was a search 
of account records to ascertain the amount of the loan spent and 
the interest charged on amounts in arrears or credited on pre- 
payments. At this stage, the tenor of the loan was recorded, 
and loans repayable in two or three annual installments were 
deleted on the grounds that these loans were relatively few in 
number and that they may have involved substantially different 
farm and borrower characteristics from those issued for the normal 
five year maturity. 
As the focus of the exercise was to study repayment performance 
of randomly selected borrowers whose loans ran a more or less normal 
course, certain further deletions were made in arriving at the sub- 
samples used for analysis. Some loans were prepaid on a greatly 
accelerated basis, probably because the borrowers desired to have 
their title deeds released to pledge for another loan or to sell 
their plot or for some other purpose. Therefore, loans not fore- 
closed which did not run for at least 30 months out of the 60 or 
slightly more than 60 months originally scheduled were excluded. 
Some borrowers failed to spend most of their loans, and those 
who spent less than Sh 500 or who spent only a small portion -- 
50% or less -- of their loans were also dropped. (Loans approved 
under the two schemes ranged from Sh 1,000 to Sh 10,000. ) Several 
other loans were rejected because the LON 201 forms contained 
wildly inconsistent data which could not be reconciled, while some 
others were dropped because of accounting problems encountered 
with respect to repayment performance. The disposition of the 
original sample and derivation of f ha.. f inAl, -$4mPle is given 
in 
Table C-3. 
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Table C-3. Subsample Size and Derivation 
Busia Nyeri 
Bungoma I'iurang'a 
Kericho Kisii Kakamega Karatina 
Original observations 
randomly selected 119 114 123 115 
Less: 
Loans cancelled, withdrawn, 
or for other reasons not 
shown in AFC loan led- 
gers or print outs 8 3 23 8 
Loans with original 
maturites of 2 or 3 years 1 5 
Loans prepaid before 30 mos. 1 1 
Loans largely unspent 1 4 
Loans involving accounting 
errors, confused install- 
ment calculations, or 
posting problems 3 1 2 3 
LON 201 forms not located 7 58 8 4 
Subtotal 20 62 43 16 
Original observations valid 
for sampling purposes 99 52 80 99 
Alternative observations 
selected by 
Randon number procedure 61 
Choosing the following 
observation 3 24 4 
Less: 
Deletions from alternative 
observations 8 7 
Further deletions reflecting 
data problems 2 1 
Subsamples used 
for computation 102 103 96 103 
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C. The Independent Variables -- Loan Decision Making Data 
Three sets of independent variables were extracted from 
LON 201 forms for sample cases: loan characteristics, farm 
characteristics and borrower characteristics: 
1. Loan Characteristics 
a. Loan amount disbursed. 
b. Value of loan security. Title deeds were taken as security 
for each of the loans studied. The security value always included 
the estimated market value of the land pledged, at times also in- 
cluded the value of grade cows to be financed or other chattels, 
and occasionally one year's salary received by the borrower from 
off-farm employment, etc. The concept of "security" for purposes 
of loan decision making did not appear to be consistent, except 
for the inclusion of the value of the land. Perhaps an explanation 
for the variation was the guideline that security value should 
equal at least 1.5 times the amount of the loan. 
2. Farm Characteristics 
a. Farm size in acres. These figures are based on land area as 
specified in title deeds and therefore may be considered highly 
accurate. However, the specification of land use by acres as 
outlined below is not nearly so accurate, being estimated by 
Ministry of Agriculture technical field staff who assisted 
applicants in filling in the data required on the LON 201 form. 
The farm size data may also at times not include the borrower's 
entire agricultural holding if such consisted of more than one 
plot. The tendency for many borrowers to be among the more pro- 
gressive and wealthy echelons of smallholders increases the 
probability that a minority of borrowers included in the sample 
in fact operate or have interests in plots in addition to that 
mentioned on their LON 201 forms. 
b. Land use in acres. Uncultivable acreage, acreage devoted to 
the homestead, cash crop acreage by type of crop and area devoted 
to livestock enterprises and other crops were included in this 
breakdown. 
c. Cash crop data in physical terms, such as numbers of coffee 
trees and tea stumps, grade cattle herd size, number of steers, 
etc., was recorded. Data for coffee and tea plantings presented 
several problems, as outlined later in this Appendix. While 
identification of a steer should pose little difficulty, certain 
non-descript animals without much trace of the Zebu hump may be 
included in the grade cattle classification as found on LON 
201 
forms. 
d. Size of the family living on the farm on a permanent basis 
at the time the loan application was lodged. 
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e. Amount of money spent per annum, before the loan was issued, 
for cultivation and wages. These categories included machinery 
hire charges, casual wages paid and the full time labour wage bill. 
f. Net farm income as estimated on a before loan basis and as 
projected on an after loan basis at the maturity of the loan- 
supported enterprise. 
3. Borrower Characteristics 
a. Approximate age of the applicant at the time of application 
for a loan. 
b. Amount of school fees paid by the farm family anually at the 
time of application for the loan. 
c. Whether the applicant lived on or off the farm. 
d. Whether the applicant was a full time or a part time farmer. 
e. Amount and source of non-farm income, if any. 
f. The borrower's estimated net worth. This figure always in- 
cluded the value of the land pledged as loan security, which was 
usually the largest single item. Other parts of net worth often 
included the value of farm assets, and widely varying values were 
assigned to such assets as coffee trees and tea stumps. Efforts 
were made for the purposes of this analysis to adjust such figures 
downward when they appeared to be inflated. Net worth and non-farm 
income figures as reported on LON 201 forms cannot be considered 
as having a high degree of accuracy. 
4. Data Quality and Realism 
LON 201 forms were not always filled in with a premium on 
accuracy by : Ministry staff, but there is no evidence that field 
staff ever attempted intentionally to misrepresent reality. The 
tendency of applicants would probably be towards conservative 
estimates or outright underestimates of income, assets and evidence 
of wealth. Little effort was made by AFC to verify data on non- 
farm income or assets not seen on the farm. Indeed, AFC's costs 
of administration could rise significantly if more details were 
required, and the experience accumulated through 1975 prompted 
AFC management to move towards simplification of the loan appli- 
cation form. 
In any event, brief explorations of data realism and quality 
provide perspective for this analysis. Planting densities for 
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coffee and tea and certain farm income expectations embodied 
in farm plan projections offer pregnant examples. 
a. Coffee and tea planting densities 
Two indicators of the accuracy of farm planning data on 
loan application forms are the reported density of coffee trees 
and tea stumps on borrowers' farms. The planting of both of 
these crops is and has been controlled and quite closely super- 
vised, suggesting that the standard, recommended density should 
prevail at the time of planting. 
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That these densities would 
usually continued to prevail during the maturity of the crop is 
indicated by the practice of having tea nurseries on most farms 
for the expansion and maintenance of existing stands, and because 
of the desire of coffee farmers to maintain their stands in the 
face of limitations on new planting, but not on replacement 
planting, imposed by Kenya's subscription to the International 
Coffee Agreement. However, it is possible that some downward 
drift in coffee density could occur in marginal zones through 
the failure to replace trees which die, are destroyed or for 
some other reason removed. In these zones coffee stands may 
not receive much attention in years when coffee prices are low. 
Interplanting does not affect the densities of these crops, as 
tea is virtually never, and coffee only occasionally interplanted 
with other crops (excluding forage grasses on contours between 
coffee rows, a not uncommon practice). The standard planting 
density for coffee is 540 trees per acre, and for tea, 3,500 
stumps per acre. 
Densities were calculated for the 90 coffee farms and 67 
tea farms for which both acreage planted and plant populations 
were given. The distribution of planting densities found by 
dividing the number of plants by the areas devoted to each crop, 
1. Controls related to licencing requirements for coffee growers 
have been described as "amounting almost to directed cultivation. " 
See Allan, William, The African Husbandman. pp. 398-399. 
2. Technical data in this section is substantiated by Acland, J. D., 
East African Crops. pp. 58-59 for coffee, pp. 208-222 for tea. 
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Table C-4. Reported Coffee and Tea Planting Densities 
for the Entire Sample 
Measure 
Planting Density per Acre 
Tea Coffee 
Recommended standard density 3,500 540 
Mean density reported 3,240 518 
As % of recommended standard 93% 96% 
Standard deviation of 
reported densities 735 160 
As % of mean 23% 31% 
Minimum reported density 1,538 111 
As % of mean 47% 21% 
Maximum reported density 5,556 1,600 
As % of mean 171% 309% 
Number of valid observations 67 90 
both as reported on loan application forms, is given in Table 
C-4. The diversity of results suggests that extension 
officers who drew up farm plans frequently failed to check 
their work for consistency, and consequently a rather wide 
margin of misreporting developed. The figures indicate that 
the dispersion of reported coffee densities is greater than 
that for tea, suggesting a somewhat greater degree of consistency 
in the reporting of tea enterprise size in physical terms. 
Table C-5 shows the same data disaggregated to the subsample 
level. The subsamples show a wide variation in reported planting 
densities, especially with respect to coffee. Coffee planting 
densities for Nyeri-Murang'a-Karatina show the least dispersion 
and also a reported mean quite close to the recommended density. 
While about 60% of the Nyeri-Murang'a-Karatina subsample cases 
were coffee growers, 15% or fewer of the other subsample cases 
were. On these grounds alone it could be hypothesised that 
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extension staff in the other sample areas would be less familiar 
with the crop and hence more prone to erroneous reporting of 
planting density. Busia-Bungoma-Kakamega also show a mean quite 
close to the recommended planting density, but with somewhat more 
dispersion. The mean for Kisii is far below and that for Kericho 
far above the recommended density, and the figures for Kericho 
also indicate a very wide dispersion, suggesting perhaps the 
least reliability in spite of the farm planning and loan appli- 
cation scrutiny activities of the German Agricultural Team in 
these areas. 
The pattern for reported tea planting densities is similar 
to that for coffee, although the Busia-Bungoma-Kakamega subsample 
contains no observations for tea. The Nyeri-Murang'a-Karatina 
data appear to be the most consistent with recommended density, 
followed by those for Kisii and Kericho. Assuming that the 
recommended density for tea is adhered to in Kericho, the wide 
dispersion in reported densities there is interesting in view of 
the relatively large proportion of the sample growing tea. While 
the coffee density was more consistent in the area with the 
greatest sampled incidence of coffee, the opposite appears to 
be true for tea. 
b. Income expectations 
The expectations embodied in farm plans also provide 
perspective on the realism of the farm planning exercise. The 
pre-loan and projected net farm incomes of borrowers when their 
credit-financed enterprises are mature show most clearly the 
magnitude of benefits credit and whatever supervision accompanies 
it were expected to bring to borrowers. Enterprise maturity means 
that the credit-supported enterprise or investment is fully on- 
stream, in full production. Maturity is usually attained some- 
time between the end of the second year and the start of the 
fifth year following receipt of the loan. Net farm income as 
defined here is simply the total farm revenue (including amounts 
imputed for the value of on-farm consumption of produce from the 
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Table C-5. Reported Coffee and Tea Planting Densities by Subsample 
Busia Nyeri 
Bungoma Murang'a 
Measure Kericho Kisii Kakamega Karatina 
Coffee Planting Density 
in trees per acre 
Recommended density 540 540 540 540 
Mean reported density 743 392 527 527 
As % of recommended 138% 73% 98% 98% 
Standard deviation of 
reported densities 488 171 127 70 
As % of mean 66% 44% 24% 13% 
Minimum reported density 389 111 300 400 
As % of mean 52% 28% 57% 76% 
Maximum reported density 1,600 667 821 800 
As % of mean 215% 170% 156% 152% 
Number of valid observations 5 14 12 59 
Tea Planting Density 
in stumps per acre 
Recommended density 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500 
Mean reported density 3,178 3,936 3,284 
As % of recommended 91% 112% 94% 
Standard deviation of 
reported densities 791 1,128 436 
As % of mean 25% 29% 13% 
Minimum reported density 1,538 3,092 2,632 
As % of mean 48% 79% 80% 
Maximum reported density 5,556 5,217 4,167 
As % of mean 175% 133% 127% 
Number of valid observations 46 30 18 
r 
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Table C-6. Measures of Net Farm Income Projections by Subsample 
Projected Net Farm Busia Nyeri 
Income : Pre-Loan Bungoma Murang'a Entire 
Net Farm Income Kericho Kisii Kakamega Karatina Sample 
Mean 6.22 2.18 6.17 3.23 4.38 
Standard deviation 20.41 1.89 12.10 2.94 12.16 
'"ý- 
farm) less cash expenditures including debt servicing expenses and 
household expenditures not directly related to the production of 
crops of maintenance of fences and structures, etc. 
The average or mean expectation for the entire sample, 
excluding 24 missing observations, was that the projected net farm 
income would by 4.38 times the size of the estimated pre-loan net 
farm income. Because of the small and occasionally negative value 
of pre-loan net farm income in many cases, the range extends from 
-41.82 to 190.26 times, and the standard deviation is 12.16 times 
the pre-loan net farm income. 
The optimism found in projections of net farm income appears 
in each of the subsamples, as indicated by Table C-6. Expectations 
for Kisii are the most modest, in relative terms, while the greatest 
expectations were applied to borrowers from branches in Busia, 
Bungoma and Kakamega. The relatively low standard deviation for 
Kisii suggests a degree of uniformity of expectations not equalled 
elsewhere. 
c. Calculation of interest on arrears 
An additional limitation on the anslysis attempted here is 
imposed by a factor which reduces the validity of the Repayment 
Index values. During the period under review, AFC did not charge 
interest on balances in arrears of less than Sh 150 and did not 
pay interest on prepaid balances of less than Sh 150. The justi- 
fication for this accounting shortcut rests simply on economy, as 
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it eliminates interest entries of less than Sh 1.00, given the 
7/% - 8% rates which prevailed. When AFC was dependent on 
mechanical bookkeeping systems the cost of an entry may well 
have been Sh 1.00, making it uneconomical to undertake the 
calculation and posting of smaller amounts on a monthly basis. 
The extent to which this practice distorts the validity of 
interest on arrears as an indicator of balances in arrears 
depends upon two factors: the size of the loan and the age of 
the loan. The larger the loan, the less the impact of the, 
Sh 150 threshold. The longer the period elapsed since the 
first installment of the loan fell due, the larger the cumulative 
amount which has fallen due for repayment, diminishing the 
relative importance of the Sh 150 limit. 
In terms of Repayment Index values, the impact of the 
threshold would be ±. 21 in the case of the minimum loan of 
Sh 1,000 as of the due date of the second annual installment. 
In other words, the Repayment Index could stand at 1.00 using 
the data employed in this study, when in fact the real arrears 
situation is consistent with a Repayment Index value of . 79; 
or if a prepaid balance of Sh 150 were on hand for that period, 
1.21. This is the maximum degree of distortion. At the opposite 
extreme, a Sh 10,000 loan outstanding for six years would suffer 
a distortion of only ±. 01 in terms of the Repayment Index. The 
mean loan of approximately Sh 3,100 suffers a distortion of ±. 05 
at the end of the fifth period after the first installment fell 
due. At plus one standard deviation from the mean loan size, the 
distortion is ±. 03; at minus one standard deviation, ±. 09 at the 
end of the fifth period since the first installment fell due. 
The extent to which this factor compromises the validity of 
the data is diminished by the extent to which any given balance 
prepaid or in arrears is less than Sh 150, the extent to which any 
balance within the ± Sh 150 range is on the books for less than an 
entire annual period, and the extent to which prepaid balances and 
arrears within the range offset each other over the life of a loan 
or during the period chosen for study. In addition, few borrowers 
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are probably aware of this accounting procedure, and hence would 
not be in a position intentionally to take advantage of the relief 
it affords to those in arrears by no more than Sh 150. 
The justification for permitting the data to be distorted by 
this factor also rests on research or analytical economy, as the 
recalculation of interest on arrears for the loans and the period 
studied would have increased data recording time greatly. In 
addition, the cost of obtaining great precision in this respect 
is not warranted by the generally "loose" nature of the great 
majority of the values accorded to other variables with which 
repayment performance is compared. 
E. Loan Characteristics 
1. Size of Loan Disbursed 
The average loan disbursed on behalf of sample borrowers -- 
AFC pays against suppliers' invoices -- approximated Sh 3,100. 
Over the subsamples, however, there was considerable variation in 
mean loan disbursement, from roughly Sh 2,300 in Kisii to Sh 4,000 
in Kericho, as shown in Table C-7. In cumulative percentage terms 
roughly 95% of borrowers sampled in Kisii had loans of less than 
Sh 4,000, while 95% of the Kericho subsample had loans of less 
than Sh 7,000, with the other two subsamples falling between these 
two observations. 
2. Disbursements in Relation to Loan Amounts Approved 
An interesting aspect which emerged during the data gathering 
in 1975 was the proportion of the shilling volume of loans which 
were not fully spent and the proportion of borrowers who failed to 
spend their loans completely. AFC expects that its borrowers will 
require about three months to spend their loans, as the first 
annual installment falls due about 15 months following the noti- 
fication to the borrower that the loan is available for drawing as 
specified in the loan agreement. Amounts not fully spent are 
a 
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Table C-7. Size Distribution of Loans Disbursed, by Subsample 
Loan Principal 
Disbursed 
Sh 1000 or less 
Sh 1001 - 2000 
Sh 2001 - 3000 
Sh 3001 - 4000 
Sh 4001 - 5000 
Sh 5001 - 6000 
Sh 6001 - 7000 
Sh 7001 - 8000 
Sh 8001 - 9000 
Mean Loan 
Disbursed 
Standard 
Deviation 
n 
Busia Nyeri 
Bungoma Murang'a Entire 
Kericho Kisii Kakamega Karatina Sample 
(--- cumulative percentages --- -) 
- 2 9 - 3 
9 44 37 20 27 
32 83 68 43 56 
55 98 87 75 79 
78 99 97 86 90 
86 99 99 95 95 
96 100 99 98 98 
99 100 100 99 
100 100 
Sh 4,012 2,291 2,663 
Sh 1,556 847 1,297 
102 103 96 
3,440 3,107 
1,394 1,459 
103 404 
generally cancelled at or before the posting of the first install- 
ment. While some of these shortfalls are quite small and of no 
analytical interest, in certain branches the portion appears to 
have been significant. The frequency and magnitude of underspending 
suggests that 
a) borrowers may not really "need" loans to the extent commonly 
assumed, 
b) the problems of organising on-farm investments supported by 
loans are beyond the management capabilities of some 
borrowers, 
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Table C-8. Comparison of Sample Loan Approvals and Disbursements 
as of 31 December 1975 
Year Loan Approved 
Subsample 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 Total 
(- Loan Amount s in Sh 000 - -) 
Kericho Subsample 
a) amount approved 24.0 39.6 226.3 201.9 498.1 
b) amount disbursed 23.2 39.6 219.6 186.5 468.9 
c) b as % of a 97% 100% 97% 92% 95% 
d) number of loans sampled 7 9 42 47 105 
e) proportion at least 
90% disbursed 71% 100% 93% 77% 85% 
f) proportion at least 
50% disbursed 100% 100% 9&% 89% 94% 
Kisii Subsample 
a) amount approved 28.5 93.6 155.8 277.9 
b) amount disbursed 27.0 83.6 144.9 255.5 
c) b as % of a 95% 89% 93% 92% 
d) number of loans sampled 14 40 56 110 
e) proportion at least 
90% disbursed 71% 80% 55% 66% 
f) proportion at least 
50% disbursed 100% 95% 96% 96% 
Busia Branch Subsample 
a) amount approved 10.0 13.0 3.6 4.9 31.5 
b) amount disbursed 9.5 8.5 1.0 .2 19.2 
c) b as % of a 95% 65% 28% 4% 61% 
d) number of loans sampled 5 7 2 2 16 
e) proportion at least 
90% disbursed 80% 43% 0% 0% 44% 
f) proportion at least 
50% disbursed 100% 71% 50% 0% 69% 
Bungoma Branch Subsample 
a) amount approved 2.8 35.8 28.0 41.6 15.1 123.3 
b) amount disbursed .9 22.1 . 25.3 17.8 
7.0 73.1 
c) b as % of a 32% 62% 90% 43% 46% 59% 
d) number of loans sampled 1 12 6 10 3 32 
e) proportion at. least 
90% disbursed 0% 33% 50% 30% 33% 34% 
f) proportion at least 
50% disbursed 0% 58% 83% 30% 33% 50% 
(continued) 
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Table C-8. (continued) 
Year Loan Approved 
Subsample 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 Total 
(- - - Loan Amounts in Sh 000 -- -) 
Kakamega Branch Subsample 
a) amount approved 34.1 46.2 66.3 49.9 5.5 202.0 
b) amount disbursed 31.2 44.0 57.8 42.7 1.9 177.6 
c) b as % of a 91% 95% 87% 86% 35% 88% 
d) number of loans sampled 11 16 20 14 2 63 
e) proportion at least 
90% disbursed 82% 88% 75% 71% 0% 76% 
f) proportion-at least 
50% disbursed 91% 94% 85% 86% 0% 867. 
Nyeri and Karatina 
Branches Subsamples 
a) amount approved 
b) amount disbursed 
c) b as % of a 
d) number of loans sampled 
e) proportion at least 
90%. disbursed 
f) proportion at least 
50% disbursed 
103.9 59.7 15.9 179.5 
102.7 59.6 15.9 178.2 
99% 100% 100% 99% 
35 16 5 56 
97% 100% 100% 98% 
100% 100% 100% 100% 
Murang'a Branch Subsample 
a) amount approved 4.5 69.9 43.2 23.7 20.8 33.2 195.3 
b) amount disbursed 4.5 66.4 38.6 22.5 20.6 33.2 185.8 
c) b as % of a 100% 95% 89% 95% 99% 100% 95% 
d) number of loans 
sampled 1 18 13 6 5 7 50 
e) proportion at least 
90% disbursed 100% 89% 69% 83% 100% 100% 86% 
f) proportion at least 
50% disbursed 100% 94% 92% 100% 100% 100% 96% 
Note: All data given refer only to statistics pertaining only to 
the subsample loans. 
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c) the farm planning exercise at times resulted in the over- 
statement of the amount of investment desired by or 
within the capability of the farmer, 
d) the "shortage" of grade cattle at times hindered the realisation 
of on-farm investment plans, especially in Western Province, 
e) many borrowers do not inflate their claims in order to use loan 
proceeds for purposes not envisaged in their loan contracts, 
and 
f) the amount of underspending which reflects insufficient or 
inadequate documentation is probably small. The level 
of underspending would have been the subject of public 
debate had it resulted from misunderstandings about 
paperwork. 
Details of underspending among sampled borrowers are shown 
in Table C-8 by branch, by year, by amounts of money involved and 
by the proportion of loans involved. The Table refers to larger 
subsamples than used elsewhere in this study because gross under- 
spending was one criterion for deleting observations to arrive at 
the final subsample composition, as explained above on page 425. 
Underspending was greatest Busia and Bungoma, where the amounts 
disbursed approximated 60% of amounts approved. Rates were 
highest in Kericho, Murang'a and Nyeri and Karatina, which all 
disbursed an average of at least 95% of loan amounts approved. 
3. Loan Security 
The value of security taken by AFC is large in relation to 
the original principal amount of loans disbursed. The mean 
security value was 4.06 times loan size, far above the 1.5 times 
decision guideline presumably used by management, with a standard 
deviation of 2.86, a maximum of 24.84 and a minimum of 1.02 times 
loan size. As repayments are made by borrowers and the principal 
amount outstanding decreases, the relationship which prevails at 
the time of loan approval increases, providing AFC with an even 
stronger position. An exception to the tendency of security 
coverage to increase over time is the case in which the borrower 
makes payments which are smaller than the interest which accumulates 
on the loan, but these cases are relatively infrequent. The 
inflation of land values over the life of a loan also has the 
effect of increasing security coverage. Disregarding the selective 
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inclusion of values other than land, the explanation of AFC's 
large security margin rests mainly with the indivisibility of 
plots. It would hardly be worthwhile for a borrower or prospective 
borrower to subdivide a plot so that only a portion would have to 
be pledged to satisfy AFC's security requirements. On paper, 
there is little doubt that AFC is well secured. 
4. Loan Amount per Acre 
The mean loan amount disbursed per acre of land reported by 
the borrower was approximately Sh 325. The mean amount by sub- 
sample ranged from Sh 234 to Sh 486, indicating a considerable 
spread. The size of the mean, as shown in Table C-9, appears to 
have little relation to the mean farm size in acres (see Table C-10), 
but rather follows a pattern suggestive of the general levels of 
development in the areas concerned. The Western Province subsample 
contains probably the least developed holdings in the entire 
sample, while the Central Province subsample contained probably 
the most highly developed. Kericho and Kisii fall in between, 
with Kericho at a higher general level than Kisii. This pattern 
suggests that more highly developed smallholdings can support 
greater incremental investment in an enterprise such as dairying, 
which typically does not involve a serious labour constraint at 
the level of a small herd, than can less highly developed small 
farms. In addition, the access of small farmers to infrastructure 
in the more highly developed smallholder Districts is correspondingly 
greater, supporting greater on-farm investment. Relevant infra- 
structure would include roads, dairy cooperatives, extension and 
animal health services and facilities. 
F. Farm Characteristics 
1. Farm Size in Acres 
Interpretation of farm size distributions must be qualified 
by the possibility that some borrowers own plots of land in 
addition to those specified in loan application forms and taken 
as security by'AFC. Multiple holdings have been minimised 
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in sample areas by land consolidation under the process cul- 
minating in smallholder land registration. However, once the 
process is complete, and in spite of the operation of Land 
Control Boards, multiple holdings arise through market trans- 
actions. Multiple holdings reflect the attractiveness of land 
as an investment by those having liquidity to devote to such 
acquisitions. Part of the attractiveness of land may reflect 
familial and social considerationsä as in the provision of 
separate farms for separate wives where polygamy is practiced 
and in the outlet it provides for dependents to become self- 
sufficient. In other cases several plots may be operated as 
one farm, but only one is reported on the AFC loan application 
so that the others are not encumbered by AFC's mortgage require- 
ments. AFC does not routinely undertake searches of Land 
Registries to ascertain whether applicants have divulged all 
their holdings. An informed estimate is that perhaps 150 - 25% 
of AFC's smallholder borrowers included in the sample own plots 
in addition to those taken by AFC as loan security. 
Of the entire sample of 404 valid observations, the mean 
farm size was 12.09 acres. The smallest farm included in the 
sample consisted of 2.0 acres, although it may be questioned 
whether this and other small plots were in fact not fragments 
of larger operations. The largest farm included in the sample 
consisted of 73.0 acres. 
By subsamples, the largest mean farm sizes are found in 
Busia-Bungoma-Kakamega (15.64 acres) and in Kericho (14.86 acres), 
although the standard deviation around these means is rather 
large, as shown in Table C-10. Mean farm sizes were considerably 
smaller in Kisii (9.94 acres) and Nyeri-Murang'a-Karatina (8.18 
acres). 
Variations in the distributions of farm size by subsample 
are striking, with Kisii and Nyeri-Murang'a-Karatina showing 
much heavier concentrations in the lower end of the scale than 
the other two areas. For example, half of the Nyeri-Murang'a- 
Karatina subsample consisted of plots of less than 7.5 acres, 
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Table C-9. Loan Amount Disbursed p er Acre 
Busia Nyeri 
Bungoma Murang'a Entire 
Kericho Kisii Kakamega Karatina Sample 
Loan amount disbursed 
per acre of borrowers' 
reported holdings 
Mean Sh 317 267 233 486 325 
Standard 
deviation Sh 149 133 149 196 
Table C-10. Reported Farm Size Distribution by Subsample 
Busia Nyeri 
Repor ted Farm Bungoma Murang'a Entire 
Size in Acres Kericho Kisii Kakamega Karatina Sample 
(-- cumulative perce ntages - -) 
Less than 2.50 1% - - 3% 1% 
2.50 - 4.99 2% 7% 3% 24'%, 9% 
5.00 - 7.49 18% 35% 21% 52% 31% 
7.50 - 9.99 29% 64% 39% 71% 51% 
10.00 - 12.49 47% 78% 50% 86% 66% 
12.50 - 14.99 59% 85% 62% 92% 75% 
15.00 - 19.99 77% 94% 75% 98% 86% 
20.00 - 29.99 95% 99% 89% 99%, 96% 
30.00 or more 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Mean reported farm 
size in acres 14.86 9.94 15.64 8.18 12.09 
Standard deviation 8.12 5.15 11.76 4.58 8.44 
n 102 103 96 103 404 
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but only about 20% of the Kericho and Busia-Bungoma-Kakamega 
subsamples were below this size. While one quarter of Nyeri- 
Murang'a-Karatina plots sampled consisted of less than 5.0 
acres, farms of this size constituted only minute portions of 
the other subsamples. Although roughly a quarter of the sampled 
farms in Kericho and in Busia-Bungoma-Kakamega consisted of 20.0 
acres or more, only 2% of the Nyeri-Murang'a-Karatina group were 
in this range. In spite of these differences, however, there is 
little doubt that sample borrowers tend to be smallholders in 
the general sense of the term. 
2. Land Use Patterns 
Of the mean farm size of 12.1 acres, an average of 10.6 
acres is devoted to agricultural enterprises. The balance con- 
sists of the homestead plot and of rocky, boggy or other land 
not suitable for agriculture. Grass leys accounted for only 
one-quarter acre on the average farm, while permanent grass- 
land occupied 5.8 acres. Thus, slightly over half of the 
mathematically average farm consisted of improved and unimproved 
pasture, with unimproved pasture predominating. 
3. Cash Cropping 
The summary of the incidence of cash crops among borrowers 
at the time they lodged their loan applications is given in Table 
C-11. Grade cattle are considered a cash enterprise for the 
purpose of this discussion only if the farmer reported three or 
more female head, on the assumption that two animals, one of 
which would no doubt frequently be immature, would in most cases 
be insufficient to provide more than the consumption requirements 
of the farm family. The greatest variety of cash enterprises is 
found in Kisii, where coffee, tea and pyrethrum were each grown 
by roughly half or more of the subsample. The highest incidence 
of any cash crop was coffee, grown by almost 70% of borrowers in 
Nyeri-Murang'a-Karatina. Over 60% of sample borrowers in Kisii 
grow coffee, too, while tea was grown by 60% of the Kericho sub- 
sample. 
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Table C-ll. Percentages of Borrowers Having Cash Crops 
at Time of Loan Application, by Subsample 
Busia Nyeri 
Bungoma Murang'a Entire 
Cash Enterprise Kericho Kisii Kakamega Karatina Sample 
Coffee 6.9% 61.2% 31.3% 69.9% 42.6% 
Tea 60.8 47.6 1.0 16.2 34.4 
Pyrethrum 2.0 58.3 - 1.9 15.8 
a/ Grade cattle 21.6 4.9 4.0 7.8 9.7 
Steers '49.0 15.5 19.8 12.6 24.3 
Others: 
Pineapples 1.0 1.9 2.1 - 1.2 
Vegetables 2.9 1.9 - 1.9 1.7 
Forest products - 1.9 1.0 18.4 5.4 
Oil seeds - - 3.1 - 5.4 
Others or combi- 
nations of other 
enterprises 31.4 30.1 56.3 26.2 35.6 
Note: The most important cash enterprise in terms of numbers 
of growers in each subsample is underlined. 
a/ Grade cattle have been considered a cash enterprise for the 
purposes of this Table only when the female grade herd consisted 
of three of more head. While it is possible that a smaller herd 
could produce a marketable surplus, lowering the threshold to two 
head would have included many herds of one mature and one im- 
mature animal, which would probably not provide much more than 
on-farm consumption requirements. 
****. 
Table C-12. Number of Major Cash Crops Operated by Borrowers at 
Time of Loan Application, in Percent by Subsample 
Busia Nyeri 
Number of Bungoma Murang'a Entire 
Cash Enterprises Kericho Kisii Kaka_me as Karatina Sample 
None 8.8% 1.9% 17.7% 3.9% 7.9% 
One 26.5 16.5 47.9 39.8 32.4 
Two 35.3 30.1 31.3 29.1 31.4 
Three 22.5 33.0 2.1 22.3 20.3 
Four 5.9 15.5 1.0 4.9 6.9 
Five 1.0 3.0 1.1 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Note: Major cash enterprises are defined here as including the 
main categories listed in Table C-11 above, but with "others" 
treated as a single enterprise. Columns may not sum to totals 
because of rounding errors. 
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In three of the subsamples more than half of the borrowers 
reported growing a cash crop which is not consumed on the farm, 
i. e., coffee and tea. In the remaining subsample, Busia-Bungoma- 
Kakamega, more than half of the borrowers reported growing other 
crops, mainly food crops, which could be considered cash enter- 
prises in the sense that they would probably produce a marketable 
surplus in average years. These statistics suggest that borrowers 
tended to operate on a commercial basis in the sense of being 
specialised to some extent in a commercial crop, or in the sense 
of having acreage to devote to cultivation other than that re- 
quired for meeting on-farm consumption requirements. 
Table C-12 indicates the number of cash crops grown by 
borrowers in each subsample. Fewer than 8% of sampled borrowers 
had no cash crop at the time they applied for their loans, while 
more than a quarter operated three or more cash enterprises. For 
the purpose of ascertaining the role of AFC loans in enterprise 
adoption, grade cattle are considered a cash crop regardless of 
herd size, and "others" are grouped together as if a single cash 
enterprise since most are temporary crops. On this basis, loans 
were most innovative in Busia-Bungoma-Kakamega. in the sense of 
providing grade cattle to those who previously had no cash enter- 
prise or only one such enterprise, defined to include combinations 
of minor crops. Almost two-thirds of this subsample fell within 
these categories, and 97% had no more than two cash enterprises. 
Loans tended to be least innovative in this sense in Kisii, 
where half the borrowers had three or more cash enterprises at 
the time they lodged their loan applications and fewer than 2% 
of the subsample reported having no cash enterprise. 
Ecology and farm layout have an influence on the high 
incidence of cash enterprises on Kisii farms, for many of these 
farms cover a wider range of altitude than those in less hilly 
areas. A single plot in Kisii could contain coffee, tea and py- 
rethrum -- a combination unheard of in Busia-Bungoma-Kakamega and 
rare in Nyeri-Murang'a-Karatina. The importance of having more 
than one cash enterprise is at least two-fold: the addition of 
another enterprise may permit intensification of production from 
447 
given stocks of land and labour supply, and by diversifying the 
farm's production the addition of another cash enterprise also 
diversifies the farmer's risk of adverse market and production 
conditions. 
The amount of land devoted to coffee and tea among those 
sampled borrowers having either of these enterprises gives some 
indication of the tendency of smallholders to diversify their 
production rather than specialise. In contrast to the mean farm 
size of 12.1 acres, the mean coffee stand amounted to less than 
one acre, while the mean tea stand occupied 1.33 acres, as indi- 
cated in Table C-13. While the standard deviation in each case 
is relatively large in relation to the mean -- . 74 acres for 
coffee, . 80 acres 
for tea -- the fact remains that few sampled 
farmers use their land primarily for the production of these 
crops. The largest coffee stand in the sample did not exceed 
five acres, and half of the 172 sample coffee growers had stands 
of less than . 75 acres. With respect to tea stands, the largest 
sampled did not exceed four acres, and half of the 139 growers 
had one acre or less. Labour constraints at seasonal peaks in 
labour demand are known very often-to provide the impetus for 
diversification of production, while disease and price factors 
also tend to discourage smallholder specialisation in coffee. 
The same types of constraints are reflected in small pyrethrum 
plots. Half of the 64 growers had stands of less than . 75 acres. 
Approximately 25% of sampled borrowers reported owning steers 
at the time they lodged their loan applications. Steers, held 
for fattening purposes and eventual slaughter for beef, are a. 
livestock enterprise which does not require the inputs or manage- 
ment demanded for successful dairying based on grade cattle. 
Steers do not require such intensive supervision as demanded by 
the daily milking routine, presentation for artificial insem- 
ination, and the disease proneness of grade cows, and thus tend 
to be less vulnerable to stress in an economic sense than are 
grade cows. 
The distribution of steer enterprises is given in Table C-14. 
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The distribution falls into two patterns. In Kericho about half 
of the subsample reported having steers, while in the other three 
subsamples the proportion having the enterprise ranged from 12% 
to 20%. The explanation for the deviation in Kericho is probably 
related to the larger average farm size there, the use of animal 
draught power, and the pastoral tradition of the inhabitants, 
who adopted sedentary agriculture relatively recently. The 
comparatively low incidence of steer enterprises in the other 
subsamples may reflect small farm sizes in some areas and a 
preference for native stock and inferior crosses as a basis for 
subsistence livestock enterprises. 
4. Loans and Grade Cattle Enterprise Adoption 
To what extent did the provision of credit in sample areas 
enable farmers to adopt dairying based on grade cattle? For the 
entire sample, 73% of borrowers had no grade cattle on their farms 
at the time loan applications were filed, as shown in Table C-1S. 
This proportion suggests a substantial degree of innovative finan- 
cing under the KFW and IDA schemes in the areas concerned. Of those 
having grade cattle at the time their application formalities were 
underway, about one-third had only one female grade animal, while 
approximately another one-third had two such animals. Thus, credit 
did flow primarily to those without grade animals and secondarily 
to small operators established in dairying, but not on a scale suf- 
ficient to produce a very sizeable marketable surplus. Only 3% of 
the sampled borrowers were reported to have five or more female 
grade head on their farms at the time they applied for loans. This 
interpretation underestates the number of larger, established opera- 
tors, however, as a portion of borrowers may have had other 
farms, not 
reported on their loan applications, stocked with grade animals. 
The pattern of innovative financing is especially apparent 
in the least developed area, Busia-Bungoma-Kakamega, where 93.8% 
1. As noted on page 419 and elsewhere in this paper, the IDA and 
KFW smallholder schemes have financed primarily grade cattle. 
Between 1967 and 1972, for example, 85% of disbursements under 
the 
IDA project were earmarked for grade cattle and related on-farm 
investments. 
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Table C-13. Reported Sizes of Coffee and Tea Stands, 
by Subsample 
Busia Nyeri 
Bungoma Murang'a Entire 
Kericho Kisii Kakamega Karatina Sample 
Coffee acreage 
reported by 
sample farmers 
Mean . 99 
Standard deviation . 54 
n7 
Tea acreage 
reported by 
sample farmers 
Mean 1.54 
Standard deviation . 84 
n 62 
. 71 . 62 1.23 . 92 
. 60 . 50 . 83 . 74 
63 30 72 172 
1.14 1.25 1.21 1.33 
. 77 - . 67 . 80 
49 1 27 139 
Table C-14. Sizes of Steer Enterprises Reported by Borrowers, 
by Subsample 
Busia Nyeri 
Reported Bungoma Murang'a Entire 
Number of Steers Kericho Kisii Kakamega Karatina Sample 
None 51.0% 84.5% 80.2% 87.4% 75.7% 
One 5.9 6.8 6.3 8.7 6.9 
Two 16.7 6.8 6.3 2.9 8.2 
Three 5.9 - - - 1.5 
Four 9.8 1.0 5.2 - 4.0 
Five 3.9 1.0 - 1.0 1.5 
Six or more 7.0 - 2.0 - 2.1 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Note: Columns may not sum to totals because of rounding errors. 
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Table C-15. Number of Female Grade Head on Borrowers' Farms 
as Reported on Loan Applications, in Percentages 
by Subsample 
Number of Female 
Grade Stock on 
Sampled Borrowers' 
Farms as Reported Busia Nyeri 
on Loan Appli- Bungoma Murang'a Entire 
cations Kericho Kisii Kakamega Karatina Sample 
None 60.8% 66.0% 93.8% 72.8% 73.0% 
One 9.8 12.6 2.1 12.6 9.4 
Two 7.8 16.5 - 6.8 7.9 
Three 8.8 1.9 1.0 1.9 3.5 
Four 5.9 1.0 1.0 1.9 2.5 
Five or more 6.9 2.0 2.1 4.0 3.7 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
of borrowers reported having no grade animals. In the other areas 
the proportion ranged from 60% to 73%, and the latter proportion 
in the highly developed Nyeri-Murang'a-Karatina area suggests 
that the incidence of innovative financing was also high, pre- 
sumably spreading this enterprise among strata of innovators 
beyond the group which were the most early adopters. However, 
the incidence of multiple holdings unreported on loan applications 
would tend to offset to some extent the high percentages indicated, 
as those having acquired more than their'original plot, which 
resulted from land consolidation, would probably by reason of 
their comparative wealth also be among the earliest adopters of 
dairying based on grade cattle. It is also possible that 
in 
certain cases grade cattle had been disposed of by operators 
prior to their application for an AFC loan, so that the loan 
could be used to acquire better animals, which must be in calf 
at the time of purchase, as specified by AFC. 
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G. Borrower Characteristics 
1. The Average Borrower 
The average borrower in the sample is in his 40's. He is 
the owner of a farm of 12.1 acres, as noted above, and his net 
worth at the time of loan application, consisting largely of his 
land, was Sh 16,450. The value of the security he is able to 
provide to back his loan is Sh 11,650, although this figure as 
computed by AFC includes not only land and certain loose assets, 
but sometimes a portion of annual non-farm income where such 
exists. Borrowers' mean pre-loan net farm income was Sh 2,145, 
supplemented by non-farm employment income of Sh 2,760. Approx- 
imately seven persons reside on the average borrower's farm. 
Children outnumber adults and the average annual expenditure on 
school fees was Sh 375. 
2. Off-farm Employment 
Approximately half of the borrowers sampled were bona fide 
smallholders in the sense of not having off-farm employment, as 
indicated in Table C-16. Employment in the public sector pro- 
vided the source of non-farm income for almost half of those 
borrowers reporting off-farm employment, and these employees -- 
teachers, civil servants and the staff of parastatal organi- 
sations -- comprised 24% of the entire sample. The balance of 
the employed were largely self-employed, no doubt including many 
owners of the numerous small shops, eating houses and pubs found 
in rural centres, small businessmen owning taxis and lorries, 
and tradesmen. 
One of the most interesting features of the occupational 
distribution by subsamples is the consistency of the proportion 
of those having off-farm employment. This proportion constitutes 
between 42% and 51% of each subsample, as indicated in the Table. 
There would appear to be no obvious explanation of this degree of 
similarity. The proportion of public sector employees among each 
subsample appears to vary inversely with the level of development 
in each of the subsample areas. The lesser developed areas, 
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Table C-16. Off-Farm Employment Reported by Sample Borrowers, 
in Percent by Subsample 
Busia Nyeri 
Type of Burgoma Murang'a Entire 
Employment Kericho Kisii Kakamega Karatina Sample 
None other 
than farming 57.8% 
Public sector 
employment 
Teachers 14.7 
Other civil 
service 5.9 
Parastatal staff 2.0 
Subtotal 22.6 
Self-employed 12.7 
Other off-farm 
employment 6.9 
Total reporting 
off-farm employment 42.2 
Total 100.0% 
49.5% 51.0% 52.4% 52.7% 
10.7 16.7 3.9 11.4 
14.6 14.6 7.8 10.6 
1.9 2.1 1.9 2.0 
27.2 33.4 13.6 24.0 
20.4 11.5 29.1 18.6 
2.9 4.2 4.9 4.7 
50.5 49.0 47.6 47.3 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Kisii and Busia-Bungoma-Kakamega, have higher proportions in the 
public service than the more highly developed areas. This 
relationship is probably due to the relative importance of the 
public sector in providing employment in any given area. The 
more highly developed the area, the wider the variety of employ- 
ment and, in all probability, the less numerically important the 
public sector as employer in relative terms. The opportunities 
for self-employment also appear to bear a less distinct relation- 
ship with area development, as the positions of Kericho and 
Kisii 
appear to be the opposite of what might be expected on the basis 
of agricultural development and potential alone. 
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3. Residence 
The proportion of farmers who reported that they resided on 
their farms was quite high, reaching 99.0% in Kericho, 79.6% in 
Kisii, 90.6% in Busia-Bungoma-Kakamega, 91.3% in Nyeri-Murang'a- 
Karatina, and 89.4% for the sample as a whole. These proportions 
show again that most of the farmers sampled were bona fide small- 
holders in the sense that they are on hand to take an active part 
in the operation and management of their farms. However, these 
percentages may be somewhat overstated, as a significant portion 
of landowners leave their plots to take employment in the cities, 
or if in the civil service may be assigned to positions outside 
their home areas and return home only on weekends and holidays. 
As no definition of residence is given on the AFC loan application 
form, it may be that many farmers who in fact are on their plots 
for less than half of each year would in fact indicate that they 
were resident on their farms, in accordance with the convention 
of maintaining very strong and close ties with one's own area and 
land even though most working days are devoted to employment in 
some distant location. In any event, the figures are of an order 
to suggest that relatively few true absentee landlords are in- 
cluded among borrowers under the programmes and in the areas 
sampled. 
4. Encumbrance 
Borrowers were required to pledge a large proportion of 
their reported assets to secure their loans. The mean relation- 
ship between the value of security taken by AFC and the borrower's 
total reported assets was . 76, with a standard deviation of . 26, 
suggesting a skewed distribution. (These computations included 21 
missing observations, largely from among the early borrowers 
sampled. ) The relatively large amount of reported net worth 
pledged as security reflects AFC's practice of taking a mortgage 
on the borrower's land as security, and the large proportion 
of most borrowers' reported net worths accounted for by their land. 
Land values are estimated by AFC loan officers in the field on the 
basis of current market values. There is reason to suspect that 
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reported net worths are frequently conservative because borrowers 
may own more than one plot of land. Thus, the mean value tends 
to overstate the actual level of encumbrance, although many 
borrowers not having more than one plot would be greatly en- 
cumbered by AFC's mortgage requirement. 
H. Sample Repayment Performance 
1. Repayment Performance Distribution 
The Repayment Index mean and measures of dispersion for the 
entire sample and the four subsamples are given in Table C-17. 
The best average performance is found in Kericho, the worst in 
the loans made in Western Province by AFC branches in Busia, 
Bungoma and Kakamega. Each subsample contained a least one case 
of total default indicated by a Repayment Index number of nought, 
and also contained net prepayers with Repayment Index values 
larger than 1.00. (Sample selection procedures included the 
deletion of borrowers repaying in full in 30 months or less, 
as noted previously. ) 
Graph C-1 shows the shape of the distribution of Repayment 
Index numbers for the entire sample and for each subsample. 
Perfect performance would be represented by a single point on 
the graph (rather than a line), at the intersection of the 
horizontal line representing 100% of the sample (beyond the 
vertical range of Graph C-1) and the vertical line representing 
a Repayment Index number of 1.00. Records approaching this 
level of achievement would be indicated by steep curves inter- 
secting the equal to or greater than 1.00 Repayment Index 
coordinate from the horizontal axis. As Graph C-1 shows, the 
curves for the sample and subsamples peak before reaching the 
equal to or greater than 1.00 value, with the Busia-Bungoma- 
Rakamega subsample curve peaking at a very low level (Repayment 
Index numbers of . 
20 - . 
40), and a secondary mode closer to the 
equal to or greater than 1.00 value. Branch managers interested 
in improving their collection performance would seek to make the 
tails of their curves flatter over low Repayment Index values, 
and the more rapidly ascending portion steeper. 
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Table C-17. Repayment Index Means and Measures of Dispersion, 
by Subsample 
Repayment Busia Nyeri 
Index Bungoma Murang'a Entire 
Measure Kericho Kisii Kakamega Karatina Sample 
Mean . 86 . 70 . 62 . 80 . 75 
Standard deviation . 37 . 33 . 31 . 28 . 33 
Maximum 2.48 1.39 1.31 1.41 2.48 
Minimum . 00 . 00 . 00 . 00 . 00 
Table C-18. Repayment Index Performance, by Subsample in 
Cumulative Percentages 
Busia Nyeri 
Repayment Bungoma Murang'a Entire 
Index Ranges Kericho Kisii Kakamega Karatina Sample 
0.00 1.0% 1.9% 3.1% 1.0% 1.7% 
. 01 - . 20 
2.0 9.7 7.3 2.9 5.4 
. 21 - . 40 
9.8 17.5 31.3 8.7 16.6 
. 41 - . 60 16.7 
33.0 49.0 22.3 30.0 
. 61 - . 80 38.2 
59.2 65.6 43.7 51.5 
. 81 - . 90 54.9 
67.0 81.3 54.4 64.1 
. 91 - . 99 74.5 84.5 87.5 82.5 82.2 
1.00 79.4 85.4 89.6 86.4 85.1 
1.01 - 1.10 89.2 91.3 95.8 91.3 91.8 
1.11 - 1.20 90.2 95.1 96.9 96.1 94.6 
1.21 - 1.40 94.1 100.0% 100.0% 99.0 98.3 
1.41 or more 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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The cumulative percentage distribution of Repayment Index 
numbers by subsample is shown in Table C-18. The upper part of 
the Table reflects the performance illustrated in Graph C-1, 
with the subsamples with inferior performance registering 
accordingly higher culumative percentages at any given category 
up through 1.00. For example, approximately half of the Busia- 
Bungoma-Kakamega subsample had Repayment Index numbers of . 60 
or less, while roughly half of the Kericho and Nyeri-Murang'a- 
Karatina subsamples had Repayment Index numbers of . 90 or 
less. 
One of the most interesting aspects of the distributions is that 
approximately 15% - 20% of each subsample paid promptly, on 
balance, or were prepayers. Repayment performance typically 
spans a wide range. The upper 15% of the entire sample prepay 
or pay on time, while the lowest 15% have Index numbers below . 40. 
Prepayment at this order of magnitude suggests that many 
borrowers tend, on balance, to honour their repayment obligations 
scrupulously, even to the extent of paying ahead of time. Reasons 
for prepayment may include the desire to hedge against the possi- 
bility of lean times in the future or to secure the return of 
their title deeds more quickly than anticipated in loan maturity 
schedules. On the other hand, a significant portion of borrowers 
are unable to repay over anything close to the time span envisaged 
in their loan contracts, or else take substantial liberties in 
stretching out repayment schedules. Those who had made no re- 
payments constituted fewer than 2.0% of the entire sample, however. 
The range of performance is so broad that it raises the 
question of whether some means of discriminating between those 
likely to be poor payers and those likely to be good payers could 
be devised and incorporated in credit rationing procedures. 
2. Repayment Performance Correlations 
The research design and rationale were based on the hypothesis 
that the Repayment Index would generate a series of repayment 
performance values which would correlate with various borrower, 
farm and loan characteristics. Through correlation analysis it 
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Graph C-1. Repayment Index. Patt.. erns by Subsample and for the 
Entire Sample 
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Table C-19. Correlation Analysis of Repayment Performance 
and Borrower, Farm and Loan Characteristics 
Repayment Index with 
Characteristics Reported Pearson Confidence 
on Loan Applications Coefficient Level 
Borrower characteristics 
Net worth . 105 . 02 
Age . 046 . 18 
Off-farm employment income . 001 . 43 School fees paid annually -. 038 . 22 
Farm characteristics 
Female grade herd size . 206 . 00 Total labour cash costa . 096 . 12 Total cash crop acreage . 067 . 09 Projected net farm income . 059 . 12 Total cultivated acreage . 049 . 16 Pre-loan net farm income . 042 . 21 Farm size in. acres . 029 . 28 Size of farm family -. 045 . 18 
Loan characteristics 
Loan amount disbursed . 086 . 04 Security value . 077 . 06 
a/ Total labout cash cost includes outlays for contract 
cultivation. 
0 
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was expected that closely associated variables would provide a 
basis for predicting loan repayment performance from the data 
given in loan application forms. However, these expectations 
proved to be misplaced, as the sample as a whole-and each of 
the subsamples individually failed to yield sufficient cor- 
relations of statistical interest. The pattern for the sample 
as a whole is given in Table C-19. The values of Pearson 
correlation coefficients for selected characteristics and the 
Repayment Index were largely between . 00 and . 10, with signif- 
icance generally inferior to the 10% level. On the basis of 
this analysis, no relationships of statistical interest between 
repayment performance and principal borrower, loan and farm 
characteristics were identified which would provide a useful 
guide for loan decision making. 
In order to ascertain whether non-linear relationships might 
exist upon which repayment performance could be predicted, 
scattergrams were constructed for each of the subsamples for 
each of the variables having continuous values. The scatter- 
grams indicated a tremendous dispersion of observations and 
suggested no promising alternative approaches to regression analysis. 
Loan repayment performance appears to be determined by factors 
other than individual variables included in the correlation analysis. 
It is probable that some factors, such as the quality of branch 
management, are beyond the range of considerations upon which 
credit decisions are made by AFC. 
Step-wise multiple regression analysis was used to ascertain 
whether groups of selected variables might have a cumulative impact 
on repayment performance. One group of variables used for analysis 
included personal attributes and income and wealth, while a 
second was limited to cash crops. An R2 of . 33 was obtained 
between Repayment Index values and off-farm income, pre-loan 
net farm income, net worth, borrower's age and size of family, 
but with an insufficient confidence level (worse than 10%) to 
permit meaningful interpretation. The cash crop group has much 
greater association with repayment behaviour, yielding an R2 of 
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. 66 when combining the influences of pyrethrum acreage, tea 
acreage, and size of pre-loan female grade herd. The addition 
of steers and other cash crop acreage to the equation increased 
the R2 only to . 68. These results also lacked sufficient con- 
fidence levels to support positive conclusions concerning the 
relationships explored. 
An additional attempt to use regression analysis consisted 
of selecting those variables which provided the best confidence 
levels in the Pearson correlation analysis and combining them on 
a step-wise basis in an effort to find a series of variables for 
each subsample with attractive explanatory power in terms of re- 
payment performance. The cutoff confidence level was again 10%. 
Multiple regression analysis using the six variables showing 
confidence levels of 10% or better for the sample as a whole pro- 
duced an R` of . 
15, with F-test significance at the . 025 level. 
Thus, amount disbursed, security value, cash crop acreage, the 
cash costs of hired labour and contract cultivation, number of 
female grade head on the farm at the time of loan application 
and borrower net worth explain about 15% of the variation in 
Repayment Index values for the sample as a whole, with confidence 
at the 2.5% level. While these may be promising variables, their 
level of explanatory power does not appear high enough to provide 
operational guidelines for loan decision making. 
The same type of analysis applied to the Kericho subsample 
produced an R2 of . 28 but filed to yield the desired F-test signif- 
icance. The variables included were loan amount disbursed, loan 
amount disbursed per acre, security value, school fees paid an- 
nually at the time of loan application and the number of female 
grade head on the farm at the time of loan application. 
For the Kisii subsample, loan amount per acre, the borrower's 
age at the time of loan application, projected net farm income and 
off-farm income produced an R2 of . 09 
lacking the desired confidence 
level. 
The variables tested for the Busia-Bungoma-Kakamega subsample 
were loan amount disbursed, loan amount per acre, net worth, school 
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Graph C-2. Repayment Performance and Loan Amount Disbursed, 
by Subsample 
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fees paid annually at the time of loan application, cash costs 
of hired labour and contract cultivation and off-farm income. 
These yielded an R2 of . 19 lacking a sufficient confidence 
level. 
The number of persons resident on the farm and the borrower's 
age at the time of loan application were the only two variables 
tested for the Nyeri-Murang'a-Karatina subsample, yielding an R2 
of . 06, significant at the 10% level. Again, the results do not 
appear to be of interest from the loan decision making perspective. 
3. Repayment Performance and Loan Size 
A simple test was conducted to see if loan repayment performance 
varied with loan size, as it is sometimes held that the larger the 
borrower the worse the repayment record with respect to many farm 
credit programmes in the Third World. The Pearson correlation 
analysis yielded a coefficient of only . 
086, but significant at 
the 4% level, between loan amount disbursed and repayment perfor- 
mance. To obtain further details of possible relationships, 
separate Repayment Index means were computed for groups of loans 
ranged in Sh 1,000 intervals for each subsample. Results are 
shown in Graph C-2. 
The Graph indicates a variety of performance patterns. 
The hypothesis that repayment performance tends to worsen with 
increases in loan size is generally confirmed by the trend in 
Kericho over most of the curve. The final upswing in the Kericho 
curve is caused by only one observation. In Kisii the hypothesis 
is less strongly confirmed, although the highest two ranges con- 
tain only one observation each and the lowest range contains only 
two observations. However, the trend exhibited by the Central 
Province subsample exhibits the opposite traits, as mean repay- 
ment performance and loan size are positively associated over 
almost the entire range of loan sizes. The Western Province 
Subsample yields a rather flat trend, indicating no general 
relationship between loan size and mean repayment performance. 
The causes of the differences between the patterns of the 
various subsamples are not clear. There are so many possible 
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influences -- quality of branch management, stage of agricultural 
development, strength of commercial practice, availability of re- 
munerative investment opportunities, power structures and political 
factors, etc. -- that the conflicting behaviour is not easily 
analysed with the data at hand. 
One point of interest, though, is that those borrowers who 
drew Sh 1,000 or less were relatively poor payers on the average. 
Few such borrowers were included in the sample because those who 
spent less than 50% of their loan were deleted in the selection 
procedure, so those which were included would have been issued 
relatively small loans in the first instance. In this situation 
borrowers may suffer from the incomplete adoption of an enter- 
prise, such as the purchase of a cow but with insufficient invest- 
ment in watering facilities to permit economic levels of exploita- 
tion. It is possible that some borrowers who fail to spend only 
a small amount of their loan divert loan proceeds to uses other 
than those specified in the loan contract. In this case there is 
an obvious lack of commitment to the investment envisaged on the 
loan application form, and there may also be no base for cash 
generation from the expenditure of the loan proceeds. In still 
other cases, failure to spend but a fraction of the loan amount 
may be caused by the death of the borrower. In all of these cases 
poor repayment performance is hardly surprising, and AFC management 
could usefully devote special attention to this problem category 
of borrowers. 
The results of the comparison of repayment performance and 
loan amount disbursed indicate that reality is more complex than 
suggested by the hypothesis that 
5. d) Repayment performance on agricultural loans in Kenya varies 
inversely with loan size within any given credit scheme. 
4. Repayment Performance and Farm Size 
Another comparison was made to ascertain whether repayment 
performance tended to change with changes in farm size. The 
results, shown in Graph C-3, show that no uniform trend is 
apparent. Borrowers whose loans are secured by very small or 
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very large plots tended to have the best repayment performance. 
Excluding the loans secured by plots of less than 2.50 acres, 
repayment performance tended to increase with plot size, but 
somewhat erratically for plots of between 2.50 and 9.99 acres, 
while borrowers whose loans were secured by plots of between 
10.00 and 19.99 acres tended to achieve the same average level 
of repayment performance. 
5. Repayment Performance and Commitment to Farming 
Are farmers who are deeply committed to farming better 
payers than farmers who have a variety of interests? Two proxies 
for commitment taken from survey data include whether or not the 
farmer lives on the farm, and whether of not the farmer has off- 
farm employment. The borrower living on his farm is in a better 
position to make decisions and to direct farming activities by 
his family and labourers than is the absentee farmer. The farmer 
dependent upon his farm for his cash income is perhaps also more 
likely to take a keener interest in his farming and land use than 
the person who owns a farm but who looks to off-farm employment 
to enjoy the good things of life, other than land ownership for 
its own sake, which can be purchased only for cash. 
Table C-20 indicates the relative repayment performance by 
residence status. Fewer than 11% of the sampled loan applications 
were submitted by borrowers who indicated that they did not reside 
on their farm, as noted on page 452 above, and because of this 
relatively low level the percentages by subsample are included in 
the Table as well as the mean Repayment Index values for each 
group. The Table indicates that on an overall basis the farmers 
who reported living on their farms are better payers than those 
residing elsewhere, but not greatly better payers. The com- 
parative performance by subsample is mixed and shows greater 
differences that that for the sample as a whole. In Kericho and 
Kisii borrowers residing on their farms are much better payers on 
the average than those residing elsewhere, while in the other two 
subsamples the opposite relationship prevails. 
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Graph C-3. Repayment Performance and Farm Size in Acres 
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Table C-20. Repayment Performance and Borrower Residence Status 
Busia Nyeri 
Borrower Bungoma Murang'a Entire 
Residence Status Kericho Kisii Kakamega Karatina Sample 
Residing on farm: 
Mean Repayment 
Index value . 88 . 72 . 
61 . 79 . 75 
% of (sub)sample 99% 80% 91% 91% 89% 
Not residing on farm: 
Mean Repayment 
Index value . 48 . 62 . 74 . 99 . 70 % of (sub)sample 1% 20% 9% 9% 11% 
Table C-2I. Repayment Performance and Employment Status 
Mean Repayment Index Values 
Occupation Status Kericho 
None other than 
farming reported 
. 
88 
Off-farm employment 
reported . 
82 
Busia Nyeri 
Bungoma Murang'a Entire 
Kisii Kakamega Karatina Sample 
. 78 . 55 . 82 . 76 
. 62 . 69 . 76 . 74 
Employment status does not appear to exercise much influence 
on repayment performance, as suggested by Table C-21. Borrowers 
reporting no occupation other than farming (53% of the sample) 
achieved a mean Repayment Index number of . 76, while those 
reporting off-farm jobs had a mean Repayment Index number of . 74. 
By subsample, the range of performance between the two categories 
was greater, and only in Western Province did those reporting off- 
farm employment have an average repayment performance superior to those 
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reporting no such employment. 
A good deal of variation in average repayment performance 
was registered for borrowers ranked according to levels of off- 
farm income. While at the upper range, in excess of Sh 10,000 
per year, relatively high repayment performance was recorded, 
the trend appears to decline over the Sh 1,500 - Sh 9,999 range, 
as shown in Graph C: 4. 
On an overall basis, then, there is some evidence from AFC's 
small loan experience, although not very strong evidence, to 
support the hypothesis that 
5. c) Repayment performance on agricultural loans in Kenya 
varies directly with the borrower's commitment to farming. 
However, these proxies for commitment fail to support the hy- 
pothesis in Western Province, where the opposite situation 
occurs among sampled cases, and produce ambiguous results in 
the Nyeri-Nurang'a-Karatina subsample analysis. The differences 
found at the subsample level may reflect variations in types of 
employment and levels of off-farm income, as well as in the types 
of on-farm innovations and returns available. While some men may 
leave their farms with no wish to improve their farms, preferring 
to seek their fortunes elsewhere, others may leave the land to 
earn money to invest on their farms, where they intend eventually 
to return. 
6. Repayment Performance with and without Major Cash Crops 
Analysis was undertaken to ascertain whether those borrowers 
with certain major cash crops were better payers than those without 
such crops. Table C-22 shows the results of comparisons on this 
basis by subsample, listing only those cases in which mean Repay- 
ment Index values differed by more than . 075. Six situations 
were identified using this criterion with respect to coffee, tea, 
pyrethrum, steers and whether or not the farmer reported having 
grade cattle on his farm at the time of his loan application. In 
five of these six cases the borrowers in the segment having the 
enterprise in question had better average repayment performance 
than those without, the exception being tea in Kericho. In three 
468 
Table C-22. Comparisons of Repayment Index Values for 
Borrowers with and without Major Cash Crops 
Repayment Index 
Enterprise & Sub- Standard 
Subsample sample Segment Mean Deviation n 
Kericho Coffee: with 1.05 . 29 7 
without . 85 . 37 
95 
Tea: with . 83 . 32 
62 
without . 92 . 
43 40 
Female grade stock: 
with . 97 . 47 
40 
without . 79 . 27 
62 
Kisii Steers: with . 82 . 
26 16 
without . 68 . 
33 87 
Busia Tea: with 1.07 . 00 
1 
Bungoma without . 
62 . 
30 95 
Kakamega 
Nyeri Pyrethrum: with . 91 . 
00 2 
Murang'a without . 79 . 
28 101 
Karatina 
Note: The comparisons in this Table relate only to those 
cases in which the Repayment I ndex means for any 
two segments differed by . 075 or more 
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of these five cases the segment having the enterprise was small, 
containing less than 10% of the subsample, limiting greatly 
the applicability of the with/without dichotomy as a credit 
decision making tool. In a fourth case (steers in Kisii), the 
segment having the enterprise consisted of about 15% of the 
subsample. In this and in the two remaining cases where subsample 
segments were more nearly balanced (tea and female grade stock in 
Kericho), the standard deviations around the means amounted to 
between one-quarter and one-half of the values of the means, also 
reducing the utility of the analysis for decision making purposes. 
The conclusion arising from this exercise is that individual 
major cash enterprises in general do not provide a basis for 
segregating relatively good payers from relatively poor payers. 
In certain areas the distinction between those having such an 
enterprise and those without may provide a means of identifying 
better and poorer payers, but not a very precise means having 
general applicability. 
7. Repayment Performance and Selected Characteristic Values 
A further stage in'the analysis of repayment performance 
consisted of separating the entire sample into two groups with 
respect to values of selected characteristics. Groups were 
determined by selecting a roughly average value for each variable. 
For each of the segments on either side of this average value the 
mean Repayment Index was computed, along with the standard devia- 
tion of Repayment Index values, as shown in Table C-23. 
The results were not dramatic, as might be expected from 
the failure of the Pearson correlation analysis to locate relation- 
ships of significance. 
One of the largest spreads in terms of the Repayment Index 
between groups classified in this manner was . 10, for reported 
net worth, significant at the 2% level. The average Repayment 
Index value was . 71 for borrowers with net worths of less than 
Sh 15,000 and . 81 for borrowers-with net worths in excess of 
Sh 15,000. 
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The analysis indicates that there is a small but significant 
positive relationship between reported net worth and repayment 
performance. The wealthier the farmer, the better his repay- 
ment record. This finding is the opposite of what would be 
expected if the hypothesis were true that 
5. e) Repayment performance on agricultural loans in Kenya 
varies inversely with the borrower's net worth. 
Hence, this hypothesis is not accepted with respect to the loan 
schemes upon which this study is based. 
Another relatively large spread occurred between farmers 
having female grade animals on their farms at the time their 
loan applications were filed and those who reported none, with 
Repayment Index values of . 
83 and . 72 respectively. In this 
case, however, the group with the better average repayment per- 
formance had a much wider dispersion about the mean, as signified 
by a standard deviation of . 
41 compared to . 29 for the other 
group, introducing ambiguity into the interpretation of these 
figures. 
By compounding characteristics it was possible to identify 
smaller subgroups differing in. terms of repayment performance. 
For example, borrowers over 40 years old with more than 10 acres 
appear to be slightly better payers than those under 40 with 
fewer than 10 acres. Farm families of more than seven persons 
which pay more than Sh 400 in school fees annually are slightly 
worse payers than those below these divides, although the standard 
deviation for the superior group in terms of repayment performance 
is greater than that for the inferior group. 
By continuing the compounding approach it was possible to 
design sets of characteristics which indeed separated good payers 
from poor payers. At the extreme, for example, compounded mutually 
exclusive criteria were identified which produced Repayment Index 
means of . 62 and 1.05 with standard deviation= of . 39 and . 37, 
respectively. However, these sets of criteria do not appear to 
be widely useful for decision making purposes because they are too 
restrictive for general application. One of the groups identified 
contained only three observations, while the other contained four. 
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Table C-23. Loan Repayment Performance by Selected Values 
of Borrower, Farm and Loan Characteristics 
for 
the Entire Sample 
Repayment Index 
Selected Standard 
Characteristic Value Mean Deviation n 
Borrower characteristics: 
Net worth < Sh 15,000 . 71 . 
33 235 
> Sh 15,000 . 81 . 
33 169 
Age < 40 . 72 . 35 
209 
> 40 . 76 . 
33 166 
Employed off the farm No . 77 . 
31 191 
Yes . 72 . 36 
213 
Off-farm income 
< Sh 3,000, employment listed . 74 . 
31 '. 60 
> Sh 3,000 . 72 . 
38 124 
School fees paid annually 
< Sh 400 . 77 . 34 
294 
> Sh 400 . 69 . 
30 101 
Farm characteristics 
Farm size < 10 acres . 74 . 
33 206 
> 10 acres . 76 . 34 189 
Farm family size <7 persons . 75 . 
36 191 
>7 persons . 74 . 
29 162 
Female grade herd size none . 72 . 29 
295 
1 or more . 83 . 
41 109 
Pre-loan net farm income 
< Sh 2,200 . 75 . 
34 240 
> Sh 2,200 . 75 . 
32 164 
Loan characteristics 
Principal amount disbursed 
< Sh 3,000 . 74 . 
36 206 
> Sh 3,000 . 76 . 27 
177 
VALUES FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE . 75 . 
33 404 
(continued) 
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Table C-23. (continued) 
Repayment Index 
Selected Standard 
Characteristic Value Mean Deviation n 
Compound characteristics 
Age < 40, farm size < 10 acres . 68 . 34 98 
Age > 40, farm size > 10 acres . 75 . 33 112 
Farm family <7 persons, 
school fees < Sh 400 . 75 . 37 165 Farm family >7 persons, 
school fees > Sh 400 . 69 . 30 69 
Age < 40, farm size < 10 acres, no 
female grade herd, off-farm job 
income > Sh 3,000, farm family 
>7 persons, school fees > Sh 400, 
pre-loan net farm income < Sh 2,200, 
net worth < Sh 15,000, principal 
amount disbursed < Sh 3,000 . 62 . 39 4 
Alternate characteristics to above 
(for < read >, and vice versa) n. a. n. a. -0- 
Age > 40, farm size > 10 acres, 
female grade herd of 1 or more, 
off-farm income < Sh 3,000, farm 
family <7 persons, school fees 
< Sh 400, pre-loan net farm income 
> Sh 2,200, net worth > Sh 15,000, 
loan amount disbursed > Sh 3,000 1.05 . 
37 3 
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The paradoxical predicament of making the compounding approach 
more sophisticated is that the number of qualifying obser- 
vations decreases with each level of compounding, causing 
statistical problems: the standard deviation tends to 
increase, while degrees of freedom decrease. In other words, 
deriving discriminating Repayment Index means tends to involve 
a sacrifice of their potential applicability. Results might 
be more promising with other data, but with respect to this 
particular study the results obtained by compounding, as 
shown in Table C-23, are quite limited in applicability. 
Whether the costs of this approach to decision making would 
be justified by the weeding out of two or three percent or 
less of applications which might otherwise have been approved 
is questionable. 
In a final attempt to find relationships between repayment 
performance and farm, loan and borrower characteristics, the 
Repayment Index was used to rank all borrowers in each subsample 
and then to group them into thirds. The bottom third, containing 
the worst payers, was then contrasted to the top third, containing 
the best payers, to ascertain whether mean characteristic values 
were significantly different for the top and bottom thirds. 
Using a two-tailed t-test significance level of 10%, several 
significantly different mean values were identified, as shown 
in Table C-24. 
The patterns shown in the Table indicate that there are 
certain significant differences between good payers and poor 
payers. However, the differences identified, in loan, farm and 
borrower characteristics, appear fragmentary and not systematic. 
It would be difficult to specify credible lending guidelines on 
the basis of the results of the analysis. In general, the results 
confirm the validity of conventional standards of creditworthiness. 
Large farmers, identified in terms of farm size, loan security 
taken, net worth and wages and contract hire charges paid tend 
to be in the top third of borrowers ranked in terms of repayment 
performance. These farmers tend to take larger loans 
l: 
and'to 
1. The average loan year was the same for three subsamples and 
not significantly different in the fourth, diminishing any in- 
flationary distortion in the comparability of loan sizes over time. 
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Table C-24. Variables Having Significantly Different Mean Values 
for Subsamples Sectored into Thirds According to 
Repayment Performance 
Occur- 
Mean Value Signif- rance 
Ranking of Charac- icance in Other bý 
Subsample Characteristic of Third teristic Level - Subamples- 
Kericho Farm size in Top 16.9 
. 08 all acres Bottom 13.0 
Steers on farm Top 2.3 
, 04 
Kisii, 
c/ Bottom 1.0 Westerrr 
Kisii Part time wages Top Sh 172 
. 
05 none 
plus contract Bottom 243 
service charges 
paid 
Busia- School fees paid Top Sh 863 
. 05 none Bungoma- annually at time Bottom 455 
Kakamega of loan appli- 
cation 
Net worth Top Sh 16,580 06 all 
d/ 
Bottom 10,745 . 
Loan amount Top Sh 3,204 
. 002 none disbursed Bottom 2,148 
Wages paid to Top Sh 418 
permanent farm Bottom 193 . 10 all 
labourers 
Total wages and Top Sh 665 
'08 
Kericho, 
ýý 
contract service Bottom 372 Central 
charges paid 
Nyeri- Net worth Top Sh 14,759 
, 06 alld/ Murang'a- Bottom 12,000 
Karatina Security value Top Sh 13,267 
. 08 
Kisii, 
c/ Bottom 10,032 Western-- 
Approximate age Top 46.3 
'06 
Kericho, 
at time of loan Bottom 42.1 Kisii 
application 
a/ Two-tailed probability 
b/ Occurrance in other Subsamples indicates those cases in which 
other Top and Bottom Thirds have the same rather than an 
inverse relationship in terms of differences in mean values 
of the characteristic in question. 
c/ Western Province subsample - Busia-Bungoma-Kakamega 
d/ Net worth produced significantly different means in both the 
Busia-Bungoma-Kakamega and Nyeri-Murang'a-Karatina subsamples. 
e/ Central Province subsample = Nyeri-Murang'a-Karatina 
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repay them in a more timely manner than the smaller, poorer 
farmers who make up the bottom third or poorest payers. 
The final column in the Table shows the other subsamples 
which have similar differences for the characteristics given, 
but differences which were not statistically significant. In 
other words, taking the first example in the Table, the top 
third of payers had larger mean farm sizes than the respective 
bottom thirds of all subsamples, although Kericho was the only 
subsample where the difference met the significance criterion. 
With respect to the statistically significant difference 
identied in Kisii, however, where poorer payers tended to 
have larger part time wage and contract hire bills, the three 
other subsamples exhibited exactly the opposite situation -- 
higher outlays of this type were associated with better repay- 
ment performance. 
In conclusion, the distinctions which were identified do 
not appear to offer much scope for the formulation of lending 
guidelines much different from those used by AFC during the 
period under review. 
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APPENDIX D 
LOAN REPAYMENT AND COMPARATIVE ANIMAL HUSBANDRY PERFORMANCE 
OF SELECTED AFC BORROWERS IN KIAMBU DISTRICT 
A. Summary 
A survey of a non-random sample of farmers in Kiambu District 
using artificial insemination (AI) service provided by the Kenya 
National Insemination Service (KNIS) was scrutinised for two 
purposes. The first was to attempt to discover whether the female 
herd sizes and husbandry standards of sample members who were 
borrowers from the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) differed 
from those of sample members who were not users of AFC credit. 
The second purpose was to search for relationships between loan 
repayment performance and herd size and performance of sample 
members who were borrowers from AFC. 
Husbandry standards were examined through proxies which 
consisted of reproduction rates, mean age at first calving, mean 
calving intervals and accidental mortality rates. In addition to 
the progressive farmer bias introduced by the non-random method of 
sample selection, factors which render performace interpretation 
tentative include a changing sample size and composition from 
year to year; the fact that the performance of the husbandry 
standard proxies is related to the genetic composition of stock, 
which is not a constant and which cannot be determined for each 
subsample or for the sample as a whole from the data employed; 
and the assumptions of undifferentiated inseminator skill and 
uniformity over time of the net benefits of calving. 
From the standpoint of statistically valid research pro- 
cedures, these shortcomings of this exercise are serious and 
fundamental flaws. However, for the type of analysis attempted 
here a case can be made on the basis of the absence of any superior 
data base, either for a single period or for a relatively longer 
period such as that covered by the survey data employed; economies 
inherent in the use of available data as opposed to the generation 
Thanks are due to KNIS and Dr Rüne Israelsson for access to field 
research data, and to my wife, Gretel, who spent many hours re- 
cording data from KNIS files. 
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of original data; and the utility of hypotheses in fields of 
knowledge where information gathered and processed in a sta- 
tistically rigorous manner is not yet available. 
Summaries of the herd variables monitored are presented 
in Graphs D-1 and D-2. These summaries as a whole suggest that 
the performance of the female herds of those sample members 
identified as borrowers from AFC is generally slightly superior 
to the performance of the female herds of sample members who were 
not identified as;. borrowers from AFC. This tendency suggests that 
borrowers may be better husbandmen, and that their female herds, 
slightly larger than those of non-borrowers, are also of slightly 
better quality. 
These summaries as a whole indicate greater variability in 
the performance of borrowers' herds relative to those of non- 
borrowers. Variability may reflect the smaller size of the sub- 
sample consisting of borrowers, and it may also reflect dis- 
continuities in borrowers' herd performance related to the dis- 
posal of inferior stock and the acquisition of AFC-financed in- 
calf animals, and the demands which such a shift to a higher 
production function makes on the managerial ability or husbandry 
performance of borrowers. 
The variables studied do not include any indicators of milk 
yields, which would probably show the greatest response to the 
upgrading of herds by both subsamples, and by the replacement of 
inferior stock by grade heifers and cows through access to credit. 
Of all the proxies studied, the reproduction rate of non-borrowers 
is probably most indicative of the results of increased effective 
access to AI in Kiambu. This measure relates to entire herds, and 
is of greater overall importance than the mean age at first calving, 
which has tended to increase, contrary to a priori expectations, 
and the mean calving interval, which was slightly shorter in 1971- 
1973 than in 1968-1970. Trends in herd size suggest that by 1971 
sample farmers had expanded their herds to a point where they had 
achieved some sort of equilibrium in terms of numbers of animals, 
implying that future progress would occur primarily through in- 
creasing herd quality and productivity rather than by expansion in 
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herd size. The data also suggest that by 1971 sample members 
had achieved increased control over the accidental mortality 
of cows. 
Analysis of herd size and performance data for the borrowers 
who constituted the most serious cases of default indicates that 
poor repayment performance tends to be associated with poor herd 
performance as measured by the variables examined. However, it 
would not appear from the data that borrowers' misfortunes with 
their loan-financed cattle should be reflected in a lenient loan 
collection policy, given indications of the worst defaulters' 
resource position and of their apparent unwillingness to make 
good their arrears in a businesslike manner. 
B. The Kenyan Smallholder Data Base 
Policymakers and researchers in Kenya have at their disposal 
a large number of field survey results relevant to various aspects 
of rural development. While each survey is generally useful to 
some degree with respect to the specific problem or variable it 
was oriented towards, the number of these studies is sufficient 
so that it is increasingly possible to use them for research at 
a secondary level, integrating them with each other or using portions 
of them in connection with additional primary data at the disposal 
of or generated by new research initiatives. 
To be sure, use of other peoples' data in this way involves 
many problems, fbur of which may be listed at the outset. The 
first is that there is no published current national small farm 
census or survey which might provide a baseline or point of 
reference. The second is that most of the studies which have 
been conducted are quite specific in nature, so that the possi- 
bility of relating them to new research projects in other fields 
is limited. The third is that the data which is available varies 
greatly in quality and validity. The fourth problem is that it is 
frequently difficult to reconstruct the samples or exact methodology 
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used by researchers from the data they have left in Kenya or 
published in journals. Dissertations generally provide more 
detail with respect to methodology, but the reader would require 
more information than is usually given in order to identify the 
farms which provided the student's data. However, the Institute 
for Development Studies in Nairobi serves as a repository for 
academic field research notes, unprocessed and processed data, 
and ensuing publications; and various Government agencies and 
individual researchers are frequently willing to share with 
others the field research data they have gathered. 
C. The KNIS Kiambu Sample Survey 
The small farm farm-level data series spanning the longest 
period is probably found in the sample surveys conducted by the 
Kenya National Insemination Service. Data collection was begun 
in 1966 by a Swedish veterinarian attached to KNIS under the 
auspices of Swedish assistance to that branch of Kenya's 
Ministry of Agriculture. The survey exercise was conceived to 
provide details useful for technical and 
managerial purposes by 
KNIS. 
Farmers using artificial insemination services are issued 
a record card on which inseminators and other AI officials record 
insemination dates, semen source, diagnostic results and treat- 
ments rendered, identification of the inseminator, disposal of 
animals, calving dates and animal identification information. 
The existence of this rather comprehensive technical record 
provided an opportunity for the compilation of useful data for 
KNIS management and planning purposes. Management was also 
interested in obtaining some measure of KNIS performance separate 
from the daily reports of inseminators, which contained in a 
different format the data also entered on users' record cards. 
Accordingly, special enumerators were trained to collect data 
from users' cards, and their activities have been closely checked 
in the field by the veterinarian responsible for generating this 
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feedback. In 1974 the enumeration staff consisted of one newly 
qualified veterinarian and two livestock officers, under the 
direction of the Swedish technician who had started the survey 
in 1966. This expert's tenure has lent continuity to the survey. 
Several field samples from various Districts have been 
included in the exercise, and results have appeared for many 
years in the annual reports of KNIS. However, the monitoring 
exercise most highly regarded by KNIS management is the Kiambu 
Sample Survey, which covers Kenya's most advanced smallholder 
District, contiguous with Nairobi. The technical orientation 
of this survey is reflected in the selection technique employed 
to generate the original sample of more than 400 farms. Farmers 
who approached insemination officers -- usually to report non- 
conception -- were asked if they would be willing to participate 
in providing data to the research staff. Participation for most 
has meant providing Al records for inspection once or twice a 
year when visited by a research officer. Some of the larger 
farms and herds have been monitored more frequently, while in 
certain cases even annual data collection has proved difficult 
because of farmers' absences from their farms on days selected 
for visits by researchers, transport problems, lost or confused 
records, problems of identification and the host of other sources 
of non-sampling errors which challenge the researcher in the 
collection of primary, farm-level data. 
An alternative sampling approach was attempted in certain 
areas of Kiambu where KNIS researchers visited all farms using 
Al. services in a particular Sublocation. In contrast to the 
generally good cooperation accorded by farmers who were included 
in the sample because they took the initiative in approaching Al 
officials about a specific problem, the complete coverage approach 
fell on relatively unreceptive ground and was abandoned. Unco- 
operative users were dropped from the sample. During this attempt 
to vary the sample it was found that those included in the original 
group were generally better farmers than the majority of their 
neighbours in their Sublocations. Fifteen percent of the sample 
were included in a model farmers programme organised by KNIS in 
Kiambu. 
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However useful the data so collected appeared to be to the 
technical concerns of KNIS management, the sample selection pro- 
cedure was obviously not rigorous by the conventions of social 
science research, and hence its utility as a general indicator 
os performance was severely compromised. The shortcomings of a 
biased sample were pointed out in an evaluation of KNIS under- 
taken by two economists, at the Institute for Development Studies, 
in 1970-1971 at the request of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
the Swedish International Development Authority, 
1 
and the cross- 
fertilisation of disciplines resulted in the selection of a new 
3% sample on a random basis. Data collection from the original 
sample continued through 1973, when the random sample survey, 
begun in 1971, had been underway for a sufficient length of time, 
relative to calving cycles, to yield useful results. 
1. The Utility of KNIS Data to Farm Credit Analysis 
Measures of cattle enterprise performance are of special 
interest from the credit perspective because almost all AFC loans 
to smallholders in Kiambu have been primarily for the acquisition 
of grade cattle and for on-farm investment related to the dairy 
enterprise. Unfortunately, the data from the random sample 
appeared from the perspective of the present study to be of 
such limited value as of 1974, in terms of number of observations, 
that it was not used for the purposes of this dissertation. 
2 
The 
utility of the non-random data from the original sample, from the 
point of view of this exercise, is simply that it provides an 
indicator, however imperfect, of female herd size and certain 
performance characteristics. Had the sample been chosen in a 
statistically random manner the data could have been used to test 
hypotheses relating to herd size and indicators of performance of 
1. Smith, L. D., and R. von Kaufmann, "An Evaluation of the Kenya 
Artificial Insemination Service. " pp. 41-42. 
2. Problems included the short length of time covered, relative 
to the reproductive cycle, and missing observations indicative 
of the usual data collection problems and also the existence of 
some AI numbers -- the means of 
identifying users and defining 
the sample population -- which had not been traced to actual farms. 
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AFC borrowers included in the sample compared to those sample 
members not using AFC credit. As the sampling bids does not 
permit the specification of confidence levels, however, the 
approach taken here is simply to compare the values of key 
variables for borrowers and for others, and to suggest certain 
subjects for analysis in a statistically rigorous manner when 
the 1971 random sample has matured to the point of offering a 
rich vein of field data. 
2. Problems of Analysis 
Before going into the design of this exercise, its limitations 
exogenously imposed should be noted. To repeat the caveat based 
on sample selection, no statistically valid inferences about the 
population of AI users or AFC clients in Kiambu District may be 
drawn from the results of this exercise. The justification for 
examining KNIS data in this exercise rests on economy and the 
basis the analysis provides for specifying areas for further study 
by rural development researchers and planners. 
l 
The most important simplifying technical assumption used in 
the analysis is that the quality 6f--inseminators is constant. In 
highly developed dairy culture the skill of the inseminator is a 
key determinant of the effectiveness of the service and hence of 
calving intervals. In the Kiambu environment the skill of the 
inseminator may be relatively less important, as there may be a. 
greater diversity of management ability among farmers in terms 
of animal husbandry expertise than found in commercialised dairy 
farming in the British Isles, for example. In addition, the 
physical and genetic status of the Kiambu herd doubtless exhibits 
greater diversity than, for example, that of the Dutch herd, 
suggesting a greater and largely inferior range of reproductive 
performance even if inseminators' skills were in fact constant. 
The quality of the Kiambu herd is of course one of the primary 
rationale for grading up with the assistance of AI using the 
1. Access to the field survey records for individual farms cost 
the researcher nothing but his own and his wife's time. 
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semen of proven bulls. In the mid-1960`s when the survey began 
the quality of the herd was no doubt very mixed. 
The most important simplifying economic assumption in the 
exercise is that "good husbandry" is manifested in the same 
manner on all farms. Orthodox micro theory indicates that 
profit is maximised within any given time frame when marginal 
cost is equated with marginal revenue, and that the maximising 
entrepreneur will exploit his resources to this margin under the 
usual simplifying assumptions. Is marginal revenue or marginal 
cost the same on all farms for any given level of performance, as 
measured, for example, by the average calving interval or the age 
at first calving? The answer must be "No, " and is in fact "No" 
in any dairy industry. While one farmer may maximise with a 12- 
month calving interval, another farmer with different risks, 
levels of access to produce and input markets, farming system, 
etc., may maximise at some other point in terms of calving fre- 
quencies or other key variable. By relying on the simplifying 
assumption that a uniform scale of dairy husbandry performance 
exists, this exercise treats risk and farm resource bases as a 
constant. (It should he noted, however, that the costs to the 
farmer of accidental mature female stock mortality are sub- 
stantial and probably overwhlem the differences in fine tuning 
at the margin which cloud the interpretation of comparisons of 
calving intervals, for example. Given the fair-ly small herds 
of most Kiambu farmers, the accidental death of a mature female 
represents a quantum change, not merely an adjustment at the 
margin. ) 
Two specific examples of maximising strategies which would 
11 lead to different calving intervals and age at first calving may 
be noted to illustrate a few aspects of the types of considerations 
which are relevant to the assessment of performance. First, the 
age at first calving may vary according to the breed of cattle. 
The East African zebu cattle are slow to mature although 
there are reports to show that with improved management 
and feeding, the age at first service could be reduced 
from the recorded three or four years. European stock, 
on the other hand, can often be served at eighteen months 
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of age because they are very well developed at this age. 
1 
The farmer's choice of breed or genetic mix depends upon 
many factors. While the crossbred animal produces several times 
as much milk as the native animal, it also requires a lot more 
food and water, is more susceptible to disease and accidental 
mortality, and requires a different level of managerial expertise 
by the farmer. Given that the genetic composition of the Kiambu 
herd has included richer European strains as access to AI has 
increased, it would be expected that the average age at first 
calving should decrease over the period under review. 
Second, the optimum calving interval is not always a 
constant, although biological factors permit a basic specification 
of the general case: 
2 
It is generally agreed that a cow should milk for about 
305 days and be allowed to rest a period of 60 days 
before she calves again. In this way she is able to 
produce one calf per annum, since her calving interval 
(the period between two consecutive calvings) is 365 
days. This, of course, depends on her having been served 
on time during the previous lactation. Taking an average 
gestation period of 280 days, therefore, the cow should 
be served not later than three months after calving (or 
her third month of lactation). 
However, the attempt to ensure a twelve-month calving interval 
may be tempered by the observation that "calves born during the 
dry season when milk cost is high are expensive to rear. "3 Thus, 
if a cow which has calved for several years on a twelve-month 
cycle during the flush season for some reason does not continue 
the annual cycle, the farmer may wish to consider delaying service 
rather than use AI to yield a calf during the dry season. 
This consideration has been diminished in importance in 
Kiambu by the development of dairying generally. The milk price 
offered by cooperative marketing societies does not vary according 
to season. As most families in many parts of Kiambu have a dairy 
I. Musangi, R. S., Dairy Husbandry in East Africa. p. 15. 
2. Ibid., p. 26. 
3. Ibid., p. 57. 
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cow, there is generally little or no local or neighbourhood 
market for milk at prices differing from that offered by 
cooperative societies. Where such markets remain, societies 
may attempt to enforce member loyalty by suspending members 
who also sell locally, and hence farmers having more than two 
or three reasonable dairy specimens are often reluctant to run 
the risk of being barred from delivering to their society during 
the flush season by selling locally in the dry season. While it 
may be possible to circumvent this sanction, circumvention is 
not costless to achieve. As most farms produce milk for family 
consumption, the opportunity cost of milk during the dry season 
may of course rise above the cooperative price if home production 
does not provide the desired level of home consumption. Likewise, 
the opportunity cost of water during the dry season may rise in 
certain areas where there are not plentiful supplies throughout 
the year. However, most Kiambu farms are reasonably well served 
by small streams which have some flow even during the dry season. 
The typical plot produced by the land consolidation, adjudication 
and registration programme runs from a road along the crest of a 
hill to a small stream at the foot of the slope. 
In addition, the out of pocket cost of milk production may 
rise in the dry season, as suggested by Musangi, if the farmer 
is dependent on purchasing fodder from local sources. 
D. Data Used for Analysis 
This exercise is based on the original, non-random Kiambu 
sample for the period 1966 through 1973. The variables extracted 
from the KNIS field survey records for individual farms are: 
1) female herd size at the time of data collection from each farm, 
classified as mature (i. e., having calved) and immature; 
2) calvings, by sex of calf; 
3) calving intervals measured in terms of months between the birth 
of live or stillborn calves, excluding abortions (mis- 
carriages); 
4) age at first calving, as for calving intervals above; 
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5) accidental mortality experience for female stock; and 
6) age of immature females at death, expressed in months. 
The month used as the basic unit of time measurement is a 
whole month, computed in a manner which has the effect of 
rounding partial months into the nearest whole months, on 
the average. For example, if a heifer were born in January 
and died in June, the age at death would be reported as five 
months (i. e., 6-1= 5). While the exact date of death and 
calving is frequently given in the field survey data, in other 
cases it is not, and hence this simplifying convention which 
assumes that events always occur on the same day of a month. 
1. Identification of AFC Borrowers 
As the primary purpose of this use of KNIS data is to provide 
insights into the comparative behaviour of borrowers from AFC, it 
was first of all necessary to identify borrowers included in the 
KNIS sample. This was not an easy task, and inevitably involved 
some degree of error. While for certain purposes both KNIS and 
AFC records are organised on a geographical basis for classifying 
clients, by Location and Sublocation, within these categories the 
means of identification vary. AI numbers and farmers' names are 
used by KN IS to identify members of its sample, while AFC bor- 
rowers are classified by name, account number and plot number. 
Comparison by Sublocation of the lists of KNIS sample 
farmers and AFC borrowers yielded some cases where the names 
were identical., and in these instances it was assumed that both 
referred to the same individual. In other cases there were vari- 
ations of numerous sorts between names which exhibited similarities 
or some elements in common. These variations ranged simply from 
different orthographic renditions -- such as Cege and Chege -- 
of a single name, to uses of different combinations of the abun- 
dant choice of names open to most residents of the area in 
accordance with traditional practice. For example, is Joseph 
N. Mwaura the same person as Nganga Mwaura? The attempt to 
eliminate this ambiguity of identification consisted of noting 
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for each Sublocation the name and AI number of an individual as 
given in the KNIS survey data and the name and plot number of 
individuals with similar names found in AFC's loan committee 
minutes. The resulting list of names, broken down on separate 
sheets by Sublocation, were given to the District Agricultural 
Officer, who generously distributed them to his field level per- 
sonnel in the Sublocations in question. On the basis of their 
local knowledge and without visiting farmers, these officers 
indicated whether similar names referred to a single person, to 
different people, or could not be conclusively identified. All 
lists were returned with appropriate notation. These judgements 
were accepted as final for the purposes of this exercise. Sixty- 
six AFC borrowers were identified out of a total of 402 useful 
observations from the somewhat larger KNIS sample. 
2. Herd Size as a Basis for Loan Administration Decisions 
In addition to permitting the comparison of AFC borrowers 
in the KNIS sample with others in the sample, the KNIS data 
permits some insights into the behaviour of borrowers them- 
selves. As noted elsewhere, loan collection problems have 
plagued AFC. Hesitancy to foreclose characterised AFC through 
about 1973 when the pace of foreclosure increased dramatically. 
An understandable basis for reluctance is the possibility that 
the accumulation of arrears reflects adverse circumstances rather 
than malicious intent on the part of borrowers. Given AFC's 
administrative problems until the mid-1970's, it was also in 
many cases not practicable to foreclose -- with postings up to 
six months in arrears on the centralised accounting system, 
management information was of such poor quality that inadequate 
data existed for timely foreclosure decisions in all but the most 
blatant cases. Foreclosing without adequate information entails 
a political and public relations risk which AFC management chose 
to avoid. 
Would foreclosure or the enforcement of better loan disci- 
line by means short of foreclosure impose a hardship on poor 
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payers, or merely an inconvenience, or simply eliminate flagrant 
violations of loan contracts by those of adequate means taking 
a free ride at AFC expense? One way of ascertaining the incidence 
of hardship which might be caused by vigorous attempts to enforce 
loan discipline consists of comparing herd value with loan amounts 
overdue and with total amounts outstanding on individual accounts 
which are in arrears. If arrears could be cleared through the 
sale of one calf out of a herd which includes three or four 
heifers, for example, it would appear that the enforcement of 
loan discipline would involve no more than inconvenience. If 
the entire loan balance outstanding represented only a minor 
fraction of total female herd value, foreclosure would appear 
to impose no absolute hardship. 
Judgements of this sort are inevitably subjective, for a 
small farm supporting a large family may require a relatively 
larger herd for some minimally acceptable standard of living by 
local criteria than a relatively large farm owned and operated by 
a small family, other things remaining equal. However, there can 
be little doubt that small farmer borrowers, especially in Kiambu 
District where many farmers have employment in Nairobi, are not 
without alternatives when faced with foreclosure. Only rarely 
have small farms been auctioned by AFC -- most defaulters served 
foreclosure notices repay their loans in full before or on the 
auction date. Liquidation or partial liquidation of a dairy 
herd is one means of obtaining cash. Easy access to AI facilities 
permits the reestablishment, over time, of a herd partially 
liquidated. 
E. Analysis of the Data 
Of the 66 AFC borrowers identified in the total usable 
sample of 402,51 had loans of up to Sh 10,000 issued between 
1968 and 1973 under the IDA 105 small scale loan scheme. The 
other borrowers had received development loans, some of which 
amounted to more than Sh 10,000, largely before 1968. It is 
warranted to assume that others in the KNIS sample had received 
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other public sector loans amounting to more than Sh 1,000 prior 
to 1967, but due to data difficulties it was decided not to 
attempt to identify any such borrowers. Their number would 
probably have been small relative to the number of borrowers 
under the IDA scheme identified in the sample, as prior to the 
implementation of the IDA scheme the number of loans issued 
tended to be limited in number and in size. For similar reasons 
it was decided to make no attempt to identify those members of 
the sample who had received loans from commercial banks. 
The analysis which follows compares various aspects of the 
characteristics and the performance of the 66 AFC borrowers with 
those of the 336 others who are called non-borrowers for the 
purposes of this analysis. In most cases, however, missing 
values reduce the effective size of each subsample used for 
purposes of comparison in any given year. The analysis also 
includes a comparison of repayment performance and herd size 
and performance data for borrowers. 
1. Sex Ratio of Calves 
As a test of data quality, the number of reported female 
calf births was compared with the number of total calvings. 
1,509 calvings were reported by non-borrowers, while 364 were 
recorded for borrowers over the period as a whole from 1966 to 
1973. Data for borrowers indicated 50.4 female calf births per 
100 calvings, while that for non-borrowers yielded 51.3 female 
calf births per 100 calvings. These figures approximate normal 
biological expectations, suggesting a high degree of reporting 
accuracy with respect to calvings. 
2. Distribution of Loans by Year of Issue 
The data suggests that the group identified as borrowers 
experienced different behaviour with respect to the variables 
measured than did the group identified as non-borrowers from 
AFC. The observations reported for borrowers tend to be more 
variable than those reported for non-borrowers. One reason __ 
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for this difference may be the impact of loans on herds and 
herd performance. The loan impact hypothesis may be tested 
to some extent by examination of the pattern of loan issues 
by year. Table D-1 gives the distribution, and it is apparent 
that activity bulked in two periods, 1968-1970 and 1972-1973, 
with a number of loans not traced to any specific year and 
therefore pre-1967, given AFC's loan classification con- 
ventions. The pattern of loan issues is reflected or at 
least parallelled by the behaviour of certain other variables 
as discussed below. 
3. Mature Female Herd Size 
Comparison of borrowers' and non-borrowers' mature female 
herd size is accomplished by use of mean herd size as an in- 
dicator, excluding missing values. These data are given in 
Table D-2. Borrowers' means were superior to non-borrowers' 
in all years except 1971. The mean female herd size recorded 
for borrowers ranges from 3.0 to 3.8 animals, with a "U" shaped 
trend from 1967 to 1973. The mean for non-bo (rowers, however, 
has ranged from 2.6 to 3.6 mature female animals, with an in- 
creasing trend from 1966 to 1971, when a plateau was reached 
at about the same level reported by borrowers. 
The non-random nature of the sample and the influence of 
possible bias from missing values renders rigorous interpretation 
impossible. However, the data do provide a basis for hypothesising 
that those farmers who have access to AFC credit tend to have 
larger mature female herds than those not using AFC credit. 
Perhaps this indicates that borrowers tend to have larger farms 
than non-borrowers, with a correspondingly greater carrying 
capacity. It may also be hypothesised that AFC tends to deal 
with farmers in Kiambu who have stable dairy herds in the sense 
of having reached some sort of limit on the expansion of the 
number of animals. Progress would therefore mainly occur on 
these farms through intensification -- upgrading stock and 
implementing superior management practices. Alternatively, it 
495 
Table D-1. Distribution of Sample Loans by Year of Issue 
Number of Sample Loans 
Year Issued under the IDA Scheme- 
aý 
1966 -0- 
1967 -0- 
1968 10 
1969 9 
1970 8 
1971 1 
1972 8 
1973 13 
1974 2 
a! 15 non-IDA scheme borrowers were also included in the 
sample, and virtually all of them would have received loans 
before 1967. 
Table D-2. Mean Mature Female Herd Sizes Reported by 
Borrowers and Non-Borrowers, 1966-1973 
Mean Mature Female Herd Size 
Year Borrowers Non-Borrowers 
1966 3.0 2.6 
1967 3.6 2.9 
1968 3.5 2.8 
1969 3.4 3.1 
1970 3.3 3.2 
1971 3.3 3.6 
1972 3.6 3.6 
1973 3.8 3.6 
Range of number of valid observations 
Minimum 39 152 
Maximum 55 251 
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could be hypothesised that non-borrowers had not reached a 
constraint on herd expansion until 1971, and that until that 
time an important element of their progress consisted of ex- 
tensive dairy enterprise growth in terms of increasing herd 
sizes, as well as through genetic improvement through AI 
which is, however, not reflected in the data analysed here. 
The herd size pattern indicated for borrowers is perhaps 
explained by the pattern of loan issues by year. The decline 
in herd size between 1967 and 1971 may reflect the fact that 
AFC requires borrowers to clear their land of unimproved stock 
prior to purchasing loan-financed animals in calf. Therefore, 
those borrowers receiving loans in 1968-1970 may have reduced 
their herds in a sacrifice of quantity for quality, pulling 
down average herd size. By 1972 the calves born on the farms 
of this tranche of borrowers would have been reaching maturity, 
accounting for the increase in mature herd sizes. It may 
further be hypothesised that this group of early borrowers 
tended to have larger herds than those who received credit in 
1972-1973, assuming that the more prosperous farmers with 
larger pre-loan herds were the first to avail themselves of 
loans or the first to be accorded effective access to loans 
through the credit rationing mechanism. 
3. Immature Female Herd Size 
The mean size of borrowers' immature female herds has 
followed a "W" shaped trend which has ranged from 2.7 to 3.6 
animals, as shown in Table D-3. In contrast, the trend with 
respect to non-borrowers' immatures has been generally in- 
creasing, from 2.3 head in 1966 to 3.1 head in 1973. As with 
mean mature female herd sizes, the magnitudes reported for both 
subsamples were roughly equal between 1971 and 1973, suggesting 
that, inter alia, any advantages of access to credit, in terms 
of numbers of head, have perhaps been swamped by widespread 
access to AI in Kiambu. 
The peak in borrowers' immature female herd sizes in 1969- 
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Table D-3. Mean Immature Female Herd Sizes Reported 
by Borrowers and von-Borrowers, 1966-1973 
Year 
Mean Immature Female Herd Size 
Borrowers Non-Borrowers 
1966 3.2 2.3 
1967 2.8 2.5 
1968 2.8 2.7 
1969 3.3 2.8 
1970 3.6 2.7 
1971 2.7 2.9 
1972 2.7 2.9 
1973 3.1 3.1 
Range of number of valid observations 
Minimum 34 137 
Maximum 48 218 
Table D-4. Female Herd Composition, Classified as Mature and 
Immature, on the Farms of Borrowers and Non-Borrowers, 1966-1973 
Immature Female Hear per 
Mature Female Head 
Year 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
197 0 
1971 
1972 
1973 
Borrowers Non-Borrowers 
. 92 . 84 
. 68 . 86 
. 67 . 88 
1.03 . 85 
1.04 . 86 
. 86 _80 
. 77 
. 79 
Range of number of valid observations 
Minimum 39 
Maxi ms 55 
. 76 
. 84 
152 
251 
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1970 is no doubt a reflection of the pattern of loan issues. 
The borrowers receiving their loans in 1968-1970 would have 
purchased in-calf animals with their loan proceeds which 
probably would have calved in 1969 and 1970. The absence of 
calvings in 1968 may be explained by the shortage of grade 
cattle which borrowers faced, especially in the early period 
of the IDA scheme, delaying their acquisition of in-calf animals. 
The decline in immature female herd size on borrowers' farms 
after 1970 is somewhat more difficult to explain from the 
distribution of loan issues by year, but the implication is 
that borrowers failed to maintain annual calving cycles or 
else perhaps disposed of calves. One motivation for disposal 
of calves may have been to supplement their incomes for the 
purpose of meeting loan repayment obligations. In a sub- 
sequent section it will be shown that calving intervals were 
apparently maintained at a fairly high level in 1971 and 1972 
on borrowers' farms. 
5. Female Herd Composition 
The composition of the female herds of non-borrowers 
remained relatively stable with averages of between . 76 and 
. 
88 immature females per mature female throughout the period 
under review, as indicated in Table D-4. The low point occurred 
in 1972, when the long rains were a month late. This suggests 
that farmers tend to dispose of immature stock relative to mature 
stock during a bad season when the opportunity cost of milk and 
vegetable matter required to raise calves is comparatively high. 
The proportion of immature females to cows on borrowers' 
farms varied between averages of . 67 and 1.03 during the years 
under review. Some of this variation no doubt reflects the fact 
that loan-financed animals are required to be in calf at the time 
of their purchase by borrowers, while some of the variation also 
no doubt reflects the fact that the sample of borrowers is smaller 
than _ that. of non-borrowers and hence more prone to variation, 
assuming other things equal. It is interesting to note that the 
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relatively low ratios recorded for borrowers in 1967 and 1968, 
. 
68 and . 
67, respectively, are lower than those reported for 
non-borrowers at any time. Reference to the data on mean herd 
size indicates that borrowers' mature herds were relatively 
large in 1967 and 1968, at 3.6 and 3.5 cows, respectively (com- 
pared to 2.9 and 2.8 for non-borrowers) while borrowers' immature 
herds were relatively small, at a mean of 2.8 head each year 
(compared to 2.5 and 2.7 for non-borrowers). During these years 
borrowers had relatively highly productive female herds, under 
assumptions of equal productivity per cow, compared to non- 
borrowers, as suggested by the lower proportion of followers 
on borrowers' farms. This pattern may also reflect a relative 
stability in borrowers' herds during 1967 and 1968, and a 
relatively greater attempt by non-borrowers to improve herd 
quality through up-grading, which would involve keeping immatures 
until they come into production. 
6. Reproduction Rates 
Reproduction rates are defined here simply as the number of 
calvings during the year divided by the number of mature females 
on hand as of the end of the year. The results of this calcu- 
lation for borrowers and for non-borrowers are given in Table D-5. 
The data indicate that in six of the eight years studied borrowers' 
herds had a higher reproduction rate than non-borrowers`. This 
observation is consistent with the fact that borrowers purchase 
in-calf animals with the proceeds of their AFC loans, although 
this influence on reproduction would occur only during the period 
immediately after the time the loan is drawn down and would there- 
fore not provide much explanatory power for the group of borrowers 
as a whole, over the period as a whole. Discounting the possible 
influence of the purchase of in-calf animals with loan proceeds, 
borrowers appear to have achieved better husbandry performance in 
terms of reproduction than non-borrowers. 
As with certain other variables monitored here, the repro- 
duction rate achieved by non-borrowers increased from 1966 through 
1969-1970, after which it levelled off; while the performance 
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reported for borrowers does not exhibit any smooth trend. 
The reasons for the difference in the course of the series 
for each group is not readily apparent. 
7. Age at First Calving 
The increasing trend in non-borrowers' mean immature 
female herd sizes between 1966 and 1973 does not appear to be 
closely related to the average age of heifers at first calving, 
which has been reasonably stable and apparently increasing 
slightly. The method of sample selection relegates this 
observation to the realms of speculation, and the missing 
values problem results in a sample of changing composition 
from year to year. However, the mean average age (i. e., the 
mean of the means for subsample members, excluding missing 
values) at first calving has ranged from 30.1 to 34.2 months 
for non-borrowers, while the pattern for borrowers has been 
more erratic and ranged from 28.9 to 34.7 months, as given in 
Table D-6. Between 1969 and 1973 the range for non-borrowers 
was between 32.1 and 34.2 months; that for borrowers, 29.0 to 
34.7 months. The cumulative average for the period is probably 
a more useful measure, given the small number of valid observations 
for borrowers in certain years, For the period as a whole, 
borrowers reported an average calving interval of 32.02 months, 
while non-borrowers reported a mean of 32.47 months. Thus, 
borrowers appear to have achieved a slightly superior level of 
performance in this respect than non-borrowers, having an average 
age a first calving approximately 14 days lower for their herds 
than that achieved by the herds of non-borrowers. This difference 
is, however, quite small, and may be to some extent a result of 
random variations in the rounding convention employed in computing 
the age at first calving in whole months. 
It is perhaps surprising that the reported age at first 
calving did not diminish over time, given the upgrading of the 
Kiambu herd through AI and the early maturity of European as 
opposed to unimproved breeds in Kenya. Several factors other 
than sampling error may account for the lack of any noticeable 
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Table D-5. Reproduction Rates Achieved by the Herds of 
Borrowers and Non-Borrowers, 1966-1973 
Reproduction Ratesa/ 
Year Borrowers Non-Borrowers 
1966 . 76 . 63 
1967 . 71 . 68 
1968 . 73 . 71 
1969 . 68 . 
77 
1970 . 89 . 81 
1971 . 87 . 77 
1972 . 83 . 77 
1973 . 74 . 82 
Range of number of valid observations 
Minimum 39 152 
Maximum 54 251 
a/ The Reproduction Rate is defined as the number of 
calvings during the year divided by the size of the mature 
female herd at year-end. 
Table D-6. Mean Age at First Calving of Cows on the 
Farms of Borrowers and Non-Borrowers, 1967-1973 
Mean Age in Months at First Calving 
Year Borrowers Non-Borrowers 
1967 31.2 30.1 
1968 28.9 30.9 
1969 33.4 32.4 
1970 32.0 33.1 
1971 29.0 32.1 
1972 34.7 32.2 
1973 30.7 34.2 
Cumulative Agerage 
1967-1973 32.02 32.47 
Range of number of valid observations 
Minimum 4 12 
Maximum 20 73 
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downward trend -- if anything, the trend for non-borrowers 
seems to be rising. One is that the Kiambu herd may already 
have been greatly infused with exotic genes at the outset of 
the period, due to the presence of European farms in and around 
the area. However, the alternative hypothesis that the pre-AI 
herd was largely unimproved is also supported by the limited 
information at hand. If the herd were largely unimproved, it 
may be argued that the upgrading process is too slow to be re- 
flected in a time series of seven years commencing shortly after 
the introduction of AI. AI progeny would come into production 
and replace unimproved stock or inferior crosses only slowly, 
especially as, not all farmers adopt AI as soon as the service 
is made available. Also, the availability of the service has 
expanded over time as additional vehicles and inseminators have 
been provided, and hence the farmers' access to AI would have 
been quite limited on a District-wide basis. prior to 1970. The 
hypothesis that the pre-Al herd was largely unimproved is sup- 
ported by Bullock's observation about the economic role of 
animal produce from cattle in Kiambu in the 1960's. 
1 
Although high grade animals have recently been intro- 
duced, the majority of cattle are still of too poor 
quality to be considered as dairy animals and their 
major contribution to the local economy is through the 
sale of hides and skins. 
While Bullock apparently neglected to consider the role of 
cattle as a store of value and source of beef, his comments 
do suggest a largely unimproved herd. 
8. Calving Intervals 
Borrowers' herds tend to have consistently shorter calving 
intervals than non-borrowers' herds over the study period. The 
measure used to obtain the calving interval statistics given in 
Table D-7 are derived by taking the mean for each farm for each 
year and then computing the mean of these means. The mean re- 
reported calving intervals realised by borrowers' female herds 
1. Bullock, R. A., "Subsistence to Cash: Economic Change in 
Rural Kiambu. " p. 701. 
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Table D-7. Mean Calving Intervals for Herds of 
Borrowers and Non-Borrowers, 1967-1973 
Mean Calving Intervals in Months 
Year Borrowers Non-Borrowers 
1967 13.6 14.6 
1968 15.2 16.1 
1969 16.3 16.5 
1970 15.1 15.8 
1971 14.1 15.1 
1972 15.2 15.6 
1973 15.0 15.5 
Weighted Average 
1967-1971 14.99 15.66 
Range of number of valid observations 
Minimum 15 79 
Maximum 47 171 
Table D-8. Cumulative Distribution of Average Calving 
Intervals Reported by Borrowers and Non- 
Borrowers, 1967-1973 
Average Calving Interval 
Cumulative Frequency in % 
Borrowers Non-Borrowers 
11 months 
12 months 
13 months 
14 months 
15 months 
16 months 
17 months 
18 months 
19 - 21 months 
22 - 24 months 
more than 24 months 
1.7 1.6 
6.8 8.9 
27.1 21.9 
55.9 38.9 
69.5 58.7 
79.7 72.1 
84.7 78.9 
89.8 84.2 
96.6 94.7 
100.0 98.4 
100.0 
Number of intervals observed 246 963 
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ranged from 13.6 to 16.3 months, and those for non-borrowers', 
14.6 to 16.5 months. The average of the reported calving 
intervals for all borrowers' herds over the entire period 
from 1967 to 1973, weighted to reflect the number of farms 
reporting each year, was 14.99 months, while that for non- 
borrowers' herds was 15.66 months, or about 20 days longer. 
Missing values were excluded from all calculations. The 
lower interval reported by borrowers may reflect better 
husbandry as well as possession of superior genetic stock, 
assuming equal access to Al services of uniform quality. 
As with certain other measures discussed here, there 
is a slight downward but somewhat erratic trend in average 
calving intervals in non-borrowers' herds over time, as 
suggested by the unweighted mean of 16.1 months for 1968- 
1970 compared with 15.4 months for 1971-1973; while any down- 
ward trend in the data for borrowers is less apparent. The 
reduction of calving intervals by material amounts between 
1969 and 1971 for both groups cannot be readily explained 
by the data used in this exercise, but may reflect better 
husbandry, increased inseminator skill and possibly increased 
access to AI. 
The technically superior performance of borrowers' herds 
in terms of calving intervals is also apparent in the cumu- 
lative distribution of calving intervals for the entire 
period under review, as shown in Table D-8. While more than 
one-fourth of borrowers' reported calving intervals were 13. 
months or less, slightly more than one-fifth of the intervals 
reported by non-borrowers were of this duration of less. While 
more than half of borrowers' reported intervals were of 14 
months or less, only about three-eighths of those reported by 
non-borrowers fell within this category. 
Borrowers' superior technical performance suggests the 
possibility that they tend to have herds of superior genetic 
stock, which is consistent with the specification that loan- 
financed animals must be in calf when purchased, not have calved 
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more than once previously, and undergo a veterinary examination 
at the time of purchase. 
9. Accidental Mature Female Mortality 
The average accidental mortality rate for mature female 
stock was 3.25% annually for non-borrowers and 3.47% for bor- 
rowers for the study period as a whole, from 1966 to 1973, as 
indicated in Table D-9. For the period 1967 to 1973, the re- 
spective average annual rates were 3.63% and 3.79%. These per- 
centages are derived by adding up the total number of female head 
reported each year, the total number of reported accidental 
mature female deaths each year, and dividing the total number of 
deaths by the total number of mature female head plus the total 
number of accidental mature female deaths. The trend for bor- 
rowers was flat but erratic over the period. That for non- 
borrowers declined between 1968 and 1973, and declined consistently 
between 1970 and 1974, suggesting an improvement in non-borrowers' 
risk position with respect to this variable. 
The difference between the weighted average accidental mature 
female mortality experience for both groups over the entire study 
period is small, and the level of accidental mortality does not 
seem excessive. The experience of the borrowers is not greacly 
different from the 20% expectation adopted by AFC management in 
the early years of. the IDA project. This figure related to the 
total number of animals financed. Given a five year loan term, 
a 3.47% annual rate would yield roughly 17% on a cumulative 
basis, while 3.79% yields about 19%. However, it is probable 
that farmers would suffer greatest accidental stock loss in 
the early years of enterprise adoption, when their management 
skills would have the least benefit from experience. 
The accidental mature mortality experience of borrowers in 
1969 is anomalous, with a rate more than twice that reported in 
any other year. In fact, both groups in the sample suffered 
their highest reported rates of accidental mature female stock 
mortality in that year. One possible explanation of the very 
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high rate reported by borrowers is that they may have had an 
incentive to report sales as accidental deaths if they suspected 
that KNIS survey results might be scrutinised by AFC. 
Another possible explanation of the 1969 peak in borrowers' 
mature mortality is that early borrowers were also early adopters 
who suffered greater risks of adoption than non-borrowers in terms 
of their ability to manage their grade cattle enterprise. This 
hypothesis suggests that management problems facing early 
borrowers inflated mature stock losses. Analysis of mortality 
reports does not support this hypothesis, however. Sixteen 
percent of borrowers' reported mature stock mortality occurred 
in the year in which their loans were issued or in the year 
following loan issue, while the incidence for immature stock 
mortality was only 7%. By comparison, 48% of reported mature 
stock mortality occurred before receipt of a loan for those 
loans for which the year of issue was identified, and for 
immature mortality the corresponding amount was 55%. 
The missing values problem renders precise interpretation 
of these figures impossible, although it does suggest that those 
borrowers for whom the loan year was identified appeared not to 
have suffered any great concentration of female stock mortality 
immediately following their acquisition of loan-financed grade 
stock. In fact, 56% of the accidental mature stock mortality 
reported in 1969 occurred on the farms of the 15 non-IDA borrowers 
who constituted 23% of the subsample of borrowers, whose herds 
accounted for 35% of the total number of mature female stock 
reported, and who received their loans prior to 1968. 
10. Accidental Immature Female Mortality 
The slightly higher incidence of accidental mortality among 
borrowers' mature female herds than among those of non-borrowers 
is the opposite of the situation reported with respect to im- 
mature female herds. For borrowers' immature female herds as a 
whole over the period 1966 to 1973 the average incidence of 
accidental immature female mortality was 7.39%, while the corres- 
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Table D-9. Accidental Mortality Rates for Mature Female 
Stock on the Farms of Borrowers and Non- 
Borrowers, 1966-1973 
Year 
Accidental Mortality Rate in % 
Borrowers Non-Borrowers 
1966 - . 17 
1967 2.75 4.39 
1968 3.06 4.37 
1969 8.33 4.78 
1970 2.66 3.64 
1971 3.41 2.85 
1972 3.43 2.80 
1973 2.55 2.12 
Weighted Average 1966-1973 3.47 3.25 
Weighted Average 1967-1973 3.79 3.63 
Number of farms reporting 
accidental mature female 
mortalities 
Minimum (excl. 1966) 3 10 
Maximum 7 24 
Range of number of 
valid observations 
Minimum 39 152 
Maximum 55 251 
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ponding level for non-borrowers was 7.92%, as shown in Table 
D-10. Levels of 8.08% apply for the period 1967-1973 if the 
anomalous data for 1966 is removed. 
The explanation for this small difference in accidental 
immature mortality between the subsamples is not clear, nor is 
the reason why experience with immatures by subsample is the 
reverse of that reported for matures. Sampling rror is of 
course the main possibility. 
Mortality rates were computed in the same manner as for 
matures, as explained above. The :: rates computed for borrowers 
appear to be more erratic from year to year, perhaps reflecting 
the smaller size of that subsample, perhaps reflecting also a 
greater sensitivity to adversity. The level of mortality re- 
ported by non-borrowers appears to have trended upwards, as 
suggested by an unweighted mean of 7.70% in 1967-1969 and of 
9.32% in 1971-1973. Borrowers' rates also registered highs in 
1971 and 1972, and also trended erratically upward over the period. 
The unweighted average rate for 1967-1969 was 6.74% for borrowers, 
while that for 1971-1973 was 10.26%. These trends for both sub- 
samples may indicate that the increasing demands made upon 
husbandry performance by upgrading have not been fully met by 
farmers with access to AI or to improved progeny from in-calf 
heifers or cows obtained with the proceeds of AFC loans. This 
judgement refers to husbandry only in the technical sense -- 
in the economic sense it would be reasonable to assume that 
higher risks would accompany the higher returns available with 
the shift from unimproved stock or inferior crosses to grade 
cattle. 
11. Age of Immature Females at Death 
Comparison of the age of immature females at the time of 
their death for the herds of borrowers and of non-borrowers is 
rendered not very meaningful by the small number of borrowers 
reporting to have suffered this type of loss, which never ex- 
ceeded eight in any of the years studied and is limited to only 
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Table D-10. Accidental Mortality Rates for Immature Female 
Stock on the Farms of Borrowers and Non- 
Borrowers, 1966-1973 
Year 
Accidental Mortality Rates in % 
Borrowers Non-Borrowers 
1966 . 91 2.04 
1967 9.92 7.93 
1968 3.70 6.91 
1969 6.59 8.27 
1970 6.15 9.18 
1971 12.90 9.77 
1972 10.29 8.70 
1973 7.58 9.49 
Weighted Average 1966-1973 7.39 7.92 
Weighted Average 1967-1973 8.08 8.58 
Range of number of farms 
reporting accidental 
immature female mortalities 
Minimum (excl. 1966) 5 33 
Maximum 10 44 
Range of number of 
valid observations 
Minimum 34 137 
Maximum 50 218 
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46 valid observations. Between 1967 and 1973 the average age 
at mortality reported by non-borrowers ranged between 4.75 and 
9,83 months, with a very erratic pattern, but with rather greater 
ages at death reported during the middle portion of the period 
than at either end. The reasons for this type of pattern are 
not clear from the data at hand. The average level reported 
by borrowers ranged from 3.00 to 7.75 months, and was in most 
cases below that reported by non-borrowers. The differences 
between these levels suggests that borrowers may tend to lose 
animals earlier than non-borrowers, which may reflect managerial 
difficulties related to the skills required to maintain in good 
health in-calf cows or heifers acquired with credit and their 
offspring. However, the nature of the data and the small number 
of cases involved relegate this sort of hypothesis to mere 
speculation. 
12. Borrowers' Repayment Performance 
Of the 66 borrowers identified in the KNIS sample, Repay- 
ment Index numbers were computed for 36. The 30 for whom no 
Index numbers were computed consisted of 15 borrowers who had 
received development loans before the advent of the IDA pro- 
gramme and whose AFC ledgers were assumed to present considerable 
data problems; 14 borrowers who had received their loans within 
approximately 15 months of the reference date, 30 June 1974, and 
who hence had no or virtually no repayment performance to evaluate 
because no installments had failed due by the reference date; and 
one for whom repayment data could not be located. 
The repayment performance of the 36 borrowers varied widely, 
as indicated in Table D-11. One-third registered Repayment Index 
numbers of 1.00 or above, consistent with timely repayment or 
prepayment. The second third in terms of descending Repayment 
Index number ranking had Repayment Index numbers of between . 88 
and . 99, suggesting performance reasonably consistent with that 
expected in terms of loan installment schedules. The lowest 
third's Repayment Index numbers ranged from . 45 to . 83, sug- 
gesting some cases of hard core default. 
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Table D-11. Loan Repayment Performance of KNIS Sample Borrowers 
Repayment Index 
Number 
. 40 or less 
. 41 - . 60 
. 61 - . 80 
. 81 - . 90 
. 91 - . 99 
1.00 
1.01 - 1.10 
1.11 - 1.20 
1.21 - 1.40 
1.41 or more 
Frequency Cumulative 
Number % Frequency 
(%) 
4 11.1 11.1 
5 13.9 25.0 
7 19.4 44.4 
8 22.2 66.6 
1 2.8 69.4 
9 25.0 94.4 
1 2.8 97.2 
- - 97.2 
"1 2.8 100.0 
n= 36 
Mean = . 
89 
Minimum = . 
45 
Maximum = 1.44 
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Of the nine borrowers with the worst repayment performance, 
the situations of two cannot be analysed for lack of KNIS data 
pertaining to the time periods over which repayments were in 
default. For the remainder, a varied picture emerges. For 
each of the seven cases in this group, the amounts overdue and 
the amounts not yet due under original installment schedules as 
of 31 December for each year following the establishment of their 
loan account was compared with estimated herd value. Herd value 
was estimated on a conservative basis and on a liberal basis. 
Each basis assumed that all immature females were one year old 
and could command the average market price given for each par- 
ticular year as listed in an AFC report. 
1 
With respect to 
mature females, the conservative valuation uses slaughter values 
for old cows, while the liberal valuation uses the values of 
heifers in calf, both as estimated by AFC. 
2 
The conservative 
basis is applied in the following discussion unless noted other- 
wise. 
Case A registered a Repayment Index number of . 
45 on a 
loan of Sh 3,000 issued in 1969. As of 31 December each year 
since loan issue through 1973 this borrower's account stood as 
follows: 
Balance in Balance 3 
Total Amount 
Year Arrears Not Yet Due Outstanding 
1969 - Sh 3,000 Sh 3,000 
1970 Sh 645 2,484 3,129 
1971 640 2,025 2,665 
1972 1,355 1,533 2,888 
1973 2,129 1,003 3,132 
1. "The IDA 105-KE Smallholder Agricultural Credit Project. " 
Annex 3. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Balance Not Yet Due is technically a misnomer, as the form 
of loan agreement used by AFC contains the conventional banking 
clause that any infringement of the agreement by the borrower 
renders the entire amount outstanding due upon demand. As the 
accumulation of arrears reflects an infraction of the installment 
schedule in the loan agreement, any "balance not yet due" on a 
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Thus, payments received failed to keep pace with the interest 
falling due through the end of 1973, as shown by a total amount 
outstanding exceeding the original principal amount of the loan. 
This borrower's loan repayment record is mirrored in his 
herd history. The herd of two grade animals on hand following 
the receipt of the loan in 1969 were both reported to have 
succumbed accidentally by the time of the KNIS data gathering 
visit to the farm in 1970. A further two mature animals were 
obtained by 1972, but KNIS data indicate that in 1973 the herd 
consisted only of one heifer. Between 1972 and 1973 two mature 
and one immature animal had been disposed of, and it appears 
from the loan account that any proceeds realised were not 
applied to the reduction of arrears. 
On the basis of this information it appears that AFC took 
an accommodating position after the total loss of the loan- 
financed herd. However, AFC's patience in riding through the 
crisis with the farmer appears to have been based on assumptions 
which were too optimistic. In 1973 the value of the herd 
amounted to less than one-quarter of the amount due. Whether 
or not foreclosure would cause absolute hardship in this case 
is not apparent from the facts at hand. Where did the farmer 
obtain the resources to reestablish his herd in 1972? Might 
these have been better applied to a reduction of loan arrears? 
What did the farmer do with any funds received from the disposal 
of his animals in 1972 and 1973? Might these also have been 
applied to the reduction of the loan balance outstanding? 
Case B registered a Repayment Index number of . 49 on a 
loan of Sh 2,000 issued in 1969. As of 31 December in each 
following year through 1973, the loan account stood as follows: 
(continued) loan with any amount in arrears is technically 
currently due. This convention is of course not justified 
to the extent that AFC's accounting system is unable to credit 
payments received to the proper loan accounts promptly. This 
possibility, as noted previously, may also distort the Repay- 
ment Index number. 
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Balance in Balance Total Amount 
Year Arrears Not Yet Due Outstanding 
1970 Sh 15 Sh 1,656 Sh 1,671 
1971 478 1,295 1,773 
1972 1,009 907 1,916 
1973 1,584 491 2,075 
In this instance also, repayments failed to keep pace with 
the accumulation of interest, and by the end of 1973 the 
total amount outstanding exceeded the original principal. 
The herd history indicates that female calves were born 
in 1971 and 1972 by the one cow constituting the mature herd. 
These calves were disposed of in 1972, and in 1973 the herd 
again consisted of only one cow. It does not appear that the 
farmer made any material loan repayments after 1970, and the 
amount outstanding at the end of 1973 exceeded the in-calf value 
of the herd by one-third, and the salvage value by an order of 
five. There is little to suggest from this record that AFC will 
be able to expect loan recovery unless it is willing to institute 
foreclosure proceedings. The possibility of absolute hardship 
must be weighed against the borrower's apparent failure to apply 
proceeds from the disposal of the two calves to the reduction of 
his arrears. 
Case C consists of a loan of Sh 7,400 issued in 1972, which 
by mid-1974 had achieved a Repayment Index number of only . 
57. 
By the end of 1973 Sh 1,869 was in arrears, reflecting unpaid 
amounts of installments due in April 1973 and 1974, and the 
total amount outstanding was Sh 7,995. 
This borrower's herd of two mature females reported in 
1969 had died by 1972 when the loan was issued, and two heifer 
calves were also lost during this period. On the basis of 
husbandry levels achieved, the decision to issue the loan appears 
to have been based on extremely optimistic assumptions. 
At the time of the KNIS enumerator's visit to the farm in 
1972 the herd consisted of two in-calf heifers, presumably those 
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purchased with the loan. Given the size of the loan, it is 
possible that AFC expected the borrower to purchase more than 
two animals. Only one of these animals was on the farm at the 
time of the 1973 KNIS visit, and it appears that the other and 
perhaps also its calf may have been sold and the proceeds not 
fully applied to the reduction of the loan. Foreclosure could 
cause absolute hardship in that the total balance outstanding 
far exceeds the value of the herd, but the size of the loan 
implies that the borrower may be of greater than average wealth. 
Case D involves a loan of Sh 5,250 issued in 1972, on which 
arrears of Sh 1,424 had accumulated by the end of 1973, giving a 
total amount outstanding of Sh 5,770 and a Repayment Index 
number of . 65. The farmer reported the accidental death of his 
herd of two loan-financed mature female animals in 1973. While 
this borrower had not experienced any accidental loss of mature 
stock between 1967 and 1972, two of four heifer calves born on 
his farm between 1967 and 1970 die within one month of birth 
and another born in 1972 died at six months. At the time of the 
KNIS data-gathering in 1973, the herd consisted of only one 
heifer. Assuming that the animals reported to have died did 
in fact die on the farm, the data do not suggest any attempt 
by the farmer to dispose of stock and not apply the proceeds 
to loan repayment, but do suggest that his husbandry standards 
may have been overestimated by AFC. 
Case E 
. 
concerns a loan of Sh 3,400 issued in 1972, of which 
only Sh 2,930 was drawn by the borrower. A Repayment Index number 
of . 68 was computed as of mid-1974. At the end of 1973 arrears 
amounted to Sh 741, giving a total amount outstanding of Sh 3,167, 
somewhat larger than the principal amount drawn. KNIS records as 
of 1973 indicated a herd of two cows and two heifers, one heifer 
having been disposed of since the previous annual visit to the 
farm. The herd value on an in-calf basis equalled about 1.4 
times the total amount outstanding as of the end of 1972 and 
1973, and about .7 of the amount outstanding on a salvage value 
basis. The amount in arrears as of the end of 1973 could have 
been liquidated with the sale of two calves, or more than met by 
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the sale of either of the mature head in calf, suggesting that 
absolute hardship would not have been caused by a more aggressive 
collection stance by AFC. 
Case F consists of a loan of Sh 4,980 drawn by the end of 
1971, for which a Repayment Index number of . 68 was calculated 
as of mid-1974. Installments due each November were not cleared 
by the year-end, so the arrears position as of 31 December may 
overstate the average position. In appears that no or negligible 
repayments were made between November 1972 and the end of December 
1973, however. 
Balance in Balance Total Amount 
Year Arrears Not Yet Due Outstanding 
1971 Sh 927 Sh 4,122 Sh 5,049 
1972 984 3,201 4,185 
1973 2,301 2,210 4,511 
The farmer's herd consisted of five cows and two heifers 
as of 1971, and by 1974 two cows had been disposed of. In 
addition, two heifer calves were also removed from the farm, 
suggesting some income for the borrower from the sale of live- 
stock. The value of the herd on an in-calf basis has approximated 
1.5 times the total loan amount outstanding since 1971, and about 
.7 of the 
loan size on a salvage value basis. The amount in 
arrears at the end of 1973 could have been practically liquidated 
by the sale of one yearling heifer and one in-calf heifer, and 
thus it appears that closer follow-up of this defaulter by AFC 
would not have inflicted absolute hardship. 
Case G involves a loan of Sh 4,600 issued in 1970, which 
had registered a Repayment Index number of . 
79 by mid-1974. The 
data used in this study suggest that the borrower slipped greatly 
into arrears only in 1972,1 when the installment due in August of 
that year was not cleared by the end of December, and repeated 
that performance in 1973. 
1. The Sh 20 reported overdue at the close of 1970 on this 
account is simply a legal fee which AFC routinely adds to all 
accounts at the time of drawing to reflect formalities of loan 
issue and registration of security. 
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Balance in Balance Total Amount 
Year Arrears Not Yet Due Outstanding 
1970 Sh 20 Sh 4,600 Sh 4,260 
1971 6 3,808 3,814 
1972 1,171 2,957 4,128 
1973 1,191 2,042 3,233 
Since 1970 this borrower's herd has grown from two to 
four cows through natural increase. In addition, the immature 
herd has grown from two to four head through the births of 
eight, less the maturing of two, the death of one at three 
months, and the disposal of three. The level of arrears 
reported at the close of 1973 could have been more than repaid 
with the sale of one in-calf heifer or two yearling heifers, 
suggesting that AFC would not have inflicted absolute hardship 
on this borrower by demanding stricter adherence to the install- 
meat schedule. 
The summarise the situation of these borrowers in default, 
it appears that the worst payers (Cases A through D) tended to 
have suffered or reported suffering high levels of accidental 
stock mortality. Whether such losses should on compassionate 
grounds be reflected in lenient collection policies by AFC 
cannot be fully ascertained from the data at hand, but the 
evidence suggests that some of the worst defaulters may be 
borrowers of greater than average substance while others have 
disposed of stock, presumably for monetary consideration, and 
have failed to apply the sale proceeds to the reduction of their 
outstanding loans. Therefore, assuming that AFC might be justi- 
fied in thinking in compassionate terms in the first instance, 
there would appears to be little reason for a compassionate 
approach in practice, barring exceptional circumstances. 
Borrowers only moderately in arrears appear frequently to be 
in a position to be better payers simply by making minor adjust- 
ments in their asset portfolios, suggesting that a more rigorous 
collection policy by AFC would yield useful financial results 
without significantly compromising the welfare of defaulters. 
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